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SUPPORT for Ethno-religious Violence in Indonesia

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Y. Tri Subagya

Colophon

ISBN: 978-602-0830-06-3

Published by
Universitas Sanata Dharma
Jl. Affandi (Gejayan), Mrican,
Yogyakarta 55281
Telp. (0274) 513301, 515253
ext.1527/1513, Fax (0274) 562383
Email: publisher@usd.ac.id

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Comeniuslaan 4, 6525 HP Nijmegen
PO Box 9102, 6500 HC Nijmegen
The Netherlands
+31 24 361 61 61
www.ru.nl

Universitas Sanata Dharma Press member of APPTI
(Association of University Publishers in Indonesia)

This study was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO)

Cover design : Milovan Sutrisno
Photographs : Wahyu Putro A. (front cover)
Y. Tri Subagya (back cover)
Layout : KY grafiti

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Support for Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. Th.L.M. Engelen,
volgens besluit van het College van Decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 28 september 2015
om 12.30 uur precies

door

Yustinus Tri Subagya
geboren op 26 september 1966
te Magelang (Indonesië)

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Support for Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia

Doctoral Thesis

to obtain the degree of doctor
from Radboud University Nijmegen
on the authority of the Rector Magnificus Prof. dr. Th.L.M. Engelen,
according to the decision of the Council of Deans
to be defended in public on Monday 28 September 2015
at 12.30 pm

by

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Acknowledgments

Ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia has been my concern since 2001, when violent conflict escalated in some regions of the country. In searching for peace and reconciliation, I began to get involved with research and advocacies on violent conflict. My great wish came true when I was given the opportunity to join a team researching ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia and the Philippines in 2010. The research was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). This research took me on an intellectual journey that included both theoretical and methodological exploration. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Carl Sterkens, Irwan Abdullah and the late Frans Hüsken for selecting me for the team. Frans Hüsken's passing away, about three months after we had started work on the research in the Netherlands, was an enormous loss. I appreciate it very much that after his demise his wife Cora Govers occasionally invited us to their house in Rheden.

My supervisors have been a wonderful source of encouragement from the start; their careful attention and assistance throughout my studies have been incredible. Carl Sterkens was not only my daily supervisor who introduced me to religious perspectives on conflict and violence, but also a good friend who gave solace to me both in times of stress and stagnation. It were his strict deadlines and discipline that enabled me to accomplish my work. Peer Scheepers provided invaluable guidance in the areas of theoretical construction and research methodology, helping me to find solutions to the problems I encountered along the way. Huub de Jonge taught me about the critical writing of history; he offered guidance, stimulating suggestions, meticulous editing and, together with his wife, Ibu Addy, extended warm friendship during my time in Nijmegen.

In the team of Ethno-Religious Conflict in Indonesia and the Philippines (ERCIP), I was lucky to find kind and welcoming colleagues. Cahyo Pamungkas always provided me with an intellectual challenge by discussing issues and discourse in relation to ethno-religious conflict. He was also my traveling and cooking buddy. Agnes Z. Camacho shared study materials, since we have the same interest in violent conflict. She has been my "Ate" in organizing the management of the house in Malden. Menandro Abanes was a very stimulating colleague. At the student chaplaincy he offered great spiritual companionship, and always encouraged me to keep my faith. His wife, Noriko, always made our life fun and kept us cheerful. Our post-doc fellow, Agnieszka Kanas, helped us with her statistical skills during our quantitative data analysis.

I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to the staff of the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies. Saskia Bergens and Elvira Jansen provided me with technical support that made my life so much easier during my stay in Nijmegen, and always invited me to join in with department activities. I

was grateful to Celina del Felice for being my buddy when I had just arrived, and helping me to adapt to the social life and environment in the Netherlands. I am also very grateful to Willem Elbers, Jelmer Kamstra, Sarah Kinsbergen, Rik Habraken, Edwin de Jong, and Toon van Meijl in the department. In the Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Study, I would like to thank Frans Wijsen, Maria Venhuizen, Jennifer Vos, Mijke Jetten, Kenei Neipfe, Suhadi Cholil, Mohammad Yusuf, Handi Hadiwitanto, Nienke Fortuin, Fatma Agca and Ahmed Kaya. The friendship and periodical discussions at Atelier meetings with Hans Schilderman and Chris Hermans were very productive.

I am deeply indebted to the informants in Ambon and Yogyakarta who enabled my fieldwork. Many thanks to Sammy Huwae, Ibu Evi, Irahandy Karrepesina, Ruddy Rahabeat, Jacky Manupputy, Abidin Wakano, and Ibu Lies Marantika for their friendship and assistance during my stay in Ambon. In Yogyakarta, I was assisted by Niken Indar Mastri, Yayan Tsalatsa, Andriani, Dessy, Agung Dias Pronowibowo, Gaffari Rahmadian, Des Christy, Andi Andrianto, Nur Cholish, and Jumadi. Their assistance was invaluable. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Adventina Putranti, Ernst Bolsius SJ, Allon Bar, and Gill Harvey who invested their time in helping me with the language editing of my manuscripts. Special appreciation was extended to Milovan Sutrisno, Veronika Margiyanti and Thomas A Hermawan Martanto who prepared it for the publication.

I would also like to thank Muhajir Darwin, Sukamdi, PM Laksono, Pujo Semedi, Made Pande Kutanegara, Heruanto Hadna, Gerry van Klinken, Laurens Bakker, Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Amrih Widodo, Najib Azca, Elga Sarapung, Al Makin, Yoshi Fajar Kresnomurti, Isabel O'Connor, Arie Setyaningrum, and Argo Twikromo, who shared their valuable experiences and insights with me. I am especially grateful to G. Budi Subanar, S.J Baskara T Wardaya, S.J, Agustinus Supratiknya, and St. Sunardi, who provided an intellectual environment in the Graduate Program of Religious and Cultural Studies, Universitas Sanata Dharma.

I appreciate the friendship offered by my fellow Indonesians in the Netherlands. Dick Römer, Guus Römer, Sonia, Fausta Novy, Kim, and Ellis Geurts were all a source of comfort during my stay there. Ary Samsura, Ridho Rahmadi, Rahmat Yanuar, Manunggal Wardaya, Agnes Nauli, Aster, Mira, Lidya Sitohang, Ainul Fajri, Dery, Olin, Mas Aji Purnosatmoko, Ahmad Komarulzaman. Eugine, Dyah Winiarti, Ichsan Kabullah, Christanty Effendi, Asmaradika Sultan were very hospitable and warm in Nijmegen.

I am deeply indebted to my late mother Clementine Suhiyati, who gave me her unconditional love. She would have been so happy to know that I completed this dissertation. She repeatedly told me that the only but most valuable thing she could pass on to me was education. My sister and brothers, Endang Susianti, Subardi Sugeng Riyanto, Yuli Ristianto have been helpful at all times. The family of Samuel

Soeharto contributed a great deal to the care of my family in Yogyakarta during my absence. In so many ways, they have supported my studies.

Above all, my greatest appreciation goes to my wife Basilica Dyah Putranti and my daughter Wanodya Kalyana Paramarta. I am very sorry for leaving you at the times when you needed me most. Their love, patience and understanding have enabled me to complete this journey.

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INTRODUCTION

1. 1. Thesis position

Ethno-religious violence has been a notable phenomenon across the globe in the post-Cold War period. In the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and Africa, as well as in South and South-east Asia, people have been fighting in the name of their ethnic identity and because of their religious convictions (Huntington, 1993: 22-38; Seul, 1999: 553-569). Irrespective of background, people have killed, and destroyed the belongings of, those categorized as the enemy to defend the interests of their own group. Peasants, fishermen, students and others who have never previously taken up arms have received brief military training and joined members of the own group on the battlefield; others have contributed to their group's interest indirectly, with moral and material support. In some cases, support has come from individuals or groups beyond the borders of the region, province and or even country involved.

Ethno-religious violence erupted in Indonesia when the authoritarian regime of the Indonesian New Order began to lose its grip on power. A survey conducted by Varshney et al. (2004; 2011:19-49) showed a trend of increasing violence between 1990 and 2003. This survey recorded 3,608 cases of violence, resulting in the deaths of 10,758 people across the Indonesian archipelago. Events reached a peak in 2000, with 722 incidents, while the highest number of victims of ethno-religious violence was recorded in 1999, when 3,546 people died. (This figure is based on news and journalists' reports and remains an estimate; violence in remote areas that was not covered by the mass media was not taken into account.) In addition, as reported by the Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2010), 1,259,481 people in Indonesia were internally displaced in 2001 because of violent conflict.

This ethno-religious violence involved physical attacks that devastated the infrastructure of the affected groups, such as their religious buildings and icons. In 1995 and 1996, violence broke out in Situbondo, Kebumen and Tasikmalaya after a long period of harmonious coexistence. Chinese properties became the target of attacks and several churches were burnt down. The riots were seen as a reflection of the deterioration of religious relations between Christians and Muslims at the time, because anti-Chinese unrest had never previously focused on their religious icons. This violence against Chinese was continued widely in Jakarta, Solo and Medan in 1997 (Purdey, 2006).

Waves of ethnic violence also took place in West and Central Kalimantan between Dayak and Madurese in 1996-1997 and 2001 (de Jonge and Nooteboom, 2006). In the Moluccas, where ethnicity is closely related to religious allegiance, the violence escalated across the region in 1999, sharply dividing people along religious lines. It took several years to simmer down, and only did so when the government intervened to mediate a peace accord between the representative leaders of the two religious groups. However, although mass attacks became less frequent, sporadic violence still occurred after the peace agreement had been signed.[1] Shortly before and after data was gathered for this research, violent clashes between Muslims and Christians occurred in Ambon city. On 11 September 2011, after the burial ceremony of a Muslim *ojek* driver who was allegedly stabbed to death by Christians, there were clashes between Muslims and Christians in the downtown area. This resulted in the death of three people; dozens were wounded and about a hundred houses were burnt down (ICG, 2011). About three months later, further clashes occurred in Air Mata Cina neighbourhood, where Muslim and Christian residents are divided by a 2-metre-wide stream. Crowds of people from both sides gathered to engage in fighting. However, it did not escalate into large-scale violence (ICG, 2012).

Scholars have examined ethno-religious violence in Indonesia via a wide range of studies. Some have focused on its historical roots, while others have paid more attention to its impact. They have presented various arguments from different perspectives while looking at its context and escalation. Some have paid attention to the legacy of violence from the colonial era and the authoritarian state (Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002), the contestation of power in times of political transition (Bertrand, 2004), the competition of local contenders for resources (Van Klinken, 2006) and the global growth of terrorism networks (Sidel, 2006; ICG, 2006). Most studies have concentrated on historical factors, the dynamics of structural transformation and the elites who have competed for power as the elements that have led to the emergence of collective violence. Individual attitudes at grassroots level, such as those of villagers, religious communities or students who have supported the violence, have been factored in less, if not neglected, in their analyses.

Few studies have connected the macro-societal context with the micro-level of individual psychological process. Green and Seher (2003) indicate a gap between macro-level investigations and studies that focus on attitudes and/or behaviour. On the one hand, macro-level investigations that consider the economic, political

1 The peace agreement was reached on 12 February 2002 in Malino, South Sulawesi. It was called Malino 2 after a similar peace agreement signed by Muslim and Christian group leaders from Poso on 20 December 2001, which ended their lethal conflict. This peace accord was initiated and facilitated by the central government of Indonesia, alongside other efforts by local government, local and ethnic leaders and NGOs to bring peace and reconciliation to the area.

and social bases for violence tend to ignore the psychological processes underlying individual action. These studies rarely attempt to measure these constructs, or to demonstrate individual-level relationships between attitudes and actions (Fearon and Latin, 2000). On the other hand, behavioural literature tends to become a form of cognitive science, whose proponents seldom attempt to create links via attitudinal measures outside the laboratory (Sears, 1986; Ashmore et al., 2001:7). As behavioural literature becomes more detached from political action, so its conceptual debates become divorced from macro-political analyses of collective violence. This disjuncture results in a lack of comprehensive analysis in the study of collective violence, since individual motivation remains insufficiently addressed.

This thesis explores the support for ethno-religious violence that is considered to fuel social tensions in intergroup relations. It examines the relationship between ethno-religious identification and the ways in which people support different levels of violence perpetrated by their own group, such as protest, intimidating demonstrations, the destruction of property, or the injuring or killing of people belonging to other ethno-religious groups. It conducts micro-level analyses of individuals' support for ethno-religious violence by taking into account individual-level determinants, while also paying attention to contextual factors such as the majority/minority positions of the groups involved. Support for ethno-religious violence is viewed as a dimension of the exclusionary reactions that arise from rational intergroup competition and the dynamics of ethno-religious identification.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured in six chapters. Chapter One presents research issues, the setting and history of Ambon and Yogyakarta as research sites, and research questions. In Chapter Two, we delineate theories, a conceptual model and preliminary hypotheses. Next, Chapter Three contains data collection and measurements; we describe the procedures used for data collection, representativeness of samples, standardized measurements, the data collection process and the development of the topic list. Chapter Four exposes the social location of support for ethno-religious violence. It is revealed via bivariate analyses between ethno-religious identification, other independent determinant variables and support for intergroup violence. In order to construct the scales for measurement, we run rigorous data reduction prior to the analysis of variance and mean comparison. Chapter Five presents multivariate regression analyses, in which the results become the basis for the theoretical evaluations. In this chapter, we describe the analysis procedure and make an assessment of the hypotheses derived from the previous theory. The triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative analyses is also presented in Chapter Four and Five in order to enrich and to validate the results of the study. Chapter Six summarizes and discusses the overall findings of the study, by highlighting the crucial questions,

empirical answers, innovation and progress, as well as by identifying new research issues.

1.2. Research issue

Collective violence involves shared identities, be they ethnic, religious or a combination of the two. Tilly (2003:75) specifically indicates that the activation of boundaries between groups opens the way for collective violence to take place, by shaping particular identities that can be distinguished from each other. The process might damage social interactions, which in turn creates conditions for violence. Ethno-religious violence occurs with the activation of ethnic and religious boundaries because of the strong identification that individuals make with their in-groups, such that it leads them to support intergroup conflict and violence (Seul, 1999; Ashmore et al, 2001:229-231; Orellana, 2009: 265).

This study focuses on support for ethno-religious violence. It refers to the approval of the instrumental use of violence in a variety of forms by people who identify themselves as members of a particular group, in order to achieve economic, political, social or cultural objectives in relation to another group (Tilly, 2003; Baron & Richardson, 1994). The support can take different forms, such as condoning abusive language and hate speech in public; supporting aggressive rallies and intimidating demonstrations, approving destruction of property of other groups (material harm); and justification for injuring or even killing others (corporal harm) (Berkowitz 1993). It involves physical and/or psychological pain. Support for ethno-religious violence works in two dimensions: the domain to which people's support refers (achievement of economic, political, social, cultural objectives of the group); and the level of intensity of the violence supported (Sterkens et al, 2009).

1.2.1. Support for ethno-religious violence as latent conflict

We consider support for ethno-religious violence to be a 'latent conflict', which means that it is a condition of social tension arising from a dysfunctional social system. Latent conflict does not always result in manifest violence. It is not really or actually visible, but it is empirically observable when people are asked appropriate questions. It exists in longstanding group competition over scarce resources, or in unequal access to political power. The term 'latent conflict' is adapted from Robert Merton's concept of latent function, in which he refers to unintended and unrecognized consequences of individual or group activities which serve in part the functional system of social relations (Merton, 1968: 330). Support for intergroup violence is considered to be a latent conflict because the support that people give to their in-groups leads to stereotyping of, prejudice about or discrimination against out-groups. In other words, support for intergroup violence creates major rifts between opposing groups (Sterkens et al., 2009: 2).

Ethnicity and religion as roots of (latent) conflict have become a focus for scholarly attention in recent decades. There are three major theoretical perspectives that try to explain it: primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist. Primordialist theories view ethnic identity as something inherited at birth, thus making the boundaries between groups immutable. Ethnic conflict is the unavoidable consequence when people defend, sustain or propagate their own kinship group, their own cultural traditions or their way of life. Instrumentalist theories see ethnic conflict as the product of individuals' pursuit of private interests. Individuals choose to take part in ethnically based economic groups in order to acquire economic goods, or participate in political movements to realize political goals. Constructivist theories pay particular attention to the social and historical contexts that shape, transform and delineate the ethnic boundaries that are inflaming a given conflict. These include historical processes such as modernization, decolonization, the structuring of colonial states and the weakening of central political institutions (Green and Seher, 2003:520-521; Bertrand, 2004:10-11; Wimmer, 2008: 971)

In recent studies on the role of religion in conflict and violence, religious differences are found to be more important than ethnic differences as a social division that can develop into conflict. There are two fundamental reasons why religious differences can generate conflict to an even greater extent than other social cleavages. First, some aspects of religion lead naturally to divergence, such as the conviction that followers must unconditionally accept certain interpretations of sacred texts, or the fact that religious identities seem to be less negotiable because of their reference to transcendence or 'ultimate reality'. Second, religious differences imply different ways of understanding the world, social relationships and so on (Seul, 1999: 564; Reynal-Querol, 2002: 31-32). Compared to ethnicity, religion seems to be more salient to recent conflicts in Indonesia because religious group identification enables people to garner greater support from the global network of fellow believers (Sidel, 2006; Steward, 2009: 14).

1.2.2. Support for intergroup violence and ethno-religious identification

The relationship between ethno-religious identification and out-group prejudice has been a subject of considerable attention in the social sciences for a long time. The concept of ethnocentrism is the prominent idiom to describe this phenomenon, which refers to in-group favouritism and out-group derogation. William Sumner (1906) pinpointed ethnocentrism as an inevitable and universal consequence of the existence of social groups. At the individual level, Adorno and his colleagues (1950) argued that individuals characterised by strong, intense, uncritical and even sometimes irrational in-group attachment and glorification also show more prejudice towards out-groups and minorities. Although some scholars disagree with the hypothesis of ethnocentrism, arguing that in-group identification does

not necessarily result in out-group hostility, recent studies show their reciprocal relationship (cf. Duckit, 2006:151-153).

Support for ethno-religious violence may arise as an effect of ethno-religious identification. In this sense, the term ethno-religious identification is used to describe the socio-psychological process whereby self-image and perception of group membership is constructed. Ethno-religious identification is a feature of individual representation since it gives a referential reservoir from which categorization of self (in-group) and other (out-group) is derived. The identification gets stronger via the competition and conflict that polarize group and power differentials. In this regard, increased competition and out-group threat develops ethno-religious identification and induces out-group hostility (Brewer, 2001b: 26-28; Mitchell, 2005).

In Indonesia, ethnic identification is apparent in relations between natives (*pribumi*) and Chinese, but in areas such as the Moluccas, religious identification seems particularly strong. Here, for instance, the colonial government used to favour the indigenous Christians as their vehicles for local middle-class bureaucracy; Muslims therefore felt discriminated against by the local authorities. When conflict arose in 1999, religious identification seemed more salient than ethnic markers. Muslim groups suspected the Christian Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), in exile in the Netherlands, of backing the Christian groups[2]. Prejudice was also bolstered by the deployment of Muslims from Java and Makassar to the Moluccas as jihadists (Hasan, 2002: 165-167; 2005: 195-228).

Ethno-religious identification has the power to motivate people to support intergroup violence; it acts as a unifying force, drawing people to support their groups on the basis of solidarity. Although ethnic and religious identification often overlap, there are several differences between them in relation to support for intergroup violence; the characteristics of leaders and followers, along with the organization used to mobilize support, are areas in which these differences are apparent (Yamin, 2008; Steward, 2009; Orellana, 2009: 266-277).

Religious organizations in Indonesia seem to be more prepared than ethnic organizations to mobilize support for intergroup violence. Some religious organizations have developed effective channels of support for specific groups, especially in shifting from purely religious to more political functions. Jihad Fighters, the Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet (Forum Komunikasi Ahl Sunnah wal-Jama'ah, FKAJ), Islamic Defender Fronts (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) or Indonesian Mujahideen Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI)

2 Most RMS members were Mollucans who resisted the integration of the region into the Republic of Indonesia in 1949 out of fear that it would disadvantage them. For a discussion about the RMS, see Chauvel, 1990.

have been among the religious organizations in Indonesia involved in violent conflicts in Ambon, while officially, their presence in the area was intended only to 'help' Muslim groups (Hasan, 2005: 112-116; Wilson, 2008). Although ethnic groups may also have formal organizations such as The Unity of Madurese Family (Ikatan Keluarga Madura, IKAMA), Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Forum Betawi Rempug, FBR*)*, The Unity of South Sulawesi Family (Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan, KKSS), and so on, these seem to be less militant when it comes to actual participation in violent conflict.

Whether violent conflict is started and escalated by elites, or constitute a mass phenomenon, has been the subject of scholarly debate. Many earlier studies by Kapferer (1988), Prunier (1995), Davidson (2005) and Wilson (2008) have emphasized the greater role of elite groups, religious charismatic leaders or ethnic entrepreneurs in channelling public support for ethno-religious violence. While these studies are vital in terms of accounting for how conflicts become heightened – via the construction of more antagonistic identities and group mobilization – they are insufficient to explain individuals' involvement. A number of other studies have indicated that the motivations of ordinary people for joining conflict differ from those of the elite. Rape, looting, thefts that occur during periods of collective violence show the complexities of individual motivation (Deng, 1995; Woodward, 1995). To enrich these earlier studies, individual motivation and support for ethno-religious conflict as a result of in-group identification will be examined in this study.

1.2.3. Relative group size and perceived threat

The minority or majority positioning of ethno-religious groups influences their support for ethno-religious violence, an assumption that relates to the relative numerical composition of ethno-religious groups and the power relations between them. Groups with fewer members are defined as minorities and numerically larger groups as majorities. Power and social status are often used as criteria for defining minority and majority groups (Tajfel, 1981 c.f . Lücken and Simon, 2005:397). In this study, power is defined as the degree of control of a particular group over its allocation of resources and that of out-groups (Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991:3) while social status refers to the relative position of groups, on the basis of valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:19). Differential access to power between groups is the most important determinant of discrimination and stratification, while the distinction of group status indicates power differentials in a society. The minorities are usually subordinate low-status groups, while the majorities have dominant status. The difference in size between ethno-religious groups partly determines their subordinate or dominant position, which in turn can lead to support for exclusionary attitudes (Eitzen, 1967:78-79; Coenders et al., 2004).

Muslims and Christians in Indonesia demonstrate a power differential between majority and minority. In terms of numbers, Muslims form the majority and Christians the minority. In spite of this, Muslim leaders were felt to have been treated as a minority from 1945 to the 1990s because both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes attempted to suppress Islamic political movements (Wertheim, 1986). However, Muslims began to reinforce their position as the dominant religious majority after the downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime. Muslims reformed existing laws and endorsed new ones with an Islamic emphasis, such as those on the regulation of places of worship, the national education system, anti-pornography laws and the enactment of *sharia* in several regions of the country. The dominant status of the Muslim majority in the state institution led the rights of Christian and other religious minorities in legal, political and cultural fields to be neglected (Salim, 2007: 115-119; Sterkens and Hadiwitanto 2015).

The relationship between minority/majority positions and discriminatory attitudes in Western countries has been examined repeatedly. Studies suggest that 'the relative size of the subordinate (out-group) population increases competition (whether actual or perceived) between minority (out-group) and majority (in-group) members, over societal and economic resources. Competition and the perceived threats of competition increase, in turn, hostility, antagonism and the need and motivation for discrimination' (Semyonov et al., 2004: 683). In a study conducted in Europe, Scheepers et al. (2002a) revealed that exclusionary views and anti-minority sentiments tend to be more pronounced in countries in which there is a heavy concentration of foreigners. In contrast, Evans and Need (2002) found that the relative size of foreign populations had no effect on attitudes toward minority rights in East European countries. However, more recent research in these countries has shown out-group size to have an effect on opposition to civil rights for minorities (Coenders et al., 2004 and 2009).

The exclusion of minority populations is strongly related to the perceptions of the majority (Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991). Research on attitudes towards foreigners among Germans reinforces the presumption that they adopt exclusionary attitudes towards migrant minorities. When German citizens believe that foreigners exert a negative impact on various aspects of social life, they are of the opinion that foreigners should not obtain equal social, political and economic rights. While the actual size of the foreign population has no effect on perceived threat or exclusionary attitudes, the perceived size strongly predicts views on the (unequal) treatment of foreigners. The higher the perceived size of the foreign population, the more pronounced the sense of threat, and the stronger the support for exclusionary practices (Semyonov et al., 2004). Similar effects have been found in the Netherlands (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010).

The exclusionary behaviour of majorities can give rise to collective action by minorities. Hecter and Okamoto (2001) found the emergence of collective action among minority groups to be a result of social identification on the micro level, in which distinctive identities were strongly related to perceived threat, and on the macro level in terms of (a) failed nationalist collective action to provide insurance, welfare and other kinds of private goods; (b) widespread demand for autonomy or outright independence and (c) the opportunity to act collectively on behalf of one's ethnic group. In other words, where there are strong inequalities and discrimination, ethno-religious identification encourages collective action.

In relation to state institutions being sites of negotiation between the majority and minority, Bertrand (2004: 40) argues that ethnic and religious identities become a stronger potential source for mobilization when groups feel threatened. When groups are not represented by, or are even excluded from state governance, they become increasingly alienated and marginal. Minorities that are subject to discrimination tend to resist the dominant power of the majority. Gurr (1993) affirms that mobilization of minority groups happens as a result of grievances due to political, cultural and economic discrimination. The ethno-religious identification which anchors the bounded identities of particular ethno-religious groups is often used as an instrument to demand justice, or greater freedom from deprived marginality and political discrimination.

1.2.4. Research setting

The research sites of this study are the cities of Ambon and Yogyakarta. The following description briefly delineates the ethno-religious profile of both places; but first, I outline the ethnic and religious composition of Indonesia as a whole.

Indonesia consists of a great many ethnic groups. Overall the population is growing, but the growth rates of the various ethnic groups differ significantly. The ranking of the top ten largest ethnic groups continuously changes, with the exception of the Javanese and Sundanese, who have been the first- and second-largest ethnic groups in Indonesia since time immemorial. Together these two make up about half of the Indonesian population. Some ethnic groups are not always mentioned separately in censuses. In the most recent census of 2010, small ethnic groups were lumped together under the category 'ethnic groups' of the province to which they belonged, such as 'ethnic groups of Sulawesi' or 'ethnic groups of South Sumatera'. The 'ethnic groups of Sulawesi' included 208 groups as well as Makassarese, Buginese, and people from Minahasa or Gorontalo, who made up the greater part of the population; those of South Sumatera consisted of people from Lampung, Ogan, Komering, Palembang, Semendo, Pasemah, Gumai, Mintang, Musi and Rawas, while the more numerous Minangkabau and Batak were mentioned separately (Naim and Syaputra, 2011:18). The category of 'others' included various ethnic groups, all with a

population of less than 5,000,000. These groups comprised Dayak, Sasak, Acehnese, Banjar and so on. The changes in categorization make it difficult to follow changes in the smaller ethnic groups over time.

Table 1.1 Size of ethnic groups in Indonesia in 2010

Ethnic groups	N	%
Javanese	95,217,022	40.07
Sundanese	36,701,670	15.44
Batak	8,466,969	3.56
Ethnic groups of Sulawesi	7,634,262	3.21
Madurese	7,179,356	3.02
Betawi	6,807,968	2.86
Minangkabau	6,462,713	2.72
Buginese	6,359,700	2.68
Malay	5,365,399	2.26
Ethnic groups of South Sumatera	5,119,581	2.15
Others	52,326,686	22.02
Total	237,641,326	100.00

Source: Na'im and Syaputra (2011: 9).

Besides indigenous ethnic groups, the country also has a few immigrant communities of which the Chinese is the largest. In 1930, when the colonial government held the first official census, there were 1,233,000 Chinese, slightly over 2% of the total population (Koning, 2007: 133). The Chinese, together with other foreign Asian groups, were classified as *Vreemde Oosterlingen* (Foreign Orientals). The legal status of ethnic Chinese and other Asian foreigners, such as Arabs and Indians, was higher than that of the indigenous population, but lower than that of the Europeans (Vandenbosch, 1943: 86; Suryadinata, 1993: 83). Between independence and the census of 2000, the Chinese were neglected in statistical records. This had to do with the ambiguous position they hold in Indonesian society, and the resentment felt towards them. In 2005, about five million of the Chinese in the country held Indonesian nationality (Mackie, 2005: 97), while the number who did not was 2,832,510 (Na'im and Syaputra, 2011: 10).

With regard to religion, the vast majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim. Christians – Protestants and Catholics combined – rank second. Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism have far fewer followers. During the New Order

Regime (1966-1998), only five religions were allowed by the government: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Initially Confucianism was also included, but in 1967 it was dropped from the list of recognized religions on the basis that it was a regional (Chinese) ethical doctrine rather than a religion. People had to register as followers of one of the five official religions. In reality, the variety of religions was much broader, but traditional beliefs existing in different part of the archipelago were not recognized. After Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, all religions unrecognized by the state were allowed again, although radical Islam groups attempted to eliminate some of them, such as the Ahmadiyah movement and the Shia denomination.

Table 1.2 shows the religious composition of the Indonesian population in 1990 and 2010. It makes clear that the percentage of Muslims stayed about the same, while that of Protestants increased a little and that of Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists declined. The category of 'others' in 2010 refers to all religions besides the earlier recognized religions, such as Kejawen, Kaharingan and Sunda Wiwitan.

Table 1.2 Population of Indonesia according to religion in 1990 and 2010

Religion	1990		2010	
	N	%	N	%
Islam	156,318,610	87.21	207,176,162	87.18
Protestantism	10,820,769	6.04	16,528,513	6,96
Catholicism	6,411,794	3.58	6,907,873	2,91
Hinduism	3,287,309	1.83	4,012,116	1.69
Buddhism	1,840,693	1.03	1,703,254	0.72
Confucianism	-	-	117,091	0.05
Others	568,608	0.32	1,191,317	0.51
Total	179,247,783	100.00	237,641,326	100.00

Source: Census 1990 (BPS, 1991) and Census 2010 (BPS, 2011).

The religious composition within the research area of greater Yogyakarta does not differ greatly from the national level. In Ambon city, however, Christians are in the majority. We will give more detailed figures for ethnic and religious diversity in the sections on the research locations below, and make clear that ethnic and religious identification are important across several areas of society, such as the economy, politics and socio-cultural life.

1.2.4.1. Ambon

The city of Ambon is situated on the island of the same name. In colonial times, it was more a town than a city. It was a centre for the spice trade from the end of

the 17th century until about 1860, when spices became less lucrative. Ambon city was the seat of the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) from 1605 to 1796 and capital of the Residency of Amboina from 1867 to 1924. In 1949, after Indonesian independence was recognised by the Dutch, it became the capital of the province of the Moluccas which consists of 1,027 islands. In 1999 the province was divided into two parts: the North Moluccas with Ternate as capital, and the Moluccas, which included the central and southern regions, of which Ambon became the capital. The history of Ambon cannot be disentangled from the history of the whole Moluccas, an area that possesses rich natural resources and has attracted people from near and far for centuries.[3] Besides making a living as hunters, gatherers and peasants, by the 15th century the population of the Moluccan islands were trading spices and pearls with people from Java, China and Malacca. The latter were followed by Buginese and Arab traders who alighted in the harbour of Ambon a long time before the Europeans (Ptak, 1992: 27-41; Andaya, 1991: 71- 79).

Ambon town started as a Portuguese fortification in 1576, around which more and more people gradually settled. From the beginning, the population around the fort consisted of local people, people of related ethno-linguistic groups from neighbouring islands and immigrants from elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago. According to a Dutch proto-census in 1673, 81.29% of the people living in the town were local Moluccans, while the rest consisted of European soldiers, employees of the VOC and migrants from other Indonesian islands. Between 1673 and 1694, the population of the town increased from 4,089 to 5,487 (Knaap, 1991:119).

3 The Moluccas is the homeland of several more or less related ethno-linguistic groups, such as the Alifuru, Togitil, Arunese, Ternatese, Takabu, Bandanese, Rana, Moa, etc. There are 41 ethno-linguistic groups living in the Moluccas (Leirissa et al., 1982:1). The term Ambonese refers to people living on the islands of Ambon and Lease, whose cultures are strongly related (Bartels, 1977:5).

Figure 1.1 Map of Ambon Island



1 : 350,000

Source: www.websitesrcg.com

The establishment of Ambon as a centre of the spice trade resulted in more and more migrants coming to the town. In 1694, almost half the population were migrants: 19.32% were of Malay-Indonesian origin, 14.38% were Europeans and 8.54% Chinese. The number of Moluccans from the island itself was about 57.76% (Knaap, 1995: 234). Due to the flourishing of spice as a lucrative commodity, the population grew steadily. In 1860, the population amounted to 9,586 inhabitants, among whom 1,793 were migrants: 43.39% Europeans, 16.79% Chinese, 3.83% Arabs and 35.97% Malay-Indonesians (Leirissa, 2000: 625). When the first official census was carried out in 1930, Ambon, now a city rather than a town, had 17,078 inhabitants, the *Afdeeling* (sub-region) of Ambon had 67,597 inhabitants, and the *Residentie* (residency) of Ambon 400,057 (see Table 1.3).[4]

4 The subregion of Ambon consisted of the town of Ambon and the islands Buru, Saparua, West Ceram, Amahai, Wahai, East Ceram, Banda, Kisar, Babar, Saumlaki, Larat, Kai, Boven Digoel and South New Guinea (South of Papua) (*Volkstelling 1930*, 1931: 31).

Table 1.3 Population groups in Ambon, 1930

	Groups								Total	
	Natives		Europeans		Chinese		Other Asians			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ambon city	13,357	78.11	2,050	12.00	921	5.39	750	4.39	17,078	100.00
Afdeeling Ambon	63,314	93.67	2,294	3.39	1,030	1.52	955	1.41	67,593	100.00
Residentie Ambon	388,754	97.17	3,803	0.95	4,612	1.15	2,888	.72	400,057	100.00

Source: *Volkstelling 1930*, 1931: 26-27, 46-47.

The census of 1930 confirms that the population of Ambon city was more heterogeneous than that of rural areas of the *Afdeeling* and residency of Ambon. The natives – all Moluccan ethno-linguistic groups – made up 78.11 % of the total population of the city. The Europeans also included *gelijkgestelden*, persons from other population groups who had legally obtained equality with Europeans, such as privileged Ambonese and Chinese. 'Other Asians' consisted of Foreign Orientals other than Chinese, such as Arabs and Indians.

Among the migrants who came to Ambon at the end of the 19th century were many Butonese from South-east Sulawesi. Physical reminders of their presence in the city still exist today (Chauvel, 1990:2-3). These migrants mainly worked as agricultural labourers in spice gardens owned by Ambonese. Buginese and Makassarese, who migrated to the city in the early 20th century, worked as fishermen or found work on passenger or cargo boats. After independence, and in particular during the New Order government, a growing number of migrants, including Javanese, came to the island both as spontaneous migrants and as part of transmigration projects for landless labourers and unemployed urban citizens. Between 1971 and 1985, the percentage of migrants in the city increased from 5.2% to 14% of the total. In 1990, they made up 30% of the city's population (ICG, 2002: 1). The steady population growth of Ambon was severely interrupted between 1999 and 2002 when a series of violent conflicts took place in the region, during which at least 1,097 were killed in the city (Varshney et al., 2010: 43). During this period, a huge number of people left (ICG, 2002: 17). In 1998, a year before the troubles started, the city had 314,417 inhabitants, which decreased to 265,830 in 1999 and 209,303 in 2000. However, ten years later, the population had risen to 331, 254.

The recent census of 2010 indicates that the proportion of migrants has increased even further, amounting to 112,715 or 34.03% of the total city population. In the same year, Moluccans made up 74.95% (1,127,148 persons) of the total population of the Moluccas. Of the total migrant population of 399,562, 70.79% or

282,860 came from Sulawesi, 19.86% or 79,340 from Java and 9.35% or 37,362 from other islands (see Table 1.4; Na'im and Syaputra, 2011: 36-41).

To reduce prejudice and hostility following the ethno-religious violence of 1999-2002, official data about ethnic groups in the city of Ambon ceased to be provided by the regional city government. The 2010 provincial data nevertheless give an idea of present ethnic diversity, as most migrants live in and around the city. In this census, the various ethnic groups in Maluku such as Kei, Ceram, Saparua, Yamdena are classified by the single category of Moluccans. The ethnic groups from Sulawesi other than the Buginese, Makassarese, Minahasa and Gorontalo are also grouped together (Na'im and Syaputra, 2011: 21-54).

Table 1.4 The ethnic composition of the Province of the Moluccas, 2010

Ethnicity	N	%
Moluccans	1,127,148	74.95
Other ethnic groups from Sulawesi	247,266	16.44
Javanese	79,340	5.28
Nusa Tenggara Timur	8,624	0.57
Makassarese	6,414	0.43
Chinese	4,556	0.30
Sundanese	4,457	0.30
Papua	3,751	0.25
Foreigners	3,300	0.22
Minahasa	2,867	0.19
Others	16,090	1.07
Total	1,432,407	100.00

Source: Na'im and Syaputra, 2011:36

Ambon has become a densely populated city over the last ten years (BPS Ambon, 2012: 5). Table 1.5 shows the population density per district (*kecamatan*). The highest density is in the downtown area, which includes the port and the markets in the districts of Sirimau, Nusaniwe and Teluk Ambon Baguala.

Table 1.5 Population density per district in the city of Ambon, 2010

District	Population		Area		Density (Person/Km2)
	N	%	Km^2	%	
Nusaniwe	89,866	27.13	88.35	0.25	1,017.16
Sirimau	140,064	42.28	86.81	0.24	1,613.45
Teluk Ambon	38.451	11.61	93.68	0.26	410.45
Teluk Ambon Baguala	53,472	16.14	40.11	0.11	1,333.13
Leitimur Selatan	9.401	2.84	50.50	0.14	186,16
Total	331.254	100.00	359.45	100.00	921.56

Source: BPS Kota Ambon 2011.

With regard to religion, in 1930 65.9% of the city population was Protestant and 32.7% was Muslim (Department van Economische Zaken, 1936:139-140). In 1990, the Protestants and Muslims made up respectively 53.46% and 41.11% (BPS Ambon, 1991). In 2010, after the troubles in Ambon, the percentage of Protestants in the city was 57.99%, while the number of Muslims accounted for 38.77%. The religious composition of the city population differs from that of the provinces. At the provincial level, the number of Muslims (50.61%) is higher than that of Christians (48.76%) (BPS and Bappeda Maluku, 2011).

Table 1.6 The population of Ambon city according to religion, 2010

Religion	N	%
Islam	128,417	38.77
Protestantism	192,105	57,99
Catholicism	7,943	2,40
Hinduism	435	0.13
Buddhism	120	0.04
Confucianism	7	0.00
Others	2,227	0.67
Total	331,254	100.00

Sources: BPS, 2011.

The natural growth of the population and the ever-swelling numbers of migrants to Ambon, only interrupted by the conflicts between 1999 and 2002, led to fierce competition for land, jobs and other scarce resources, and reinforced the already existing social segregation along ethnic and religious lines. In the countryside, where segregation had taken place much earlier, Christians and Muslims continued to keep each other at a distance. In the city, Muslims chose to settle in neighbourhoods with fellow Muslims, and Christians in Christian neighbourhoods.

Political situation

Religion has an enormous impact on politics in Ambon and the Moluccas. Since the downfall of the authoritarian New Order regime, the city and provincial parliaments have become arenas of political contest between Muslims and Christians. This contest has become even more vocal, but also more complex, since the advent of political reforms that have given rise to new political parties that attract a specifically pro-Muslim or pro-Christian electorate. As well as the New Order United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the most popular new Islamic parties are the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), while Christians mainly favour the new Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS), the Love the Nation Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, PDKB), and the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik) (al-Makassary and LBH Bakubae, 2004:106). Besides the confessional parties, secular parties already in existence also accommodate the interests of the religious groups in order to gain the support for their followers. The Party of Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar) furthers the interests of the local Muslim population to prevent them from voting for Islamic parties, while the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) sides with the local Christian population, which makes up the greater part of the population in Ambon. Although these parties differ in terms of grassroots support and have quite different ideologies, coalitions are relatively easily made. For example, before the elections for a governor and vice-governor of the Moluccas or for a mayor and vice-mayor of Ambon city, co-operating parties nominate a pair of candidates who differ in religion (a Christian mayor and a Protestant vice-mayor, or the reverse) but who might be acceptable to different ethno-religious groups (Tomsa 2009: 241-247). Also, parties in parliament who present themselves as pro-Muslim or pro-Christian have to work together to defend plans that benefit the voters (or, rather, believers), they represent.

Local elites play an important role in politics at both city and provincial level. The members of these local elites easily cross the boundaries between business, politics and religion. They change membership from one party to another to further

their political and economic interests (van Klinken, 2007a: 95). During the conflict of 1999-2002, these elites manipulated religious sentiments to mobilize followers for their personal objectives (Tanamal and Triyono, 2004: 242-246). In the elections for a city mayor and a provincial governor, they acted as political brokers, setting up coalitions between religious and secular parties as well as between Christian and Muslim parties (Tomsa, 2009: 230). If they fail to obtain public positions themselves, they work behind the scenes to orchestrate policy-making in the city and the province (Kumorotomo, 2009: 9-13).

In the 1999 city and provincial elections, six months after the outbreak of violence, many members of the local elites won seats in the city and in the provincial parliament. In the city of Ambon, PDI-P obtained 54.29%, Golkar 19.45%, PPP 17.14%; the rest went to other parties. On the provincial level, Golkar obtained 30.46%, PDI-P 27.72%, PPP 17.84% and the remaining 23.98% was distributed among 45 parties (Suryadinata, 2002: 223). Although the PDI-P is a secular party, it gained many Christian votes in this election because many Christian leaders belonged to the party elite. Muslims won less than 20% because many Muslim migrants had left the city to escape the conflict (ICG, 2002:2)

In comparison with the national elections of 1999 and 2004, in the 2009 national elections PDI-P and the confessional parties lost a large number of voters in Ambon city to nationalist and secular parties. People were apparently disappointed with the confessional parties' failure to reduce tensions in line with their expectations. The PDI-P vote drastically decreased to 13.88%, despite remaining the party with the most votes. The other secular parties such as Golkar, the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), the People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura) and The Great Indonesian Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) together received 29.73% of the votes. The Islamic parties obtained 19.94% and the Christian parties 5.49%; the remainder was distributed among 33 other small parties (BPS Kota Ambon, 2011: 32). On the provincial level, the result of the general election was quite similar. Golkar received roughly 17.13% of the vote, and the Democratic Party 16.39%. The Islamic party PKB obtained about 12.82%, slightly more than PDI-P, which was supported by Christians (BPS dan Bappeda Maluku, 2011).

In 2001, when the election for city mayor was held during the conflict, the elected mayor was a Christian from PDI-P, and the vice-mayor a Muslim from PPP. In the governor election of 2003, PDI-P and its coalition partner PPP were able to install their Christian candidate Karel Albert Ralahalu (PDI-P) as governor, and their Muslim candidate Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina (PPP) as vice-governor of Maluku. In 2008, the incumbent governor was elected as the result of a coalition between secular parties (PDI-P, Democratic Party and PDK) and Muslim parties (PKB and PBB). When I conducted fieldwork in 2011, the election of the city mayor of Ambon had just taken place peacefully. The new mayor is a Christian and his vice

mayor a Muslim. This pair of elected candidates was nominated by a broad political coalition between the secular parties Golkar and Gerindra, the Muslim parties PPP and PBR, and the Christian party PDS.

This co-operation between political parties to present a pair of Christian and Muslim candidates in the elections for both (vice-)governor and (vice-)mayor shows the importance of religion in regional politics. The coalition represents a political deal among the elites to fulfil the demand for acceptable leaders from both religious groups. The elites also desire a Christian-Muslim balance across the high ranking government positions and among civil servants, and in the budget allocation for regional development, such as for education and health services (Pariela, 2007: 107). The increasing number of votes for secular and national parties in the 2009 election demonstrates the success of such parties' proposals to mitigate the tensions between Muslims and Christians.

Economic situation

The violent conflict of 1999-2002 deeply affected the economic situation. During this time, most of the public infrastructure was devastated, business activities were paralyzed, and many people lost their jobs and income. In 2000, the economic growth rate was -7.18% and the level of poverty went up from 13% to 29% (BPS Ambon, 2001). In 2011, the economic growth rate was 8.7% and the poverty level was about 8% (BPS Ambon, 2012: 66), but the impact of the conflict was still apparent in the division of economic activities between Muslims and Christians.

During the conflict, both Muslims and Christians set up their own markets because people felt too insecure to sell and buy wares in places where they were outnumbered by members of the religious out-group. Muslims usually shopped in Batu Merah Mardika, Pasar Amplaz or Pasar Aman, while Christians went to Pasar Batu Meja, Pasar Paso, Pasar Tagalaya or Kuda Mati. There was only one market in the city, founded by the local government at the insistence of peace development organisations, where both Muslims and Christians did their shopping. Once the number of violent incidents had declined, believers of different religions began to return to a variety of markets. However, traders of the same faith were now clustered together, as they felt more secure working among members of their own religious group.

The conflict also led to a reshuffling of work roles between Christians and Muslims. Many Ambonese Christians, who had predominantly worked in salaried jobs or administrative positions, had to make a living during and after the conflict from petty trades, transportation services or other informal activities that were previously carried out by Muslim migrants (Adam, 2008b: 6); this was due to the closure of offices and business operations, and because Muslims had left Christian areas. Muslims in turn took over various kinds of work in areas where Christians

had moved out. Spatial religious segregation of economic activities continues to this day; it has led to a substantial reduction of economic specialization along (ethno-) religious lines, which was widespread before the conflict. Now, Muslims and Christians compete for jobs in bureaucracy, trade and services, which have become the main source of income for about 64% of the city's population (BPS Kota Ambon, 2012: 68). While they may work in the same field as before, however, they choose their workplace in an area where their religion is dominant (Adam, 2009: 188).

After 2002, when the security situation of Ambon began to improve, Chinese Christians were among the first to return to the city to resume their role as suppliers of dairy foods and other commodities. During the conflict, the wholesale sector stagnated; only a few of these suppliers ran their businesses, under military custody. As soon as the market began to pick up, Butonese Muslims who had left the island during the conflict also came back to the city to resume their work as petty traders or crop collectors. They now had to compete with Ambonese Christian vendors who had taken over part of their informal economic activities in the meantime. In bureaucratic positions, Christians were still dominant, although their numbers had begun to decrease. Before the conflict, about 90% of civil servants had been Christians (Bertrand, 2002:69); in 2006, 84.07% were Protestants, while the rest consisted of Muslims and followers of other denominations (Tamagola et al., 2007: 27). The dominance of Christians in local administration is an issue that easily raises tensions between ethno-religious groups. Muslims still feel that discrimination operates in the selection of civil servants, while Christians fear that their dominant position will be taken over by Muslims (van Klinken, 2007a: 93-94).

Socio-cultural situation

Before the outbreak of violent conflict in 1999, Muslims and Christians in Ambon lived together, despite all kinds of tensions, in relative harmony. Members of both communities interacted freely, and many lived side by side in the same quarter (Lee, 1997: 59-67). Social segregation began to increase in the 1970s, when the government legally prohibited interreligious marriages, intensified religious education in schools and recruited civil servants on the basis of religious identity (Sidel, 2006: 40). The conflict of 1999-2002 increased and reinforced segregation and sharply defined territorial boundaries between Muslims and Christians. As stated above, almost all residential settlements have now become religiously homogenous.

Spatial and social divisions between Muslims and Christians also developed in the educational sector. Public schools as well as denominational schools became religiously homogeneous. Before the conflict, Muslim and Christian pupils attended the same public schools; many Muslim and Christian families felt no qualms about sending their children to public schools in areas dominated by other denominations. Likewise, Christian and Muslim teachers faced no difficulties in teaching in areas and

schools where the majority of the population or pupils were of a different religion. During the conflict, however, they moved to schools in areas where the majority of the population practised the same religion. Since most school teachers are Christian, schools in Muslim areas experienced a shortage of teachers during those years; secondary school teachers were obliged to teach subjects for which they had no training. However, after the conflict, many teachers felt safe enough to return to their old schools. In 2006, about 30% of the 83.83% of teachers who were Protestants were employed in schools of a different denomination (Tamagola et al., 2007: 20).[5]

Religious segregation in Ambon is also visible among university students. The majority of Muslims study at the State Islamic Institute (Institute Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN), or the Islamic University of Darussalam (Unidar). Christian students prefer to attend the Indonesian Christian University in Maluku (Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku, UKIM) or the Higher Education of State Protestantism (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Kristen Protestan Negeri, STAKPN). Only the University of Pattimura (Unpatti) and the State Polytechnic School (Poltek) have a relatively high proportion of students from both religious groups.

By the early 1990s, the University of Pattimura, the oldest and biggest university in the Moluccas, was already plagued by tensions between Muslim and Protestant students, which frequently led to violent incidents. The selection of new students or the appointment of the rector or staff members often led to overt conflict between Christian and Muslim groups; both demanded a fair 'religious' balance between the number of staff members and students. In 2011, the student registration building, which had been burned down in 2000, was destroyed again following several waves of student demonstrations against alleged unfairness in the admission of Muslim students. One of our respondents said that violence also took place because Christian students resisted the restructuring of student organizations on campus, believing it benefitted Muslim organizations. Students of confessional universities, for example UKIM or IAIN Ambon, never actively took part in these conflicts, but often expressed solidarity with their ethno-religious group in demonstrations or rallies outside campus.

Relations between Muslims and Christians in Ambon at all levels of society have remained inharmonious. Even if it is unlikely that eruptions of violence on a scale comparable to those of 1999-2002 will recur, conflicts between Muslims and Christians are inevitable. Because of large-scale spatial and social segregation, daily interaction between the two groups is limited. Suspicion towards each other runs

5 The effect of the conflict was that 36 school buildings were seriously damaged, and about 30.56 % of high school students dropped out. The majority were male students who were forced to look for income-generating activities to support their families (Tamagola, et al., 2007: 20-21). By the time of our research in 2011, most of the school buildings had been renovated and educational activities had returned to normal.

high, and trivial issues can easily trigger violent clashes. During the period of data collection, two violent incidents between Christians and Muslims took place. The first was triggered by the death of a Muslim *ojek* driver on 10 September 2011.[6] According to the police, it was a traffic accident, but rumours soon circulated that the driver had been stopped, beaten, tortured and killed by Christians. After the funeral ceremony, violence erupted leaving three victims dead and dozens wounded. Over a hundred homes, mostly of Muslims, were burned to the ground. Another eruption of violence took place on 12 December 2011 between Muslims and Christians whose villages were separated by a small river some two metres wide. Inhabitants of both communities shouted insults and hurled rocks at each other; within minutes, crowds on both sides were throwing stones. However, this violent incident was isolated and was stopped, thanks to the intervention of government officials and peace activists, who in the meantime had already started to work on the prevention of further conflict escalation.

The biggest effort made by the government to end the conflict was the peace accord made between Muslim and Christian representatives from Ambon in Malino on 11-12 February 2002. After this agreement, the number of violent incidents soon declined; the city government succeeded in restoring order via law enforcement and the improvement of public infrastructure. The government also supported meetings and dialogues between Christian, Muslim and *adat* leaders to foster peace in the city.

In order to reconcile the warring parties, peace activists and non-government agencies in Ambon continuously try to bridge the communication gap between Muslims and Christians, and to develop mutual understanding of their religious and socio-economic concerns. Among the peace organizations are the Peace Provocateurs, Moluccan Ambassadors of Peace (MAP), Coffee Badati and the Moluccan Interfaith Institute (Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku). The Peace Provocateurs are a group of peace activists using social media, such as internet or SMS, to disseminate information designed to reduce prejudices between Muslim and Christian groups. MAP is a non-government organization, consisting of youths, ex-combatants and social workers, that trains young Christians and Muslims in kampongs and villages to speak about peace and to work together. Coffee Badati is a youth organization in which Muslims and Christians co-operate to promote solidarity and harmony by organizing musical performances and sporting competitions. The Moluccan Interfaith Institute is an organization of both Christian and Muslim religious leaders that attempts to reduce religious conflict by dialogue and discussion. Although these organizations have different activities and strategies, they share the same goal: to stimulate harmony

6 An *ojek* is a motorcycle taxi that carries passengers riding pillion.

between different groups, reduce tensions and prevent the escalation of violence in Ambon city.

The peace efforts of government and activists are favourably received, as the majority of people in Ambon are no longer willing to become involved in conflict. The violence has brought suffering from the death and injury of relatives, the loss of property, displacement and a lack of food supplies. They shoulder the burden of traumatic experiences that make their daily lives difficult enough, without the added problems brought about by suspicion and distrust of people and groups. Most people believe that violence leads to nothing. Only people who wish to take advantage of the conflict may provoke violence again.

On almost all levels of society, people believe that a revival of *pela* can prevent conflict and make sustainable peace in Ambon possible. *Pela* is a traditional institutionalised bond of friendship or brotherhood between two or more Moluccan villages (cf. Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009: 66-67). Apart from in a few villages, *pela* did not function well during the conflict, but is now being used again as a symbol of unification and restoration of broken relationships between villages in the peace-building process (Bräuchler, 2009: 879). After the conflict, several villages renewed their *pela* relations to prevent new conflicts; in 2003, for example, the leader of the predominantly Muslim village of Tulehu invited their *pela* partner, the Christian village of Hulaliu, to renew their pact to help and protect each other. Inhabitants of both villages performed a ritual called 'kindling *pela*' (*panas pela*). During the conflict, Christians from Hulaliu had been afraid to pass Tulehu, because its people had attacked the village of Waai of which the majority of the population are Christians. By renewing the *pela* pact with Hulaliu, the people of Tulehu also made peace with Christian Waai. In 2006, Batu Merah and Passo also renewed their oath to help and protect their *pela* partners by 'kindling *pela*'. Following the ritual, the predominantly Christian people of Passo provided material and labour for the renovation of the mosque in Batu Merah, which was damaged during the conflict.

1.2.4.2. Yogyakarta

The Special Region of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta* or DIY) is situated in the southern part of central Java, between the Indian Ocean in the south and the Merapi volcano in the north. It is divided into one municipality and four regencies: the city of Yogyakarta and the regencies of Bantul, Gunung Kidul, Kulon Progo and Sleman. My research area consists of the city of Yogyakarta and the highly urbanized adjacent regencies of Bantul and Sleman. I refer to this area as 'greater Yogyakarta'.

Yogyakarta was founded in 1756 as a result of the Gianti Treaty, which divided the Mataram kingdom into two principalities: Surakarta (Solo) and Yogyakarta. Both principalities were given self-rule, but were overseen by the Dutch. Paku Buwono III, a descendent of the king of Mataram, continued to govern Surakarta, while

Hamengku Buwono I, his uncle, became the ruler of Yogyakarta. Originally, the areas were poorly defined, as the division was based on numbers of *cacah*, households, rather than geographic territories. Each principality numbered 53,100 *cacah* in their central area and around 30.000 *cacah* in their outlying regions.[7] The present Sultan of Yogyakarta and Surakarta are direct descendants of these first rulers.

Figure 1.2 Map of the Special Region of Yogyakarta



Source: http://www.pip2bdiy.org/sigperkim/peta.php

In 1833, the number of inhabitants in the court city of Yogyakarta totalled 283,820. Between 1890 and 1905 the population grew from 785,473 to 1,100,000 (Haryono,

7 The central area of Yogyakarta comprised *Nagari Ngayogyakarto* (the capital), *Nagara Agung* (the main region), and *Mancanegara* (the outlying region). *Nagari Ngayogyakarto* consisted of the current area of Yogyakarta Special Region and part of the current Central Java province. *Mancanegara* consisted of Surabaya, Kediri, Madiun, Rembang and Semarang. The present size is the result of the Constitution of 1945, which defined Yogyakarta as an autonomous region within the Indonesian state. The area is 3,185.80 km^2.

2009:8). In 1930, the year of the first official census, the city had 1,558,844 inhabitants: 914,939 natives, 7,158 Europeans and others of the same status, 11,710 Chinese, and 201 other Foreign Orientals (*Volkstelling 1930*, 1931a: 2-3).

In the first census after Indonesian independence, in 1961, the inhabitants of the Special Region of Yogyakarta totalled 2,233,791. Between 1971 and 1980, the population increased steadily from 2,488,544 to 2,750,128, and between 2000 and 2010 from 3,120,478 to 3,457,491 (BPS-DIY, 2011). Table 1.5 shows that the city has a high population density. The highest density is in the municipality or city of Yogyakarta, followed by the regency of Sleman and the regency of Bantul respectively.

Table 1.7 Population and population density in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, 2010

Municipality/ Regency	Population		Area		Density (Person/Km²)
	N	%	Km²	%	
Yogyakarta	388,627	11.24	32.50	1.02	11,957. 75
Sleman	1,093,110	31.62	574.82	18.04	1,901.67
Bantul	911,503	26.36	506.85	15.91	1,798.37
Kulon Progo	388,869	11.25	586.27	18.40	663.29
Gunung Kidul	675,382	19.53	1,485.36	46.63	454.69
Total	3,457,491	100.00	3,185.80	100.00	1,085.28

Source: BPS-DIY, 2011.

Although Javanese make up the majority of the population, several minority groups have lived in Yogyakarta ever since its foundation. In the past, both the indigenous population and foreign minorities lived in their own quarters. The original names for those quarters still exist, and reflect the ethnic groups who lived there. For instance, Kranggan and Ketandan were the Chinese quarters; Kotabaru (New Town) and Loji Kecil were Dutch; Kampung Bugisan was originally the quarter for Buginese, who mainly worked as soldiers at the royal court; Kampung Menduran was Madurese and Sayidan the quarter for Arabs. Although quite a number of Chinese still live in the old Chinese quarter and most of its buildings are owned by Chinese, the majority moved to new areas after independence.

Nowadays, a greater variety of ethnicities live in the city than in the past, although with the exception of Javanese, most groups are quite small. The census of 2010 gives a good picture of the ethnic composition of the population (see Table 1.6). Of the small ethnic groups, Sundanese, Malay and Chinese are larger in number

than Batak, Madurese, Dayak and groups from East Nusa Tenggara. Students from beyond greater Yogyakarta are not represented in the table, as they are registered as temporary migrants.

Table 1.8 Ethnic composition of the Special Region of Yogyakarta, 2010.

Ethnicity	N	%
Javanese	3,331,355	96,54
Sundanese	23,572	0.68
Malay	15,430	0.45
Chinese	11,545	0.33
Batak	9,858	0.29
Madurese	5,289	0.15
Minangkabau	5,152	0.15
East Nusa Tenggara	4,238	0.12
Dayak	3,790	0.11
South Sumatera	3,629	0.11
Others	36,986	1.07
Total	3,450,844	100.00

Source: BPS, 2011: 34

In 2010, 90.27% of the population was Muslim. Muslims have always made up the majority of the city's population; the majority are nominal Muslims (*abangan*), but the number of pious Muslims (*santri*) has increased dramatically in recent decades. At the end of the 19th century, Christianity was introduced, first Protestantism and later Catholicism. Besides spreading their faith and building churches, Catholic and Protestant missionaries also built hospitals and schools. Over the years, the number of Catholics surpassed the number of Protestants. Buddhist and Hindus are also present in the area, but their numbers are small.

Table 1.9 The religious composition of greater Yogyakarta, 2010

Religion	N	%
Islam	2,078,032	90.27
Protestantism	75,706	3.29
Catholicism	141,346	6.14
Hinduism	3,219	0.14
Buddhism	3,485	0.15
Confucianism	35	0.00
Others	108	0.01
Total	2,301,931	100.00

Source: BPS DIY, 2011:181

During colonial times, most native migrants came from the Javanese countryside. After Yogyakarta had become the capital of the Indonesian Republic (1946-1949), more migrants from elsewhere in the archipelago came to the city. Between 2001 and 2010, about 278,233 people migrated to greater Yogyakarta (Handiyatmo, 2010: 13). The highest number of migrants is registered in the regency of Sleman (48.15%) followed by the regency of Bantul (22.58 %) and the municipality of Yogyakarta (20.74%). The higher migration to Sleman and Bantul is the result of the housing development policy of Yogyakarta, which has stimulated settlement in these regencies instead of in the city since the 1990s. Although most migrants live in Bantul and Sleman, a great number of them commute daily to the city to work.

Political situation

In Yogyakarta, the dominant political orientation is secular and nationalist, as the parliamentary election results for the special region of Yogyakarta since 1955 make clear. In the recent election of 2009, 29 political parties competed for seats: 21 secular and nationalist, 6 Muslim and 2 Christian. The secular and nationalist parties, including the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), the Functional Groups Party (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar), the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), the People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura), and the Great Indonesian Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) received 61% of the votes. The Islamic parties, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the

Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the National Sun Party (Partai Matahari Bangsa), and the Ulema National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, PKNU) won the rest. The two Christian parties, the Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS) and the Love the Nation Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, PDKB), did not win any seats in the regional parliament, having obtained 0.8% of the votes, far below the electoral threshold of 15%.

Many Christians voted for secular parties, such as the PDI-P, which won 21% of the vote. The Democratic Party, which in the same year won the elections for the national parliament with 21% votes, became the second biggest party in the special region of Yogyakarta with 14% of the vote. The National Mandate Party (PAN), affiliated to Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, won only 12%, despite having its headquarters and the greatest number of organization members in the city.[8] It is clear that the nationalist and secular groups, supported by *abangan* and Christians, dominate politics in Yogyakarta.

The process of law reform, which has given rise to national political controversies, has also had an influence on the region. For example, Muslim groups on the one hand and secular and nationalist groups on the other became polarized both in and outside parliament during the preparation of an anti-pornography bill (Rencana Undang-Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi, RUU APP). The bill was promoted by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1999, and was discussed by the national parliament in 2006. The debates attracted a great deal of attention; it was an emotive issue that effectively divided those for and against the bill. In March, April and May 2006 a series of mass demonstrations by both pro and contra took place in several big cities, including Yogyakarta. The supporters of the bill included, besides MUI, Islamic organizations such as the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI), the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI), HTI (Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia) and the Social Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sosial, PKS). During their demonstrations, they would shout slogans such as, “Against pornography and porn-actions, save the nation’s morality!”, “Only under shariah can Indonesia be civilized!”, or “Porn culture is the child of secularism!” Opposition to these groups came from artists, activists, academics and traditional leaders who joined groups such as Unity in Diversity Alliance (Aliansi Bineka Tunggal Ika) and Yogyakarta for Diversity Alliance (Yogyakarta untuk Keberagaman). With messages such as “RUU APP is not the solution to moral degradation,” “Indonesia is not America, but also not Arabia: reject pornography, reject RUU APP,” or “Keep creativity alive, respect diversity,” they showed their

8 http://www.kpud-diyprov.go.id/main.php?hal=arsip

concern about the content of the anti-pornography bill, with its enforcement of a single narrow-minded moral perspective. Although the religious polarization brought tensions, it did not lead to violent conflict.

In 2011, a national decentralization reform bill stipulated that all governors and vice-governors in Indonesia should be elected, which created great political consternation in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (Undang-Undang Keistimewaan Yogyakarta); the bill opposed the hereditary position of the sultan and paku alam as the region's leaders, which had been granted to them by the first president of Indonesia in 1945 (Poerwokoesoemo, 1984:15). As some Muslim leaders favoured direct election, Christians and *Kejawen* (adherents of an amalgamous Javanese religious tradition) suspected that their plan was to replace the sultan with an elected Muslim governor, and to create "*Yogyakarta Serambi Madinah*'' (Yogyakarta, veranda of Medina).[9] The tensions declined when the national government eventually decided to maintain the hereditary position of sultan and paku alam as governor and vice-governor of Yogyakarta.[10] The fact that the position of these traditional leaders was preserved demonstrates the strong influence of secular and nationalist groups on the local politics of the region. For them, the sultan is not only a symbol of Javanese Islamic syncretism; even though he is a *santri* himself, but also a leader who stands above the religious groups.

Economic situation

The urban area of greater Yogyakarta has a diverse economy. Its major economic sectors encompass trade, services (hotels, restaurants), transportation, small industry, street vending, tourism and education. The last two sectors in particular heavily influence the informal sector (souvenir industry, boarding houses). The unemployment level is relatively low. In August 2011, it stood at about 4.8% of the labour population (BPS-DIY, 2012: 93). Nonetheless, a relatively high number of people live below the poverty line. The average income per capita in greater Yogyakarta is less than IDR 300,000 monthly, while the regional minimum wage is IDR 745,694 per month. In the city of Yogyakarta, the poor number about 9.75% of the population, and 10.70% and 16.09% in Sleman and Bantul respectively (BPS-DIY, 2012: 235).

Although Javanese can be found in almost every economic sector, some ethnic groups dominate certain jobs, such as the Madurese who are active as barbers and sate-sellers, and Minangkabau who run Padang restaurants or sell souvenirs as vendors along Malioboro Street. Chinese dominate the wholesale business and the

9 The idea of Yogyakarta as veranda of Medina is inspired by the position of Aceh as veranda of Mecca.

10 Declaration of Law No. 13/ 2012, Article 18c.

trade in gold, building materials, electronic goods and food. The production and sale of handicraft products such as *batik*, silver and leather are the domain of Javanese businessmen. Some of them also own guest houses and hotels. Generally speaking, Chinese businessmen with or without Indonesian citizenship are economically better off than those from other ethnic groups, even though they still suffer discrimination: they are, for example, not allowed to live in *kampong* (quarters) within the walls of the *kraton*. They still have no rights to own land, although they can own houses and other buildings in the city (Susanto, 2008: 137-138). Chinese also cannot become civil servants or military officers and have to pay higher bribes to officials than others.

Due to the increasing Islamization which started at the end of the New Order and continued during the reformation, the production and distribution of products specifically for Muslims become more and more lucrative. Nowadays, Yogyakarta has special shops for Muslim dresses, veils and perfume; it has shariah banks, *halal* restaurants, Muslim publishing houses, and businessmen who trade in Islamic real estate. The veil has become popular since the New Order allowed students to wear it at school and university. Muslim dress (*busana Muslim*) and fashionable accessories with an Islamic label are produced by fashion designers and displayed in stores in the local malls. Cheaper varieties are sold in the traditional markets. Muslim dress is also the uniform in Islamic schools and offices. Some real estate contractors promote housing in complexes with an exclusively Islamic atmosphere ("Mosque nearby", "Muslim neighbours"). Darrusalam, Yogya Terrace and Baitus Sakinah are examples of these real estate projects that are aimed exclusively at Muslim buyers. Religious labels for consumer products have made the boundaries between Muslims and other religious denominations more visible in everyday life.

Socio-cultural situation

As a student city, Yogyakarta has a large number of students from a wide range of ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, who come from all over Indonesia. In 2011, the number of students at universities in greater Yogyakarta totalled 239,128, consisting of 103,627 students at the 10 state universities and 135,501 students at about 115 private universities (including institutions of higher education, such as academies and polytechnics). About 60% of university students are not registered as inhabitants of Yogyakarta because they are temporary residents in the city (BPS DIY, 2012: 159).

Most students from other regions live in boarding houses situated around their campus. Most of these boarding houses accept students irrespective of their religion, but some accommodate Muslim students only. A small number of students from other regions stay in dormitories provided by their regional governments. There are about 30 of these dormitories in Yogyakarta, such as *Meurapi Duwa* for Aceh students, *Saweri Gading* for Makassarese students, *Wisma Bukit Barisan* for North

Sumatra students, *Wisma Bundo Kanduang* for female students of West-Sumatera, and *Kamasan* for West Papua students, to name just a few. The relationship between students and permanent residents in a *kampong* is generally speaking good, although now and then conflicts arise between students and local inhabitants or between students of different ethnic groups. For instance, a Makassar dormitory was attacked by Ambonese students after a street fight on January 15, 2008; the incident was triggered by a quarrel between a Makassarese and an Ambonese in a discotheque. This led several friends of the Makassarese to beat the Ambonese, who was alone. In retaliation and to express their solidarity, other Ambonese attacked the dormitory of the Makassarese the next day.[11]

Ethnic discrimination clearly exists among the inhabitants of Yogyakarta. Many landlords refuse Papua and Batak tenants in their boarding houses because members of these ethnic groups are seen as trouble-makers. People complain that they drink alcohol or use drugs, or throw parties that disturb the neighbourhood. According to the chairman of the Catholic Union of University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI), a number of students from Papua were seriously beaten in the city[12] – without any investigation by the police.

Increasingly, religious identity has become a factor in the selection of room boarders. A growing number of Muslim house owners accept only Muslim tenants, the main reason being their desire to maintain Muslim purity. The presence of non-halal food and the smell of pork, or habits that are strictly forbidden for Muslims, such as exposing certain parts of the body or drinking liquor are seen as threats to the Muslim lifestyle. Boarders have to prove their religion by showing their identity cards (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk*). Some boarding houses are even limited to female students wearing veils.

1.3. Historical sketch of Ambon and Yogyakarta

1.3.1. History of Ambon

Ethno-religious conflict has occurred in Ambon since pre-colonial times, particularly since the introduction of Islam. During colonial times, such conflict erupted as a result of political intervention and economic control over the production and distribution of spices. The conversion of part of the native population to Christianity also led to increasing tensions between Muslims and Christians. Religious segregation started with the implementation of colonial policies that favoured the education of Christian

11 Interview with the chairman of the Indonesian Nationalist Students' Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI) on 27 October, 2011.

12 Interview with the chairman of the Catholic Union of University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia,PMKRI) on 8 July 2011.

inhabitants, and the recruitment of clerks and soldiers from among them. After independence, Christian Ambonese felt threatened at the prospect of living in a state that was dominated by Muslims. The tensions between Christians and Muslims became heightened at the end of the New Order, when Muslim migrants took over important positions in government and business from Christians. Between 1999 and 2002, a bloody conflict erupted between the two main religious groups in Ambon and neighbouring islands.

Political changes

When the Portuguese arrived in the Moluccas in 1512, the islands were under the influence of one of four competing sultanates in the area: Ternate, Tidore, Jailolo and Bacan.[13]Ambon, still a relatively isolated island, fell within the sphere of the sultanate of Ternate. Politically, Ambon was divided into villages (*negeri*) with a high degree of autonomy, whose inhabitants claimed to descend from the same ancestors. A *negeri* consisted of a varying number of extended families (*lumatau)* that belonged to the same lineage or *uku* (Leirissa, et al, 1982:1).

As elsewhere in the Moluccas, there were two types of inter-village alliance: *ulisiwa* and *ulilima*. *Ulisiwa* were associations of nine villages, and *ulilima* associations of five. These two types of associations regarded each other as enemies. On Ambon island, *ulisiwa* were situated in Leitimor and the south coast of Hitu, while *ulilima* were only found on the north coast of Hitu (Cooley, 1962: 6-18; Bartels, 1977: 26-27). The function of these associations was for the villages to help each other in times of disaster, calamity or war. Competition, tension and violent conflict between *ulisiwa* and *ulilima* were frequent. The population of the *ulilima* had already embraced Islam and was more influenced by the sultanate of Ternate than the inhabitants of *ulisiwa*, who remained 'heathen' until the Portuguese engaged them in the spice trade in the 1530s. From then on, many *ulisiwa* villagers converted to Catholicism to obtain protection from the Portuguese against their Muslim enemies, who were backed by the Sultan of Ternate (van Fraassen, 1983:5).

The Portuguese built a fortress in Ternate in 1522, and initially bought cloves from the local traders for the European market. The traders used Ambon only as a source of water and other refreshments on the shipping route between Banda, where they bought nutmeg and mace, and the northern Moluccas, where they bought cloves. Once the Portuguese had intervened in local politics and converted Moluccans to Catholicism, they were expelled from Ternate in 1576 by troops that

13 The Sultan of Ternate claimed sovereignty in the central part of the Moluccas, the eastern part of Sulawesi and the southern part of Mindanao, while Tidore was powerful in south-east Halmahera, the Raja Ampat islands, the northern coast of Bird Head's peninsula and the Biak Islands (Warnk, 2010: 111).

included Muslim Javanese and Arab descendants from Makassar. Moluccans who had converted to Catholicism also became targets for attack; if caught, they were forced to accept Islam to prove their loyalty to the sultan and were killed if they refused (Andaya, 1993: 134; Heuken SJ, 2008: 19, 34; Bartels, 2010: 226).

A much smaller Portuguese settlement on Ambon Island had in fact been built earlier, in 1513, on the north coast of Hitu at the mouth of a small river between the villages of Hitulama and Mamala. However, a conflict with the Hituese forced them to move from the north to the south coast of Hitu in 1524. As Portuguese influence was growing in Ambon, in 1558 the Sultan of Ternate appointed a governor for Hitu who was stationed with a military unit on the opposite coast in Hoamoal (Ceram), and whose main task was to support the Muslims in their fight against the Portuguese. After a series of attacks, the Portuguese decided to move again: in 1572 they built a new fortification on Leitimor peninsula, which eventually developed into the city of Ambon. In 1605, they were forced to leave the island (van Fraassen, 1983:2-13; Widjojo, 2007:11-12). In 1599 the Dutch had landed on Ambon and forged an alliance with Ternate; the allies had then succeeded in defeating the Portuguese together.

Between 1605 and 1796, Ambon and the Lease islands were ruled by the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Since their arrival in the archipelago, the Dutch tried to control the spice trade completely, first by introducing a trade monopoly (1619) and later by introducing a production monopoly (1627). From 1610 until the founding of Batavia in 1619, Ambon was the headquarters of the VOC in the Indian archipelago. During the monopoly system, the economy of Ambon flourished from the spice trade. All spices from the Moluccas were collected there before being shipped to Europe via Batavia. When the centre moved to Batavia, Ambon became the capital of the *Afdeeling* (sub-region) of the same name.

In 1656, the Dutch began to resettle the population of Ambon, Lease, Hoamoal, East Ceram and Buru to prevent resistance to Dutch rule (Bräuchler, 2010: 68). This resettlement policy obliged all inhabitants to move to easily controllable villages along the coast and all village heads to come under Dutch supervision (Cooley, 1966: 139; Bartels, 1977:27). In these new settings, Muslims started to live in Muslim villages (former *ulilima*) and Christians in Christian villages (former *ulisiwa*) (Chauvel, 1990: 4-5). In the course of the resettlement, the population of villages formerly belonging to *ulisiwa* gradually converted from Catholicism to Protestantism. However, there was no special support from the VOC for the growth of Protestantism at this stage; pastoral activities were initiated by local churches without its support. There were no differences between Muslims and Christians with regard to taxes and compulsory services levied by the company (van Fraassen, 1983:18-19).

Short occupations of the islands by the British between 1796-1803 and 1810-1817 did not change the political system significantly, although they did increase the supply of consumer goods and openly supported the missionary and educational

activities of the Protestant church. When the Dutch returned to the islands in 1817, a rebellion broke out in Saparua, Ceram and Ambon to demand that they improve their treatment of the population (Noldus, 1984:177-180). This rebellion led the Dutch government to reconsider the monopoly system, in particular the compulsory labour service for clove production that was introduced in 1627, and the *hongi* expeditions to combat illegal production and smuggling. In 1864, when the price of the spice dropped drastically on the world market, the monopoly system was completely abolished and the colonial government decided to put an end to compulsory labour services.

In the first half of the 19th century, many Ambonese tried to raise their status from villager to *burger* (burgher) to free themselves from compulsory clove production labour, and to earn a wage or salary instead. This status of *burger* could be obtained via a pass (*vrijbrief*) from the government. In order to obtain one, Ambonese had to prove that they had a paid job in the city. Burgher status could also be achieved through education in the Ambonesche Burgerschool (ABS), which was founded by the government to recruit civil servants. Most of the Ambonese burghers worked as civil servants, carpenters and boatmen, peddlers (*penjaja*) and manual labourers (*tenaga serabutan*) (Leirissa, 1995: 3-10). From the beginning, more Christians than Muslims became burghers, because Muslims were reluctant to work for the predominantly Christian colonial government. As a result, Muslims held marginal positions until the burgher status disappeared in the second decade of the 20th century (Leirissa, 2000:626). It was only during the Japanese occupation of World War II and after Indonesian independence that an increasing number of Muslims succeeded in getting better, or even prominent, positions in society (van Fraassen, 1983: 32- 38; Bartels, 2010: 226).

When the Dutch left the islands after the recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949, the Moluccans who had benefitted from their loyalty to the colonial state felt threatened by the new Republic of Indonesia. To stem the tide, members of the Moluccan elite, mainly Protestants with just a few Muslims, proclaimed the South Moluccan Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS). Those who feared losing their former privileged position in the new Republic of Indonesia sympathised with the RMS. The violent action of the Indonesian army in 1950 against the RMS led to the immediate departure of 4,000 Moluccan soldiers of the *Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indische Leger* (KNIL, Dutch Indies Army) and their relatives to the Netherlands (Chauvel, 1990: 396; Bartels, 1977:11-12).

Religion continued to influence politics in Ambon after independence; political parties often used religion as a banner under which to gain supporters. In 1955, when the first national election was held, the Indonesian Christian Party (Partai Kristen Indonesia, Parkindo) obtained 49.36% of the votes, the Islamic Masyumi 24.10%, and the Indonesia Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, PNI) 7.89%

(van Klinken, 2008:12). In 1971, Parkindo won 35%, Golkar 32%, the Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslim Indonesia, Parmusi) 10% and Nahdatul Ulama Party (Partai Nahdatul Ulama, PNU) 5%. When the New Order reduced the number of political parties to three in 1973, Golkar, which they controlled completely, always won a majority.[14] In 1977 and 1997, Golkar obtained 62.11% and 74.51% of the vote respectively.

In the new political landscape that followed reformation, the religious groups demanded greater powers and representation in local government (Klinken, 2005:101 and 2007: 158), something that the secular parties were prepared to consider. In the general elections of 1999 and 2004, the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) obtained the highest number of votes in Ambon: 54.29% and 26.67% respectively. Even though it was a secular party with a nationalist ideology, PDI-P attracted many Christian voters on the island. In 2009, it lost many followers, but still won a majority in the city. As mentioned earlier, a great number of voters moved to other secular parties including the Democratic Party, Golkar, Hanura and Gerindra. This swing to secular and national parties was the result of their proposed accommodation of Christians and Muslims who demanded a 'religious balance' in government policies and in the recruitment of civil servants in the region.

Far-reaching political change at village level took place in Ambon in the 1980s, when a new type of village administration was introduced throughout Indonesia. New village government (*desa)* replaced the traditional *negeri* and reduced the authority of the *adat* leaders.[15] Village administration came under direct control of the government, which also appointed the leaders. More often than not, traditional *adat* leaders were passed over for these positions. Due to the increasing migrant population, new villages were also founded (Lee, 1997: 68-72). Just like traditional villages, they were formed along religious lines, because migrants chose to settle in places in which their own religion was dominant. In these new migrant villages *adat* did not, of course, play the role it performed in traditional villages.

When the New Order government came to an end, the division between Christians and Muslims was more sharply defined than ever before. After the downfall of the Soeharto regime, the prolonged tensions between Muslims and

14 In 1973, the New Order government reduced the existing political landscape to three parties. The Islamic-oriented political parties merged into the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), and the nationalist, Protestant and Catholic parties fused into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI). The third, new, political party was the Functional Group (Golongan Karya, Golkar) that became the electoral vehicle of the military-backed New Order government.

15 Law No. 5/1979 concerning the village governance system and mechanism of village leadership.

Christians led to an outbreak of violence in Ambon and neighbouring islands such as Haruku, Saparua, Buru, Kei and Ternate (Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009: 59-61). According to Varshney et al. (2010: 40-43) the conflict killed between 4,000 and 5,000 people in the Moluccas, 1,097 on Ambon alone. In the city, 12,249 houses were damaged and 106 government offices, and 636 stores and kiosks were looted and burnt down (Manuputty and Watimanela, 2004: 128); 170,590 inhabitants were internally displaced, and public services were paralyzed (Yanuarti, 2003: 40-41). This violent conflict increased prejudice, suspicion and distrust between Muslims and Christians and widened religious segregation yet further.

Economic changes

The population of the Moluccas originally made a living as peasants, hunters and gatherers (Stark and Latinis, 1996: 52-53). Trade become more important from the 11th century onwards, when Asian traders became interested in cloves, nutmeg and mace for culinary and pharmacological use (Knaap, 1986:66-67). As stated above, these traders dominated the spice trade until around 1500, when it was gradually taken over by Westerners, first the Portuguese and then the Dutch (van Fraassen, 1983:1-8). From the beginning, the VOC tried to monopolize the trade in cloves in Hitu and Hoamoal, and in nutmeg and mace in Banda, by excluding Javanese, Makassarese and Malaccan traders who had exchanged these commodities for rice, cloths and other goods. The trade monopoly was enforced by obliging the population to sell spices only to the company or to traders operating with VOC's permission. In 1609, the company made a monopolizing contract for the purchase of cloves with the chiefs of Hitu and Hoamoal, and in 1621 forced the population of Banda to sell their nutmegs and mace to VOC exclusively. Peasants, traders and villagers who undermined the monopoly were punished.

Besides a trade monopoly, the company introduced a production monopoly in 1627. This only allowed clove cultivation in Ambon and forbade production in Hoamoal. The villagers of Ambon were obliged to cultivate according to VOC's directions and to sell for a fixed price to the company. Village leaders were assigned to control the system (van Fraassen, 1983:18). By way of compensation, these leaders received 4% of clove sales from their villages (Braithwaite and Dunn, 2010: 148). The production monopoly benefitted the economic position of Christian Ambonese more than that of Muslims, as clove production mainly increased, over time, in areas where Christians lived. As Christians were also given more privileged positions in both the production and distribution spheres, the social and economic gap between Muslims and Christians eventually became larger.

To prevent people from selling spices beyond the monopoly system, the VOC also forced Ambonese villages to hand over rowers for boats used to control smuggling. During these punishment expeditions or *hongi-tochten*, 'illegal' production sites were

also destroyed (Bartels, 1977: 124). Between 1641 and 1646, the Hituese violently resisted the interference of the company, as did the populations of Hoamoal, East Ceram and Buru between 1651 and 1656. After the Dutch had succeeded in repressing these insurrections, they took complete control of the clove trade and production on the islands (Knaap, 1992: 21; Widjojo, 2007:26).

In 1864, the Dutch put an end to the spice monopoly because the international market for spices decreased sharply, and Java had already become a centre for much more valuable export commodities such as sugar, tobacco and indigo (Chandler et al., 2005:130). The declining value of spice as a commodity caused Ambonese to abandon their clove plantations. To survive, many farmers tried to cultivate new introduced crops, such as coconut, cacao and tobacco, but they did not succeed (Chauvel, 1990: 14). 8,060 Ambonese who had previously worked as village clove farmers became manual labourers or administrators in the colonial government (Leirissa, 1995: 4). As described in the previous section, they obtained *burger* status once they had found salaried positions.

Ambonese Christians were favoured over Muslims as employees of the colonial government. This was partly because the Dutch trusted Christians more, but also because the Christian education was better, thus making Christians better equipped work for the government; some had studied in schools established by Protestant missionaries. Conversely, Muslims were neither interested in working for the colonial government, nor had they studied at Christian schools because of their concerns about being converted to Protestantism. Protestants and, to a lesser degree, Catholics found privileged roles as, for example, bureaucrats, middlemen, doctors, nurses, teachers and soldiers across the whole colony, while Muslims mainly worked as petty traders, sailors and fishermen (Bertrand, 2002: 62-63). As only Protestants took advantage of the education system to fill bureaucratic and military positions in Ambon and elsewhere in the western part of the Dutch Indies, the economical division between Protestants and Muslims had intensified by the end of the 19th century (Bartels, 1977: 11).

This economic polarization along religious lines rose to unprecedented heights in the first half of the 20th century and during the Old Order regime that followed independence. It only started to change during the New Order regime (1966-1998), a change that was enhanced by migration from Sulawesi and Java. The number of migrants, most of whom were Muslims, increased from the beginning of the 1970s. Muslims from Buton and Makassar moved spontaneously to Ambon to seek employment, while many Javanese, again mainly Muslims, came as members of transmigration projects initiated by the government. This influx of Muslim migrants gradually took over local trade, transportation and established commercial enterprises, thus becoming a threat to, and reducing the economic opportunities for Ambonese Christians. As a result, the Ambonese saw Muslim outsiders become

wealthier than themselves, and dominate these areas of the economy (Goss, 2000:19-20).

As a result of the shifting balance between the number of Muslims and Christians in Ambon and the interference of the central government in Jakarta, towards the end of the New Order Muslims began to obtain more and more of the key jobs in the administration, such as that of governor, vice-major, and head of department (Bertrand, 2002: 67-71). Although the balance is still in favour of Christians, the competition and tensions between Muslims and Christians was without doubt the main trigger for violence in the closing years of the Suharto regime (van Klinken, 2001: 18; Sidel, 2008: 37-38).

Educational and religious developments

Islam was introduced to the Moluccas in the middle of the 15th century by Javanese, Malay and Arab merchants and wayfarers. It began to spread when the kings of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo in the northern part had embraced the new faith shortly afterwards (van Fraassen, 1883: 2; Chauvel, 1990: 1-23, Bräuchler, 2010a: 67). Before the arrival of Islam, the Ambonese practised an indigenous animistic belief system called *Nunusaku*. According to this belief, the ancestors of the Ambonese originally came from a sacred mountain of the same name. After a quarrel among them, their descendants were divided into Patasiwa and Patalima. Despite this division, they promised to respect one another and maintain harmony and solidarity (Bartels, 1977: 313-320). As already stated, Islam mainly developed in *ulilima* villages in Northern Leihitu (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:32). During the presence of the Portuguese on the island, the population of Leihitu remained predominantly Muslim, while Catholicism took root among of the rest of population. In 1605, when the Dutch replaced the Portuguese, there were about 16,000 baptized Catholics in Ambon and Lease (Chauvel, 1990:18), the majority of whom were gradually converted to Protestantism during the VOC period.

Besides proselytizing the indigenous population, Christian missionaries established health services and schools in several locations on the island. By 1618, a teacher-training school had already been founded in Ambon. Schoolteachers became the main agents for the spread of Protestantism, as they acted as local religious leaders at the same time. Between 1633 and 1860, the number of primary schools in the *Afdeeling* Ambon increased from 32 with 1,200 pupils to 54 with 5,190 pupils. Schools became the main forum for introducing Protestantism (Chauvel, 1990:25).

The VOC was replaced by the colonial state at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1823, the colonial government started to support educational activities initiated by Reformed Protestant missionaries in the Moluccas by paying the salaries of village teachers. Between 1817 and 1871, village teachers were made responsible for both teaching in the schools and leading religious services in the churches.

Over that period, Muslims were reluctant to send their children to school for fear that they would be converted to Christianity. Even when the colonial government separated school and church in 1871, they were not willing to send their children to schools they associated with the colonial system. Hence, Ambonese Christians benefitted much more from the development of education, particularly when the colonial government's demand grew for educated people to serve as teachers, nurses, administrators or soldiers across the whole archipelago (Chauvel, 1990: 25-38; Steenbrink and Tapilatu, 2008: 383-400). The development of the education system thus widened the gap between Muslims and Christians and led to a closer relationship between Ambonese Christians and the Dutch over the course of the 19th century.

In 1821, there were 30,435 Protestants in the Moluccas, a number that had increased to 35,877 by 1837 (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008: 389). In 1842, the Protestant Church of the Indies (*Indische kerk*) was founded, in order to organize missionary activities more systematically. It trained native teacher-preachers for the confessional schools; their tasks were to lead Sunday services, to lead catechesis and pay pastoral visits to native congregations. In 1885, the theological school (*School tot Opleiding van Inlandse Leraren*, STOVIL) was founded to educate native ministers; in the 1930s, there were 347 such ministers. Since 1935, the Protestant churches of the islands have been united under the synod of the Moluccan Protestant Church (Gereja Protestant Maluku, GPM).

The rise of Protestantism gradually led to a division between Muslims and Protestants in the Moluccas. The Protestant church began to use Malay in its religious services, which led to a decline in the use of local languages in Protestant villages. In Muslim villages, however, the local vernacular remained the principal language. Given that Malay had become the lingua franca in the archipelago, it was also used interchangeably with Dutch as a language of education in schools. Dutch was taught to enable pupils to read the Bible and religious publications that were only available in that language. In 1665, all schools in the Moluccas began to use Malay, when the Dutch government in Batavia decided to no longer encourage the teaching of Dutch; it was not only difficult to develop as a means of communication on the islands, but was also too expensive to teach in schools (Groeneboer, 1994: 1-10).

However, at the beginning of the 20th century, Dutch was adopted once more as the language of education, both in three Dutch native primary schools (*Hollandsch-Inlandsche Scholen*, HIS) and the secondary school (*Middelbaar Uitgebreid Lagere Onderwijs*, MULO) in Ambon. In Saparua, Dutch was likewise taught at the HIS. In 1926, the total number of pupils in Dutch language schools totalled 2,846. Most pupils who graduated from these schools became colonial government officers. In 1920, the Dutch government also built schools in six Muslim villages in Ambon, but only one survived until 1930 (Chauvel, 1990: 28-32). Muslims were not inclined to

study at these modern schools, since they suspected that they would be proselytized. However, there were very few traditional Islamic schools (*pesantren*) on the islands.

After independence, as well as the Protestant schools, Muslim and public schools were widely established in the villages. Public schools were located where there was a higher proportion of more Christian pupils, while Muslim schools were built in Muslim-dominated areas. Nowadays, most young people go on from primary education to secondary school, but only a few attend university. Both Christians and Muslims can pursue their studies at a state or private university in the city. The oldest state university is the University of Pattimura (Unpatti), which was founded by the government in 1962. Although Unpatti is the state university, Christians have outnumbered Muslims in terms of lecturers, administrative staff and students ever since its foundation. This has nothing to do with discriminatory policies toward Muslims, but is a reflection of the fact that Christians have a relatively higher level of education, and are thus better qualified for university positions. In the city of Ambon, Christian students have options other than Unppati; they can continue their studies at the Moluccan Christian University of Indonesia (Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, UKIM). This is the extension of the Theological School – Protestant Church of the Moluccas (Sekolah Tinggi Theologia – Gereja Protestan Maluku, STT GPM) that was founded in 1885 by Dutch missionaries. An institute for higher Muslim education was built in 1980 in Ambon. It started as a branch of the State Islamic Institute (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) of Sutan Alauddin in Makassar, and was developed into an independent institution as the State Islamic Academy of Ambon (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ambon) in 1997. It became the State Islamic Institute of Ambon in 2007.

Education in Ambon is affected by the religious tension between Muslims and Christians. During the violent conflict of 1999-2002, school and university buildings were the target of raids by both conflicting groups. Unpatti and UKIM were burnt down by Muslim groups, since both universities were seen as symbols of Christianity. Conversely, the Islamic schools were destroyed by Christians. Many students joined religious paramilitary groups such as Christ Soldiers (*Laskar Kristus*) for Christians, and Jihadist Soldiers (*Laskar Jihad*), Islamic Defender Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI), or Muslim Fighters (*Mujahidin*) (Mulyadi, 2003: 76). The conflict also deeply divided schools and other educational centres along religious lines. Even after the conflict had ended, pupils and students were still inclined to continue their studies in religiously homogenous schools and universities; state universities alone were attended by both Muslim and Christian students.

1.3.2. History of Yogyakarta

Political changes

The founding of Yogyakarta and Surakarta by the Gianti Treaty in 1755 was meant to end recurrent conflicts between claimants to the throne. However, the authority of the *sunan* was challenged by one of the Surakarta princes, Raden Mas Said. After fresh negotiations, he became ruler of a sub-region of Surakarta with 4,000 *cacah* (households) and was given the title of Mangkunegoro in 1757. A similar development took place in Yogyakarta during the British interregnum (1811-1816). A brother of Sultan Hamengku Buwono II, who had supported the British, received his own princely domain amounting to 4,000 *cacah*, and received the title *paku alam*. Both principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta were now divided into two regions, although for both pairs of areas, the terms Surakarta and Yogyakarta continued to be used. The rulers were allowed to demand taxes and labour from the households; a high proportion of the rights were given out in apanage to relatives of the sultan (*sentono dalem*) and court officials (*abdi dalem*) as remuneration for their services (Ricklefs, 1974:71-72).[16]

Between 1825 and 1830, Yogyakarta became the centre for the Java War which was started by a discontented relative of the sultan, Prince Diponegoro, against the Dutch. During the war, which spread through the whole of Central and Eastern Java, about 200,000 people died, including half the population of Yogyakarta. After the end of the war, the Dutch became more involved in the administration of the principalities than before and drastically restricted the authority of the sultan. Although they continued to govern indirectly, their influence on political and economic affairs gradually increased; for example, they allowed the apanage holders in Yogyakarta to lease their land rights to private plantations for the cultivation of crops such as indigo and tobacco (Soemardjan, 1962: 33; Shiraishi, 1990: 8-18).[17] Later, the government even permitted private plantations in the principalities to regulate the rights and obligations of the population in the apanage lands they were renting (Houben, 1989:193). Over time, the sultan also lost the right to appoint higher officials without the consent of the colonial administration. In fact, each time a new sultan came to the throne, he had to give up some of his traditional privileges. This interference by the Dutch in political and economic affairs gradually reduced the sultan's power; by

16 The apanage system is discussed further in the section on the economy.

17 In Yogyakarta, the apanage land leased to the Dutch plantations increased from 54,600 hectares in 1870 to 65,000 hectares in 1890. It comprised 46 indigo, 8 sugarcane and 6 tobacco plantations. The plantations expanded further after the construction of the railway connecting Yogyakarta with Batavia, Bandung, Semarang, Surakarta and Surabaya and the operation of tramways from Yogyakarta to Brosot and Parakan at the end of the 19th century (Shiraishi, 1990: 8-18).

the end of the 19th century, his court had been turned into little more than a centre for civilization, literature and the performing arts (Ricklefs, 2001:163-166).

In August 1945, the sultan and *paku alam* took the side of the Indonesian Republic. In 1946, Yogyakarta became the capital of the newly proclaimed Indonesian Republic. Shortly after the recognition of independence by the Dutch, it was granted the status of Special Region (Daerah Istimewa); the sultan and *paku alam* were appointed as its governor and vice governor.

Since 1955, a regional parliament has been elected every five years (alongside the national elections). In 1955, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) won 26% of the vote, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) 25%, and the Islamic parties Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama 19% and 15% respectively. During the New Order, when all political parties were condensed down to just three, Golkar, the party backed by the government, always won by a majority. In 1999, the first election after political reformation, nationalist and secular parties won significantly more votes than religious ones. Together PDI-P, the Democratic Party and Golkar Party won more than 60% of the vote in Yogyakarta. The religious parties attracted fewer votes, even though the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), which is affiliated to Muhammadiyah, has its headquarters in Yogyakarta. It did, however, win proportionally more votes in Yogyakarta than elsewhere.

The present Sultan Hamengku Bowono X has played an important role in diffusing ethnic and religious tensions in the region. For instance, when ethno-religious violence in the form of rioting against the Chinese spread to several areas of Indonesia in 1997, the sultan persuaded the people to stay calm. At the time, he also led large peaceful demonstrations in the front yard of his palace, demanding state reformation and the abdication of President Soeharto. The sultan, who entered politics as leader of the local Golkar Party, is held in great respect by the majority of inhabitants of Yogyakarta.

Besides political parties, several religious organizations are active in politics; sometimes, as in the case of PAN, in co-operation with parties. When a new law regarding the national education system was drafted in parliament in 2001, most Islamic organizations in Yogyakarta mobilized their supporters to demonstrate in favour of it, while Christian minority groups lobbied against it on the basis of a particular article. The controversy pertained to article 12, sub 1a of the proposed bill, which stated that: “Every student in an educational unit is entitled to receive religious education in accordance with his/her belief imparted by an educator who has the same religion.” Muslim supporters of the bill saw this as the reflection of fair democratic process, and a good way to prevent religious proselytization and conversion of their children in Protestant and Catholic schools. Christians, for their part, saw it as direct state intervention to install Islamic education in Protestant

and Catholic schools. Neither of these reactions dealt with the substantial issues of education, but the article lent itself to the reinforcement of prejudice and hostility within the public arena. Although there were no physical clashes, this sharp division on the basis of religion shaped tensions in society. However, when the bill was legalized in 2003, the protesters apparently accepted the outcome, as demonstrations and other forms of protest stopped.

Economic changes

As was common in Javanese kingdoms, the royal court of Yogyakarta depended on taxes and labour from the population, levied through an apanage system (*lungguh*). Apanage is an entitlement to returns from the land or other resources in areas assigned by the sultan and *paku alam* to relatives (*sentana dalem*) and high officials (*abdi dalem*) (Moertono, 1981: 117). The apanage holders demanded taxes in kind and labour from the peasant population, both for themselves and for the sultan or *paku alam*. They commonly extracted 2/5 of the rice harvest twice a year, of which 1/5 was left to the village head as the collector. Of their own share, the apanage holders had to pay 2/5 to the sultan (Margana, 2007:97). The size of apanage varied according to the administrative rank of the court officials and their closeness to the sultan. The number of households living in the apanage area depended on the status of the holders. *Panewu* (thousand) was the term for apanage holders who had the right to demand taxes from a thousand households, *panatus* (hundred) for those with a hundred households and *paneket* (fifty) for those who had fifty (Moertono, 1981:88-89).

In the course of the 19th century, the apanage system underwent several changes due to colonial economic policies. For example, when private plantation systems started to lease land from apanage holders, 2/5 of the land was rotated annually (*geblagan*) for plantation crops, 2/5 for rice and other food crops for the peasant themselves, while 1/5 of the land was reserved for the village head as remuneration for his services. The peasants were forced to provide labour for the cultivation and harvesting of the plantation crops; if unable to do so, they had to pay compensation in cash (Shiraishi, 1990:13-16). The detoriating situation of the peasants under the apanage and the plantation system became of growing concern for the government. In 1918, the system was completely replaced by a 'modern' system of land-tenure, village organization and taxation (White, 2004: 4).

After this reform, the peasants in Yogyakarta received exclusive rights to exploit the land, i.e. they were given individual and hereditary rights to use the land, but not to own it. All peasants' rights were registered in the village (Soemardjan, 1962: 34). This policy not only brought about more economic security for peasant families, but also affected the economic development of the principality. Besides subsistence crops, peasants started to cultivate commercial crops that were bought up by Chinese

traders who travelled the countryside during the harvest season. Some commercial crops was sold by the Chinese to European firms in the city before being exporting abroad. When peasants were in need of cash they would ask for an advance from the Chinese traders (which of course had a negative effect on the prices paid), go to money lenders who were mostly Chinese, or take their valuables as collateral to a Chinese pawnshop (Kwartanada, 1997: 88-99).

On the outskirts of the city, the home craft industries – such as handloom cloth weaving, or working in silver, *batik* or leather – also grew as the result of the increased buying power of the wider population. In 1930, there were 163,397 artisans, or about 10.6% of the population, in the region of Yogyakarta (Haryono, 2009a: 7). Most of the craft industry was the preserve of the Javanese. Only in the *batik* industry did Javanese entrepreneurs compete with the Chinese, who produced the commodity on a large scale;[18] but they were highly dependent on Chinese wholesalers, who controlled and supplied them with the materials for *batik* such as cotton cloth, wax and dye. This dependency on Chinese traders led to serious tensions between the groups on a regular basis. In 1934, the Javanese *batik* entrepreneurs of Yogyakarta founded the Association of Native Batik Entrepreneurs (Persatuan Pengusaha Batik Bumi Putera, PPBBP) to fight the monopoly of the Chinese traders (Subagya, 2001: 40).[19]

The expansion of private plantations and commercial activities in the early 20th century attracted a great number of migrants to the region. The number of Dutch and other Europeans increased from 2,097 in 1890 to 7,317 in 1930. They dominated the high ranks in government and on plantations. A new wave of migrants from China also arrived in Yogyakarta at the end of 19th century, adding to the Chinese community that had existed since the founding of the city. In 1890, there were fewer than 3,000 Chinese in the city but in 1930, this number had increased to 12,640. During the colonial period, the Chinese generated their income as traders, entrepreneurs, tax collectors, money lenders, and owners of opium houses until the economic crisis of the 1930s. Japanese, Indians and Arabs also settled in Yogyakarta city as traders and shopkeepers (Purwanto, 2003: 29).

18 After the invention of the stamp (*cap*) technique in the 1850s, batik production grew in importance, as this made it possible to produce batik for the commercial market on a large scale. In 1920, 17 of 225 batik workshops in Yogyakarta were owned by the Chinese (Subagya, 2001: 4-9 & 39).

19 In Surakarta, an association of Javanese batik entrepreneurs, Rekso Rumekso, had been already been founded in 1909. It was established not only to fight against the monopoly on materials, but also to protect its members against criminals stealing and robbing their batik factories. Members of this association were often involved in street fighting with members of the Chinese association Kong Sing. To attract more members, the name of the association was changed to Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Association) in 1912 (Shiraishi, 1990: 41-48).

In the 1930s, Yogyakarta felt the impact of the worldwide economic depression. Not only did prices of agricultural commodities such as sugar cane, tobacco or cotton fall to their lowest levels ever, but many craft industries went bankrupt, as consumers had no money to purchase their products (White, 2004: 6-11). The economic depression worsened during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), and the independence war (1945-1949). In both periods, famine spread throughout the region. During the war, many fled for safety to areas outside the region, and most of the population lived in poverty.

During the Old Order, economic growth was very limited; most sectors stagnated. Between 1958 and 1965, the economy even deteriorated, as economic measures taken did not succeed. Efforts to diminish the influence of foreign trade with import substitution failed, as did policies to develop an indigenous entrepreneurial class. In this period, according to Dahles (2001: 62) "Yogyakarta was lacking economic and human capital to restore old and establish new enterprises to provide jobs in the region. The few existing private enterprises were mostly family businesses that offered no employment to non-family members."

During the New Order, economic development gradually increased as a result of the successive Repelita Plans (5 in total) which focused on agricultural and industrial growth. Thanks to the green revolution, agricultural returns increased drastically, as did industrialization at a later stage due to the introduction of new technologies and the influx of foreign capital. In Yogyakarta, the local government gave priority to the tourism and educational sectors (Dahles, 2001: 64). Local entrepreneurs took advantage of the opportunities to start all kinds of small-scale business activities. Inhabitants of Yogyakarta now own dormitories, boarding houses, restaurants, food stalls, stationery and copy shops. The souvenir craft industry also flourishes in the city and its surrounding areas. The city now has an impressive number of star-rated hotels, shopping malls, boutiques and supermarkets.

Economic development during the Old and New Order did not occur without tensions arising between ethnic groups. During the Old Order, the governments discriminated against Chinese entrepreneurs by complicating the issuing of export and import licenses, and by forcing them to accept indigenous partners to run their businesses. The discriminatory policies continued during the New Order, although in Yogyakarta a large number of Chinese profited from the ongoing economic development. They played major roles in the production and distribution of dairy foods and cigarettes as well as money-lending to small businessmen (Susanto, 2008: 36).

With a few exceptions, such as the post-war years and the time of the Asian crises in 1997, Yogyakarta has experienced continuous economic growth in the post-colonial period. Economic development benefitted more or less all ethnic groups, not least the Chinese. Paradoxically, this did not lead to more anti-Chinese resentment.

Between 1996–1998, when anti-Chinese riots took place in many cities in Java, the Chinese in Yogyakarta experienced few problems. They made considerable efforts to prevent conflict escalation in the city by giving material and financial support to groups hit by the economic and political crisis. After reformation in 1998, the Chinese expanded their businesses to include printing, publication, real estate and entertainment (karaoke nightclubs, bars) as well as education, in the form of computer training and foreign language courses. Some big businesses in Yogyakarta, such as Matahari and Ramayana Department Store, Hypermart, Carefour, Hero Supermarket, Gramedia, Melia Hotel, Sheraton Hotel, Hyatt Hotel, Novotel, Syantika, BCA, Bank Mega, Bank Niaga are owned by tycoons from Jakarta.

Socio-cultural changes

In the 19th century, the Dutch colonial government legally classified the population into three categories. At the apex of the hierarchy were the Dutch and other Europeans, who occupied the most important administrative and economic positions in the colony. The second level consisted of Chinese and other Foreign Orientals, who dominated the intermediary trade. The natives, mostly peasants and labourers, sat at the bottom. Only a few native people worked as administrators or entrepreneurs (Kartodirdjo, 1991: 107-127). As an effect of this stratification, relations between population groups were characterized by antagonism and prejudice. There were occasional outbreaks of violence between the Dutch and the natives, and between the natives and the Chinese minorities. More often than not, these conflicts also had an ethnic and religious dimension. As aforementioned, the worst and bloodiest violence in Yogyakarta took place during the Java War. From the end of the war in 1830 until the Japanese occupation in 1942 the violence declined, but relations among the ethno-religious groups were marred by a high degree by prejudice and hatred; for instance, Javanese peasants hated the Dutch plantation managers, who saw the peasants as cheap labour and often treated them badly (Shiraishi, 1990: 17-18). The Javanese perceived the Chinese as opportunistic and untrustworthy. The Dutch, in turn, saw the Javanese as backward and lazy and the Chinese as parasites (Kwartanada, 1997: 136-137). When the Japanese occupied Yogyakarta, most of the Dutch had to leave the city. Tensions now arose between the Japanese and the Chinese, because the Chinese were seen as supporters of the Dutch. Some Chinese stores became the target of looters and robbers. Relationships between the Javanese, who had helped to drive out the Dutch, and the Japanese were initially good (Kwartanada, 1997: 200-205).

After Indonesian independence in 1945, ethno-religious conflict arose between fundamentalist Muslims who favoured an Islamic state, and nationalists who supported a secular state (Van Bruinessen, 1996: 23-24). A widespread rebellion of *Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic Movement/Islamic State of Indonesia)

took place in West and Central Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi between 1948-1962, but did not erupt in Yogyakarta because the majority of the population in the principality were loyal to nationalist figures such as Soekarno-Hatta and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. Only after the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) was accused of masterminding the abortive coup d'état attempt in 1965 did ethno-religious conflict take place in the city. A large number of communist sympathizers in Yogyakarta were put under military detention without trial. Some of them were executed on the outskirts of the city, and others were exiled to Nusa Kambangan or Buru (Sumarwan, 2007: 55-197). Muslim and Catholic groups backed by the military clashed with the organizations affiliated with the PKI, such as the Indonesian Peasant Organization (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI), People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat, PR) and the Student Movement of Liberation (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, CGMI) (Harnoko, Fakkih and Darban, 1996: 45-54).

During the New Order, the government suppressed conflicts based on ethnicity, religion and race (*Suku, Agama dan Ras*, SARA). Incitement to such conflicts was considered subversive and attracted severe punishment. During the first decades of his regime, President Soeharto was also very critical of Muslim politicians who were keen to combine religion and politics and were thus a danger to the neutral *Pancasila* state philosophy. In 1990, when Soeharto's grip on power was slipping, he began to accommodate Islamic leaders both in and outside government. For example, he sponsored the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim, ICMI) in order to obtain more support. Since then, Islamic leaders have become deeply involved in government policies, and a great number of Muslims have taken over strategic positions in the military and the bureaucracy (Van Bruinessen, 2004: 31-34). In Yogyakarta, Muslims began to intensify their religious activities on campus through the Campus Preaching Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK), and Muslim student organizations such as the Jamaah Shalahuddin[20] at the University of Gadjah Mada, and Jamaah Al Mujahidin[21] at the State University of Yogyakarta (Turmudi and Sihbudi, 2005: 116-119). In neighbourhood communities, religious activities have intensified with the establishment of the Mosque Youth organization (Remaja Masjid) (Kim, 2007: 90-92). These religious organizations run their programmes not only to deepen knowledge of Islam among Muslims, but to promote action in religious, societal and political arenas. Occasionally, they collect funds for charity, particularly for distributing aid to victims of disasters or conflicts. Compared to Christian organizations such as the

20 Shalahuddin is the name of an Islamic figure from the Crusades. The organization took his name in recognition of how he incited Muslim forces at the time (Karim, 2006:37).

21 Al Mujahidin was originally the name of the mosque in the State University of Yogyakarta. Mujahidin means holy warrior.

Youth Commission of Churches (Komisi Pemuda Gereja), or Catholic Youth (Pemuda Katolik), Muslim groups are much more active.

When violent conflict erupted in Ambon and Poso during the reformation, Muslim and Christian organizations supported their fellow believers in the conflict zone by collecting donations, and recruiting volunteers and fighters. Many Muslims from these organizations became jihadists of the Holy War Force (Laskar Jihad) or the Indonesian Holy Warriors' Force (the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia), paramilitary groups with headquarters in Yogyakarta. The Holy War Force was originally founded in January 2000 by *salafi* groups, namely the Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet (Forum Komunikasi Ahl Sunnah wal-Jama'ah, FKAJ), to help Muslims in the Moluccas fight against Christians; recruitment of jihadists started after a huge prayer meeting (*tabligh akbar*) in the Kridosono Stadium in Yogyakarta. The Indonesian Holy Warriors' Force was founded in August 2000 by the Indonesian Holy Warriors' Assembly (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia). This group was an alliance of Muslim paramilitary organizations from Solo, Yogyakarta, Kebumen, Purwokerto, Tasikmalaya and Makassar; it aimed to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia by rejecting all ideologies that are opposed to Islam, and by conducting jihad for the dignity of Islam. Many members of the group had joined the jihad in Afghanistan and the Southern Philippines (Hasan, 2005: 3-9).

The religious tension between Muslims and Christians that started to increase in the 1990s raised concern among academics, progressive religious leaders, students and NGO activists in Yogyakarta, while the government paid skant attention to it. In 1991, the Institute for Interfaith Dialogue (Institut Dialog Antariman di Indonesia, *DIAN*/*Interfidei*) was founded to generate mutual understanding among different religious groups and to prevent conflicts. When violence broke out in different regions of Indonesia in 1996, *DIAN/Interfidei* established the Brotherhood in Faith Forum (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, FPUB) in Yogyakarta. The Forum aims to share knowledge of religion and to generate tolerance by respecting difference. Its members consist of religious leaders such as *kyai* (Islamic teacher), priests, monks and followers from religious communities in Yogyakarta. In the regular meetings (which are usually held in a mosque, church, Buddhist *vihara* or Hindu *pura* in turn), each religious group presents information about their religion and their religious activities. Among the student population, a group called *Tikar Pandan* promotes student solidarity across ethnic and religious lines. Their activities are mainly designed to unify students by fostering understanding of other religions and reducing the prejudice that arises from ignorance. The *Tikar Pandan* was founded by *Tim Relawan Yogyakarta* (Yogyakarta Volunteer Team) in response to the inter-religious tension in the city.

Besides this dialogue about religion within various organizations, tensions between ethno-religious groups are reduced further via the *slametan* ritual in

neighbourhood communities. The *slametan* (also known as *kenduri*) is a communal meal held on important occasions such as births, marriages, circumcisions and death. *Slametan* are a means whereby social solidarity are reinforced, and shared social and cultural values significant to the group are emphasized (Geertz, 1973: 110). To some extent, *slametan* also take place during national or local festivities, such as the commemoration of Independence Day or the start or finishing of the building of a house. The host invites relatives, neighbours and acquaintances to his or her house to participate in a meal that has been blessed by an Islamic religious leader in the village. Before the meal prayer, this leader generally explains the intentions of the host in holding the ritual; he asks all those present to forgive each other, and to maintain peace and harmony. Neighbours have to attend unless they do not share a sense of solidarity and religious tolerance, which now happens more and more regularly. Although not designed specifically to resolve ethno-religious tensions, *slametan* do contribute to the diffusion of conflict in a neighbourhood (Kim, 2007: 127-131).

Religious developments

When the principality of Yogyakarta was founded in 1755, the vast majority of the region's population were Muslims. Most were *abangan*, nominal Muslims, who claimed Islam as their religion, but seldom or never prayed five times a day (*sholat*) or read the Koran. Only a small section of the population were *santri*, pious Muslims. Among the pious Muslims, court religious officials (*abdi dalem putihan*), religious teachers, guardians of holy sites and students at Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) were most prominent (Ricklefs, 2007: 30-104). At the kraton (palace) of the principality there was even an Islamic court that favoured an Islam that was different from the folk variant, but also heavily influenced by the Hindu and Buddhist traditions (Nakamura, 1993: 4).

In the early 20th century, the spread of Islam in Yogyakarta was furthered by two Muslim organizations: Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912 by a local religious official, K. H. Ahmad Dahlan, attempted to purify Islam of pre-Islamic influences (Nakamura, 1993: 45-50). In order to increase religious preaching and social services, Muhammadiyah built hospitals, orphanages and modern schools (Ricklefs, 2001: 215-216). In Yogyakarta, many of its members come from urban quarters such as Kauman, Nitikan, Jogokaryan, and trading villages, such as Kotagede. NU, which was founded in 1926 in Jombang, advocated the traditional *abangan* worldview and has a great influence in the countryside. In Yogyakarta, the centre of the NU tradition is found in the Islamic boarding schools of Besi, Ploso Kuning, Mlangi, and Krapyak. The students of these *pesantren* are mostly from East and Central Java.

Christianity started to grow in Yogyakarta in the second half of the 19th century, when European missionaries were allowed by the Dutch authorities to proselytize among its inhabitants. Before this, the Dutch government had restricted the work of missionaries to avoid conflict with the principality's Islamic rulers. The Protestant missionaries' activities started earlier than those of the Catholics. Among the first missionaries was Sadrach Surapranata from Purworejo, whose followers in Yogyakarta date back to 1870. In 1891, the sultan of Yogyakarta gave permission to the *Nederlandsche Gereformeerde Zendings Vereeniging* (NGZV), the Dutch Reformed Mission Organization, to build a church and to establish the first hospital, along with a training school for indigenous evangelists (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008: 671-677). Having given permission for Protestant missionaries to work in Yogyakarta, the government refused Catholic missionaries to do the same. However, Catholics began to spread their faith in Muntilan, where in 1908 Jesuit fathers founded Xaverius College. The first indigenous Catholics in Yogyakarta originally came from this college (Ricklefs, 2007:114-122).

In 1920, the restriction on spreading Catholicism in Yogyakarta was lifted and in 1922 the first Catholic Church was built. In 1932, the city had four parish churches, a hospital, 6 elementary schools and 2 high schools led by various Catholic congregations such as Jesuits, Sisters of Carolus Borromeus, Heythuizen and Brothers of the Immaculate Conception (Steenbrink, 2007:390-391). In the 1930s, there were more Catholics (4,342) than Protestants (3,148) in the city of Yogyakarta (Haryono, 2009b:7; Sumartana, 1991; 105). Both Protestants and Catholics rose in number after the 1965 massacre, when people had to choose one of the five officially recognized religions (Subanar, 2001:241-242). In 1974, there were about 21.766 Protestants (1.39%) and 59,576 Catholics (3.80%) in greater Yogyakarta (BPS, 1975: 97). In 1980, Catholics in greater Yogyakarta totalled 75,087, distributed over 19 parish churches (Subanar, 2001:342-344).

The rapid growth of Christianity in Yogyakarta concerned some Muslim leaders. They were particularly suspicious that Christianization took place in Christian schools attended by Muslim children, since these schools did not offer Islamic education as a subject. In order to counteract this, they established the Islamic Community Forum (Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah, FUI) in 1997, the main aim of which was to reduce the number of Muslims studying in Christian schools. In 2001, the FUI posted anti-apostasy banners on Christian schools in the main streets of Yogyakarta, and distributed a list of Christian schools that Muslim parents should avoid sending their children to. This activity gained the support for the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), which released a decree (*fatwa*) stating that "Muslims are strictly forbidden to study in Christian schools." (Subkhan, 2007:110-113). The problems were partly solved in 2003 with the introduction of the national

education law that compelled Christian schools to provide Islamic education for their Muslim pupils.

After reformation, religious organizations on campus began to recruit members and run religious activities more actively. Although these organizations have no formal ties with the universities, they nevertheless play an important role in campus life. Particularly noteworthy are the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI), the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII), the Muhammadiyah Student Association (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah, IMM), the United Action of Indonesian Muslim Students, (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), the Catholic Union of University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI), the Indonesian Christian Students' Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI), and so on. Members of these organizations are not only encouraged to pray and to read their particular holy scriptures, but are also trained to become future society leaders. Student activists often approach political parties to support their programmes; and to some extent, political parties use these student organizations as a recruitment ground – many political figures in Indonesia are former student activists from religious organizations.

In Yogyakarta, Islamic fundamentalist groups have found a large following among students. Ahllu Sunnah wal Jamaah and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia were founded in the city in 2000; Hizbut Tahrir, which was established in Bandung, also gained many members in Yogyakarta (Turmudi & Sihbudi, 2005: 121-130). These groups have connections with Jama'ah Tabligh, Darul Arqam, Ihwanul Muslimin and various *salafist* groups that were established in Palestine, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt and various countries of the Middle East (Wahid, 2009: 212). Since the 1980s fundamentalist Christian groups, neo-Pentecostal and charismatic in nature, have also emerged, although their following is smaller. Essential to these denominations is the concept of being "born again", in which individuals are spiritually reborn and leave their "sinful past" behind (Koning, 2011: 31). Among the Pentecostal and charismatic churches in Yogyakarta are Aletheia, El Shaddai, Camp David, the Seventh Day Adventist Church and the Indonesian Bethel Church (GBI), Jehovah Witnesses in Indonesia, Mawar Saron and Bethany. This fundamentalist form of Christianity has found adherents among urban, professional and middle-class Chinese (Koning & Dahles, 2009:6-16).

The increasing diversity of ethno-religious groups in Yogyakarta occasionally brings about conflict and tension in the city. For instance, in 2007 members of the Muslim FUI protested against a healing rally held by Pentecostal and charismatic churches. Called "Jogja Festival 2007," the rally was led by a Canadian pastor, and both Christians and Muslims were invited. It was condemned by the FUI, which suspected that it would encourage Muslims to apostasize. A few days beforehand, FUI

asked the regional government for it to be banned and for the organizers to cancel it, threatening trouble if their wishes were ignored. Meanwhile, FUI members took down posters in the main streets. When the regional government withdrew permission for the event, a clash between Muslim groups and the Christian Pentecostal church was averted (Subkhan, 2007:115-118). Many other ethno-religious conflicts have taken place in the city, but have never escalated into full-scale violence.

1.4. Research questions

After the above outline of the research setting, we now introduce the main research questions of this empirical study. These consist of descriptive and explanatory questions. The descriptive questions seek to ascertain the presence of ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence as the main variables of this study, while the explanatory questions explore relations between the independent, dependent and intermediary variables.

1.4.1. Descriptive questions

This study aims to scrutinize the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. In order to explain the relationship, we seek to investigate whether ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence are present and observable among Muslims and Christians in Yogyakarta and Ambon. Hence, the set of descriptive questions at individual level can be formulated as follows:

To what extent is ethno-religious identification present among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta?

To what extent is support for intergroup violence present among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta?

In what ways is ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims observable in their daily lives?

In what ways is support for intergroup violence among Christians and Muslims observable in their daily lives?

1.4.2. Explanatory questions at individual level

One of the theoretical foundations of this study is social identity theory. The main proposition of this theory is that in-group identification gives rise to prejudice, hostility and discriminatory behaviours towards out-groups (Tajfel, 1970, Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Based on this theoretical assumption, we are interested in examining the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence in the Indonesian setting. To do so, we set up the research question as follows: (5) To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious

identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup violence?

Studies of intergroup relations show the important influence of social position on the relationship between social identification and exclusionary attitudes. In European countries, studies have found that people with a socio-economic position similar to that of ethnic minorities compete fiercely for scarce resources. Such people hold weak or very weak socio-economic positions and in general are poorly educated (Scheepers *et al*., 2002a; Coenders, et al., 2003). Further evidence for individual determinants of ethnic exclusionism show that people of a lower educational level, including manual workers and some sectors of the self-employed, avoid all social contact with immigrants (Coenders et al., 2007: 233). In this study, we include social characteristics such as gender, parents' religion, parents' level of education, social class or household income, parents' occupational status and the subject's occupational status. The research question is: (6) To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup violence, considering other individual-level determinants (such as gender, educational attainment, social class of individuals and their parents)?

This study also examines determinant variables in the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. Previous studies have found evidence that the relationship can be explained by these variables. Scheepers and his colleagues (2002a; 2003; 2009) demonstrated that an increasing level of perceived threat intensifies exclusionary tendencies. Phinney (1990) and Duckit (2006) affirmed the salience of ethnic identity as a determinant variable for ethnic identification. Allport (1954) Pettigrew (1998), (Coenders, 2001), Tropp et al. (2006), Brown et al (2007), Schneider (2008), Schlueter and Scheepers (2009) and many others have shown that variables such as intergroup contact, perceived discrimination, trust, nationalistic attitudes all affect the relationship between social identification and exclusionary attitudes. Hence, we propose the following research question: (7) To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup violence given particular intermediate determinants (such as perceived group threat, intergroup contact, perceived discrimination, individual memory of violence or nationalistic attitudes)?

In order to find (some) preliminary answers to these research questions, a number of theories from the field of intergroup tensions will be presented in the next chapter, from which preliminary hypotheses can be derived indicating relevant phenomena, concepts and implementation.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS

This chapter presents the theories and hypotheses that form the basis for this study. First, we discuss the main theories referred to, which are realistic group conflict theory, social identity theory and ethnic competition theory. Next, we review other relevant theories in order to derive a set of hypotheses. To apply the theories to this study, we subsequently draw a conceptual model. In the last section, we set out hypotheses.

2.1. Theories on support for ethno-religious violence

This study builds mainly on a combination of realistic conflict theory, social identity theory and ethnic competition theory. Taking realistic conflict theory as our base, we look at support for ethno-religious violence as a form of latent conflict arising from competition for scarce resources and values that shape status and group differentials. Social identity theory helps us to understand ethno-religious identification as the formation of social identity in relation to the psychological processes of individuals, along with societal factors. Ethnic group conflict theory explains support for ethno-religious violence as a dimension of exclusionism. This study also adopts several theories, complementary to the above, to examine the individual factors that explain support for intergroup violence. These theories pertain to include salience of identity, intergroup contact, memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalist attitudes, and intergroup (dis-)trust, and will be proposed as complementary to our main theories. Overall, these insights will be presented in an overarching theoretical model, containing many insights previously developed in predominantly Western countries, to be eventually tested in Indonesia.

2.1.1. Realistic conflict theory

The premise of realistic conflict theory is that conflict of interest between social groups arises from competition over scarce resources, such as material goods, power, status and values. It assumes that intergroup conflicts are rational – that different groups have incompatible goals and compete with each other for resources; hostility towards an out-group is thus a means of reaching the in-group's goals. It contrasts with non-rational conflict, which involves two or more groups engaging in conflict as a result of the need to release tension. Rather than being psychologically driven by aggression or frustration, realistic conflict is rational in the sense that the individuals

or groups involved have ultimate objectives to achieve, and are competing for scarce resources (Coser 1956; Sherif, 1969; Le Vine and Campbell 1972). In addition, Coser (1956: 54) points out that conflicts between social groups (such as ethno-religious groups) do not merely relate to economic interests, but also deal with struggles over values or competing value systems.

Realistic group conflict theory has been repeatedly examined in the field of social psychology and sociology. Sociological studies have validated the theory by inquiring into the contextual factors that induce conflict. Coser (1956) points out that the function of social conflict is to reinforce the social boundaries of groups and to establish group identities. Conflict strengthens social cohesion and solidarity within the group, and at the same time excludes members who are not part of the in-group. To reinforce social cohesion, group leaders often employ the strategy of looking for an enemy within the out-group. Blumer's study (1958) of the racial prejudice of dominant groups in society supports Coser's concept of group characterization. Accordingly, the sense of social or group position that emerges from group identification is considered to be the basis for unequal power relations. Racial prejudice is viewed as a defensive reaction to a felt challenge to the group position. The dominant group tends to claim the scarce resources over subordinate groups (cf. Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2009).

Blalock (1967) specifically proposes that objective competition over scarce resources may become a cause of intergroup conflict. He classifies two kinds of competition: actual and perceived. While actual competition refers to contextual aspects of intergroup relations, perceived competition refers to a subjectively experienced degree of competition, i.e, perceived ethnic threat. They are interlinked by the way in which the perceived competition derives from the individual experience of looking at the actual competition. The perceived competition leads to the sense of threat, and so becomes the determinant for intergroup reactions. Furthermore, actual competition can be located within macro- or meso-level socio-economic conditions, such as the availability of scarce resources, the balance of work force, level of unemployment, discriminatory policies, population growth affected by migration, etc. At the micro level, actual competition can, for instance, be identified as competition for scarce resources between individuals from different groups who hold similar positions (cf. Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004: 14).

Perceived competition can be specified in terms of the personal evaluations of social conditions made by individual members of the groups, more specifically relating to four domains: economy (perceived future job opportunities, and evaluation of family living standards), politics (closure through patronage or nepotism), social life (access to education) and cultural life (negative perceptions of the dominant culture). Both actual and perceived threat of competition influence individuals to

support conflict and/or collective violence when the competition is interpreted in terms of the groups involved (cf. Sterkens et al., 2009).

2.1.2. Social identity theory

Complementary to realistic group conflict theory is social identity theory, which we employ to explicate individuals' position in group formation, along with its relation to social identification. The micro-foundation of social identity theory has been validated empirically by social psychologists (Tajfel 1970; 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Reynolds, 2010); it attempts to explain individual attitudes and behaviours through the psychological processes underlying the development and maintenance of group identity. It encompasses four interwoven concepts, namely: social categorization, social identity, social comparison and psychological group distinctiveness (cf. Gijsberts, Hagendoorn & Scheepers, 2004: 9).

Social categorization is the cognitive selection that sets up social boundaries, by which people define themselves as belonging to an in-group or out-group, us or them. Via social categorization, members of the same group shape social identities on the basis of their similarities. Social psychological experiments reveal that competition between groups creates solidarity within a specific group, which in turn increases hostility between groups (Sherif and Sherif 1969; 1979). A series of experiments in 'minimal' conditions, in which there was no interaction between the participants, also supported this theory. As Tajfel (1970) emphasized, the mere perception of belonging to a distinct group is sufficient to produce in-group favouritism and discrimination against out-groups. Individuals perceived greater homogeneity among out-group than in-group members. This process is called the 'depersonalization' and 'dehumanization' of out-groups (Tajfel, 1982; cf. Sterkens et al., 2009).

Moreover, social categorization also defines the individual's place in society. In the social group, membership does not only entitle an individual to the group's identities, but also defines his or her own identity. Social identity is defined as part of an individual's concept of self, which derives from the knowledge of membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to membership (Tajfel, 1981: 255). In this regard, individuals also practise self-enhancement by emphasizing norms and stereotypes that favour the in-group. Although individuals might belong to several different groups, they prefer to associate themselves with the positive characteristics of each group and downplay its negative characteristics, for the sake of their self-esteem. Individuals strive for a positive self-image via their social identification and tend to generalize negative characteristics of out-groups, i.e., they practise contra-identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, Brewer: 2001: 17-28).

As well as social categorization, Hecter and Okamoto (2001) added that the mechanism of social identification is affected by interest interdependence. Based

on social psychological research, they argue that the categories of in-group and out-group do not emerge until some kind of mutual dependence creates beliefs that members of different categories will act for or against, in their own self-interest. Furthermore, they claim that in minimal group experimental settings, individuals will favour out-group members when they perceive that they share interests with them.[22] Accordingly, categorization is not sufficient to produce in-group bias when there is no mutual dependence.

This social identification is constructed on the basis of social comparison. The concept of social comparison refers to individual's assessment of their position in relation to members of other groups. Through the social comparison process, individuals achieve an understanding of the relative status and value of their own group and the status and value they acquire through membership of that group. Individuals strive for positive group distinctiveness by maximizing the differences between in-groups and out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). They perceive in-groups to be 'better' than out-groups as a result of the cognitive process of social identification, which enhances their in-group distinctiveness. In this sense, individuals selectively define positive characteristics of the entire in-group, and negative ones of the out-groups.

The counterpart process of social identification, which refers to the perception and generalization of negative characteristics of the out-group, is labelled 'social contra-identification'. The process of social identification and contra-identification brings about ethnocentrism, which underlies individual favouritism towards the groups which they (consider themselves to) belong to, and negative perceptions of out-groups (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn & Scheepers, 2004: 10).[23]

Psychological group distinctiveness is an individual need that underlies in-group identification. The need to differentiate is the basis of identity for which individuals search as members of the in-group. Differentiation develops its own distinctive characteristics that go beyond the comparative characteristics of the out-groups. Optimal distinctive theory shows the need for differentiation to be the crucial factor for group identification. According to this theory, in-group identification is particularly affected by the extent to which satisfaction of assimilation and differentiation needs are balanced simultaneously (Brewer, 2001). In terms of group size, this theory

22 The minimal group experiment is a methodology in social psychology, used to investigate the minimal conditions required for discrimination to occur between groups (Tajfel, 1970: 96-102).

23 Ethnocentrism refers to a perspective in which one's own group is seen as central, and all others are measured in relation to it. It manifests itself in complex attitudes, including positive identification with one's own group, and xenophobia expressed in varying degrees towards outside groups. For further discussions of the concept, see Sumner, 1906; Adorno et al., 1950; Levine and Campbell 1972, and Scheepers et al., 2003.

reveals that minority groups are well suited to meet differentiation needs, unlike majority or large groups (Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). Furthermore, in large groups, individuals often identify themselves in fragmented categories as a means of shaping their distinctiveness (Badea et al., 2010).

2.1.3. Ethnic group conflict theory

The combination of realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory is formulated in what is called ethnic group conflict theory or ethnic competition theory (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004; Schneider, 2007; Coenders et al., 2009). This theory integrates the dispositional notions of social identity theory with the situational notions of realistic group conflict theory, and unites them in one theoretical framework. It develops realistic group conflict theory, which does not account for the psychological processes that are the focus of attention in social identity theory. Simultaneously, it reveals contextual factors underlying individual attitudes, derived from rational competition within the conflict. In this sense, competitive conditions intensify group identification in conjunction with factors such as group size, power and status differences, as well as specific histories of conflict. Both theoretical approaches are complementary to one another.

Ethnic group conflict theory attempts to explain various phenomena – individual attitudes, and formation of groups in which either individual or group identities are drawn along specific boundaries, such as ethnic or religious. It is a multi-level theory that can be used to derive hypotheses regarding variations in different social contexts as well as at an individual level. The fundamental proposition of the theory is that inter-group competition, at an individual as well as a contextual level, reinforces the mechanisms of social identification and contra-identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as group exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004: 18; Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2009).

Figure 2. 1. Theoretical model of ethnic group conflict theory



Sources: Adapted from Gijsberts et al., 2004.

In this theory, actual competition is seen to develop perceptions of threat, which in turn intensifies the processes of social identification and contra-identification. It is assumed that the intergroup conflict that inevitably occurs deals with group claims to and possession of scarce resources, and values as well as the distribution of power, privileges and other means of livelihood. The challenge to in-group prerogatives by out-groups creates a threat to the in-group. The competition between groups induces social cohesion, solidarity and feelings of superiority among in-group members, and hostile and prejudiced attitudes towards members of out-groups. Perceived threat plays a mediating role between individual and contextual level determinants when it comes to competitive intergroup conditions and unfavourable out-group attitudes (Scheepers, et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004)

In terms of its methodology, this theory suggests different levels of analysis. At the contextual level, competition refers to observable and measurable macro-social conditions. At the individual level, competition may be specified in terms of the observable and measurable social conditions of the individual members of groups; it also refers to perceived threat, which mediates the effects of social conditions on different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. In this sense, the intensity of actual competition and/or perceived threat is crucial: it may vary between different social categories and between various contexts that affect exclusionist and nationalist attitudes (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004; Coenders, Luppers and Scheepers, 2009).

2.1.4. Salience of identity

Salience of identity is defined as strong attachment by individuals to group identification. It refers to individuals' awareness of their ethno-religious categorization and identity, and the importance that they give to ethno-religious differentiation (Duckit, 2006: 154). It has its roots in ethnocentrism, which comprises the existence of social groups and the hostility between them. However, salience of identity is different from ethnocentrism, in that its in-group attachment is not necessarily related to out-group hostility. In other words, salience of identity is a process of social identification by which individuals strongly associate with their group. This group identification can be multidimensional, given that it can embody a variety of attitudes towards the out-group, from hostility to acceptance.

Salience of ethno-religious identity comprises one of four dimensions to ethno-cultural group identification, as proposed by Phinney (1990). The three others are attachment to the ethno-religious group; evaluation of the ethnic-religious group; and involvement with the group and its cultural practices, ways and customs (cf. Duckit, 2006: 152). The salience of identity measure consists of eight composed scales (see appendix 1, Table 2). Therefore, salience might intermediate the relation between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence.

2.1.5. Intergroup contact theory

Intergroup contact theory seemingly contradicts ethnic group conflict theory. While ethnic group conflict theory assumes that the increasing size of out-groups strongly induces perceived ethnic threat, intergroup contact theory proposes that such increases strongly induce intergroup contact opportunities, which in turn reduce exclusionist attitudes. However, the repeated validation of the intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) shows its relevance in explaining ethnic exclusionism, such as anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe (Schneider, 2008) and anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands (Savelkoul et al., 2010). The meta-analytic test for intergroup contact theory also finds that it is applicable beyond racial and ethnic groups (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).

Among the studies that have developed intergroup contact theory, Allport's (1954) hypothesis is the most influential, by specifying the situational conditions in which intergroup contact tends to decrease prejudice. The fundamental assumption of the theory is that contact between groups can effectively reduce negative attitudes toward out-groups under 'optimal' conditions, i.e. equal group status within the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support for authorities, laws or customs. It has gained support from a diverse range of empirical studies, not merely laboratory experiments but also field research (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).

Pettigrew (1998) refines Allport's hypothesis by adding friendship potential as an essential factor for positive intergroup contact, in that it leads to less negative stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. He argues that constructive contact relates more closely to long-term relationships than to initial acquaintanceship. Optimal intergroup contact requires time for cross-group friendships to develop. By taking into account recent findings of intergroup contact studies, he thus reveals the importance of four interrelated processes: learning about the out-group; changing behaviour; forming affective ties; and reappraising the in-group. Furthermore, Pettigrew proposes a longitudinal model for intergroup contact with a meso-level analysis, placed between the micro-level context of participants' characteristics and the macro-level social setting. It distinguishes between essential and facilitating situational factors and emphasizes the dimension of time, with different outcomes predicted for different stages of intergroup contact.

The result of a longitudinal study of intergroup contact theory by Brown et al. (2007), conducted between two neighbouring schools, also affirms that contact with members of an out-group can improve intergroup attitudes, especially if those people are viewed as representatives of their group. This study provides evidence that quantity of contact with a member of the out-group is predictive of more favourable intergroup attitudes. When the contact is with someone perceived to be typical of the out-group, the effects are stronger and more beneficial than with an 'a typical' individual. This conclusion serves to further validate previous longitudinal researches in the context of interethnic or inter-nation attitudes.[24]

In her study of anti-migrant attitudes in Europe, Schneider (2008) shows that over time, growing familiarity with immigrants decreases perceptions of ethnic threat. The huge number of migrants that exists not only increases competition, but also increases opportunity for contact and familiarity with them. When immigration has featured strongly in a country's past, people become accustomed to the presence of other nationalities, and can deal more easily with cultural diversity without feeling threatened. Schneider's research implies that an increase in contact opportunities leads to a reduction in perception of out-group threat. Similar findings have been reported in the Netherlands (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010).

By taking into account intergroup contact theory, this study examines the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious violence on the individual level. As contact theory suggests that 'constructive' intergroup contact reduces prejudice (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Brown et al., 2007), it can be expected that contact between ethno-religious groups tends to decrease negative attitudes towards out-groups and may decrease support for ethno-

24 Earlier longitudinal studies of contact and attitudes include the work of Hamilton and Bishop (1976), Maras and Brown (1996), Eller and Abrams (2004).

religious violence. Therefore, and vice versa, this study assumes that individuals who have less contact with other ethno-religious groups are more likely to support ethno-religious violence.

2.1.6. Memory of violence

The experience and memory of past violence affects how people see present social relations. The memories of atrocities, attacks and injustices play a vital role in motivating individuals to continue the struggle and to somehow resist peacemaking. Individual memory constitutes part of collective memory, since individuals have a shared memory of the past by virtue of being members of a community. Consequently, they may shoulder the community burden of past violence, which hinders their social relationship with other groups. Collective memories play an important role in creating or recreating conflict, and in reactivating it when people work through their past experiences in the present (Cairns and Roe, 2003: 3-5).

Daniel Bar-Tal (2003: 77-93) describes how protracted ethnic conflicts of long duration and deadly impact lead to a culture of violence. Such cultures tend to have characteristics in common, including particular memories about conflict, rivals and enemies, patriotism, and common practices such as rituals, ceremonies and memorials. When a culture of violence has arisen, it can play a major role in perpetuating the conflict and hindering peacemaking; examples are the cultures of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, or of Arab states and Israel. In this study, it is clearly illustrated that the impact of past violence deeply influences present social relationships via collective memories.

Other studies of collective memories of past violence delve into the different attitudes of both victims and perpetrators towards their traumatic burden. The survivors of past violence never forget their bitter experiences; individuals who have lost their families or valuable belongings suffer deeper pain as a result of traumatic memories than those who have not. Their experiences are often shared within their group in an attempt to release the burden of the past, and to seek justice for their loss or suffering. Both victims and perpetrators strive to create historical narratives within their society by commemorating past events. The experience of atrocities persists in collective memory. Individuals who strongly identify themselves with their in-group tend to recall their groups' histories by limiting their social identity. They are less likely than low identifiers to recall harm or wrongdoing committed by members of their in-group in the past (Sahdra and Ross, 2007: 384-386). Therefore, we propose that those who have experienced, or have memories of, past intergroup violence are more likely to support ethno-religious violence in the present.

2.1.7. Perceived discrimination

Perceived discrimination refers to individual or group perceptions of being treated differently (especially unfairly) by other groups, because of membership of a certain group. Discrimination arises from the threat that increasing out-groups may become dominant, and gain control of scarce resources. Ethnocentrism and out-group antagonism between over-privileged and under-privileged groups become strongly defined when the unequal division of scarce resources leads to social stratification (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Individuals of lower economic status tend to support discrimination more, and have more negative attitudes towards out-groups (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998).

Previous studies of the perception of discrimination and ethno-cultural variables show results consistent with social identity theory; perceived discrimination occurs more where there are negative attitudes towards out-groups. Perceived discrimination can be transmitted by a process of socialization – learning about injustice and unequal distribution from ancestors can make individuals more aware of it. Via ethnic affirmation, which constitutes a positive sense of belonging to an ethnic group, it brings about negative attitudes towards out-groups (Romero and Roberts, 1998: 652).

In another study, of the relationship between perceived discrimination and integration among the migrants of Moroccan and Turkish descent in Belgium, researchers found no clear support for either assimilation theory or ethnic competition theory (Vancluysen and Van Craen, 2010).[25] This shows the difference, in relation to integration, between perceived personal discrimination and perceived discrimination towards the ethnic group. Social-cultural integration seems to be negatively associated with perceived discrimination towards the group, but not to bear relation to personal experiences of discrimination. The findings for structural integration are also ambiguous. Perceived discrimination is higher among people with high-status occupations. The relationship between integration and perceived discrimination is complex and depends on the specific dimensions of integration, local context and the characteristics of the ethnic groups being studied.

Hence, perceived discrimination is proposed as an explanation for the relation between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. On the basis of earlier studies, it seems that the higher the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the perception of being discriminated against. This may therefore induce support for violence.

25 Assimilation theory states that the greater extent to which ethnic minorities integrate into the country of residence, the less discrimination they perceive. It is contradictive with ethnic competition theory, which proposes that the greater the integration of ethnic minorities, the greater their perception of unequal treatment.

2.1.8. Religiosity

According to Stark & Glock (1968: 14), religiosity refers to a personal attachment to religion in at least five dimensions: belief, practice, knowledge, experiences and consequences. Belief refers to personal faith experience, and practice involves the participation in religious rituals. Doctrinal knowledge refers to the whole set of representations of reality supported by religious institutions, while experiences relates to the personal relationship with what is seen as divine reality in all its forms and mediations. Several measurements of religious dimensions have been tested cross-culturally, mainly among Christian denominations in different contexts, but also occasionally among Muslims (Anthony et al., 2015). In their cross-cultural study in eleven European countries, Scheepers et al. (2002b) provide evidence for the relationship between different dimensions of religiosity and exclusionary attitudes, and more specifically prejudice. In this study, we measure several indicators of religious identification: religious self-definition, participation in religious practices (praying, attending religious services and reading Holy Scriptures), friends by religion, participation in religious ceremonies and membership of religious organizations. But alongside this general measurement, we will observe some additional important aspects of religiosity that may influence support for violence: religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality and religious fundamentalism.

Religiocentrism refers to the combination of positive attitudes towards the religious in-group and negative attitudes towards religious out-groups; it is analagous with the concept of ethnocentrism, in which group-belonging refers to ethnicity. Religiocentrism is inherent in religions in which adherents favour themselves with positive characteristics of the religious in-group, while dissociating themselves from the negative attributes of religious out-groups (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008: 63).

Attitudes towards religious plurality refers to different interpretations of the truth claims of people's own religions against a background of religious plurality. We have measured three different attitudes towards religious plurality: monism, pluralism and relativism (Anthony et al., 2005; Hadiwitanto & Sterkens 2012). Monism can take an inclusivistic or exclusivistic approach. Inclusive monism is an affirmation that there is partial truth in other religions, while maintaining that absolute truth is the provenance of one's own religion, while exclusive monism affirms that one's own religion is the only true religion in the world. Pluralism consists of commonality pluralism and differential pluralism. Commonality pluralism emphasizes the underlying common elements expressed by various religions in various ways. Differential pluralism acknowledges real differences between religions, and sees their particularities as sources for reciprocal enrichment and growth. Relativism is the attitude that different religious traditions are always equally valid, equally profound and equally humanitarian.

The third aspect of religiosity is religious fundamentalism. Earlier studies have defined fundamentalism as a meaning system through which adherents interpret the world and derive motivation via the sacred text of Holy Scripture. Fundamentalists may be militant, especially when "they react to a perceived threat as posed by the larger culture to their absolute beliefs – and even then, their resistance may take on forms that are non violent" (Hood et al., 2005: 5). This militancy can be seen as an exclusionary attitude via which fundamentalists support their in-group when intergroup conflicts occur. The current studies define fundamentalism as "an intra-textual disposition towards the text that a tradition holds as sacred". Fundamentalism views the sacred text to hold an absolute, non-negotiable truth, which stands above individuals as a ground of objective reality in their understanding of life and experiences (Williamson et al., 2010: 722-723).

These dimensions of religiosity mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. Moreover, we consider the ritualistic dimension as an important control: membership of a denomination and frequency of church or mosque attendance will therefore be included.

2.1.9. Nationalistic attitudes

Nationalistic attitudes are defined as favourable attitudes toward one's own country and the national in-group. It has two dimensions: chauvinism and patriotism. Chauvinism is the view that one's own country and people are unique and superior, thereby implying that other countries compare negatively. Patriotism refers to feelings of pride in one's people and country. While chauvinism relates to a blind, uncritical attachment to the national group and country, patriotism stems from a more critical assessment of them (Coenders, 2001: 64; Coenders et al., 2004: 29-32).

The results of a cross-national study in 22 countries by Coenders et al. (2004) show multiple dimensions to nationalistic attitudes. Both chauvinism and patriotism correlate differently to individual and contextual characteristics. While chauvinism is positively associated with perceptions of ethnic threat, patriotism shows a negative correlation. Chauvinism is stronger among individuals who live in inter-ethnic competitive socio-economic conditions, and national circumstances of rising inter-ethnic competition. It tends to exclude ethnic minorities. On the other hand, patriotism is stronger when the home country achieves high economic development. There are only minor differences in patriotism between individuals holding different socio-economic positions.

Todosijevic (2001) conducted another study of nationalist attitudes in Hungary and Yugoslavia. The result shows similar trends to those found by Coenders (2001), in that nationalistic attitudes were multidimensional. Nonetheless, the number and content of dimensions varied. In Yugoslavia, romantic and ethnocentric nationalism

fused into a single ethnocentric nationalism, and seemed strongly related to the authoritarianism that was embedded in the country's traditional values. Nationalistic attitudes in Hungary spanned three dimensions: national discrimination, romantic nationalism and national closeness. The term national discrimination is interpreted as support for discrimination toward out-groups or ethnocentrism, while national closeness refers to in-group exclusiveness (Todosijevic, 2001: 10).

The link between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic identification has also become the focus of research by Bollen and Medrano (1998), in relation to Spain's identity. The result of their analysis underscores the view that group identification is of lower importance than national attachment. The degree of national attachment is related to ethnic origin, economic development, economic specialization and people's cognitive skill. Respondents' ethnic origin and education have the strongest negative influence on national attachment. Economic specialization within a region also has a strong negative effect on national attachment. Furthermore, the legitimization of the development of regional character, enshrined in the Spanish Constitution of 1978, contributes to the contest between regional and Spanish identities in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia.

In the Balkans, religion was tied to nationalism and served to legitimize wars, even against different factions within the same religion (Loizides, 2000). Hence, this study proposes that nationalistic attitudes explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence.

2.1.10. Trust and distrust

Trust refers to the mutual "faithfulness" on which all social relationships ultimately depend. It is even more fundamental to the constitution of group solidarity than a sense of moral obligation (Parsons, 1970: 142; Tropp et al., 2006: 771; Tam et al., 2009: 46). From a sociological perspective, trust refers to how people relate one to another within a social system, rather than to their psychological states or individual traits. Trust has been studied in experimental sociology and political science, but the majority of quantitative research has been carried out by psychologists, who tend to conceptualize it as a psychological construct within individuals, and only to a lesser extent as an inter-subjective or systemic social reality.

Social psychological studies of trust and acceptance in interaction between members of ethnic minority and majority groups find that "group members may have different expectations for cross-group interactions, depending on the way in which their group membership is introduced in the contact situation" (Tropp, et al., 2006; 789). More specifically, respondents feel less trust in interactions with out-group members who explicitly refer to their group membership. The result is not limited to members of ethnic minority groups, which are often confronted with prejudice and stigma; it has been found in two different groups of respondents – among Asian,

Latino and white participants, and among black and white respondents (Tropp et al., 2006: 769).

Another study examining inter-ethnic trust in conflict-affected societies shows that respondents who do not express strong ethnic pride, and those with friends from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, are more likely to trust members of other national groups. Further, respondents who have personal experience of ethnic violence are more likely to express trust in members of other ethnic groups. Only respondents who doubt that the current situation is improving are less likely to trust members of other ethnic groups. This result is consistent with the results of a social psychology study that found that trust can be achieved through intergroup contact. This survey was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia (Ward et al., 2007: 1-4). Furthermore, a survey in Northern Ireland on intergroup trust pinpointed the positive impact of increased intergroup contact on behavioural tendencies towards out-groups. Direct and extended intergroup contact apparently enhances inter-group trust (Tam et al., 2009: 55-58). Hence, we propose that distrust may mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence.

2.2. Research model

In the scheme of the conceptual model below, we propose a relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious violence at individual level. Ethno-religious identification is the main independent variable. It shapes group distinctions by strengthening in-group solidarity, while at the same time inducing hostility towards out-groups.

Support for ethno-religious violence arises when exclusionary attitudes result from the multiple processes of ethno-religious identification. We propose to explain the relation between the two phenomena via intermediary variables, including: perceived group threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and intergroup (dis)trust. Specifically, Figure 2.2 below draws the set of relations between variables that are examined in the study.

Figure 2.2. Research model



Perceived group threat is proposed as an intermediate variable in the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious violence. It includes competition that increases ethno-religious identification. At an individual level, competition refers to the social conditions of individual members of the groups, which can be specified in terms of perceived threat to economic, political, social or cultural objectives. Economic objectives may relate to the closing down or opening up of a job market for respondents' own or other ethno-religious groups; political objectives, to protect or reduce power structures and group–related nepotism; social objectives, to preferential access to education, and cultural objectives, to fight repudiated behavioural and normative patterns.

Intergroup contact mediates the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious violence in a different direction as compared to perceived group threat and salience of identity. Earlier studies suggest

that the intensity of contact among different groups reduces prejudice and increases positive attitudes towards out-groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Schneider, 2007). In this regard, it is assumed that a high level of contact between ethno-religious groups will reduce support for violence between members of these groups.

The memory of past violence is assumed to influence individuals' support for ethno-religious violence. Survivors of past violence may have bad memories that affect their current social relationships. The traumatic burden of individuals' memories of loss from past conflicts hinders their encounters with out-groups. Conversely, they are more likely to share collective memories with the in-group; such memories reinforce solidarity among them (Cairns and Roe, 2003; Sahdra and Ross, 2007: 384-394). By taking into account earlier findings, this study attempts to search for different individual responses, mediated by their memory of violence, that support ethno-religious violence. It is assumed that individuals with traumatic memories of past violence tend to support ethno-religious violence.

Perceived discrimination refers to the internalization process of individuals or ethno-religious groups in relation to their marginalization and exclusion from social domains by dominant groups. Previous studies affirm that perceived discrimination is related to fear of economic competition and of a perceived threat posed by the out-group population (Semyonov et al., 2002; Gijsberts et al., 2004). As well as in economic, political and cultural arenas, religion also plays an important role in various forms of discrimination (Fox, 2000). In this study, perceived discrimination is viewed as a mediator for the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence.

In this research, we also examine the significance of religiosity, nationalism and intergroup distrust as intermediary determinants in the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. Religiosity could be a strong determinant for support for ethno-religious violence, because strong religiosity might increase ethno-religious identification. This assumption is similar to the relevance of intergroup distrust to the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious violence. Ethno-religious identification decreases intergroup distrust, which in turn increases support for intergroup violence. The influence of nationalistic attitudes as an intermediary variable is similar to that of distrust. Ethno-religious identification decreases nationalistic attitudes, which in turn increases support for violence.

Furthermore, social positions can be determinants that affect the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. Social positions include categories in society such as gender, church or mosque attendance, parents' education, homogamy and social economic status. These are used as control variables to examine the relationship between independent and dependent variables.

2.3. Preliminary hypotheses

This study is going to examine the following hypotheses:

1. The stronger people's ethno-religious identification, the higher their level of support for intergroup violence.
2. The stronger people's ethno-religious identification, the higher their level of support for intergroup violence even after controlling for other individual-level determinants (e.g. gender, educational attainment and social class of individuals and their parents).
3. The relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence can be explained by particular intermediate determinants:
   a. perceived group threat
   b. salience of identity
   c intergroup contact
   d. individual memory of violence
   e. perceived discrimination
   f. religiosity
   g. nationalistic attitudes
   h. intergroup distrust.

CHAPTER 3

DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENTS

This chapter describes data collection procedures, the representation of the research sample, measurements of the variables, and the development of a topic list used for this study. Quantitative and qualitative approaches are applied to the data collection through fieldwork, while the theoretical concepts and historical analysis presented in the previous chapters are scrutinized via literature and archival study. The survey was carried out in six universities in two different cities in Indonesia. The two sites are Yogyakarta and Ambon. The former is a relatively calm and peaceful area where conflict does not often manifest itself in collective violence. However, Ambon experienced a series of massive violent conflicts that were destructive and unpredictable; the ethno-religious dimension to these conflicts is very apparent, and the tension between Muslims and Christians manifests itself in residential segregation and division in other social domains. Three universities were thus selected in each city with the criterion that one (state university) was attended by heterogeneous groups, and that the two others were dominated by one (ethno-) religious group. A qualitative approach was employed when interviewing informants, both respondents and non-respondents of the survey. The research instruments were developed from inventories of previously tested measurements. The selected batteries of measurements were reviewed, tested via a pilot survey, and modified to ensure the validity and reliability of the research.

3.1. Data collection procedures

This research uses a range of quantitative and qualitative approaches. A survey was conducted to collect data regarding respondents' attitudes and behaviours in relation to ethno-religious conflict. The respondents of the survey were university students, chosen because they constitute part of the middle class, yet with various socio-cultural backgrounds that represent the diversity of society. Moreover, students belong to intellectual groups that will determine the dynamics of society in the future.

A qualitative approach, using a number of techniques, was employed to collect data from available sources. Documents and other printed materials, as well as media sources, were used to complement the analysis. Besides providing baseline data to embed within the research question, secondary data sources enriched the details of history and information related to the study focus. The study used topic lists for

semi-structured interviews in the qualitative aspects of our empirical research. To ensure the validity of the research outcomes, the data is then triangulated using the different techniques mentioned above.

3.2. Representation of samples

The research sample was drawn from the student population in Yogyakarta and Ambon. We employed a purposive random sampling technique to ensure a full representation of the population. This procedure was used after the selection of three comparable universities in both cities; a selection made with a view to representing the variety of religious profiles and relative group sizes of Muslims and Christians at university level. These universities consisted of state universities, Islamic universities and Christian universities. State universities were selected for their heterogeneity, which corresponds proportionally to religious diversity in the area. Student populations at Islamic and Christian universities, however, tend to be homogenous in terms of their respective religions. In Ambon, the three universities were the University of Pattimura (Unpatti), Indonesian Christian University in Moluccas (Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku, UKIM) and the State Islamic Institute Ambon (IAIN Ambon). In Yogyakarta, the selected universities were the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM), Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW) and the Islamic State University of Sunan Kalijaga (UIN Sunan Kalijaga).

The respondents were undergraduate students in their second year or above, from the intake of 2010, 2009, 2008, and so on. This criterion was made because first-year students (the 2011 intake) who had just started university were less likely to have adequate experience of student life or to be involved intensely with the campus at the time of the survey; they might not have made enough contacts to be integrated in social networks, or to have developed close friends, be able to recognize their class- or board-mates well, or to have formed particular groups. In each university, we aimed for 250 survey respondents, randomly selected from the student lists held by the registrar or directorate of academics and administration. Before the actual survey was begun, a pilot project was initiated to examine the instruments, to make contact with the authorities of each university, and to ask for permission to carry out the research.

3.2.1. Pilot survey

The pilot was conducted in the same three universities in Yogyakarta and Ambon respectively. It aimed to explore the appropriate research procedure, as well as to examine and assess the validity of the questionnaire. Sampling was undertaken by drawing a random selection of 50 students from each university population. The pilot survey was expected to give insights that would enable a more efficient and more effective distribution of the questionnaire, and to conduct preliminary research; it

also allowed time to garner the necessary permission from each campus and local authorities.

In the three universities in Yogyakarta, student data is kept centrally in the administration office. Nonetheless, we initially found the student list of UIN Sunan Kalijaga to be inaccurate; because IAIN (Institute Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic Institute) was in the process of becoming UIN (Universitas Islam Negeri, Islamic State University), data centralization was still ongoing. So, replacements were made because some randomly selected students had already dropped out or graduated. Thus, we used data that was more accurate from each faculty rather than the data from the central administration office. At UGM, the student list was obtained after about a month of bureaucratic procedures. Meanwhile, apart from at UNPATTI, where student data had been centralized, the registration list of two other universities in Ambon (IAIN and UKIM) was generated at faculty level. The sample for these universities was then drawn randomly after combining all faculties into one list.

Of the three universities in Yogyakarta, it was only at UKDW that the campus authority formally supported the research by providing a student list, meeting room and invitation for students to fill out the questionnaire. At UIN, the survey was assisted by the student union. At UGM, the organization of the survey was helped by the Centre for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS), part of the university. Data collection in Yogyakarta was first carried out by gathering the respondents in the auditorium, and then contacting them in their faculty when the first effort was unsuccessful; getting students together to fill out questionnaires was not easy. Fewer than 50% of the expected 50 invited were present. In Ambon, the data collection technique was to visit the selected respondents directly, and ask them to fill out the questionnaire personally.

Respondents varied across the different universities in Yogyakarta in their response to the invitation to fill out the questionnaire together. At UKDW, only 23 respondents participated; to meet the quota of 50, the rest were reached through their faculties. Replacements were made due to the absence of some faculty students for more than a week. In UIN Sunan Kalijaga, the student union assisted the organisation of data gathering, and was very helpful in encouraging respondents to attend the data gathering session; 32 respondents were present. At UGM, only 21 students attended. The absentees were tracked down in their departments, faculties or boarding houses to fill in the questionnaire.

The result of the pilot survey was then assessed to examine the validity and reliability of the research instruments. The correlations between items/variables were scrutinized; if they were very low or extremely high, the items were reformulated or simply removed from the survey. To some extent if, according to respondents, the wording of questions and translations was unclear, it was either replaced or revised with a more straightforward or simpler one. Likewise, some directions as to how

to answer questions were improved to prevent misunderstandings about what the questions meant. Thus, the pilot helped to create better research measurements.

3.2.2. Survey

Given what had been learnt from the pilot, the actual survey began with advance preparation of updated student lists from the selected universities, invitations to respondents from the sample lists and the organization of venues at which the respondents would gather to fill out the questionnaire. The overall goal was to collect a random sample, from each university, of students in the second or third year of their BA, so that generalizations could be made. Institutional permission to obtain the latest student lists was again required from the office of academic administration; this updated data was needed because many students had graduated, and some had dropped out. It is general policy in Indonesian universities for studies to last for a maximum of 7 years; students who take longer must leave the campus. At UGM and UIN Sunan Kalijaga, the student list was issued by the office soon after student registration for the new semester had ended. The data of the survey population in Ambon was obtained at faculty level in all three universities, i.e. UKIM, UNPATTI and IAIN. Due to the eruption of mass violence in the city where the campus was affected, the sampling frame used the data from the 2010 population obtained in the pilot. As explained in the previous section, the research sample was drawn from higher-level students and did not include the new 2011 academic year intake.

The sample was taken by random procedure. It began with calculating the total population divided by 250 as the sample quota for each university. To ensure the randomness of the procedure, the beginning number was selected randomly from 1 to 10, and was then multiplied by the interval. While selecting the sample, a replacement was also taken from the upper number of the sample selection. Thus, 500 respondents were obtained, consisting of 250 as the respondent sample and 250 as the replacement sample. This procedure was applied to the populations of all three universities in Yogyakarta. Meanwhile in Ambon, the sample was drawn at faculty level, so that the total number of respondents was proportionally equivalent to the number of students in each faculty of the respective universities.

Again, data collection was carried out via two procedures, as practised in the pilot. The first was to gather respondents in an auditorium to fill out the questionnaire together, and the second was to hunt down the remaining respondents and ask them to do it personally. The University of Gadjah Mada was targeted first, because the experience of the pilot indicated that it had given the lowest response to the survey invitation. As the capacity of the auditorium was only 125, the survey was held twice, with the invitation given to two groups. The first session was on 27 September 2011 and the second on 28 September 2011, the expectation being that 250 students would attend. Unfortunately, a total of only 52 students came. The

remaining respondents (198) were tracked down in their departments and faculties. With the permission of the chairman of the departments and the deans, we looked for them on campus with the assistance of the student organization. When we found one of them, we gave a short introduction to the survey and asked if they would be willing to fill out the questionnaire. If they refused, we looked for a replacement. We provided a ball point pen as a gift to each respondent.

At UIN Sunan Kalijaga, a similar procedure, in which the respondents were asked to answer the questionnaire together in an auditorium, was also followed. Two auditoriums, each with a capacity for 150, were prepared on the same day; these were the Faculty of Islamic Philosophy and the Faculty of Islamic Teaching and Communication, which are situated close one to one another. However, only 58 students attended, so we used only one room. We looked for the remaining 192 respondents in their faculties, departments and boarding houses with the help of the student union, which is represented in every faculty; we provided the union with a short briefing about the research and information on how to fill out the questionnaire. It took about one and half months to reach all these remaining respondents.

The lengthiest process was at UKDW, where the survey did not run as smoothly as it had at the pilot stage. The university authorities still supported the actual survey, but the number of students who turned up to fill out the questionnaire together was very low. The date of the gathering was set by the vice rector for 28 October 2011 – after the mid-semester when students no longer had a hectic academic schedule. Four big classrooms with a capacity of 75 each were prepared in anticipation of 250 students. However, only 46 students appeared. This may have been because the meeting was only announced on the blackboard of the administration office, so not all invited students were able to read it. Thus, we looked for the remaining 204 respondents in their faculties and even their dormitories.

Tracking down the UKDW respondents was no easy task, simply because students seldom went to their faculty office other than to meet their lecturers or deal with administrative matters. Furthermore, most students at UKDW hesitated to participate in student union activities. So, when I attempted to approach them through the board of the student executive, the results were still unsatisfactory; the student union at UKDW was not really active, and its organizers found it difficult to ask students to join extra campus activities. Only some (69 students) were interviewed with the assistance of the student union. The remaining 135 were located in their dormitories and after class by four trained survey assistants, who were willing to wait day after day in the faculties of the survey respondents. In the end, 122 respondents were from the replacement list, because the original sample hardly met even until the season of the final examination came.

Data gathering in Ambon was even harder to manage, because of the incidents of mass violence between Christian and Muslim groups that occurred at the time. Academic activities on campus were affected; some students may have been involved in the riots. Campus activities were halted for several weeks, especially at UNPATTI and UKIM, where some of the buildings were burnt down. However, respondent gatherings to fill out the questionnaire together took place in some faculties including Agriculture, Engineering, Education and Economy; this was made possible with the cooperation of the respective faculties. In the other faculties and IAIN, as well as UKIM, the data gathering was carried out by the student union or research assistants; they distributed the questionnaire to respondents, who were personally asked to fill it out.

The response rate to the survey is presented in the following Table 3.1., which indicates the correspondence between the actual and the planned sample. The calculation of the response rate was made by dividing the number of responses with the number of respondents on the sample list and their replacements. The outcome shows a higher response rate in Ambon than in Yogyakarta. In Ambon, it is in the range of 55.45% to 78.57%, so more than half of the invited respondents participated in the survey. By university, the highest response rate was at UNPATTI (65.45%), followed by IAIN (64.43%) and UKIM (59.38%). In Yogyakarta, the highest response rate was at UIN Sunan Kalijaga (60.83%). UGM (54.70%) was higher than UKDW (50.51%), but still lower than UIN Sunan Kalijaga. Compared to Ambon, the response rate of the three universities in Yogyakarta was more varied, and so a pattern is more difficult to discern. The lowest was 22.78% by the Faculty of Law at UGM, and the highest was 95.00% by the Faculty of Theology at UKDW.

Table 3. 1. Sampling frame and response rate at 6 universities in Yogyakarta and Ambon

UIN Sunan Kalijaga

Faculty	N of students	% of students in the university	LIST A/B	Sample	Response rate N (%) sample/ list	% of students in the sample
Islamic Literature and Cultural Science	1,467	13.39	77	46	59.74	18.40
Islamic Teaching and Communication	1,147	10.47	35	33	94.29	13.20
Islamic Philosophy	862	7.87	52	42	80.77	16.80
Islamic Education	2,250	20.53	59	43	72.88	17.20
Islamic Law	2,057	18.77	67	37	55.22	14.80
Science and Technology	2,236	20.41	93	42	45.16	16.80
Social and Humanities	938	8.56	28	7	25.00	2.80
Total	10,957	100.00	411	250	60.83	100.00

University of Gadjah Mada

Faculty	N of students	% of students in the university	LIST A/B	Sample	Response rate N (%) sample/list	% of students in the sample
Economics and Business	2,035	7.05	24	8	33.33	3.20
Social and Political Sciences	2,556	8.85	30	20	66.67	8.00
Cultural Science	2,137	7.40	42	34	80.95	13.60
Philosophy	230	0.80	6	5	83.33	2.00
Geography	954	3.30	12	6	50.00	2.40
Law	1,449	5.02	31	7	22.58	2.80
Psychology	858	2.97	11	8	72.73	3.20
Agriculture	1,731	5.99	39	23	58.97	9.20
Agricultural Technology	1,209	4.19	11	5	45.45	2.00
Forestry	1,021	3.54	16	9	56.25	3.60
Biology	824	2.85	14	8	57.14	3.20
Veterinary Science	708	2.45	9	4	44.44	1.60
Animal Science	921	3.19	15	14	93.33	5.60
Mathematics and Natural Sciences	2,842	9.84	34	22	64.71	8.80
Medicine	1,907	6.60	28	13	46.43	5.20
Pharmacy	830	2.87	9	6	66.67	2.40
Dentistry	883	3.06	19	7	36.84	2.80
Engineering	5,783	20.03	107	51	47.66	20.40
Total	28,878	100.00	457	250	54.70	100.00

Duta Wacana Christian University

Faculty	N of students	% of students in the university	LIST A/B	Sample	Response rate N (%) sample/list	% of students in the sample
Business	629	20.78	103	60	58.25	24.00
Theology	300	9.91	60	57	95.00	22.80
Information Technology	1,396	46.12	224	80	35.71	32.00
Architecture and Design	408	13.48	68	28	41.18	11.20
Biotechnology	121	4.00	26	18	69.23	7.20
Medicine	173	5.72	14	7	50.00	2.80
Total	3,027	100.00	495	250	50.51	100.00

State Islamic Institute Ambon

Faculty	N of students	% of students in the university	LIST A/B	Sample	Response rate N (%) sample/list	% of students in the sample
Islamic Education	2,467	62.81	66	32	62.12	59.60
Islamic Philosophy	499	12.70	98	61	61.22	16.40
Islamic Law	962	24.49	224	157	66.52	24.00
Total	3,928	100.00	388	250	64.43	100.00

Indonesian Christian University in Moluccas

Faculty	N of students	% of students in the university	LIST A/B	Sample	Response rate N (%) sample/list	% of students in the sample
Theology	494	23.20	81	58	56.79	18.40
Engineering	389	18.27	101	76	55.45	22.40
Economics	651	30.58	91	37	61.54	22.40
Social Sciences	312	14.65	70	46	61.43	17.20
Public Health and Nursing	283	13.29	78	33	62.82	19.60
Total	2,129	100.00	421	250	59.38	100.00

University of Pattimura

Faculty	N of students	% of students in the university	LIST A/B	Sample	Response rate N (%) sample/list	% of students in the sample
Agriculture	959	6.75	24	17	70.83	6.80
Engineering	541	3.81	15	10	66.67	4.00
Law	1203	8.47	31	21	67.74	8.40
Economic	1781	12.54	49	32	65.31	12.80
Political and Social Science	1490	10.49	37	26	70.27	10.40
Natural Science	1273	8.97	28	22	78.57	8.80
Fishery	1,147	8.08	31	20	64.52	8.00
Education	5,804	40.88	167	102	61.08	40.80
Total	14,198	100.00	382	250	65.45	100,00

However, there was a trend at UGM, where the response rate of the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities was higher than that of the Faculty of Natural Science and Engineering, with the exception of Animal Science. Table 3.1 also shows the high response rate of Philosophy (83.33%), followed by Cultural Science, Psychology, and Social and Political Science. Indeed, three faculties of social science returned a low score. These were the Faculty of Geography, Economics and Business and Law. The Faculty of Natural Science tended to be low except for Animal Science, Pharmacy and Mathematics, and Natural Science. The Engineering Faculty, which has eight departments, was extremely low with participation of only 47.66%.

This trend was rather similar at UKDW, but considerably different at UIN Sunan Kalijaga. In UKDW, the Faculty of Information Technology had the lowest percentage response rate to the questionnaire of all the faculties (35.71%), while the Faculty of Theology was extremely high (95.00%). At UIN, the Faculty of Dakwah (Communication), Ushuluddin (Religious Study) and Tarbiyah (Education) showed a higher response percentage than Adab (Literature), Syariah (Islamic laws), Science and Technology, or Social Science and Humanities.

Given the random procedures we used, the relatively high response rates and the match between the distribution of students across faculties and in the samples, we propose that this database allows us to generalize from this sample to the general student populations of these universities.

3.3. Measurements

This research examines the sets of relationships between dependent, independent and intermediary variables presented in the conceptual scheme. The variables comprise support for ethno-religious violence as the dependent variable, ethno-religious identification as the independent variable, individual categories of gender, parent's education, household social status as control variables and some intermediate variables i.e. perceived threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitude and intergroup distrust. The measurements were developed and improved using relevant variables from previous studies as a benchmark. Reliability as indicated by Cronbach's alpha of inventories became the main consideration for testing the measurement. Modifications were made due to the local sensibilities of the Indonesian context. Some other measurements that we could not find in earlier studies were explored through meticulous discussions of the variables.

3.3.1 Support for ethno-religious violence

Support for ethno-religious violence encompasses attitudinal and behavioural dimensions in which members of ethno-religious groups approve the instrumental use of violence in order to achieve their objectives. Support for violence can be viewed on two difference planes: the societal domains it inhabits, and the levels of violence supported (Tilly, 2003; Sterkens et al., 2009). The societal domain has economic, political, social, cultural and religious dimensions. Within these, the religious domain cannot be said to relate directly to violent motivation, but it is connected to violence in the sense of conflict of values, norms and convictions between religious traditions. Besides the societal dimension, support for violence can be assessed at different levels including criticism, protest or public debates, demonstrations, corporal harm and material harm. Public debates and demonstrations do not necessarily denote violence per se, but they are considered to bring about psychological hurt that can provoke violence. Corporal harm includes physical injuries and killings, while material harm refers to destroying property and the belongings of people from other ethno-religious groups.

We used the questionnaire of Hadiwitanto et al. (2007) in order to measure support for violence and to investigate religion, social trust and conflict in Ambon. Within it, the variable of conflict included support for intergroup violence. Its 40 questions were equally distributed over five societal domains and four levels of violence; the respondents were requested to answer with the five categories of Likert's scale, from "I totally disagree" to "I fully agree".

Based on this questionnaire, we assessed the results using factor analysis. We set up two religious traditions (Muslim and Christian) as the comparative categories

without ignoring the distinctiveness of each religion. The result of the analysis showed the different loadings of the scale which were then classified according to the level of violence, cross-cutting the domains of political economy, socio-cultural life and religion. Overall, the result of the classification was 22 items divided into three levels of support for violence, namely: public criticism (6 items), demonstrations (6 items), corporal and physical harm in relation to economic, political and social domains (6 items), and corporal and physical harm in relation to cultural and religious domains (4 items). The following items are measurements based on the result of the factor analysis. Semantic adjustments to the questions were made to affirm the personal attitude of the respondent towards being a member of a group. For instance: "My religious community should openly criticize the lack of free access to all levels of education," was changed to, "I would openly criticize my religious group's lack of free access to education."

Public debate/ criticism

1. I would openly criticize my religious group's lack of free access to education.
2. I would openly criticize unjust treatment of fellow believers.
3. I would openly criticize the behaviour of other religious groups that does not accord with the values of my religion.
4. I would openly criticize abuse of political power that threatens my religious group.
5. I would openly complain when there are not enough religion-based schools.
6. I would look for political influence through public debate.

Demonstration

1. I would support demonstrations that protest about my religious group's lack of free access to education.
2. I would support demonstrations that demand that other religious groups respect the values of my religion.
3. I would support demonstrations that protest against abuse of political power that threatens my religious group.
4. I would support demonstrations that demand religion-based schools.
5. I would support demonstrations that protest when my religion is deeply insulted.
6. I would support demonstrations that protest about job discrimination against my religious group.

Harm

Economic/political/social

1. I would accept corporal harm to others to enforce free access to all levels of education for my religious group.
2. I would accept the damaging of homes and public buildings to enforce free access to all levels of education for my religious group.
3. I would accept the damaging of public buildings to enforce religion-based schools.
4. I would accept corporal harm to others to fight for religion-based schools.
5. I would accept corporal harm to others to enforce the political influence of my religious group.
6. I would accept corporal harm to business people to ensure higher income for my religious group.

Cultural/Religious

1. I would accept corporal harm to fight for respect for my religious values.
2. I would accept corporal harm to others when my religion is deeply insulted.
3. I would accept the damaging of houses and public buildings when my religion is deeply insulted.
4. I would accept the damaging of public buildings to enforce respect for my religious values.

However, the measurement used in the pilot study was considered to be inadequate, because the distribution of the questions was unbalanced across the different domains and level of violence; the table 3.2 below shows that there were no questions in the economic and religious domains that assessed support for public debate, while the political domain had three such questions, thus creating a bias. Economic items linked to physical harm were likewise not covered. The unbalanced design of the measurement influenced the results, since important factors may have been eliminated before data gathering.

Table 3.2 The composition of items to analyse support for intergroup violence from the previous study

	Social	Economic	Political	Cultural	Religious
Public debate/ criticism	2	-	3	1	-
Demonstrations	2	1	1	1	1
Corporal Harm	2	1	1	1	1
Material Harm	2	-	1	1	1

The measurement was modified to give equal weight to each of the domains. As the result of the preliminary factor analysis, the social and economic domains were combined with cultural and religious domains into one single question. Each domain category was then assessed using four dimensions of support for violence: public debate, demonstration, corporal and material harm. For example, the items in the social-economic domain then included, "I would support public criticism of my religious group's lack of free access to education," "I would support demonstrations that protest against my religious group's lack of free access to education," "I would support harm to others to enforce free access to education for my religious group." The total set of questions then comprised twenty items, with the distribution of the domain composition as in the following table 3.3.

Table 3.3 The balanced composition of items to analyse support for intergroup violence

	Social-Economic	Political	Cultural-religious
Public debate/ criticism	2	2	1
Demonstrations	2	2	1
Corporal Harm	2	2	1
Material Harm	2	2	1

To adjust the balance, six items were retained while others were excluded from the measurement. In the category of public debate and demonstration, these preserved items pertained to free access to education, job discrimination, abuse of political power, political influence and disrespect for the values of religious groups. Corporal and material harm were allocated four similar items except for the last, regarding disrespect for the values of religious groups, which was added to the items related to religious insults. As well as changing the structure of how the measurement was set

out, we also made semantic changes to several sentences to make the statements clear and obvious. First was the additional phrase, "my religious group's" or "of my religious group" in all statements since it theoretically links the individual with group identification. The second was a grammatical change – the addition of "would support" to ascertain the attitudinal affirmation of respondents. The third was to use the word "property/properties" rather than housing and public buildings, because public buildings are associated with government buildings while the question was meant to include housing, and private, non-government and government buildings. There were five answer categories from "totally disagree" (1) to "totally agree" (5), with "I am not sure" or "neither disagree nor agree" (3) in the middle.

We also added two more questions to the measurement to discover respondents' participation in violent activities. These asked whether the respondents' support for violence is matched by their behaviour, or includes joining protests, public criticism or demonstrations undertaken by their respective group. Although the study is about latent conflict, the respondents' involvement in violence is an important aspect of how they express support for it.

When we look at the survey results presented in tables 3.4 – 3.6, they point to high support for public criticism and demonstrations, but low support for corporal and physical harm. It seems that people are willing to support their groups through verbal protest and public demonstrations when they lack access to education, are discriminated against in the labour market, are politically abused or when the values of their group are disrespected (means > 3.00). But in contrast, they tend to disagree, or show low support, when it comes to using physical violence and destroying property (means < 3.00). However, there is a high mean (3.21) for Muslims in Ambon who support harm to others when their religious group is deeply insulted.

Furthermore, more Muslims support public criticism and demonstrations than Christians. The mean for Muslims ranges from 3.14 to 3.77 and the mean for Christians ranges from 2.62 to 3.59. In general, the standard deviation of Muslims is also lower than Christians, meaning their answers are more homogenous to some extent. In terms of location, both Muslims and Christians in Ambon have higher mean scores at all levels of support for violence than groups in Yogyakarta.

Specifically, in table 3.4, Muslims in Ambon tend to show greater support than Muslims in Yogyakarta and Christians (both sites) for open criticism of their religious group's lack of free access to education (3.83) and for open criticism or disrespect towards their religious group (3.73).

Table 3.4 Mean and standard deviation on public criticism

Public criticism	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Mean (SD)		Mean (SD)		Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=746)	Christians (N=254)	Muslims (N=368)	Christians (N=349)	Muslims (N=842)	Christians (N=603)
262. I would support public criticism of my religious group's lack of free access to education	3.72 (.90)	3.53 (.95)	3.83 (.96)	3.36 (1.167)	3.77 (.93)	3.43 (1.09)
263. I would support public criticism of job discrimination towards my religious group.	3.75 (.84)	3.66 (.82)	3.66 (1.00)	3.54 (1.02)	3.71 (.91)	3.59 (.96)
264. I would support public criticism of abuse of political power that threatens my religious group.	3.67 (.91)	3.60 (.90)	3.62 (1.11)	3.51 (1.14)	3.65 (1.00)	3.55 (1.05)
265. I would support public criticism of actions that undermine the political influence of my religious group.	3.54 (.94)	3.36 (.95)	3.46 (1.05)	3.35 (1.10)	3.50 (.99)	3.36 (1.04)
266. I would openly criticize people who disrespect the values of my religious group.	3.48 (1.04)	2.99 (1.11)	3.73 (1.04)	3.08 (1.26)	3.59 (1.05)	3.04 (1.20)

Meanwhile, Muslims in Yogyakarta indicate more support for public criticism of job discrimination, of abuse of political power that threatens their religious group and of actions that undermine the political influence of their religious group. The standard deviation of Muslims in both cities is lower in general than that of Christians, which ranges from 0.91 to 1.05, indicating that the Muslims' answers tend to be more homogenous than Christians'. So, Muslims tend to stick to one answer while Christians give a variety of answers.

Regarding support for demonstrations as presented in Table 3.5, Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta indicate higher support than Christians in both cities. The mean ranges from 3.53 to 3.58, which shows strong support for demonstrations.

The standard deviation also indicates that their responses to the questions tend to be more homogeneous (0.98-1.07) than the Christians (1.03-1.16). Even though Muslims in Ambon are in the minority, it appears they show the highest support for demonstrations in relation to all measures. Their answers for the parameter also tend to be homogeneous, especially for "support demonstrations that protest against my religious group's lack of free access to education", as the standard deviation is only 1.00. In contrast, the lowest support is indicated by the Christians in Yogyakarta, who are considered to be a minority group. Their means ranges from 2.58 to 3.24 and their standard deviation from 0.93 to 1.07, signifying less support than Muslims; and their answers tend to be more diverse, from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Table 3.5 Mean and standard deviation on demonstrations

Demonstrations	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Mean (SD)		Mean (SD)		Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=477)	Christians (N=254)	Muslims (N=373)	Christians (N=348)	Muslims (N=844)	Christians (N=602)
267. I would support demonstrations that protest against my religious group's lack of free access to education.	3.46 (1.01)	2.96 (1.07)	3.72 (1.00)	3.10 (1.23)	3.57 (1.02)	3.05 (1.16)
268. I would support demonstrations that protest against job discrimination against my religious group.	3.53 (.94)	3.24 (.93)	3.54 (1.04)	3.30 (1.09)	3.54 (.98)	3.27 (1.03)
269. I would support demonstrations that protest against abuse of political power that threatens my religious group.	3.50 (1.05)	3.09 (1.06)	3.69 (1.05)	3.38 (1.12)	3.58 (1.01)	3.26 (1.10)
270. I would support demonstrations to enforce the political influence of my religious group.	3.13 (1.03)	2.58 (1.00)	3.14 (1.11)	2.64 (1.11)	3.14 (1.07)	2.62 (1.06)
271. I would support demonstrations to demand respect for the values of my religious group.	3.73 (1.03)	2.81 (1.07)	3.73 (1.04)	3.00 (1.22)	3.53 (1.05)	2.92 (1.16)

In general, both Muslims and Christians do not show support for damage to property and harm to others, as shown in table 3.6 below. The range of mean scores is mostly lower than 3.00. Specifically, most of them extremely disagree with supporting harm to others merely to enforce the political influence of their religious groups. The exception is the highest mean score for Muslims in Ambon, which points to 3.21 with standard deviation of 1.41 for the statement that "I would support harm to persons when my religion is deeply insulted." They tend to agree about this, but their answers are more diverse than those of other groups. The mean for this item is also relatively high for Muslims in Yogyakarta (2.28), where the standard deviation points to 1.13. This tendency shows how essential the meaning of religion is for Muslims, in that they cannot accept their religion being insulted.

Table 3.6 The mean and standard deviation on physical and corporal harm

Harm to others or property	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Mean (SD)		Mean (SD)		Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=477)	Christians (N=254)	Muslims (N=368)	Christians (N=350)	Muslims (N=845)	Christians (N=602)
272. I would support harm to others to enforce free access to education for my religious group.	1.89 (.89)	1.72 (.73)	2.00 (.90)	2.06 (.90)	1.94 (.89)	1.92 (.91)
273. I would support the damaging of property to enforce free access to education for my religious group.	1.94 (.88)	1.75 (.73)	2.00 (.94)	2.05 (.96)	1.97 (.90)	1.92 (.88)
274. I would support harm to others to obtain more jobs for my religious group.	1.84 (.87)	1.81 (.81)	1.89 (.87)	1.94 (.93)	1.86 (.87)	1.89 (.88)
275. I would support the damaging of property to obtain more jobs for my religious group.	2.02 (.91)	2.03 (.91)	1.92 (.88)	2.05 (1.03)	1.98 (.90)	2.05 (.98)
276. I would support harm to others to fight abuse of political power against my religious group.	2.05 (.98)	1.92 (.89)	2.47 (1.08)	2.22 (1.05)	2.23 (1.04)	2.09 (1.03)
277. I would support the damaging of property to fight abuse of political power against my religious group.	2.13 (.99)	1.98 (.92)	2.27 (1.04)	2.18 (1.06)	2.19 (1.01)	2.10 (1.01)
278. I would support harm to others to enforce the political influence of my religious group.	1.80 (.73)	1.72 (.73)	1.97 (.90)	1.91 (.85)	1.87 (.82)	1.83 (.80)
279. I would support the damaging of property to enforce the political influence of my religious group.	1.87 (.80)	1.77 (.76)	1.87 (.84)	1.92 (.86)	1.87 (.82)	1.86 (.82)
280. I would support harm to others when my religion is deeply insulted.	2.28 (1.13)	1.84 (0.87)	3.21 (1.41)	2.22 (1.11)	2.68 (1.34)	2.06 (1.03)
281. I would support the damaging of property when my religion is deeply insulted.	2.18 (1.05)	1.84 (.84)	2.93 (1.35)	2.16 (1.04)	2.51 (1.25)	2.03 (.98)

In contrast with their attitudes, the actual support by respondents for public criticism and demonstration is low both in Ambon and Yogyakarta. Only about 10% of respondents said that they had expressed public criticism and 9% had participated in a demonstration over the past year. Nonetheless, the respondents of Yogyakarta

are more frequently involved in public criticism (58.5%) and demonstrations (70.5%) than those of Ambon who participate in public criticism (42.4%) and demonstrations (57.6%).

3.3.2 Ethno-religious identification

Ethno-religious identification is a cognitive process by which individuals construct the image of themselves from their ethno-religious group membership, along with the values and emotional significance of that group (Gijsberts et al., 2004: 10). Ethno-religious identification stems from social identity theory, which proposes that identification with in-group activities is motivated by a desire to positively differentiate that group from out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brown, 1995). In this sense, ethno-religious identification encompasses both ethnic or religious dimensions, and allows individuals to develop a positive image from their in-group while dissociating themselves from the out-groups. Ethno-religious identification is measured by several indicators, adopted from inventories of a previous study with some modifications, and built into the new scale. It encompasses self-definition in relation to ethnic/religious groups, language use, friends by ethnicity/religion and friend preferences, participation in ethnic/religious ceremonies, religious beliefs and practices, and individual affiliation with ethno-religious organizations.

3.3.2.1. Ethnic self-definition

Ethnic identification has four distinct dimensions: ethnic self-labelling or self-categorization, attachment to the ethno-cultural group, evaluation of the ethnic group, and involvement with the group and its cultural practices and customs (Phinney, 1990). While individuals cannot change its basis in genealogical relations, they can deny or choose ethnic group attributes, and can be subjective about their membership of a certain ethnic group. Ethnic groups serve as a point of reference that give individuals a positive image of their identity. Since the category is inherited from blood relations, our measurement asks for parents' ethnic groups. However, the father's ethnic group can be different from that of the mother's in inter-ethnic marriages; to allow for this, individuals could choose the ethnicity of their mother, father or a combination of the two via the question, "To which ethnic group do you consider yourself to belong?"

The question is actually similar to that in Tuti's questionnaire (2007), but the answer categories were adjusted according to the specific situation of the research areas. Based on the combination of the six big ethnic groups in Yogyakarta and Ambon, we provided twelve ethnic groups in the answer, including Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Ambonese, Bugis, Makassar, Buton, Toraja, Minahasa, Chinese and Batak. In anticipation of other possibilities, the choice of "other" was openly provided.

As a part of individual self-definition, the parent's ethnicity was also of interest to us. It identified whether respondents were from one or more ethnic lines, and if so, we were curious as to how they defined themselves. The measurement we used for parent's ethnic identification was similar to Tuti's scale, but the answer categories were different. The question was, "To which ethnic group do you consider your parents to belong?" This was divided into father's ethnic group and mother's ethnic group, with the answers in precisely the same categories as for individual self-definition.

The survey recorded the various ethnic backgrounds of our respondents. In Yogyakarta, Javanese is the largest group, followed by Chinese, while Ambonese is the dominant group in the city of Ambon. As well as respondents whose ancestors were from the ethnic groups of the Ambon and Lease islands, respondents who claimed to be Ambonese could be those who were born in Ambon and whose parents had lived there for a generation, although they might also belong to various ethnic groups of the neighbouring islands such as Seram, Aru, Saparua, Buru, Kei, etc. As shown in Table 3.7, the ethnic diversity of Yogyakarta is higher than in Ambon, despite the large number of ethnic groups found in the latter. This is due to the fact that Yogyakarta has become a student city, to which young people from many regions of Indonesia come to study. In Ambon, the ethnic diversity is apparently increased by the number of migrants who make a living in the area, as indicated by the percentage of Buton (12.4%), Toraja (1.3%), Buginese (0.8%) and Makassar (0.1%).

Table 3.7 Ethnic group composition

Ethnic groups	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Javanese	436	58.1	21	2.8	457	30.5
Sundanese	38	5.1	0	0	38	2.5
Madurese	37	4.9	0	0	37	2.5
Minangkabau	16	2.1	1	.1	17	1.1
Ambonese (e.g. Seram, Kei, Ternate, etc.)	8	1.1	581	77.5	589	39.3
Buginese	5	.7	6	.8	11	.7
Makasarese	2	.3	1	.1	3	.2
Butonese	2	.3	93	12.4	95	6.3
Toraja	10	1.3	10	1.3	20	1.3
Minahasa	4	.5	1	.1	5	.3
Chinese	47	6.3	2	.3	49	3.3
Batak	37	4.9	0	.0	37	2.5
Others, specify	90	12.0	14	1.9	104	6.9
Missing	18	2.4	20	2.7	38	2.5
Total	750	100.0	750	100.0	1500	100.0

The respondents' ethnicity is notably similar to that of their parents. Among 77.5% of respondents who define themselves as Ambonese, only 2.1% have non-Ambonese fathers, while the percentage with mothers who are non-Ambonese is a little higher (8.5%). These parents are of Javanese, Butonese, Buginese, Makasarese, Toraja, Chinese descent, etc., who married Ambonese-born spouses. So, even with one non-Ambonese parent, the respondents saw themselves as Ambonese.

We found the same trend in Yogyakarta. Respondents tend to identify themselves as Javanese when they have either a Javanese father or mother; indeed, a few respondents do so even when neither parent is Javanese. 3.5% of fathers and 5.5% of mothers are from other ethnic groups such as Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Buginese, Bataknese, Butonese and Chinese. This demonstrates that there are relatively few interethnic marriages, and that endogamous spouses are preferred.

3.3.2.2. Language use

The corresponding indicator for ethnicity is the use of language in everyday life. Individuals might speak different languages or dialects with different people i.e. with family, with friends, with neighbours, with government officers or in different social

contexts, i.e. at home, at family gatherings, at school, in the neighborhood, etc. Language use indicates individuals' ethnic category in relation to people with whom they have a certain degree of intimacy or with those who belong to their ethnic group, such as siblings, parents, family members, relatives, etc. In Indonesia, it is very common for people to speak different languages, either their local dialect/ethnic language or the national language, depending on the situation. Which language is used signifies individuals' attachment to their ethnic group; the more they speak local languages with different people across a range of social interactions, the higher their degree of attachment to their ethnic group.

An inventory of previous studies sets out the importance of language use in showing individuals' relation to their social identities. The European Social Survey (2008/2009) asked what languages respondents speak most often at home. The other study was the Tuti questionnaire (2007), which asked "What is the language that you usually speak at home (big family gathering, work place, and social gathering)?" We made changes to the situation categories, because our survey was carried out among university students rather than the general population: work place was changed to university, and social gathering was changed to community of residence. We additionally asked what language respondents mainly speak with close friends and in dealing with government offices, with the response options being "Indonesian", "ethnic language", and "other language".

The survey outcome indicates that ethnic rather than national languages are generally spoken at home and at family gatherings. In Yogyakarta, 59.9% of respondents claim to speak their ethnic language at home, and 33.9% the national language. In Ambon, 46.1% of respondents speak their ethnic language and 42.5% speak Bahasa Indonesia at home. The language used at family gatherings is not significantly different from the language used at home. However, Bahasa Indonesia, as the national language, is more frequently spoken on campus and in government administration offices.

Nonetheless, there is a sharp difference between Muslims' and Christians' use of language for particular social interactions. Christians, both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, tend to talk in Bahasa Indonesia at home, at big family gatherings and in the community residence. With close friends, Christians in Yogyakarta are more likely to use Bahasa Indonesia than their ethnic languages, as are Muslims in Ambon. Tabel 3.8 illustrates the survey results for the language used at home and at family gatherings, and with close friends.

Table 3.8 The language used at home, at big family gatherings, and with close friends

22. What language do you mainly speak at home?	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=454)	Christians (N=245)	Muslims (N=348)	Christians (N=344)	Muslims (N=802)	Christians (N=589)
Indonesian	23.8	58.4	36.5	55.3	29.3	56.5
Your ethnic language	75.1	40.4	59.8	39.8	68.5	40.1
Other language	1.1	1.2	3.7	4.9	2.2	3.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
23. What language do you mainly speak at big family gatherings?	**Respondents**					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=450)	Christians (N=250)	Muslims (N=333)	Christians (N=329)	Muslims (N=783)	Christians (N=579)
Indonesian	36.2	62.4	41.1	57.4	38.3	59.6
Your ethnic language	63.1	36.8	54.1	40.7	59.3	39.0
Other language	.7	.8	4.8	1.8	2.4	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
25. What language do you mainly speak with close friends?	**Respondents**					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=423)	Christians (N=247)	Muslims (N=336)	Christians (N=325)	Muslims (N=759)	Christians (N=585)
Indonesian	45.4	64.0	58.9	55.1	51.4	58.9
Your ethnic language	49.9	33.2	30.4	40.0	41.2	37.1
Other language	4.7	2.8	10.7	4.9	7.4	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3.3.2.3. Friends by ethnicity

Ethnic identification can also be measured by numbers of friends who belong to the same ethnic group. This is a good indicator for individuals' wider relationship to their ethnic groups. It is assumed that the more same-ethnicity friends, the stronger the identification of individuals with their ethnic group. The measurement was developed by estimating respondents' number of close friends. A measurement from Tutti (2007) was adapted, with appropriate adjustments of the question as well as the answer. The original question was, "How many Javanese friends/colleagues/neighbours do you know well?" This was then changed to, "How many of your close friends are…?" The change was made because the triple-barrelled nature of the original (friends/colleagues/neighbours) could be confusing for respondents. Furthermore, intervals were replaced with ordinals, because of respondents' difficulty in counting the

number of people that they could remember. The previous scale comprised: none; 1 to 10 people; 11 to 25 people; more than 25 people. We modified this with four ordinal scales of none, some, relatively many, almost all and all.

The result shows that the respondents of Ambon tend to be exclusive in their friendships, and the respondents in Yogyakarta inclusive. The respondents in Yogyakarta state that they have more friends of different ethnic groups than the respondents of Ambon. Indeed, there are different ethnic groups from which their friends come, but the Yogyakarta sample is more diverse compared to that of Ambon. In Yogyakarta, they said they had "some to many" Sundanese (89.2%), Bataknese (78.3%), Makassarese (68.4%), Chinese (67.8%) and Madurese (65.3%) friends. In Ambon the respondents mentioned Javanese (81.7%), Butonese (67.8%), Buginese (61.2%), Makassarese (63.7%) and Toraja (46.3%) as the ethnic identities of their friends.

Muslims and Christians show different preferences in their friends. Muslims tend to have more Madurese, Minangkabau and Butonese friends; these ethnic groups have traditions that are often strongly interwoven with Islam. Table 3.9 below indicates the stronger tendency of Muslims to make friends with Madurese, Minangkabau and Butonese, while Christians show the opposite tendency. A higher percentage of Christians said "few to none" friends from these groups.

Table 3.9 Madurese, Minangkabau and Buton friends

Madurese	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=451)	Christians (N=240)	Muslims (N=307)	Christians (N=256)	Muslims (N=758)	Christians (N=496)
None	22.0	47.1	65.8	77.3	39.7	62.7
Some	48.6	44.6	30.6	16.0	41.3	29.8
Relatively Many	20.0	6.3	2.0	2.3	12.7	4.2
Almost all	6.9	.4	1.0	2.0	4.5	1.2
All	2.7	1.7	.7	2.3	1.8	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Minangkabau	**Respondents**					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=415)	Christians (N=234)	Muslims (N=297)	Christians (N=254)	Muslims (N=712)	Christians (N=488)
None	33.5	47.0	74.4	80.3	50.6	64.3
Some	51.1	41.9	21.2	11.0	38.6	25.8
Relatively Many	12.0	9.0	2.7	1.2	8.1	4.9
Almost all	2.4	1.3	.7	3.9	1.7	2.7
All	1.0	.9	1.0	3.5	1.0	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Butonese	**Respondents**					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=407)	Christians (N=230)	Muslims (N=348)	Christians (N=278)	Muslims (N=755)	Christians (N=508)
None	70.5	73.0	.9	41.0	38.4	55.5
Some	23.8	20.0	42.8	46.8	32.6	34.6
Relatively Many	3.7	5.7	33.0	7.2	17.2	6.5
Almost all	1.2	.4	16.4	2.5	8.2	1.6
All	.7	.9	6.9	2.5	3.6	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Christians tend to make more Torajan, Chinese and Bataknese friends than Muslims. This might be because of the large number of Christians within these groups, thus making it easier for the Christian respondents to engage in friendships with them.

Table 3.10 Toraja, Chinese and Batak friends

Toraja	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=411)	Christians (N=242)	Muslims (N=307)	Christians (N=294)	Muslims (N=718)	Christians (N=536)
None	63.5	14.5	69.1	14.3	65.9	14.4
Some	29.4	57.0	26.7	69.7	28.3	64.0
Relatively Many	3.9	21.5	2.3	9.5	3.2	14.9
Almost All	2.2	4.5	1.3	3.7	1.8	4.1
All	1.0	2.5	.7	2.7	.8	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Chinese	**Respondents**					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=415)	Christians (N=245)	Muslims (N=306)	Christians (N=275)	Muslims (N=721)	Christians (N=520)
None	37.6	3.7	80.1	37.1	55.6	21.3
Some	43.6	27.8	17.3	48.4	32.5	38.7
Relatively Many	15.9	49.0	1.3	8.7	9.7	27.7
Almost All	1.9	15.1	.3	2.9	1.2	8.7
All	1.0	4.5	1.0	2.9	1.0	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Batak	**Respondents**					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=433)	Christians (N=247)	Muslims (N=308)	Christians (N=285)	Muslims (N=741)	Christians (N=532)
None	24.0	2.0	77.6	33.0	46.3	18.6
Some	56.8	36.0	19.8	55.8	41.4	46.6
Relatively Many	15.9	51.8	1.3	6.3	9.9	27.4
Almost all	1.6	5.3	.3	1.8	1.1	3.4
All	1.6	4.9	1.0	3.2	1.3	3.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3.3.2.4. Participation in ethnic ceremonies

Individuals' participation in ethnic ceremonies reflects their level of integration as members of their ethnic group, and also their identification with their group's distinctive characteristics – the traditions and customs that deal with individual life cycles or key events, such as birth ceremonies, maturity or coming of age events, wedding rituals, dealing with illness, funerals, or moving house. The measurement is based on the individual's knowledge and participation, with or without their family. It is linked to their family because ethnic ceremonies usually involve members of either the nuclear or extended family. In this question, we also checked their level of knowledge about ethnic ceremonies or rituals, since such knowledge could not be assumed. The question was therefore, "Are you familiar with these ceremonies and do you and/or your family participate in these ethnic ceremonies or rituals?" The ceremonies and rituals concerned related to births, weddings, moving house, dealing with illness, funerals and others that the respondents could add. The answer categories were "no knowledge", "I do not participate and neither does my family", "I do not participate, but my family does", and "I participate."

The survey results generally found that respondents are familiar with their ethnic ceremonies, but they do not actively participate in them except for weddings and funerals. This is indicated by the relatively high mean score in both Yogyakarta and Ambon, regardless of religion (> 3.00). However, more precisely, Muslims seem to have slightly higher participation levels than Christians. The mean for Muslims is between 2.44 (illness) and 3.42 (wedding rituals), and for Christians between 2.18 (illness) and 3.26 (funeral/wake). The variability also indicates that Muslims are more consistent than Christians, given that the standard deviation of Muslims ranges from .84 to 1.38 and of Christians from .98 to 1.40.

3.3.2.5. Membership of ethnic organizations

An ethnic organization is a formal group that binds members together by virtue of ethnic particularities such as shared inherited customs, place of origin or myths of ancestors. Formal ethnic organizations or ethnic associations usually exist in heterogeneous spaces such as urban areas which have high densities of migrants, high ethnic diversity and multiple cultures. Ethnic organizations are assumed to play an important role in strengthening ethnic group identification. Membership indicates a positive association by individuals with their ethnic group that also distinguishes them from ethnic out-groups. Although an ethnic group is a system of social organization, it is not always the case that they create formal organizations. In this measurement, therefore, an example of an ethnic group organization or association was presented to give an idea of what was meant to the respondents. Such examples were the South Sulawesi Family Association (Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan,KKSS), the Unity of Madurese Family (Ikatan Keluarga Madura, IKAMA), the Unity of Banda Eli Society (Ikatan Masyarakat Banda Eli), The Unity of Minang Society (Ikatan Masyarakat Minang) etc.

The measurement for this item was formed by two yes and no questions, in which respondents could indicate whether they were supporters or members, the first being “Are you a member or a supporter of any ethnic organization?” The second, follow-up question was designed to discover the intensity of respondent participation, and was worded “On average, how often did you participate in the activities of your ethnic group organization over the past year?” Answers were categorized on an ordinal scale comprised of “never”, “only on special days”, “at least once a month”, “once a week”, and “more than once a week”.

The survey found that few respondents were members of ethnic organizations both in Ambon (8%) and in Yogyakarta (10%). A large number were not members, but some participated in organization activities only on special days (52.5%), at least once a month (12.3%), once a week (9.4%), and more than once a week (12.3%). This suggests that their attachment to their ethnic groups is founded less on formal

organizations, and more on kin or genealogical relationship to people with a similar tradition.

3.3.2.6. Religious self-definition

Religious self-definition refers to an individual's subjective feeling, or acknowledgement and recognition through verbal statement, that their membership of a religious group represents their religious identity. It is an individual choice of religious identity in which the characteristics of a religious group are associated with a positive image. The question we used is actually a common measurement for demographic variables, adapted from the European Social Survey (Round 4, 2008/2009) question, which is, "Do you consider yourself to belong to any particular religion or denomination?" Given the social context of Indonesia, in which citizens are officially obliged to follow one of six religions, we modified this to, "To what religion do you consider yourself to belong?" In the earlier question, the respondent could answer "no," as they might be either agnostic or atheist – impossible for Indonesians. Our range of answers comprised the five official state religions, i.e. Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Respondents who followed Confucianism or local beliefs could insert their religion under the option "Others".

Table 3.11 Religious self-definition

Religion	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Islam	480	64.0	373	49.7	853	56.9
Catholicism	59	7.9	19	2.5	78	5.2
Protestantism	196	26.1	355	47.3	551	36.7
Buddhism	6	.8	0	0	6	.4
Hinduism	3	.4	0	0	3	.2
Others	2	.3	0	0	2	.1
Missing	4	.5	3	.4	7	.5
Total	750	100.0	750	100.0	1500	100.0

Furthermore, we were interested to discover whether respondents had changed or converted from one religious identity to another. This is simply because identity is not fixed, for many reasons, one of which is oppression or discrimination against minorities. In Indonesia, the obligation to adhere to one of the state religions was declared after the extermination of communist party sympathizers in 1965/1966, when the authoritarian regime of the New Order exerted control over civil society. Data on previous religious identity and parents' religion were also important for

understanding religious diversity and pluralism in the family; it would be possible for the respondents and their parents to have different religions, or even for their mother and father to differ. The deciding factor for whether a respondent had changed religion was whether they had converted during high school, because the period between the ages of 12-17 is considered to be when the respondent could make up their own minds in relation to this.

A large number of respondents' religion is Islam (56.9%). Unlike in Yogyakarta, the religion of respondents in Ambon is almost balanced, with 49.7% Muslims and 49.8% Christians (Protestants and Catholics). This simply reflects the student population of Unpatti – the state university is more heterogeneous than the other two. In Yogyakarta, it appears that not all students at the Christian university are Christians; some are in fact Muslims. Even if the Protestant and Catholics are combined, they still number fewer than the sample of 250 respondents.

Interestingly, there are a few respondents whose religion differs from that of their parents, with Yogyakarta showing similarities to Ambon. This difference could be a result of the inter-religious marriage of parents or religious conversion. The cross-tabulation between respondents and their fathers show that 0.6% of Muslim respondents have Christian fathers and 1.8% of Christian respondents have Muslim fathers. In addition, 0.8% Muslim respondents have Christian mothers and 1.3% Christian respondents have Muslim mothers. There are more Christian respondents with Muslim parents than Muslim respondents with Christian parents. A small number of respondents said that they had a different religion at high school – 1.3% in Ambon and 3.9% in Yogyakarta. These converts identified as Catholic (30.8%), Protestant (10.3%), and Muslim (7.7%). Such religious conversion was apparently slightly higher in Yogyakarta than in Ambon.

3.3.2.7. Religious practices

Religious practices are not only an indicator for individual religiosity, but also religious identification. Religious practices encompass the frequency of church or mosque attendance, the reading or reciting of Holy Scripture, and personal prayer. There are at least three studies that we used to design the measurement. These were the European Social Survey (2008/2009), Religiosity and Personality in a Muslim Context (Wilde and Joseph, 1997), and the questionnaire of Hadiwitanto (2007). The European Social Survey asked about the frequency of religious service attendance, with the answer categories: "every day", "more than once a week", "once a week", "at least once a month", "only on special holy days", "less often", "never" and "don't know". The questions were, "Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, roughly how often do you attend religious services?" and "Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?"

Many studies of religion have a Protestant or Catholic bias in their measurements of religious practices, so this research adapted input from the Muslim Attitudes towards Religion Scale (MARS) (Wilde and Joseph, 1997), allowing religious practices to be measured not only by frequency of church or mosque attendance, but also by the extensive dimensions of reading or reciting Holy Scripture and personal prayer. Our research developed three items that were similar to those used by Hadiwitanto (2007). The first question was, "How often do you read or recite the Holy Scripture (Bible or Al Quran)?" The word "recite" was added since reciting, instead of reading, is common in the Muslim tradition. The second question was "How often do you go to religious services in mosques, churches, or other places of worship?" The term "other places of worship" was added to include *langgar* or *mushola* and other common places of worship in Indonesia, and to provide a choice for other religious adherents who formed part of the random sample. The third question was the same as the Hadiwitanto question, "How often do you pray?" The measurement for religious practices involved a more or less straightforward question based on these three dimensions, with answers ranging in seven scales as follows: "never", "only on feast days or special holy days", "at least once a month", "once a week", "more than once a week", "once a day", and "several times a day".

The survey results delineate a similar direction for the three religious practice indicators; frequency of respondents reading or reciting Holy Scripture, attending religious services and praying tend to be high. A large number of respondents (80.3%) read Holy Scripture from once a week to several times a day. Table 3.12 points out the higher level of activity among Ambon respondents (83.8%) than among those in Yogyakarta (77%). In Ambon, those who claim to read the Holy Scripture once a day or several times a day constitute 50% of the respondents. In particular, more Muslims tend to read Al Quran once a day, while more Christians read their Bible more than once a week.

Table 3.12 Frequency of reading or reciting Holy Scripture

57. Reading or reciting the Holy Scripture (Al Quran, Bible, Vedas or Tripitaka)	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=470) (%)	Christians (N=248) (%)	Muslims (N=358) (%)	Christians (N=340) (%)	Muslims (N=828) (%)	Christians (N= 588) (%)
Never	1.1	3.6	0	1.8	0.6	2.6
Only on feast days or special holy days	7.9	11.7	5.6	4.1	6.9	7.3
At least once a month	10.9	6.0	5.6	3.5	8.6	4.6
Once a week	10.9	24.6	10.6	14.1	10.7	18.5
More than once a week	20.4	23.4	20.1	27.6	20.3	25.9
Once a day	25.5	22.6	24.9	22.9	25.2	22.8
Several times a day	23.4	8.1	33.2	25.9	27.7	18.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3.13 Frequency of religious service attendance

39. How often do you go to religious services?	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=463) (%)	Christians (N=253) %%)	Muslims (N=355) (%)	Christians (N=366) (%)	Muslims (N=818) %	Christians (N=619) (%)
Never	1.3	.8	.3	.3	.9	.5
Only on feast days or special holy days	21	8.7	40.0	12.3	29.2	10.8
At least once a month	12.7	7.5	6.8	3.3	10.1	5.0
Once a week	16	50.2	12.1	29.5	14.3	38.0
More than once a week	19.4	31.2	9.9	40.2	15.3	36.5
Once a day	7.1	.4	5.4	2.5	6.4	1.6
Several times a day	22.5	1.2	25.6	12	23.8	7.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Likewise, the vast majority of respondents attend religious services at least on feast days or special holidays. Among these, 67.7% attend religious services in the aggregate range from once a week to several times a day. In addition, more respondents in Ambon than in Yogyakarta go to the mosque, church, or other places of worship frequently. A greater percentage of Muslims attend religious services on

feast days or special holy days and several times a day. Meanwhile, Christians are more likely to attend religious services once a week and more than once a week.

The vast majority also pray at least once a day (11. 9%) and even several times a day (71.9%). In Yogyakarta, the percentage of respondents, especially Muslims, who pray several times a day is higher than in Ambon. Most of the respondents actively practise their religion, even in terms of personal worship such as praying. Interestingly, only 0.3% of respondents claimed that they never pray, and apparently more Christians than Muslims never pray.

Table 3. 14 Frequency of praying

38. How often do you pray?	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=463) (%)	Christians (N=254) (%)	Muslims (N=355) (%)	Christians (N=367) (%)	Muslims (N=815) (%)	Christians (N=621) (%)
Never	0	1.2	.6	0	.2	.5
Only on feast days or special holy days	1.5	1.6	3.7	.5	2.5	1.0
At least once a month	.7	2.0	1.4	1.6	1.0	1.8
Once a week	2.0	2.8	1.7	1.6	1.8	2.1
More than once a week	5.4	6.7	11.0	8.2	7.9	7.6
Once a day	7.2	16.9	13.0	15.0	9.7	15.8
Several times a day	83.3	68.9	68.7	73.0	76.9	71.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3.3.2.8. Friends by religion

The number of same-religion close friends indicates individuals' identification with their religious group, and how much they distinguish themselves from other groups. It is assumed that a close friend is one with whom individuals have an intimate relationship and can build trust. The more close friends they have from within their religious group, the stronger their religious identification. Our measurement stemmed from the Hadiwitanto questionnaire (2007) with a paraphrasing modification; the original question was, "How many of your best friends consider themselves to be members of the same religion as you?", which we modified to, "How many of your close friends are (Muslims, Protestants or Catholic)?", splitting the categories of religion across three questions. We changed the term "best friend" to "close friend" to give a clearer idea of the distance within the relationship. However, the answer options remained the same with five categories from "none", "some", "relatively many", "almost all" to "all".

In general, intergroup relationships are apparently inclusive. A large number of respondents do not limit their friendships. Both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, fewer than 25% of respondents claimed to have no close friends from other religious groups. The Christian respondents with close Muslim friends tend to answer some (45.5%) and relatively many (40.8%), a tendency that seems higher for Christians in Yogyakarta than in Ambon. For the Muslim respondents, those with close friends who are all Muslims is higher in Ambon (61.5%) than in Yogyakarta (22.3%) as shown in Table 3.15 below.

Table 3.15 Muslims as close friends

274. How many of your close friends are Muslims?	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=476) (%)	Christians (N=253) (%)	Muslims (N=366) (%)	Christians (N=330) (%)	Muslims (N=842) (%)	Christians (N=583 (%)
None	.6	2.4	.5	5.5	.6	4.1
Some	1.3	31.6	1.6	56.1	1.4	45.5
Relatively many	12.6	49.8	14.2	33.9	13.3	40.8
Almost all	63.2	14.6	22.1	1.5	45.4	7.2
All	22.3	1.6	61.5	3.0	39.3	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The percentage of Muslims who have some Catholic close friends (51.1%) and some Protestant (49.3%) close friends also appears high, but the number with no close Christian friends is also relatively high. Specifically, Muslims in Ambon had fewer close Christian friends, either Catholic or Protestant, than in Yogyakarta. This implies a tendency towards exclusiveness among Muslims in Ambon and inclusiveness among Christians in Yogyakarta. In Ambon, this presumably reflects the religious segregation that hinders social interaction between Muslims and Christians.

Table 3.16 Catholics as close friends

275. How many of your close friends are Catholics?	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=435) (%)	Christians (N=253) (%)	Muslims (N=314) (%)	Christians (N=325) (%)	Muslims (N=749) (%)	Christians (N=578) (%)
None	16.1	.4	51.6	4.3	31	2.6
Some	61.6	28.1	36.6	57.8	51.1	44.8
Relatively many	20.5	58.5	9.9	28.6	16	41.7
Almost all	1.6	10.3	1.3	4	1.5	6.7
All	.2	2.8	.6	5.2	.4	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3.17 Protestants as close friends

276. How many of your close friends are Protestants?	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	Muslims (N=430) (%)	Christians (N=253) (%)	Muslims (N=321) (%)	Christians (N=337) (%)	Muslims (N=751) (%)	Christians (N=590) (%)
None	17.0	0	42.1	.6	27.7	.3
Some	60.5	7.5	34.3	1.5	49.3	4.1
Relatively many	19.3	46.2	19.6	17.8	19.4	30.0
Almost all	3.0	35.2	2.8	41.5	2.9	38.8
All	.2	11.0	1.2	38.6	.7	26.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3.3.2.9. Participation in religious ceremonies

Individuals' identification with their religious group can also be measured via their participation in religious ceremonies, which are often celebrated in accordance with the religious calendar or to mark important events in an individual's life. Participation in religious rituals strengthens religious identification because ceremonies or rituals increase social cohesion and distinguish group members from non-members. The term "participation" is defined as taking part in the ceremony, such as helping out with the preparations or being involved in the ceremony itself.

The measurement for participation was adapted from Tuti's questionnaire on ethnic attitudes in Indonesia (2007). The original question was, "Could you indicate the traditional ceremonies of your own ethnic group and whether you have knowledge of them, you know about the traditions but do not perform them, or whether your family still carries them out and you participate?" We changed this to, "Could you

indicate whether or not you and/or your family participate in religious ceremonies/ rituals?" The religious rituals were divided into Muslim and Christian ceremonies. The Muslim ceremonies were circumcision, marriage, funerals, *Ramadhan, Idul Fitri, Idul Adha, Isra Mi'raj, Maulud*, and *selamatan*. For Christians, the ceremonies were baptism, marriage, Christmas, Easter, funerals and fasting. The answers options were, "I do not participate and neither does my family", "I do not participate but my family does", "I do participate, but for non-religious reasons" and "I do participate, for religious reasons."

The survey revealed that most respondents participate in almost all religious ceremonies as shown by the high mean score (> 3.00), except the mean Christians' fasting Christians (2.81). For Muslim respondents, the highest mean is for participation in *Idul Fitri* (3.89) and slightly lower for *Idul Adha* (3.88). Conversely, Muslims in Ambon participated less in wedding ceremonies (3.23), while for Muslims in Yogyakarta, lowest participation is in circumcision (3.18). For the Christian respondents, Christmas is apparently viewed as the most important ceremony so they participate for religious reasons (3.80). However, Christians, as indicated above, might not participate in fasting, or if they do, they fast for non-religious reasons. The variability of Christians is wider for fasting (SD: 1.31) and of Muslims for circumcision (SD: .98)

3.3.2.10. Membership of religious organizations

Membership of a religious organization is assumed to be a good indicator for individual religious identification, simply because religious group membership gives individuals an identity that is distinct from other groups. The measurement was adapted from Hadiwitanto's questionnaire (2007); the original asked respondents to identify any student organization to which they belonged, as well as the frequency of involvement in mosque or church activities. Our first question was, "Please indicate if you belong to one of the organizations below." The answer choices were several student organizations: the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI), The Islamic Student Movement of Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII), the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Movement (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI,), the Indonesian Christian Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI), The Union of Catholic University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI), others (namely…), and "I am not a member of any of these organizations". The second question was, "How often are you involved as a volunteer with a mosque or church?" The answer options were "never", "on feast days or special days", "now and then", "monthly or several times a month", "weekly or several times a week", and "every day".

We then modified both the question and answer categories further. For the first question we asked, "Are you a member or a supporter of any religious organization?", in the expectation that the respondent would give a specific answer. We then added a distinction between two types of religious organization – community-based and school-based, because the respondents are university students who might be members of both, or perhaps only one of them. The second question was, "On average, how often did you participate in the activities of your religious organization over the past year?" The range of answers were "never", "only on special days", "at least once a month", "once a week", and "more than once a week".

More than half of the respondents are not members of a religious organization (55.3%). 27.2 % are members of an organization and 12.5% claim to be supporters only. Ambon (34.9%) has a higher rate of membership than Yogyakarta (19.5%). This trend is similar for supporters; Ambon has 14.3% and Yogyakarta 10.8%. Although only a small number of respondents are members of a religious organization, the trend is higher than for membership of ethnic organizations; it seems that this is the case in both Ambon and Yogyakarta.

Most respondents (74.0%) who are members of an organization are connected to a campus-based organization. Fewer are members of community-based organizations (45.3%). Some are, in fact, passive members, since they said they had not participated in any activities over the past year (9.7%) or only on special days (37.9%). Some, about 46.5%, attended organizational activities once a week or even more than once a week. In terms of preferential membership of and participation in campus-based organizations, there is not much difference between Ambon and Yogyakarta.

3.3.2.11. Political orientation

Ethno-religious identification might also be indicated by an individual's choice of political party. The political reformation in Indonesia after the downfall of authoritarianism led to an increase in political parties, all with their roots in the three parties that had been previously recognized by the New Order government. In total, 43 parties passed the electoral threshold requirements in the latest general election of 2009. Among these, there exist religious parties that claim to represent Muslim communities, all offering a different angle, be it nationalist, liberal, moderate or fundamentalist. Such religious parties are the Justice and Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), the Development Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the Moon Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) and the Peace Welfare Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS), etc. It is assumed that choosing a party constitutes an aspect of individuals' religious

identification; respondents who vote for a particular religious party are likely to have a strong religious identification.

For this measurement, the respondents were asked three questions. The first was, "Did you vote in the last national election?" with the answer choices "yes" or "no". The next question was, "If no, why did you not vote?" Four categories of answers were listed, from "I was not yet eligible to vote", "I am eligible to vote, but was not able to register", "I am eligible to vote, but did not want to participate in the election", to "Other reasons, specify....." From this followed, "If yes, which political party did you vote for in the last election?" and "If you were not able to vote, which political party would you have voted for?" The answer options for the second and third questions included the political parties of Indonesia.

The survey discovered that more than half of respondents voted in the national election in 2009. Reasons for not voting were that they were not yet eligible (36.2%), were not able to register (18.6%) and were uninterested in participating in the election (17.2%). The favourite parties were PKB (2.2%), PAN (2.1%), Gerindra (1.7%) and Hanura (1.2%). Other parties receiving less than one per cent included PDS, PBB, PKPI, Patriot, etc. This indicates that the respondents prefer nationalist and secular parties to religious parties; the top three choices are all secular. The religious parties that obtained more than 9.9% per cent of respondents' votes were PKS, PKB and PAN. These seem to have higher support in Ambon (10.6%) than in Yogyakarta (9.4%).

3.3.3. Social position

Social position refers to social categories of individuals that might influence their attitudes to supporting violence by their ethno-religious group. It constitutes a number of control variables in which all indicators potentially affect such support. These include gender, age, place of birth, parents' educational level, parents' occupational status, parents' field of occupation, parents' income, migration, and where they live.

3.3.3.1 Gender, age, place of birth and university courses

Gender is a social indicator based on sexual difference between male and female. Earlier studies reveal different attitudes and behaviours on the part of men and women regarding ethno-religious conflict and support for violence. For instance: the study of religiocentrism in Tamil Nadu by Sterkens and Anthony (2008; c.f Anthony, Hermans & Sterkens, 2015: 157-159) found higher levels of religiocentrism among male students than their female colleagues. Another study related to communal conflict pinpointed the different roles played by men and women during and after violent conflict. The men were engaged on the front line as military, militia or as political decision-makers, while women mostly supported them by preparing food,

taking care of casualties or looking after the camps. When the violent conflict came to an end, women played a greater role in their family's survival as refugees by making a living and taking care of their children within the uncomfortable and insecure conditions of the camps (Putranti and Subagya, 2005).

Age difference might affect individuals' identification with ethno-religious groups as well as their support for ethno-religious violence. We were interested to discover whether there was a difference in attitude between younger and older students in relation to this. Besides their age, the survey respondents were questioned about their place of birth, where they currently live and where they grew up, to examine whether there are different attitudes between natives and migrants; between individuals who live in the city and those who live outside it; and between individuals who grew up in the city and those who grew up in other areas such as towns or the countryside, all in relation to their ethno-religious identification and support for violence.

As control variables, the university attended and course of study were also included in the questionnaire, to assess differences in attitude according to these factors. Do students at a state university identify with their ethno-religious groups more negatively than those attending Islamic state universities or Christian universities? Do they have similar attitudes towards support for violence? Do students of the natural sciences or engineering support violence more strongly than students from the social science department? The aggregate answer for such questions acts as a control for the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence.

In terms of gender balance, 52.1% of the respondents were male and 46.3% female, with a slight difference between Ambon and Yogyakarta. In Ambon, the percentage of male respondents was 49.1%, and female 48.8%. In Yogyakarta, 55.2% were male and 43.9% female. The gender composition of respondents in Ambon was apparently not very different from that of the total population of the city; the male population of Ambon is 49.50% and female is 49.84%. However, the gender composition of Yogyakarta is reversed when compared to the gender of the respondents – the city's male population (49.75%) is smaller than the female (50.24%) (BPS, 2011).

The respondents' age ranged from 18 to 33 years old in Yogyakarta. In Ambon, the range was a little wider, with some respondents as old as 42 when the survey was carried out. A large number of respondents in both cities were seemingly migrants. Even though most now live in the city where they are studying, they grew up in different places (237 regencies of 35 provinces). The respondents of Yogyakarta were more diverse than those in Ambon; of 43.1% living in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, only 19.3% were born there and 20.5% grew up in the city. The rest were from the other 35 provinces of Indonesia i.e. Central Java (23.5%), East Java (14.9%),

West Java (7.9), East Nusa Tenggara (2.3%), South Sumatera (2.0%), North Sumatera (2.0%) etc. This trend was similar among the Ambon respondents, although their place of birth and where they grew up showed less diversity. 79.2% of respondents lived and studied in the city of Ambon while the rest commuted from neighbouring regencies, but all within one province of Maluku. The vast majority of respondents (86.5%) were born and grew up in the province, while the rest came from South East Sulawesi (1.5%), North Maluku (1.3%) and other provinces. In addition, almost half the respondents, both in Yogyakarta and Ambon, have lived in their current place of residence for more than three years (47.7%). The rest varied from two to three years (15.6%), one to two years (25.4%) to less than a year (9.3%).

As has been delineated in the preceding section on the sampling procedure, the survey respondents were students in their second year or above when they were drawn randomly from the sampling frame at the selected universities. This resulted in the following distribution: second year (6%), third year (30.6%), fourth year (29.8%), fifth year (15.3%) and above fifth year (9.9%). In Yogyakarta, the fourth year provided the largest number of respondents (295) and in Ambon it was the third year (228). The exact respondent composition according to their course of study and university is shown above in Table 3. 1.

3.3.3.2. Parental education, occupational status and household income

The social position of the respondents could be identified from their family backgrounds, in terms of, for example, the highest educational attainment of parents, their parents' occupational status and fields, and family income. From these measurements, the socio-economic positions of the respondents could be classified as low, middle or upper class. The inventory of the measurements was derived from the European Social Survey (2008/2009) with some modifications to both questions and answers. For the highest level of parents' education, the answer options were "Primary school", "Junior high school", "Senior high school", "Diploma", "Bachelor (S1)", "Master (S2)", and "PhD (S3)." These were adjusted for the range of educational levels in Indonesia.

For the occupational status of parents, father and mother were addressed separately. The original question of the European Social Survey (2008/2009) was, "Was your father/mother an employee, self-employed, or not working?" with answer categories of employee, self-employed, not working, and father/mother dead/absent when the respondent was 14. We changed this to, "What is the occupational status of your father/mother?" The answers were adopted from the Indonesian occupational status categories used in the 2010 Indonesian population census, and followed a scale from "self-employed", "employee helped by paid workers", "employee helped by unpaid workers", "workers", "free workers in agriculture", "free workers in non-agriculture sector", to "unpaid workers".

Likewise, parents' occupation was an important measure of the respondents' social characteristics. The measurement was adapted from the European Social Survey (2008/2009) and the 2010 Indonesian population census. Again, the parents were listed separately, and occupations ranged from government officials or officials of specialist organisations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors and supervisors; professionals; technicians and associate professionals; to farmers, forestry workers and fishermen, etc. The question for parental occupation was initially, "What field does your father (mother) work in?" After the pilot survey, this was changed to, "What is your father's (mother's) occupation?"

Another indicator was household income. This was estimated from the earnings of all persons living under the same roof including parents, siblings and other members of the household. Household income suggests individuals' socio-economic class. In this measurement, the scale started with "lower than IDR 500,000" for the lowest economic class, which is below the poverty line. The second category was an adjustment by an interval scale of IDR 1,000,000, on the basis of the average provincial minimum wage both in Maluku and Yogyakarta in 2010. The regional minimum wage is decided according to the Regulation of Ministry of Empowerment, PER-01/MEN/1999, and includes the calculation of basic salaries and fixed allowances. In Yogyakarta, the minimum wage is IDR 750,480, and IDR 1,400,990 in Maluku. The average for the two provinces is IDR 1,075,000; we rounded this down to IDR 1,000,000 to provide the interval scale for our measurement. Individuals' differing socio-economic class may affect their identification with ethno-religious groups and their attitudes to supporting violence.

Respondents' parents in Yogyakarta tended to have attained a higher level of education than those in Ambon. Some 7.5% of respondents' fathers had acquired a master degree and 25.3% a bachelor degree. The educational attainment of respondents' mothers in Yogyakarta was lower than that of their spouses, but the percentage who reached higher education is still greater (38.8%) than for mothers in Ambon, where a high percentage of parents did not study beyond senior high school. There, 70.3% of fathers graduated from primary school to senior high school, while the percentage for mothers was similar (75.5%).

In terms of occupational status, most parents were workers, labourers, officers or were self-employed. In Ambon, more respondents' fathers were self-employed than in Yogyakarta (38.3% vs 27.7%). Conversely, respondents' fathers in Yogyakarta with an occupational status of worker, labourer or officer were more numerous than in Ambon (41.5% vs 25.6%). For respondents' mothers, the trend is similar both in Ambon and Yogyakarta; the aggregate result was 38.1% self-employed and 22.8% workers, labourers and officers. However, the percentage of self-employed was slightly higher in Ambon (45.5%) than in Yogyakarta (30.7%). It is notable that 11.5% of respondents' mothers in Yogyakarta are unpaid workers, or work for family.

Table 3.18 Parent's occupation

Occupation	Father				Mother			
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Yogyakarta		Ambon	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Officials of government and special-interest organisations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors and supervisors	30	4.0	9	1.2	7	.9	4	0.5
Professionals	45	6.0	9	1.2	29	3.9	4	0.5
Technicians and associated professionals	14	1.9	8	1.1	3	.4	0	0.0
Clerks	219	29.2	172	23.1	181	24.1	120	16.0
Service workers and shop and market sales workers	50	6.7	20	2.7	49	6.5	7	0.9
Farmers, forestry workers and fishermen	110	14.7	284	37.9	88	11.7	242	32.3
Trades and related Workers	107	14.3	46	6.1	159	21.2	108	14.4
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	14	1.9	14	1.9	1	.1	1	0.1
Labourers and unskilled Workers	32	4.3	20	2.7	21	2.8	5	0.7
Special occupations	56	7.5	48	6.4	130	17.3	103	13.7
Dead/absent	47	6.3	62	8.3	37	4.9	64	8.5
Missing	28	3.7	57	7.6	45	6.0	92	12.3
Total	750	100.0	750	100.0	750	100.0	750	100.0

Respondents' parents' occupations also varied across all fields, with differing trends in Yogyakarta and Ambon and also between father and mother. In Yogyakarta, most parents are clerks, while in Ambon most are farmers, forestry workers and fishermen. The percentage of clerks in Ambon is relatively high, but comes second to agricultural work. In Yogyakarta, the percentage of mothers whose work relates to trade is also considerably high (21.2%), after clerks. Trade and its related work is also an important sector for women in Ambon. The details for parents' occupation are shown in table 3.18.

Half the respondents are considered to come from a middle-class household, with a monthly income from IDR 1,000,000 to IDR 5,999,999. 12.9% belong to the upper class, with a household income of more than IDR 6,000,000, but at the same time 31.8% come from the lower income class. In Ambon, 29.5% of respondents' households even live below the poverty line, with a monthly income of less than IDR 500,000. Indeed, the majority of respondents in Ambon could be classified from low

(46.7%) to middle class (40.7%). Meanwhile, the respondents in Yogyakarta come from middle (59.7%) to upper class (20.5%) households, as illustrated in Table 3.19.

Table 3.19 Household income

Household income	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta		Ambon		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Lower than IDR 500.000,	47	6.3	221	29.5	268	17.9
IDR 500.000 - IDR 999,999,	79	10.5	129	17.2	208	13.9
IDR 1,000,000, - IDR 1.999.999,	113	15.1	119	15.9	232	15.5
IDR 2,000,000, - IDR 2.999.999,	115	15.3	86	11.5	201	13.4
IDR 3.000.000, - IDR 3.999.999,	98	13.1	60	8.0	158	10.5
IDR 4.000.000, - IDR 4.999.999,	56	7.5	22	2.9	78	5.2
IDR 5.000.000, - IDR 5.999.999,	65	8.7	18	2.4	83	5.5
IDR 6.000.000, and over	154	20.5	40	5.3	194	12.9
Missing	23	3.1	55	7.3	78	5.2
Total	750	100.0	750	100.0	1500	100.0

3.3.4. Intermediate determinants

The intermediate variables in this study cover perceived group threat, salience of identity, actual intergroup contact, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and intergroup distrust. All these variables relate to ethno-religious identification and support for violence in different ways; they are affected by ethno-religious identification and in turn determine variations in support for violence. They also mediate the relationship of ethno-religious identification to support for violence. The measurements for each of them were set up from a review of previous relevant studies.

3.3.4.1. Perceived group threat

This concept refers to an in-group's feeling of insecurity due to increasing competition with out-groups. It is an individual response to perceived and actual competition. The subjectively perceived group threat arises when the presence of other groups is assumed to pose risks to the socio-conditions of individuals and their groups in terms of, for example, job prospects, housing availability, financial assistance, privileged positions in government offices, or preferential treatment by authorities, etc. (Scheepers et al. 2002a; Gijsberts et al., 2004, Schneider, 2008; Savelkoul et al. 2010). In our measurement, perceived group threat was addressed in relation to religious groups, because in recent times religion has come to play a stronger role in intergroup relations.

To construct a measurement for perceived group threat, we began with the one used by Scheepers et al. (2002a) to predict exclusionist reactions to ethnic minorities. The reliability of this measure is a quite high, ranging from 0.61 in Portugal to 0.83 in France. From this measure, four statements were adopted for their relevance to perceived group threat in relation to issues of way of life, security, preferential treatment and the job market. These were, "The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life;" "The presence of people from these minority groups is a cause of insecurity;" "People from these minority groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities" and "The presence of people from the minority group increases unemployment in (country)." We then adjusted them for our focus on ethno-religious groups and to reflect the characteristics of university students.

To do this, we changed the term minority groups to "other religious groups", so that the statement, for example, "The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life" then became "The religious practices of people from other religious groups threaten our own way of life." We also extended the measurement in the statement about insecurity by identifying the two specific sites where the respondents perceive a threat from individuals related to the out-groups, paraphrasing it thus: "I am worried that security in my neighbourhood will decline due to the presence of other religious groups." Furthermore, we added two new statements to make the measurement relevant to university students, especially in terms of economic competition at the micro-individual level. These were based on the fourth item of Scheepers et al. (2002a) about the effect of migrants on increasing unemployment; we modified the term "unemployment" to "job prospects", which is more suitable for students, and added a statement about business opportunities to obtain a measure of perceived group threat in the important sector of economic activity. The new statements were, "I am worried that job prospects for members of my group will decline due to the presence of other religious groups," and "Members of other religious groups are in control of business opportunities."

The other items were partly constructed from the measurement of Savelkoul et al. (2010) on perceived threat dimension. The reliability is relatively high, as indicated by the score of Cronbach alpha = 0.80. The original statements were about perceived threat in relation to the housing market and culture: "Minorities get their turn before Dutch people in the housing market" and "Minorities are a threat to our own culture" (Savelkoul et al., 2010: 16). To make this measurement more relevant to university students, we changed housing market competition to boarding-house competition so that it became, "The chances of finding room in a boarding house will decline due to the presence of other groups." The statement about culture was split into two to cover cultural groups and religious groups: "I am afraid that customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups," and "The

migration of people of different religious groups to my community is a threat to my own religious group."

Our measurement also contained three other items related to subjectively perceived competition – study grant opportunities, political threat of the dominant in government positions, and increasing violence due to the presence of other religious groups. These were, "I am worried that study grant opportunities will decline due to the presence of other religious groups," "The day will come when members of other religious groups will occupy crucial positions in government," and "I am afraid of increasing violence in my neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups." In total, the measurement set for perceived group threat numbered 12 items, with the answer categories ranging from "totally disagree" to "totally agree".

Tabel 3. 22 Perceived group threat

Perceived group threat	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=476)	Christians (N=252)	Muslims (N=367)	Christians (N=354)	Muslims (N=843)	Christians (N=606)
74. I am afraid that customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups.	2.59 (1.01)	2.22 (.83)	3.09 (1.18)	2.70 (1.15)	2.80 (1.11)	2.50 (1.05)
75. The migration of people of different religious groups to my community is a threat to my own religious group.	2.38 (.93)	2.00 (.68)	2.88 (1.18)	2.46 (1.05)	2.60 (1.07)	2.27 (.94)
76. I am worried that job prospects for members of my group will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.	2.42 (.88)	2.14 (.77)	2.80 (1.08)	2.56 (1.02)	2.59 (.99)	2.39 (.95)
77. I am worried that study grant opportunities will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.	2.30 (.89)	2.11 (.78)	2.46 (1.02)	2.30 (.91)	2.37 (.95)	2.22 (.86)
78. I am worried that security in my university will decline due to the presence of students of other religious groups.	2.26 (.84)	2.10 (.77)	2.69 (1.16)	2.35 (.96)	2.44 (1.01)	2.24 (.89)
82. People from other religious groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities.	2.41 (0.90)	2.79 (1.11)	2.56 (1.10)	2.68 (1.12)	2.47 (0.99)	2.72 (1.12)
83. Members of other religious groups are in control of business opportunities.	2.66 (.96)	2.54 (.91)	2.69 (1.03)	2.64 (1.04)	2.67 (.99)	2.60 (.99)
84. I am afraid of increasing violence in my neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups.	2.47 (.92)	2.39 (.89)	2.97 (1.14)	2.68 (1.09)	2.69 (1.05)	2.56 (1.02)
85. The chances of finding room in a boarding house will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.	2.26 (.91)	2.12 (.79)	2.43 (1.02)	2.29 (.91)	2.33 (.96)	2.22 (.87)

The general trend of the survey result indicates a moderate attitude towards perceived threat. The highest mean score is for Muslim respondents in Ambon who are "afraid that customs of their group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups" (3.09). Even though the means are not extremely low or high, the pattern is still apparent. The respondents of Ambon feel more threatened than those in Yogyakarta. Specifically, Muslims in Ambon tend to perceive threat more than Christians in Ambon and Muslims in Yogyakarta. Furthermore, Muslims in Yogyakarta perceive more threat than Christians in the same city. The highest score for perceived threat among Christians in Ambon, as well as Muslims and Christians in Yogyakarta, relates to the occupation of crucial positions in the government by other religious groups.

3.3.4.2. Salience of identity

Salience of identity refers to an individual's acknowledgement, conscious and intentional, of identifying as a member of a certain group and the importance attached to this membership and its consequences. Since this study delves into aspects of ethnic and religious identities, the measurement was developed via two indicators, namely salience of ethnic identity and salience of religious identity. The measurement stems from a combination of "the salience of ethno-cultural identity scale" (Duckit, 2006:161) and "salience of religion" (Eisinga et al., 1991:320). Duckit's salience of ethno-cultural identity is measured by eight items with fairly high reliability for white Africans (0.70), Indians (0.60), and white English (0.77), but slightly lower for Africans (0.44). Two items were adapted from this measurement, namely: "My ethnic/cultural identity is very important to me" and "Most of the time, I don't see myself as a 'real' member of my ethnic/cultural group." Three other items were modified from the measurement of "salience of religion", which originally had five questions. The alpha of the measurement is 0.87.

The four items were then revised to make them clear and parsimonious. For instance, Duckit's statement (2006), "Most of the time, I don't see myself as a 'real' member of my ethnic/cultural group'' was modified to "I see myself as a 'real' member of my ethnic group." The term "cultural" was omitted to avoid a double barrel. We also made some linguistic revisions to the items adopted from Eisinga et al. (1991). One item was added to measure the influence of religion and ethnic identities on social relations, namely, "My religious belief/ ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I relate to others." All in all, we devised five items that were similar for both ethnic and religious identities. The scale of the measurement used a similar scoring system to that of Eisinga et al. (1991), a five-point index ranging from totally disagree to totally agree.

The result of the survey shows that salience of ethnic identity is relatively high in both Muslims and Christians (> 3.32), as shown in Table 3.20. However, the

ethnic identity of respondents in Ambon is more salient than that of respondents in Yogyakarta. In all measurements, both Muslim and Christian respondents in Ambon score higher than respondents in Yogyakarta; and the ethnic identity of Muslims in Ambon is more salient than that of Christians.

Table 3.20 Salience of ethnic identity

Salience of ethnic identity	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=475)	Christians (N=253)	Muslims (N=368)	Christians (N=346)	Muslims (N=978)	Christians (N=599)
69. My ethnic identity is very important to me.	3.69 (.87)	3.73 (.90)	4.30 (.72)	4.18 (0.67)	3.96 (0.86)	3.99 (0.81)
70. I see myself as a committed member of my ethnic group.	3.59 (.82)	3.52 (.83)	3.61 (1.05)	3.60 (.95)	3.60 (.93)	3.56 (.90)
71. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence in my daily life.	3.66 (.80)	3.62 (.83)	3.79 (.94)	3.76 (.96)	3.71 (.86)	3.70 (.91)
72. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions.	3.24 (.94)	3.20 (.87)	3.41 (1.02)	3.40 (1.05)	3.32 (.98)	3.32 (.98)
73. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I relate to others.	3.45 (.93)	3.39 (.91)	3.49 (1.03)	3.51 (1.08)	3.47 (.97)	3.46 (1.01)

In general, religious identity has even more salience than ethnic identity; the pattern looks similar, but the score is higher. In all measurements, the mean is close to 4.00 and even higher, except for Christians in Yogyakarta who see themselves as committed members of their religious group (3.80) and claim that their religious belief has a great deal of influence on how they relate to others (3.92). Compared to Yogyakarta, the religious identity of respondents in Ambon is more salient. Nonetheless, the religious identity of Muslims in both cities is more salient than that of Christians and religious identity is most salient to Muslims in Ambon.

Table 3. 21 The salience of religious identity

Salience of religious identity	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=476)	Christians (N=252)	Muslims (N=365)	Christians (N=368)	Muslims (N=841)	Christians (N=622)
64. My religious identity is very important to me.	4.38 (.80)	4.06 (1.00)	4.78 (.46)	4.65 (.59)	4.55 (.70)	4.41 (.84)
65. I see myself as a committed member of my religious group.	4.03 (.85)	3.80 (.88)	4.24 (.83)	4.11 (.89)	4.12 (.85)	3.98 (.90)
66. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence in my daily life.	4.33 (.74)	4.26 (.80)	4.47 (.89)	4.54 (.77)	4.39 (.81)	4.42 (.79)
67. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions.	4.23 (.81)	4.21 (.82	4.29 (.95)	4.41 (.84)	4.26 (.87)	4.33 (.84)
68. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I relate with others.	4.05 (.95)	3.92 (1.00)	4.25 (1.05)	4.13 (1.22)	4.14 (1.00)	4.05 (1.13)

3.3.4.3 Actual intergroup contact

The main concept of intergroup contact refers to the intensity of social interaction between members of different ethno-religious groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Brown et al. 2007; Schneider, 2008). It involves the quantity and quality of both individual and group contact in terms of their effect on negative attitudes towards out-groups. While quantity of contact refers to what can be measured in terms of, for example, frequency of face-to-face meetings, quality of contact emphasizes the depth or intimacy of interaction. In our measurement, we determined levels of intimacy, from far to close, in terms of neighbours, classmates, board mates, close friends and relatives.

There are several inventories that are seen as the benchmark for constructing this measurement. The quantity of contact scale was developed by Tabory (1993), which measured the frequency of respondents' social encounters with religious and non-religious youth. The answer categories were "often", "occasionally" and "infrequently, if at all", with a high score for reliability as indicated by Cronbach alpha 0.95. A comparable measure was devised by Wagner et al., (2006), whose questions were, "How often do you have personal contact with foreigners in your

neighborhood?" and "How often do you have personal contact with foreigners in your work place?" The answer categories ranged from "never" to "often". From these measurements, we constructed a new scale of contact quantity by replacing "the religious and non-religious youth" of Tabory (1993), and foreigners of Wagner et al. (2006), with Christians if the question was asked of Muslim respondents, and with Muslims if the question was asked of Protestants or Catholics. We also specified categories of religious out-groups, from far to close, e.g., neighbours, classmates, board-mates/house-mates, close friends and relatives. To limit the time-frame of the contact, we added the qualifier of "in the past year". So, the question became, "In the past year, how often did you have contact with Christians/Muslims as neighbours, classmates, board-mates, close friends and relatives?" Each question had similar answer categories, from "never", "almost once a week", "once a week", "more than once a week", "once a day", to "several times a day". The column "not applicable" was provided for respondents who might not know anyone relevant to the question.

The work of Nix (1993) assessing social distance and factors that affect its magnitude at Southern University in the United States of America was adapted to measure quality of contact. This study evaluated contact from extremely positive to extremely negative with six scales, via the question, "How would you rate your cross-cultural experience at (insert your university)?" In our measurement, we modified this to, "How would you rate your contact with them?" – "them" referring to the aforementioned categories of neighbours, classmates, board-mates/house-mates, close friends and relatives. The answer categories were "very negative", "negative", "neither negative nor positive", "positive", "very positive", and "not applicable".

A further measurement was constructed from Brown et al. (2007) on quality of relationships, the reliability of which is shown by Cronbach alpha 0.66. In this inventory, quality of contact is measured by asking about closeness, equality and cooperativeness, with seven scales of answer categories ranging from "once a year" to "daily". We changed the grammatical structure of the measure by using the question form instead of a positive statement, to establish social distance from neighbours, classmates, board-mates/house-mates, close friends and relatives. The three items of closeness, equality and cooperativeness remained as in the original version.

The resulting measurements were, "How close are you to your neighbours, close friends, class-mates, board-mates, and relatives from other religious groups?", "How equal would you say you are to your neighbours, close friends, class-mates, board-mates, and relatives from other religious groups?", "How much do you cooperate with your neighbours, close friends, class-mates, board-mates, and relatives from other religious groups?" The answer categories were changed respectively to five categories: very close, close, neither close nor not close, not close, nor not close at

all. The column of "not applicable" was provided for respondents who might not be able to choose an answer.

The survey found that the average quantity of contact between Muslim respondents, both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, with Christians is less than with their board-mates or housemates (1.42). In Ambon, where the residential segregation of Muslims and Christians is so apparent, it might be less prevalent for respondents staying together with people of different religions, either in the same house or boarding house. Certainly, contact with Christians neighbours must be very rare, or almost never, since they are unlikely to live in their neighbourhood. In Yogyakarta, the quantity of contact with Christian house-mates or neighbours is more frequent. Muslims in Yogyakarta are even in contact with Christians as their close friend more than once a week (3.07).

In contrast with Muslims, Christians in Ambon have contact with their Muslim house-mates or board-mates at least once a week (2.00) and with close Muslim friends more than once a week (3.07). The higher quantity of contact might be an indication that there are more Muslims living in Christian neighbourhoods than the reverse. In Yogyakarta, Christians have almost no barrier to their contact with Muslim friends or neighbours, as the average mean is high (> 3.51). However, Muslims seem to have less contact with Christians, overall, than Christians with Muslims.

A similar pattern appears when survey respondents were asked to rate their contact with Christians as neighbours, classmates, house-mates/boarding-mates, close friends and relatives. All respondents have positive contact (> 3.00), especially Christians, who claim it is very positive (>3.99). Even though positive, the quality of contact with Muslims in Ambon is the poorest compared to other groups. The lowest mean is for the quality of contact with house/boarding-mates (3.36) and the highest is for neighbours (3.55). This trend is consistent with Christians in Ambon, where there is less contact with house/boarding-mates of different religions due to social segregation. Furthermore, Christians in Ambon seem similar to Muslims in Yogyakarta. Nonetheless, if the rate is made within the comparison of their relation, the Muslims in Yogyakarta value Christians less as neighbours and house/boarding-mates (3.87). The variability of all answers tends to be less pronounced, but Muslims are slightly more heterogeneous than Christians. The standard deviation for Muslims is .78 - .90 and for Christians it is .67 - .75.

When respondents were asked about their closeness and equality in relationships with people of other religious groups with the same parameters, the outcome is consistent with the pattern above, though the mean of closeness differs slightly from that of equality. The pattern also recurs in terms of how different religious groups in Ambon and Yogyakarta cooperate with one another; the lowest cooperation is of Muslims in Ambon with Christian house/boarding-mates (2.78) and neighbours (2.99). Christians also seem to cooperate less with the Muslims in

Ambon as neighbours (3.49); the level is similar to that of Muslims' cooperation with Christians in Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, Christians in Yogyakarta cooperate openly with Muslims, especially their close friends, relatives, neighbours, class mates, but less with house/boarding-mates. The variability of answers follows the same pattern in terms of closeness, equality and cooperativeness, in that Christians vary less than Muslims. The standard deviation of Christians for assessing cooperativeness is .65 - .81 and of Muslims is 1.08 – 1.25

3.3.4.4. Experience and individual memory of violence

Violent conflict brings about individual traumatic experiences and resides in the collective memory of the community. Even if individuals have not experienced it, memories of past violence persist in the groups or communities affected. It can be transmitted from generation to generation or from group to other groups. The memory of past violence influences individual identification with ethno-religious groups; it increases the tendency to create positive associations for the in-group and to dehumanize out-groups (Sahdra and Ross, 2007; Fierke, 2008).

The measurement for individual memory of violence was constructed via two inventories – Sahdra and Ross (2007) and Hayes and McAllister (2001). In their experimental design, the first inventory asked the participants three main questions. The first asked them to rate the extent to which they had thought about communal violence over the past five years. The scale offered five choices, ranging from "never" to "very frequently". The second asked them to rate the extent to which they thought that members of the victim group should forget about the event and move on. The response scale was in nine categories from "agree not at all" to "agree very much". In the third, the participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced various emotions while reading about the incidents of violence; they were asked to respond to fourteen negative emotions and four positive ones, on a scale of 1-10 ranging from "not at all" to "very much".

Hayes and McAllister (2001) cited some questions from an Irish social mobility survey of 1973; a social attitudes survey of 1978; a social identity survey of 1995 and a Northern referendum and election survey of 1995. The relevant questions were as follows for 1973: "Have you been present when a riot or confrontation took place?", "Have your family and/or friends suffered any kind of injury due to the troubles?" and "Have your family and/or friends been killed due to the troubles?" For 1978: "Have you ever witnessed an act of terrorism, for example a shooting, an explosion, a hijacking, or rioting?" For 1995 and 1998: "Were you a victim of any violent incidents?", "Were any of your family or close friends killed or injured due to the violence?" and "Do you know anyone (not family or relatives) who was killed/ injured due to the violence?"

Overall, our instrument for individual memory of violence comprised twenty-four questions, consisting of twelve items as the leading questions with a scale of "yes" and "no" answers. The first item was developed from the measurement of Sahdra and Ross (2007), and asked whether the respondents remember incidents of violence from the past ten years. If yes, they were then asked to estimate the number of incidents. The second item inquired as to whether memory of ethno-religious violence had been transmitted within the respondent's family; if the answer was yes, we asked how often it was talked about, with answers on a four-point scale of "never", "rarely", "sometimes" and "often".

The remaining items were based on several questions from the second inventory. The third asked whether the respondent had witnessed ethno-religious violence over recent years. If yes, they were asked how many times they had witnessed it. The fourth through eighth items asked whether the respondents and their family, relatives, close friends, and/or neighbours had been injured during communal violence over the past ten years, and if yes, how many of them had suffered physical injury. The last item asked whether any members of the respondent's family, relatives, close friends or neighbours had been killed during the communal violence. If yes, they were asked how many people around them had died.

The vast majority of respondents (79%) in Ambon remembered ethno-religious violence from the past ten years, even though the peace accord was implemented a decade ago. Most of them can recall it happening more than once; 22.7% remember two incidents and 20.0% remember three. Moreover, 10.8% remember more than ten instances of ethno-religious violence in their immediate environment. In Yogyakarta, where there has been little mass violence since 1965, 19.7% of the respondents said that they remembered acts of ethno-religious violence; it could be that these were students from other regions. More than half of them remember violence occurring more than once (65.5%).

About half the respondents talk about ethno-religious violence in their family. In Ambon, the percentage is 76.3%, while in Yogyakarta it is 39.9%. More than half the respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta answered "sometimes" and "often". In Ambon, 61.6% of the respondents had witnessed violence. Among them, 57.8% had witnessed one to three episodes and 27.1% had experienced it more than three times. In Yogyakarta, 28.9% respondents had witnessed violence over the past ten years; considerably fewer than in Ambon.

A large number of respondents had also suffered physical injury as a result of ethno-religious violence. In Ambon, 46.6% of respondents said they had done so more than once. Some also claim that members of their immediate family had been injured; 62.6% said that this had happened to more than two family members. Moreover, 25.1% of respondents said that members of their immediate families had lost their lives; almost half had lost more than two. In Yogyakarta, the number of

respondents to have suffered injury is fewer than in Ambon; the number whose immediate family members had been injured or had died was similarly low.

Besides immediate family, 35.2% of respondents in Ambon also say that relatives had been injured and even killed in the violence of recent years (22.9%); 40.7% had lost one of their relatives. The percentage of relatives injured is similar to that for close friends (22.7%), but slightly different to that for neighbours (32.1%). However, the percentage of close friends who had been killed is smaller than the percentage of neighbours who had been victims of ethno-religious violence. Several respondents in Yogyakarta also said that they have relatives, close friends and neighbours who had been injured or lost their lives, but the percentage is much lower than for the respondents in Ambon.

3.3.4.5. Perceived discrimination

Discrimination in general refers to the feeling of being excluded because of race, nationality, religion, ethnic group, language, age, gender or disability. Perceived discrimination is a subjective perception of exclusionary treatment on the part of the minority by the dominant groups, as a result of competition over scarce resources in economic, political, cultural and religious domains (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2006; Fox, 2000a). In order to construct the measurement for perceived discrimination, this study uses the indicators applied by Fox (2000a) and the questions of the European Social Survey 2008/2009.

The leading questions for perceived discrimination asked respondents to make a general assessment as to whether or not they belong to the group being discriminated against. First is a polar question, followed by an open-ended one. These questions are modified from the European Social Survey 2008/2009, which asked, "Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?' and "On what grounds is your group discriminated against?" The answer categories were colour or race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality and disability. The next question was, "Do you consider yourself to be a member of a group that is discriminated against in this city?" and "If yes, on what ground is your group discriminated against?" The answer categories were basically similar, with the choices condensed to religion, language, ethnic group, gender and other.

The measurement for perceived discrimination was also specified according to the fields of economics, politics, culture and religion, in which ethno-religious groups compete for limited resources. The question for economic discrimination was modified from Fox (2000a), "To what extent is there official restriction on minorities' economic activities?" to "Would you agree or disagree that your own ethno-religious group experiences the following economic limitations?" We also modified the set of following phrases, since Fox's questions are difficult to apply and

somewhat confusing. The new phrases described economic discrimination indicators including "Limitation on access to credit", "Limitations on access to government subsidy", "Limitations on participation in the local market", "Limitations on access to the housing market" and "Limitations on access to the job market". The answer categories, across the economic, political, cultural and religious domains, were listed from "totally disagree" to "totally agree". However, limitations on access to credit was omitted after the pilot survey, because of its low correlation with other indicators for economic discrimination.

The indicators for political discrimination were defined in terms of limitations on freedom of expression, on freedom to choose a place of residence, on the right to form political organizations, on the exercise of the right to vote, on recruitment to the police corps, on recruitment of civil servants and on attaining higher positions in government offices. The set of the measurement was mostly derived from Fox (2000a) with some modifications to make it more reliable, plausible and simple. The first modification was to replace the word "restriction" with "limitation" because some aspects of discrimination may not be enshrined officially, but occur due to the challenge from other groups. Of the eight items, we initially used only seven, since the right to judicial proceedings is not applicable to the Indonesian legal system; after the pilot study, only four were retained, namely: freedom of expression, freedom to choose a place of residence, recruitment of civil servants and attaining higher positions in government offices. The general question for political discrimination was, "Would you agree or disagree that your own ethno-religious group experiences the following limitations in politics?" The following limitations refer to the four dimensions above.

Cultural discrimination was measured by four aspects of limitations on cultural practices: on celebration of group ceremonies, of dress, behaviour and marriage. This was simpler and more relevant to the local context of this study than the original indicators of Fox (2000a), which comprise seven aspects of restriction, namely restriction of observance of group religion; restriction of speaking and publishing in the group's language/dialect; restriction of instruction in the group's language; restriction of celebration of group's holidays, ceremonies and cultural events; restriction of dress, appearance and behaviour; restriction of marriage and family life; restriction of organizations that promote the group's cultural interests.

Perceived discrimination can be experienced by the minority religious group in relation to the dominant majority. The measurement for the religious dimension was constructed with the following question: "Would you agree or disagree that your own ethno-religious group experiences the following limitations on religion?" The indicator was partly modified from Fox (2000a) on religious discrimination, since some of the latter's dimensions were inappropriate for the societal context of our research sites. For instance, ordination or access to clergy were not applicable to

Muslim respondents. Moreover, the Fox measurement could be confusing given the double and triple nature of its question. Our measurement consisted of seven questions encompassing limitations on public observance of religious services, public observance of religious holy days, public observance of religious festivals, building places of worship, forced observance of religious laws of other groups, running of religious schools, and the observance of religious laws on marriage and divorce. In the interests of efficiency, and based on results of the pilot survey, limitations on religious services and religious holidays were then omitted. The answer categories were the same as for other dimensions of discrimination: from "totally disagree" to "totally agree".

A large number of respondents said that they do not belong to groups that are discriminated against. In particular, the respondents in Yogyakarta tend to affirm this (89.3%), while some in Ambon claim that their group is still discriminated against (24.5%). Of respondents who feel they are discriminated against, both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, a large percentage (66.3%), especially in Ambon (73.4%), see religion as the root of discrimination against their group, followed by ethnicity (14.9%). In general, discrimination is at a low to moderate level (means < 3.00).

In the economic sector, Muslims in Ambon feel that limitations on access to the housing market (2.32) are the main form of discrimination, while Muslims in Yogyakarta feel it to be limitations on access to the job market (2.97). Christians in Ambon (2.31) and Yogyakarta (2.39) both indicated limitations on access to government subsidies. The variability indicates less disparity between Muslims than Christians in general, as showed by the standard deviation of Muslims in the range of .84 to .87, while Christians range from .96-1.03. In the political sector, Christians in Ambon indicate limitations on freedom of expression (2.27) while Christians in Yogyakarta (2.57) and Muslims in both cities (2.23 and 2.16) assert that limitations on attaining higher positions in government offices are the main area of discrimination. The variability seems be largely similar to that for the economy, but slightly wider; the range of standard deviation for Muslims is .90-.94 and for Christians is .98-1.12.

All respondents in Ambon and Muslims in Yogyakarta feel that there is cultural discrimination in relation to limitations on dress (> 2.59). Meanwhile, Christians pinpoint limitations on behaviour as the discriminative focus of the majority group (2.61). Dress is still the subject of debate in Indonesia in relation to the implementation of an anti-pornography law. Christians perceive that there are limitations on wearing clothes that reveal *aurat* (sensual parts of the body), which Muslims are forbidden to show. Conversely, Muslims who wear veils and long dresses are often accused of following Arabic traditions, rather than being proud of local or national identities. Parallel to the issue of dress is behaviour; Muslims are viewed as more conservative than Christians. The range of standard deviation tends to be greater for Muslims (.87-1.12) than Christians (.93 – 1.14)

Furthermore, respondents tend to agree that there is religious discrimination. Respondents in Yogyakarta feel that there are limitations on building places of worship (2.56). This is true for minority groups, due to the implementation of Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 2006/8 2006. This regulation seems to have a powerful impact, because the requirement for agreement by both the local community and the government constrain minorities' ability to build such places (Wijsen and Singgih, 2002:87-90). This is the item for which respondent responses show the highest disparity in standard deviation, a score of 1.24. All respondents in Ambon and Muslims in Yogyakarta tend to agree that discrimination is high in terms of limitations on observance of religious laws regarding marriage and divorce. The variability indicates that Muslims in Yogyakarta are more homogenous than other groups; the standard deviation is .99, while for Muslims in Ambon it is 1.10. Christians in Ambon are similar to Christians in Yogyakarta with a standard deviation of 1.09.

3.3.4.6. Religiosity

As discussed in the previous chapter, religiosity is a religion-based sentiment of exclusiveness in which individuals believe their religion to be the axis of everything, and that all others should be assessed with reference to it. It encompasses religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality and religious fundamentalism. The measurements for these are described in more detail below.

3.3.4.6.1. Religiocentrism

At least two measurements for religiocentrism are available. The first was constructed by Ray and Doratis (1971) to measure religiocentrism and conservatism in Catholic and Protestant groups in Australia. The second was developed by Sterkens and Anthony (2008) in their study of religiocentrism among Muslims, Christians and Hindus in India. Although the former measurement has higher reliability with a Cronbach alpha score of .88 (Sterkens and Anthony has an alpha between .55 and .70), we used the latter as the basis our measurement, simply because its questions are more elaborative and more systematic and because it has already been tested in a cross-religious comparative study.

The instrument of Sterkens and Anthony (2008) consisted of three sets of questions to be asked of the three different religious groups, i.e. Christians, Muslims and Hindus. The respondents were asked to respond to a list of positive statements about their in-group and negative statements about the religious out-groups. So Christian respondents assessed their positive attitudes toward Christianity and their negative attitudes toward Islam and Hinduism; Muslims their positive attitudes towards Islam, negative attitudes toward Christianity and Hinduism, and so on for Hindus too.

The statements for each religious group consisted of fourteen items: four positive statements about the religious in-group and two sets of five items associating religious out-group members with negative characteristics. For our measurement, we selected three of the positive in-group items and three of the negative out-group ones. The positive statements were: “Christians (Muslims) show the most faith in God;” “Thanks to their religion, most Christians (Muslims) are good people;” and “Christians (Muslims) are best able to talk meaningfully about God.” The negative statements were: “Muslims (Christians) talk about doing good deeds, but they do not practise them,” “When it comes to religion, Muslims (Christians) are intolerant,” and “Muslims (Christians) are often the cause of religious conflict.”

While our measurement remained similar to this, we paraphrased the statements to an extent. For instance, in the statement “Muslims (Christians) talk about doing good deeds, but they do not practise them,” we used the word ”without” for its strong sense of irony, so that it read, “Christians (Muslims) only talk about doing good deeds without practising them.” We also refined the sentence about tolerance by adding “less”, so that it read, “When it comes to religion, Muslims (Christians) are less tolerant.” The answer categories were on a five-point Likert scale from “totally disagree’’ (1) to ”totally agree” (5). Muslim respondents were asked to react only to the positive statements about Muslims and the negative statements about Christians, and vice versa.

Table 3.23 below shows the positive attitudes towards the in-group, and Table 3.24 the negative attitudes towards the out-group. The tables show, on average, stronger levels of religiocentrism among Muslims than Christians; they value their religious in-group highly, and show higher levels of negative out-group attitudes, particularly in terms of the view that Christians only talk about doing good deeds without practising them (2.77) and that Christians are less tolerant (2.84). Nonetheless, Muslims view Christians as the cause of conflict less (2.72) than Christians consider Muslims to be so (2.78). The variability of responses to the positive statements is greater (.89-1.23), while negative attitudes towards the out-group is more homogenous among Muslims (.99-1.09) than among Christians (.93-1.18).

Table 3.23 Positive attitudes towards religious in-group

Positive attitudes towards in-group	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=471)	Christians (N=251)	Muslims (N=361)	Christians (N=359)	Muslims (N=831)	Christians (N=610)
1. Muslims/Christians show the most faith in God	4.19 (.88)	3.36 (1.12)	4.42 (.89)	4.39 (.89)	4.29 (.89)	3.97 (1.11)
2. Thanks to their religion, most Muslims/Christians are good people	3.21 (1.14)	2.74 (.94)	3.16 (1.34)	3.20 (1.23)	3.19 (1.23)	3.01 (1.15)
3. Muslims/Christians are best able to talk meaningfully about God	3.79 (1.10)	2.75 (1.06)	4.30 (.84)	3.69 (1.16)	4.01 (1.03)	3.30 (1.21)

Table 3.24 Negative attitudes towards religious out-group

Negative attitudes towards out-group	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=471)	Christians (N=251)	Muslims (N=361)	Christians (N=359)	Muslims (N=831)	Christians (N=610)
1. Christians/Muslims only talk about doing good deeds without practising them	2.60 (.95)	2.41 (.79)	2.99 (.99)	2.62 (1.00)	2.77 (.99)	2.53 (.93)
2. When it comes to religion, Christians/ Muslims are less tolerant	2.64 (.91)	2.79 (.97)	3.12 (1.03)	2.78 (1.05)	2.84 (.99)	2.79 (1.02)
3. Christians/Muslims are often the cause of religious conflict	2.49 (.99)	2.73 (1.09)	3.02 (1.15)	2.81 (1.24)	2.72 (1.09)	2.78 (1.18)

Specifically, Muslims in Ambon have stronger religiocentric attitudes than Muslims in Yogyakarta. Not only do they value their own religious group highly (4.42); they also view Christians as less tolerant (3.12) and to be the cause of conflict (3.02). In this section, the variability of responses to the positive statements tends to be homogenous, as indicated by the standard deviation of .84, while their negative attitudes tend to vary more (SD: .99- 1.15). The Muslims in Yogyakarta are probably more tolerant because they are less prejudiced towards Christians. The mean for assessing Christians as less tolerant is relatively low (2.64), and so are their assumptions that Christians are the cause of religious conflict (2.49). Despite this

tolerance, Muslims in Yogyakarta tend to value their religious group highly, as indicated by the mean value for "Muslims show the most faith in God" (4.19) and for "Muslims are best able to talk meaningfully about God" (3.79). Their responses to the negative statements, as indicated by the standard deviation, tend to be less varied (.91- .99) than to the positive statements (.88 - 1.10).

Compared to Christians in Yogyakarta, Christians in Ambon are more religiocentric; all the means for positive attitudes towards their in-group are higher. Only in the view that Muslims are less tolerant do Christians in Ambon have slightly lower mean score (2.78). In Yogyakarta, Christians are apparently more tolerant and somewhat more critical of their own religious group than Christians in Ambon, as indicated by their tendency to moderately disagree with the claims that Christians are good people (2.74) and that Christians are best able to talk meaningfully about God (2.75). Moreover, they tend to disagree that Muslims only talk about good deeds without practising them (2.41), that Muslims are less tolerant (2.79) and that Muslims are often the cause of religious conflict (2.73). The variability of answers is also less heterogeneous, as shown by the standard deviation, which is from .79 to 1.09.

3.3.4.6.2. Attitudes towards religious plurality

Attitudes towards religious plurality involve individuals' interpretation of other religions from the perspective of what is claimed to be true by their own religious tradition. These attitudes encompass three different models: monism, pluralism and relativism. Each model has four dimensions, namely: normative, experiential, transformative and relational. The normative dimension refers to a religion's truth claims; the experiential dimension deals with the human being's experience of God; the transformative dimension concerns self-realization or liberation, and the relational dimension can be viewed as the relationship of one religion to others (Anthony et al., 2005).

Our measurement for attitudes toward religious plurality stems from the research of Anthony et al. (2005), but with a number of modifications. The monism models used four similar items with small revisions to make the statements clearer. First, we changed, "The truth about God, human beings and the universe is found only in my religion" to "The truth about God is found only in my religion," deleting "human beings" and "the universe" to avoid the triple barrel. The second item, "Other religions do not offer a true experience of God," was reformulated to "Other religions do not provide as deep an experience of God as my religion." The third item, "Only through my religion can people can attain true liberation," was changed to "Compared with other religions, my religion offers the surest way to liberation." The fourth item remained the same: "Compared with my religion, other religions contain only partial truths."

The pluralism model had similar dimensions and consisted of four items. The first and second items from Anthony et al. (2005) were replaced by new statements because of their low points founded in the research. These two were, "Differences between religions are an opportunity for discovering the truths ignored by my own religion," and "Differences in God-experience made possible by various religions challenge the idea that God is one". We replaced them with, "Differences between religions provide more knowledge of God," and "Differences between religions are a source of spiritual development." We also modified the third item, given that the pilot survey revealed that respondents had difficulty understanding it. The original was, "Differences between religions are part of God's plan to save the world," which we changed to "In religious traditions, different aspects of God are revealed." The fourth item was revised by deleting the words "and growth" at the end, which we considered to create a double barrel for the measurement. Thus it became, "Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment." Each item had five answer categories from "totally disagree" (1) to "totally agree" (5).

Table 3.25 Monism

Monism	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=473)	Christians (N=255)	Muslims (N=366)	Christians (N=362)	Muslims (N=837)	Christians (N=617)
78. Compared with other religions, my religion offers the surest way to liberation.	3.76 (1.02)	3.15 (1.14)	3.94 (1.09)	3.73 (1.19)	3.84 (1.06)	3.49 (1.21)
81. Other religions do not provide as deep a God-experience as my religion.	3.26 (1.08)	2.27 (.82)	3.63 (1.18)	2.64 (1.17)	3.42 (1.14)	2.49 (1.05)
84. The truth about God is found only in my religion.	3.85 (1.09)	2.60 (1.17)	4.09 (1.14)	3.11 (1.39)	3.96 (1.12)	2.89 (1.33)
87. Compared with my religion, other religions contain only partial truths.	3.24 (.95)	2.55 (.86)	3.54 (.98)	2.64 (.97)	3.37 (.94)	2.60 (.93)

The four items for the relativism model were modified from the earlier measurement of Anthony et al. (2005). The first, "Different religions reveal different aspects of the same ultimate truth," was changed by replacing "different" with "all", to become "All religions reveal different aspects of the same ultimate truth." We modified the

second item by replacing the passive with an active sentence, and by again replacing the word "different" with "all". So, "Different aspects of the same divine reality are experienced in different religions" then became "In all religions, you can experience aspects of the same divine reality." The third item, "Every religion contributes in a unique way to the ultimate liberation of human beings," we kept exactly the same. However, we changed the fourth item totally, from a relational dimension to a normative one: "The similarities among religions are a basis for building up a universal religion" was replaced with "All religions provide an equally profound experience of God." After the pilot survey, all items were changed to a formulation that could be understood easily by respondents, and so became, "All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth," "All religions are equally valid paths to liberation," "Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same value," and "At the deepest level, all religions are the same." Both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, Muslims agree with monism more strongly than Christians. Muslims in Ambon reveal the strongest belief that their religion is the only source of truth. The mean for "The truth about God is found only in my religion" is 4.09. The lowest is 3.54, for "Compared with my religion, other religions contain only partial truths." This tendency is similar for Muslims in Yogyakarta, with a lower mean. For "the truth about God", the mean of Muslims in Yogyakarta is 3.85, and for "partial truth", it is 3.24. The tendency of Christians to believe in the truth of their religion is different; certainly, like Muslims, they believe that their religion offers the surest way to liberation, but some of them seem to have a different understanding of what this means, given that their mean value is 3.73 in Ambon and 3.15. The mean for Christians in Ambon is even lower than that for Muslims in Yogyakarta. The lowest mean is for "Other religions do not provide as deep a God-experience as my religion," which is 2.64 for Christians in Ambon and 2.27 for Christians in Yogyakarta. The variability between Muslims and Christians is similar, with a spread of .93-1.14, except for Christians in Yogyakarta who are more homogenous in relation to "Other religions do not provide as deep a God-experience as my religion" (SD .82).

For pluralism, the highest mean of the aggregate measurement appears in Christians in Yogyakarta. The highest mean (4.11) is for "Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment,'' while the lowest is 3.45 for "In religious traditions, different aspects of God are revealed." Christians in Ambon follow a similar pattern to Christians in Yogyakarta. Furthermore, Muslims in Yogyakarta view pluralism in much the same way as Muslims in Ambon. The measurement for 'Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment" has the highest mean for Muslims in Yogyakarta (3.62) and the lowest mean for Muslims in Ambon (347). The lowest mean for Muslims in Yogyakarta is 3.41 for "Differences between religions are a source of spiritual development." The variability tends to be wider among Muslims (SD .95 – 1.03) while Christians are more consistent (SD .87-.97).

Table 3.26 Pluralism

Pluralism	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=474)	Christians (N=255)	Muslim (N=359)	Christian (N=360)	Muslims (N=833)	Christians (N=615)
79. In religious traditions, different aspects of God are revealed.	3.46 (.89)	3.45 (.83)	3.56 (1.01)	3.35 (1.05)	3.50 (.95)	3.39 (.96)
82. Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment.	3.62 (.96)	4.11 (.81)	3.47 (1.07)	3.90 (1.03)	3.56 (1.01)	3.99 (.95)
85. Differences between religions provide more knowledge of God.	3.50 (1.03)	3.90 (.90)	3.65 (1.03)	3.86 (.94)	3.57 (1.03)	3.87 (.93)
88. Differences between religions are a source of spiritual development.	3.41 (.96)	3.84 (.78)	3.53 (.97)	3.80 (.92)	3.46 (.96)	3.82 (.87)

Concerning relativism, Christians have a higher mean than Muslims, as Table 3.27 shows. Christians in Ambon have the highest mean, which is 4.14 for "All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth," slightly more than for Yogyakarta (3.93). For Christians in Yogyakarta, "Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same value" has a mean of 3.66; the lowest mean is 3.77 for Christians in Ambon. The lowest mean is for Muslims in Ambon, for "Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same value" and "At the deepest level, all religions are the same," which are both 2.76. Muslims in Yogyakarta are slightly more moderate than those in Ambon, but still less so than Christians. The mean is in the range of 3.06 for "Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same value" to 3.28 for "All religions are equally valid paths to liberation." Overall variability tends to be wider for Muslims (1.11-1.30) while Christians tend to be homogenous (.89-1.01).

Table 3.27 Relativism

Relativism	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=476)	Christians (N=255)	Muslims (N=363)	Christians (N=362)	Muslims (N=839)	Christians (N=617)
80. All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth.	3.20 (1.19)	3.93 (.93)	3.02 (1.32)	4.14 (.93)	3.12 (1.26)	4.05 (.94)
83. All religions are equally valid paths to liberation.	3.28 (1.11)	3.94 (.88)	3.03 (1.21)	4.04 (.89)	3.17 (1.16)	4.00 (.89)
86. Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same value.	3.06 (1.11)	3.66 (.88)	2.76 (1.09)	3.77 (.99)	2.93 (1.11)	3.72 (.95)
89. At the deepest level, all religions are the same.	3.21 (1.26)	3.91 (.99)	2.76 (1.31)	4.13 (1.02)	3.01 (1.29)	4.04 (1.02)

3.3.4.6.3. Religious fundamentalism versus hermeneutic interpretation

Religious fundamentalism has been a focus of attention since the early 20th century. Several definitions and measurements have been used to examine this form of religious dogmatism. From among the scholarly developments of the methodological framework, we chose an intra-textual fundamentalism scale (Williamson et al., 2010: 738). This scale consists of: (1) “Everything in sacred writing is absolutely true without question”; (2) “Sacred writing should never be doubted, even when scientific or historical evidence outright disagrees with it”; (3) “Sacred writing is not really the words of God, but the words of man” (which should be reverse-coded); (4) “The truths of sacred writing will never become outdated, but will always apply equally well to all generations”, and (5) “My sacred writing is the only one that is true above all holy books or sacred texts of other religions”. These five statements were taken from the previously tested measurement without any changes. We also added, “I think that the sacred writings should be taken literally as they were written,” taken from the literal affirmation measurement of Duriez et al. (2005).

Alongside fundamentalism, we measured its opposite – a hermeneutic interpretation of sacred writings – through two items, taken from the measurement of symbolic affirmation by Duriez et al. (2005: 854). These two items were: “The Bible holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection” and “The meanings of sacred texts are open to change and interpretation”. There were the same five answer categories for all eight items, ranging from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”.

The survey found that Muslims in Ambon tend to be the most fundamentalist in their approach to religion. This is indicated by the highest mean value in the aggregate measurement (> 0.40). For the item, “Sacred writing is not really the words of God, but the words of man,” Muslims agree the least (1.40). Muslims in Yogyakarta seem to be more fundamentalist than Christians in the city, but they are less fundamentalist than Christians in Ambon. Moreover, Christians in Yogyakarta show some disagreement with items that others agree with, such as “My sacred writing is the only one that is true above all holy books,” and “Sacred writing should be taken literally as written,” as shown by the mean of 2.75. In addition, Christians show more interest than Muslims in hermeneutic interpretations of sacred writing, given that they tend to strongly agree with the statement “The meanings of sacred writing are open to change and interpretation’’ and ”Sacred writing holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection.” Their variability is also less compared to Muslims for both these questions (.91 and 1.10), but wider for others (.84-1.39)

Table 3.28 Intra-textual fundamentalism (q62-67) and hermeneutic interpretation (q68-69) of sacred writings

Fundamentalism	Respondents					
	Yogyakarta Mean (SD)		Ambon Mean (SD)		Total Mean (SD)	
	Muslims (N=470)	Christians (N=254)	Muslims (N=369)	Christians (N=364)	Muslims (N=840)	Christians (N=618)
62. Everything in sacred writing is absolutely true without question.	4.19 (1.01)	3.48 (1.27)	4.62 (.70)	4.34 (.94)	4.38 (.92)	3.99 (1.16)
63. Sacred writing should never be doubted, even when scientific or historical evidence outright disagrees with it.	3.99 (1.06)	3.41 (1.19)	4.26 (1.00)	4.17 (.97)	4.11 (1.04)	3.86 (1.13)
64. Sacred writing is NOT really the word of God, but the words of man.	1.58 (.86)	2.30 (.98)	1.40 (.66)	1.94 (.99)	1.50 (.78)	2.09 (1.00)
65. The truths of sacred writing will never become outdated, but will always apply equally well to all generations.	4.38 (.77)	4.04 (.93)	4.56 (.66)	4.58 (.69)	4.46 (.73)	4.36 (.84)
66. My sacred writing is the only one that is true above all holy books.	4.18 (.98)	2.72 (1.14)	4.57 (.74)	3.61 (1.33)	4.35 (.90)	3.25 (1.33)
67. I think that sacred writing should be taken literally, as it is written.	3.14 (1.23)	2.75 (1.24)	4.10 (.90)	3.96 (1.07)	3.56 (1.20)	3.45 (1.29)
68. The meanings of sacred writing are open to change and interpretation.	3.56 (1.12)	3.84 (.99)	3.34 (1.26)	3.72 (1.16)	3.46 (1.19)	3.77 (1.09)
69. Sacred writing holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection.	3.63 (1.06)	3.84 (.85)	3.74 (1.06)	4.21 (.92)	3.68 (1.06)	4.06 (.91)

3.3.4.7. Nationalistic attitudes

Nationalistic attitude is defined as a favourable attitude towards one's own country and the national in-group. It contains two dimensions: patriotism (romantic nationalism), and chauvinism (ethnocentric nationalism). Patriotism refers to the

degree of attachment to one's country and the national in-groups, while chauvinism is the view that these are unique and superior. Patriotism refers to the expression of love and pride; the latter inclines to be rather blind and uncritical of country and national in-group (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001). Nationalist attitude is in contrast to regiocentrism, which focuses on the interests of a particular region and/or ethnic groups within a region. The increase in regiocentrism is a recent phenomenon in post-authoritarian Indonesia, along with decentralization policies and the democratization process (Aspinal and Fealey, 2003).

The measurement for nationalist attitudes was made by combining the measurement of Coenders (2001) on patriotism/chauvinism, and of Todosijevic (2001) on romantic nationalism/ethnocentric nationalism. The term "romantic nationalism" of Todosijevic actually equates to patriotism in Coenders and "ethnocentric nationalism" to chauvinism. The reliabilitiy of Todosijevic is shown by Cronbach alpha of .60 to .75. The patriotism measurements cited from Coenders were, "How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievements in history?" and "How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievements in equal treatment of all groups in society?" Other questions regarding patriotism were taken from Todosijevic, including, "One should respect the nation and its traditions," "One should always put national interest above the personal," and "Renewing of our national ideals is our most important task."

To measure chauvinism, most of our statements were taken from Coenders. These were, "I would rather be a citizen of (country) than of any other country in the world," "My country is better than most other countries," "I should support my country even if my country is wrong," and "There is something about (country) that makes me feel shame." Only one was taken from Todosijevic, namely, "One's most important characteristics come from nationality."

We made some minor changes; in the fourth item, the term "personal" in "One should always put national interests above the personal" was replaced with "ethno-religious interest", so that it became, "One should always put national interests above ethno-religious interests." In the fifth item, the term "our most important task" was replaced with "our most national task", to become, "Renewing our national ideals is our most national task." Furthermore, we used "Indonesia" instead "country" in the rest of the chauvinism items.

In order to measure regiocentrism, we constructed four statements by modifying the dimension of nation to region, using two items for patriotism and two for chauvinistic attitude. These were, "I should support my region even if my region is wrong," "I should always put regional interest above ethno-religious group interest," "I would rather be a resident of (my region) than of other regions in Indonesia," and "I should respect my province and its tradition." Based on the pilot experience, region was changed to district to make the meaning clear. There were five answer

categories for most items, but a different scale for the two items on patriotism; the range for these two was from "not proud at all" to "very proud", while for the remaining twelve, the scale was from "totally disagree" to "totally agree".

Muslims apparently have a greater spirit of patriotism than Christians, though the overall mean is high (>3.29). Christians in Ambon score even higher than Muslims, and Christians in Yogyakarta are particularly proud of their country (4.20), but less so in terms of its equal treatment of all groups in society. Christians in Yogyakarta have the lowest mean value for patriotism. In relation to dedication to their country, all respondents tend to strongly respect their nation and tradition. Nonetheless, not all really commit to putting the national interest above that of ethno-religious groups, although they tend to strongly agree with it (>3.74). The variability is apparently greater among Christians than Muslims, the range of standard deviation among Muslims being .70-.97 while it is.60-.96 for Christians.

Likewise, the aggregate measurement shows that Muslims tend to be have a more chauvinistic attitude to their country than Christians. Christians demonstrate their lower mean in their responses to "My country is better than most other countries" (2.89). They are also less likely than Muslims to support their country if their country is wrong. The Christians in Yogyakarta have the highest value of all in strongly agreeing that "There is something about Indonesia today that makes me feel shame." In this measure, Christians tend to vary more than Muslims, with the standard deviation being from .97-1.18 for Christians and .90-1.15 for Muslims.

While Muslims tend to have higher mean values than Christians for nationalistic attitudes, the score is reversed for regiocentrism. Christians score higher in the aggregate measurement, which means they are more regiocentric than Muslims. Moreover, Christians in Yogyakarta tend to agree (2.64) more than others with the statement, "I should support my district even if my district is wrong." The standard deviation is similar for Muslims and Christians (.75-1.19).

3.3.4.8. Intergroup distrust

Trust is a psychological mechanism whereby individuals believe and rely on others. People tend to trust their in-group, but not their out-group. Trust permeates all spheres of everyday life and enables individuals to interact with others and institutions. It is often presumed that trust fades during times of conflict. Hence, trust can be constructed and institutionalized, which can greatly reduce prejudice and the chances of explosive violence (Ward, et al., 2007). The measurement for trust was taken from the survey questionnaire on "Living in Germany: Survey 2003 on the social situation of households," with several modifications appropriate to this research and the local situation of Indonesia.

The original questionnaire had three questions. There were three aspects to the first question; respondents were asked to express their opinion about these

statements: “On the whole one can trust people,” “Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone,” and “If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before trusting them.” These were measured with four scales ranging from “totally agree” to “totally disagree”. We developed all three statements by changing “people”, and “anyone” and “strangers” with “Muslims” and “Christians” interchangeably. So, the three dimensions became six, with three each for Muslims and Christians. We also added “neither disagree nor agree” to the answer scale.

The two other questions were also multiplied by exchanging “people” for Muslims and Christians. Here, the respondent was asked to choose one of two statements by matching it with the main clause. For instance: “Do you believe that most Muslims....” was followed by the choice of “...would exploit you if they had the opportunity,” and “...would attempt to be fair towards you.” The next question followed a similar pattern and asked the respondent whether Muslims or Christians are helpful, or only act in their own interest. All in all, there were ten questions on trust.

The general tendency was for respondents to trust their in-groups and to be less trusting towards the out-groups. Both Muslims and Christians tend to strongly agree about the positive characteristics of their groups, and strongly disagree about its possible negative characteristics. The mean value for Muslims is 3.87 for the statement, “On the whole, one can trust Muslims.” Conversely, their mean value is 3.19 for the statement, “On the whole, one can trust Christians.” Christians show the same tendency when asked the parallel questions. However, the gap in trust between Muslims and Christians in Yogyakarta is smaller than it is between Muslims and Christians in Ambon. It seems that Muslims have less trust than Christians in Ambon, as the mean value (2.86) is lower than that for Christians’ view of Muslims (2.95). The mean for Muslims who feel they cannot to rely on Christians is also lower (2.67) than for Christians in relation to Muslims (3.14), and so on. The variability of both Muslims and Christians tends to be wider when they assess their out-groups, but more consistent for the in-groups.

3.4. Topic list

Besides a questionnaire for the survey, data was also collected with a topic list for conducting interviews with informants. The main objective of the interviews was to explore and to generate data that might not be captured through the questionnaire, and that would give context to the local situation. It was also intended to elaborate variables and indicators used in the questionnaire. Hence, the topic list consisted of a series of themes and variables that were itemized in a set of keywords, and as such, gave direction to the interviews.

3.4.1. Selection of interviewees

We selected 18 informants for the interviews to complement our data from the quantitative survey. The general criteria for their selection were (1) knowledge or familiarity with the theme of the study in general, or the topics of the list in particular; (2) willingness to communicate and to share information regarding the issues being studied. They were selected from survey and non-survey respondents; we chose survey respondents in accordance with "low", "middle" and "high" support for ethno-religious violence, based on their responses to the "support for violence" scale on the questionnaire. Prospective informants were invited at each university; their addresses were obtained from the final page of the questionnaire, where they could fill in their contact details if they were willing to be interviewed personally.

All in all, the informants from the survey respondents included nine students from Yogyakarta and nine from Ambon. The informants from Yogyakarta were derived from the three universities selected for the survey. Their ethno-religious groups were varied, and included Christians and Muslims from Javanese, Sundanese, Dayak and Melayu backgrounds, as well from other places such as Gorontalo and Sumba. Some of the informants from Ambon had different ethno-religious backgrounds from those in Yogyakarta; other than Ambon itself, they came from various places such as Java, Minangkabau, Manado, Buton, Seram, Kei, Ternate, Bugis and Makassar.

All in all there were 20 non-survey informants. These key informants consisted of leaders and activists of various organizations inside and outside campus, and were chosen on the basis of the group leaders and their knowledge regarding ethno-religious identification and intergroup violence. In Yogyakarta, the organizations included the Indonesian Christian Student Movement (GMKI, Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia), Indonesian Catholic Student Association (PMKRI, Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia), the Indonesian Islamic Student Association (PMII, Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), the Executive Board of Students – UGM, Student Senate of UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Student Union of UKDW; the leaders included those of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhamadiyah, and a director of Interfaith Dialogue Dian Interfidei, and Sekretariat Bersama untuk Keistimewaan Yogyakarta (the Secretariat for the Special Region of Yogyakarta). In Ambon, the informants included were from the Board of Student Representatives of UKIM, GMKI, PMKRI, the Synod of the Protestant Church of the Moluccas (GPM), ethnic leaders in the village of Soya, Wai and Wakal, the Islamic Student Association (PII) and Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (National Comittee of Indonesian Youth, KNPI).

3.4.2. Development of topic list

The topic list was primarily developed from the variables used in the survey and from macro-contextual factors that might affect the relation between dependent and

independent variables. To develop the list, we began by elaborating ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence as the main independent and dependent variables. Ethno-religious identification was divided into two categories: ethnic identification and religious identification. Then, several categories for intermediary variables were constructed, including perceived group threat, perceived discrimination, intergroup distrust, memory and experience of violence, religiosity and nationalism, as well as regionalist orientation. Contextual factors relevant to this study were added, such as the history of conflict and violence in the research areas, the role of mass media and the importance of migration and education. In particular, student organizations were studied, as the survey respondents were students who might build socio-political affiliation with ethno-religious groups for the sake of their prospective careers.

The topic categories were then used to structure the interview questions, and covered subject matter that might have influenced informants' experiences, world views or personal opinions. The layout of the topic guide opened possibilities for informants to articulate, elaborate and clarify points for which there was not enough space on the questionnaire. At same time, it prevented incoherent or pointless conversations during the interview process.

The guide was then translated into Bahasa Indonesian. As we had done for the questionnaire, we also tested it in the field during the pilot study by interviewing two respondents of the preliminary survey, and two outside informants who had not been included in it. The aim of this was to explore the guide's capacity to generate data and to discover any problems that might arise during the interviews. The experiences of the pilot study taught us to give priority to the main variables of the research, i.e. ethno-religious identification and support for violence, simply because after about two hours of interviewing, the informants began to tire and lose concentration. We therefore gave priority to list topics that informants knew more about and were keen to discuss. The flow of the interviews followed the situation and the context of what the informants shared; they were designed to be comfortable and convenient conversations that also provided enough time for the informants to think and answer questions. In other words, the researcher kept the topic list in mind while keeping the interview on track.

3.4.3. Actual topic guide

The actual topic guide was similar to the one used in the pilot study. The only changes were to the interview strategy and techniques, to make it more efficient and effective. The interviews with non-survey respondents had been set up earlier, while the survey had been going on, and were conducted soon after data cleaning the questionnaire. To make them more effective, the topic list was sent to informants prior to the appointment so that they could learn and prepare. If the informant had

limited time or if the interview was interrupted, it could be rescheduled up to three times or more as long as the informant agreed to it.

After filling in the questionnaire and showing willingness to be interviewed, the informants were selected and appointments for an interview were arranged. A list of available respondents with their postal or email addresses or phone numbers was prepared. For reasons of privacy, this list was kept confidential and was only used for research purposes. Not all the respondents who had given their addresses and contact information were keen to be interviewed; some of them cancelled the appointment, with or without giving reasons.

The topic guide

1. Ethno-religious identity
   Ethnic and religious identity:
   socialization (family, clan, community, school)
   characteristics and stereotypes: ethnic/religious in-group (positive, negative)
   ethnic organizations (membership, activities, contribution, importance)
   ethnic ceremonies (attendance, contribution, importance)
   characteristics and stereotypes: ethnic/religious out-group (positive, negative)
   importance of identity (family, clan, community, school; politics, economy)

2. Intergroup contact
   family, clan, friends, classmates, neighbours of out-groups (intensity, closeness, cooperation, equality, maintenance, changes, problems)

3. Perceived discrimination
   social, economic, political, cultural, religious (which groups, when, where, how, why)

4. Perceived group threat
   presence and size of out-group (in neighbourhood, university, region)
   migration and immigration
   nature and impact of out-group threats (economic, political, social, cultural/religious)

5. Intergroup (dis)trust
   experiences and circumstances (where, whom, when, how; family, clan, university, neighbourhood, government)

reasons, motivations, effects (personal, group)
strengthening intergroup trust (possibilities and expectations)

6. Memory and experience of inter-group violence
experiences (personal and in-group members)
bio-physical effects (self, family, university, neighbourhood/community)
effects on attitudes and views vis-à-vis government, armed groups, religious groups
religious effects (attitudes and beliefs)

7 Support for intergroup protest and violence
opinion and participation (public debate, demonstration, material harm, physical harm)
issues (economic, political, social, cultural/religious)
goals, reasons, justification, efficacy, results

8. Intergroup (dis)satisfaction
experiences and circumstances (where, whom, when, how, why; family, clan, university, neighbourhood, government)
reasons, motivation, effects (personal, group)
strengthening levels of satisfaction (possibilities and expectations)

9. Nationalist and regionalist orientation
affinity to, and opinions about region, nation, regional and national government
national and regional interests versus ethno-religious group interests
multiple identities (national, regional, ethnic, religious)

10. Social dominance orientation
perceptions of dominance and equality
fairness, justification
causes and effects
changes over time

11. History of conflict and violence
ethnic and religious groups/organizations/movements (history, members, leadership, networks, funding)
tensions in intergroup relations
incidents of intergroup violence
conflict resolution

12. Student organizations (ethnic and religious)
    profile of organizations (members, recruitment, funding, alumni)
    goals and activities (educational, political)
    ethnic and religious affiliations (political parties and religious organizations)

13. Mass media
    portrayal of Muslims and Christians (stereotypes, prejudices, discrimination; how, why)
    reporting ethno-religious conflict and violence (facts and interpretation)
    policies and practices (media organizations, government)
    media groups and ethno-religious affiliations

14. Migration
    presence and size of out-groups (neighbourhood, university, region, migration and history)
    nature and impact of out-group threats (economic, political, social, cultural/religious)
    adaptation and integration (university, community)

15. Education
    religious and public education (advantages and disadvantages)
    opinion on curriculum (religious vs public; quality)
    influences on religious and ethnic identities

The place of interview could be anywhere, depending on where the informant felt comfortable talking. Some liked a public space such as a campus, mosque, coffee shop or restaurant. Others preferred somewhere more private, such as a boarding house or family house. All interviews went smoothly, with only a little variation from the topic list. Relevant questions that might differ from the list were continuously asked to generate more data, so conversations could jump from one topic to another without necessarily following the numbering on the list. However, the interview would return to any omitted questions once the interviewee had finished explaining the earlier topic; most topics were covered. Questions were sometimes repeated to make sure that the given answer was correct. The interview was then transcribed verbatim. Eventually, 18 were translated into English after being edited properly, omitting conversational pauses (such as eh, ah...), laughter, and incomplete sentences.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL LOCATION OF SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE

This chapter presents the results of univariate and bivariate analyses. It begins with an attempt to find factor scales for the observed variables. We use factor analysis to test the validity and reliability of the dimensions of support for intergroup violence (4.1). Then, independent t-tests and analyses of variance are used to discover whether there are group differences and significant correlations between the variables examined. These analyses specifically look into the relationships between the dependent variable(s) and independent variables (4.2) as well as their relationships to control and intermediary variables (4.3 & 4.4). Prior to the description of the results, we briefly discuss the general procedures for scale construction. The qualitative data are presented after the presentation of these quantitative results to triangulate the study findings. We also elaborate the results of the factor analyses for support for violence and ethno-religious identification. The selection criteria for the qualitative data are based on the expressions and explanations of the respondents about the relevant topics.

General procedures for factor analysis and the analysis of variance

Factor analysis is employed to identify the important dimensions of the observed variables in this study. It also streamlines the data by reducing its complexities to a more parsimonious model, the goal being to find a smaller number of theoretical variables. It is assumed that some underlying factors that are smaller in number than the number of observed variables are responsible for the co-variation among the observed items (Kim and Mueller, 1978). We chose confirmatory factor analysis rather than exploratory factor analysis to reduce the number of variables and identify the pattern between them. The method applies the principal axis factoring extraction with Oblimin rotation. The computation process relies on SPSS 19 software.

As the factor analysis was intended to find a substantial construction to enable comparison between Muslims and Christians, we tested it three times on the observed variables. First we ran it on national-level data, ignoring differences between religious traditions. Next, we ran it on the Muslim and Christian groups separately. Other religious groups (Buddhist, Hindu and some smaller religious denominations) were excluded from the analysis. When the factors had been defined from these tests, the final test was run again on the national level to get an identical

solution for the respective religious traditions. The distinctive characteristics of the groups were filtered out, since we were looking only for the commensurable factor for Muslims and Christians (Anthony et al., 2007: 111-112). The process resulted in a comparable model solution for the two religious groups. In the process, the outcomes of communality, Eigenvalue, structure of the pattern matrix and item-correlations became the focus for the data interpretation.

Commonality refers to the proportion of common variance present in a variable. It measures the variance of an observed variable accounted for by common factors. It is equivalent to the sum of the squared factor loadings. For the commonality (h^2), the score must be higher than .20, as a rule of thumb, as it indicates the lowest point of the shared variance in the tested variable. In the process, the score of Eigenvalue also comes into consideration. Eigenvalue is the mathematical property of a matrix used in relation to decomposition of a covariance matrix. It accounts for the variances explained by a given dimension and is a criterion for determining the number of factors to extract. In this sense, the Eigenvalue must be greater than or equal to 1, because it represents a substantial amount of variation, i.e., larger than the variance of a standardized variable (Field, 2009: 637-642).

The scale construction is also determined by the factor loadings in the pattern matrix. The factor loading indicates the correlation coefficient between the item and the factor. It must be relatively high, which is, as a rule of thumb, greater than .30. Factor loadings in more than one dimension or cross-loadings are avoided. If the item loads in two dimensions, the higher value must be selected for the respective dimension. Likewise, the positive direction is chosen if the item loads in two dimensions that appear both positive and negative. Furthermore, the correlation between factors is highlighted so that a reasonable number of them can be selected. If the correlation is high (>.50), the factors can be combined together. Next, there is a check as to whether the items in one factor show a conceptually meaningful dimension; this dimension can then be labelled substantially.

The reliability of the factor is also tested by measuring Cronbach's alpha (α). This score refers to internal consistency, i.e., how closely a set of items are related as a group. The inter-item correlation determines the value of α. If the average inter-item correlation in the set is high, Cronbach's α will be high as well. So, the higher the score of the Cronbach's α, the more reliable the scale. Generally speaking, a score of less than .40 is not reliable; .41 -.60 is quite reliable (moderate); and a score greater than .61 is reliable (Nunnally, 1978; Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, 1991). In our process, Cronbach's α was tested in the groups of Muslims and Christians as well as at national level. The descriptive statistics of the scale results are presented to discover the mean and its standard deviation.

Analysis of variance is run to test whether there are any differences between groups for particular variables. It specifically looks into significant correlations

between the dependent and independent variables as well as the dependent and control variables and the intermediate determinants. All dimensions are examined to reveal group differences and tendencies. This test assumes that the scores in each group are normally distributed and the variances in all groups are equal (Te Grotenhuis and Van der Weegen, 2009: 77); we take into account the score of F, the significance level, and the correlation among the tested variables. The significance level should be less than .05 (Field, 2009: 660).

Furthermore, the linearity (or deviance from it) between the tested variables is observed. This tells us if there is a linear or non-linear relationship between them. If the relation is linearly significant, Pearson's correlations are applied. The statistic of eta is used when the relation is deviant from linearity. In this test, the mean values of the dependent variables and of the independent, control and intermediate determinant variables are calculated and possibly recoded, simply to get more normal distribution and to avoid low frequencies.

4.1. Support for intergroup violence

Support for intergroup violence, the key dependent variable, consists of four dimensions: support for harm to persons, harm to property, public criticism and demonstrations. The questionnaire contained twenty items, with five for each dimension (q218-q237).

The factor analysis was run in three steps to generate a cross-religious comparative measurement of support for violence towards Muslims and Christians. In the first step, the analysis combined Muslim and Christian respondents; in the second step, they were analyzed separately. In the final step we combined the two again. The twenty items were loaded in three factors corresponding to support for public criticism, demonstrations and harm. Among the twenty items, eight were loaded clearly in the first factor and seven were loaded clearly in the second. One item (q227) was loaded both in the first and second factors while four items (q345, q235, q236, q237) were loaded both in the second and third. Q227 was removed because the score was higher than .30 and loaded in two factors. However, q345, q235, q236, q237 were retained for the next analysis because they were all positive in the second factor but negative in the third (<. 30). In the next run, two factor solutions consisting of harm to persons and property and public criticism and demonstrations were found.

In the second step, q224 was eliminated because of double loadings in the Muslim sub-sample. Then the scale was readjusted by removing q234, q235, q236, q237 because these items loaded in two factors; q234 and q235 loaded both in the second and third factor and q236 and q237 in the first and third. After deleting these items and running the program again, q220 was also excluded because of the double loadings. Overall, q220, q224, q227, q234, q235, q236, q237 were removed

in the new scale. In the last step, this scale was then tested again using Muslims and Christians combined; the result remained consistent in two dimensions, as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Support for harm and demonstration: scales

	Muslims & Christians		
	h^2	Factor loading pattern matrix	
		Harm	Demon-strations
233. I would support harm to persons to enforce free access to education for my religious group	.73	.85	
229. I would support harm to persons to enforce the political influence of my religious group	.71	.84	
232. I would support the damaging of property to enforce free access to education for my religious group	.67	.82	
228. I would support the damaging of property to enforce the political influence of my religious group	.65	.80	
221. I would support harm to persons to obtain more jobs for my religious group	.51	.71	
225. I would support harm to persons to fight abuse of political power against my religious group	.46	.67	
223. I would support demonstrations that protest against abuse of political power that threatens my religious group	.51		.71
222. I would support public criticism of abuse of political power that threatens my religious group	.47		.69
231. I would support demonstrations that protest against my religious group's lack of free access to education	.48		.68
226. I would support public criticism of actions that undermine the political influence of my religious group	.41		.64
230. I would support public criticism of my religious group's lack of free access to education	.41		.64
219. I would support demonstrations that protest against job discrimination of my religious group	.40		.63
218. I would support public criticism of job discrimination of my religious group	.33		.56
Initial Eigenvalues		4.12	3.53
% of variance explained		28.81	22.85

The reliability of Muslims for harm is .88 and for demonstrations is .81, while the reliability of Christians for harm is .93 and for demonstrations is .85.

The result does not match our expectation that support for intergroup violence has four dimensions; instead, the dimension of harm to persons and property merge

into one, as do public criticism and demonstrations. The range of factor loadings for support for harm to people and properties both for Muslims and Christians is between .85 and .67. The highest loading is for the item, "I would support harm to persons to enforce free access to education for my religious group," and the lowest is for, "I would support harm to persons to fight abuse of political power against my religious group." Meanwhile, the range of factor loadings in the dimension of public criticism and demonstrations is between .71 and .56. The highest loading is for the item, "I would support demonstrations to protest against abuse of political power that threatens my religious group," and the lowest is for, "I would support public criticism of job discrimination of my religious group."

We labeled the first factor: "support for harm to persons and property' (hereafter called harm) and the second factor: "support for public criticism and demonstrations" (hereafter called demonstrations). They indicate two levels of violence: harm points to a high level, while demonstration points to a low level that is actually acceptable in democracies. The correlation between the first and second dimension is .01, indicating that they are completely non-related or independent.

The Eigenvalue is 4.12 for harm and 3.53 for demonstrations. The variance of the first factor is 28.81% and of the second 22.85%. The reliability of both factors is very high (>.80) both for Muslims and Christians, but even more so among Christian respondents (.93 for the first dimension and .85 for the second) than among Muslims (.88 and .81 respectively).

The means for the items for each scale were then calculated. The mean for support for harm was 1.94 and the standard deviation was .73. The mean for support for demonstrations was 3.51 with a standard deviation of .73. This indicates that the respondents disagree with supporting harm to persons and property, but tend to agree with supporting public criticism and demonstrations. When a comparison is made between Muslims and Christians regarding support for harm, it shows that Muslims have a slightly lower mean (N= 839, M=1.71, SD=.69) than Christians (N=602, M=1.75, SD=.75). However, the tendency is different in relation to support for demonstrations; Muslims (N = 844, M= 3.26, SD .78) have a higher score than Christians (N=602, M=3.03 SD = .84). The difference between Muslims and Christians in support for both harm and demonstration is significant (p =.00). In order to get a clearer picture, we calculated the percentage of Muslim and Christian support for violence in each category.

Table 4.2 shows that Muslim disagreement with support for harm (90.00%) is slightly higher than that of Christians (87.80%). In relation to support for demonstrations, the percentage indicates that the reverse is true; Muslims are inclined to agree more than Christians, with the percentage of Muslims at 36.70% and of Christians 26.60%.

Table 4.2 Support for harm and demonstrations: distribution of scores

	Harm				Demonstrations			
	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Totally disagree	340	40.50	244	40.50	10	1.20	19	3.20
Disagree	415	49.50	285	47.30	110	13.00	126	20.90
Neither disagree nor agree	73	8.70	56	9.30	414	49.10	297	49.30
Agree	9	1.10	15	2.50	272	32.20	139	23.10
Totally agree	2	.20	2	.30	38	4.50	21	3.50
Total	839	100.0	602	100.0	844	100.0	602	100.0

What forms can "support for harm" and "support for demonstrations" take? Illustrations can be found in the testimonies of our interviewees; the qualitative data show that Ambonese respondents, in particular, show high levels of support for harm. Even though large-scale violence has decreased since the outbreaks of 1999-2003, there are still significant tensions between Christians and Muslims. Small-scale incidents still take place regularly to the present day. People who participate in harmful activities or demonstrations sometimes relate this to their experiences of violence in the past. Karim, an Ambonese respondent, explained why he gets involved. "I felt drawn to it. Summoned, and I was motivated to fight back," he told us, in response to the question as to why he was self-avowedly involved in a riot on *Jalan Baru* in 2011. He related his willingness to participate in violent rallies with a traumatic experience during his war-time childhood, in which he saw mutilated heads. He said: "It's like an instinct that drives me to fight without anybody else encouraging me. Nobody tells me to do it. I've been driven to violence since my childhood. My childhood was filled with that horrible game with those heads. I just want to have another chance at that game."

Other respondents agreed with supporting harm as long as it can be seen as self-defense. Alhady, a student in the Faculty of Law, argued: "Well, for people who study law, attack and self-defense are different. Attacking is proactive. It's different from passive action. If you're attacked, it's all right to defend yourself." In Ambon, where the tension between ethno-religious groups runs high, people are inclined to support their in-groups even if they are not explicitly violent. Iskandar, a student at the University of Pattimura, expressed his opinion: "I prefer dialogue, but, if the situation got critical, I would do something […] You know, in Unpatti, all demonstrations always involve something physical, like burning down properties."

However, a large number of respondents are explicitly opposed to harm to persons and property. They argue that violence is not a good solution, even when

carried out in the name of religious solidarity. Habieb, a student activist at State Islamic University, commented that the way the Muslim *jihad* had manifested itself physically in Ambon over recent years was inappropriate: "They could have done something different instead of using violence. In my opinion, there were only a few who went to *jihad* [...]. I believe there are other ways to solve problems." Likewise, Achmad was critical of religious groups that take justice into their own hands, such as the Front Pembela Islam (The Islamic Defenders Front): "In my opinion, they've gone too far. I'm also a Muslim, but I believe in government. The FPI doesn't have the authority to act like that. It's true that we need to remind the government about certain religious issues, but only the police have the authority to do things like that […] It wasn't the raid that I disagreed with, but the violence that was sometimes part of it. Personally, I like the fact that there are people who care about my religion, but I don't like what they do because they don't have the right."

Some informants affirmed that acts of violence were unacceptable under any circumstances; the damaging of property only results in loss of valuable goods or public infrastructure. With regard to the use of violence in retaliation to other groups, Heribertus responded: "No, I don't approve of violence at all. Destruction can cause a lot of loss. Even if people humiliate my religion, I'd rather have a dialogue to find out what's at the root of the problem. Having discussions to find the best solution is the best way. I'd prefer not to solve problems with violence." Disagreement with support for harm was also expressed by Maemunah; she suggested using other channels to protest about unequal treatment or humiliation of her religious group. She said: "I prefer openness. If we don't agree, we can express our opinion. But, then, what we see is different. People destroy things around them. I know that it's freedom, but it's not right, it's going too far. If you have a different opinion, voice your criticism, but in the right way. Don't cause any destruction. Well, for whatever reason, I don't agree with anarchy."

Compared to support for harm, which a large number of respondents disagreed with, there was considerable support for public criticism and demonstration. As discussed above, public criticism and demonstrations are acceptable in a democratic society. Several respondents felt that the government plays an important role in the mediation of conflicts between ethno-religious groups, and in offering solutions to social problems. They considered public criticism and demonstrations to be acceptable, and even wanted better strategies for drawing the attention of the government or other involved parties to their specific problems.

Passolo said that demonstrations are a way to articulate the opinions of a group of people when dialogue fails, and believes that the government pays attention to them. Karrepesina said something similar during his interview, and added that protest or demonstrations are related to freedom of expression. The government has the legal authority to take action in order to solve problems, while members of

civil society can press it to do so through public criticism or demonstrations. Literally, he said: "Via demonstrations, we express our opinion. It's our fundamental right. Take Ahmadiyah for an example. We can protest against their existence, but we can't destroy things that belong to them. Banning this religion is the state's decision. The state is the legitimate leader. So I don't approve of destructive acts against them. In other words, as long as we do it orally, in forms of symbols, we can agree with action, but not with destruction."[26]

In some cases, the demonstrations in Ambon were seen to as a means to put political pressure on the government and local authorities for injustices towards religious in-groups. For instance, Passolo claimed that the aim of a demonstration in Pattimura University (Ambon) was to get attention from the local authority. He says: "We put them under pressure, for example by staging a protest in favour of Muslims, demanding a balance of students from both religions in the University of Pattimura, in accordance to the Malino agreement.[27] This principle determines that if there are two Christians, there must be two Muslims as well. Unpatti was burned down because of these political pressures […] We just noticed that new Christian students outnumber new Muslim ones. What's that all about? We staged the demo to show we weren't happy. Isn't it fair to say there's something dirty going on there? […] We questioned it – why are more Christians than Muslims admitted? There are fewer Muslim students. Why does that happen? Why did we put pressure on the rector? Because I believe that it has something to do with the rector."

Maria, a female Christian student in Yogyakarta, said that she accepts criticism, demonstration and protest, but finds physical destruction unacceptable. She revealed: "In certain situations we need to do that [protest or demonstrate], for example for the right to build churches. We know it's hard to get permission to build one. My father is an architect. He understands the problem well. We need to openly protest about this, so that people understand the real situation. But, violent protest

26 Ahmadiyah is a denomination of Islam founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in British India at the end of 19th centuries. The denomination also developed in Indonesia with the growing adherents in some regions. In 2008, the Indonesian government officially banned the denomination following the protests and demonstrations from a large number of Islamic organizations. The Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia)* supported this decision, after it already declared a fatwa against Ahmadiyah teaching in 2005. The decision resulted in asking the Ahmadiyah adherents to convert to other Islam denominations. In the mean time, intimidation, attacks and loiters against Ahmadiyah take place in Lombok, Tasikmalaya, Tulungagung.

27 Malino agreement is the peace accord between Muslim and Christian representatives from Moluccas to end the conflict on 12 February 2002. As part of the agreement, both groups agree to work together to create peace. Many people think that the peace making could be achived by power sharing and balance number between Muslims and Christians to occupy positions in the government offices and public administration.

like, sorry, what the FPI (The Islamic Defenders Front) does, I don't agree with that at all. In my opinion some communities damage their reputation by claiming their bad deeds are on behalf of religion. So, it's not about bad religion, but about bad acts carried out by a small number of people who claim they're acting on behalf of their religion. I wish there was regulation to control this kind of thing." Concerning discrimination towards her religious group, she asserted her right to protest or demonstrate to highlight those problems. "We have to fight in order to survive, and we have to unite to fight against discrimination. If we are silent about many things, people won't understand that discrimination occurs," she declared.

Our respondents also mentioned several reasons as to why they would participate or actually did participate in public criticism and demonstrations. These were to do with religious solidarity, political pressure and religious obligation. Alhady, a respondent of Yogyakarta, said that solidarity with his fellow Muslim believers was the main reason for his participation in a demonstration to show solidarity with Palestine. Besides speaking about the hypocrisy of Israel, he also helped to collect donations for the event. He told us: "Of course we don't support them by killing Israelites that we meet, but we give other support, like supplies. We're not on the battlefield. On a battlefield you can kill the enemy if you have to, but, here, we are not on a battlefield, so we only do it verbally. We've also raised funds, and sent medical volunteers. We've tried to stay within these limits. We raised a lot of funds last time, so we're planning to do it again." When we asked whether he was involved in any activities in relation to religious problems in Indonesia, he did not give a clear response, but said there was no pressing reason for violence against Muslims in Indonesia. In addition, he explained that solidarity with fellow Muslims is considered to be a religious obligation. He asserted: "Muslims are one body. As one body, if some of the other parts are in pain, we cannot laugh at them. We must show our concern. It doesn't mean we have to feel the pain, but we have to stand up for them so that they don't suffer too much."

Compared to Muslim respondents who boldly expressed their anger about injustice against their own religious group, Christian respondents tended to stay quiet although they did of course disagree with discrimination or unequal treatment. This could be to do with the minority status of Christians in the country. Heribertus revealed this opinion: "I can't accept the discrimination. It's not right because we are one nation. But, with our limited capabilities, we can only say that it's not right."

Overall, our interviews confirmed the findings of the quantitative data: that people are willing to support protest and demonstrations, but that only a few support harm. There was also a striking difference between interviewees from Ambon and those from Yogyakarta. Some Ambonese respondents showed support for violence, especially those who had suffered violent experiences in the past; they supported harm and damage to property as long as it could be considered self-defense. In line

with the quantitative data, the Muslim interviewees also gave the impression that they are more supportive of demonstrations than Christian respondents. They were, in specific circumstances, also relatively less negative about harm.

4. 2. Ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence

Ethno-religious identification is measured by a set of variable combinations between ethnic and religious identification. Ethnic identification consists of self-definition on the basis of ethnic group, ethnic languages, friends by ethnicity, participation in ethnic ceremonies and membership of ethnic organizations. Religious identification is measured by self-definition on the basis of religion, participation in religious ceremonies and practices, friends by religion and membership of religious organizations. Ethno-religious self-definition is measured by the intersection between ethnic and religious identities.

4.2.1. Construction of measurements

4.2.1.1. Ethnic and religious self-definition

Self-definition of ethnicity refers to individuals' identification with a certain ethnic group. In this study, we identify twelve ethnic groups based on the populations of Ambon and Yogyakarta. These are Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Ambonese, Buginese, Makasarese, Buton, Toraja, Minahasa, Chinese, and Batak. The category of "others" includes ethnic groups not on the list such as Timorese, Papua, Betawi, Malay, Dayak, etc. Self-definition of religion refers to individuals' identification with their religion or denomination. While there are five official religions in Indonesia i.e. Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism, this study examines the relationship between Muslims and Christians, so the analyses exclude Hinduism and Buddhism but account for both Protestantism and Catholicism as aspects of Christianity. The composition of ethnic and religious identity in the sample appears in the table below.

Table 4.3 Ethnic and religious self-definition

Ethnicity	Religion				Total	
	Muslims		Christians			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Javanese	348	41.8	104	17.0	452	31.3
Sundanese	36	4.3	2	.3	38	2.6
Madurese	36	4.3	0	0	36	2.5
Minangkabau	17	2.0	0	0	17	1.2
Ambonese	241	29.0	346	56.5	587	40.7
Buginese	10	1.2	0	0	10	.7
Makasarese	2	.2	1	.2	3	.2
Buton	95	11.4	0	0	95	6.6
Toraja	0	0	20	3.3	20	1.4
Minahasa	0	0	5	.8	5	.3
Chinese	1	.1	43	7.0	44	3.0
Batak	2	.2	35	5.7	37	2.6
Others	44	5.3	56	9.2	100	6.9
Total	832	100.0	612	100.0	1,444	100.0

Cross-tabulation between ethnic and religious self-definition was done by counting the number of Muslims and Christians for each ethnic group. The biggest Muslim group was Javanese and the biggest Christian group is Ambonese. There was neither a Muslim Toraja or Minahasa, nor a Christian Madurese, Minangkabau or Buton in the sample. The combination of ethnic and religious identities is called "ethno-religious self-definition" and will be used in the further regression analysis.

Our respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta defined their ethno-religious identity in different ways. In Yogyakarta, they defined their ethnicity with direct reference to the ethnic groups of their parents. For instance, Anto, from Yogyakarta, introduced his ethnicity as follows: "I am Javanese. My parents are originally Javanese." Or Habibie said: "I am Sundanese because my parents are a hundred per cent Sundanese."

The ethnic identity of respondents is inherited from their parents. It does not change if they have not lived in their place of ethnic origin for a long time, or cannot speak their ethnic language. Achmad was one of the respondents whose parents moved from Java to Sumatera more than thirty years ago. He was born in Sumatera but still identifies himself as Javanese. When asked about his identity, he replied: "Well, I see myself as Javanese. Sumatera is identical with Malay, but I was born and brought up in an environment in which Javanese are the majority. Then, I went to school, starting in kindergarten, then elementary school, junior, and then senior high school. My teachers and my friends were Javanese. Although I live in a Malay area, my community is still Javanese."

In some cases, if parents had different ethnicities, the respondent's self-definition referred to either the father's or mother's ethnicity, depending on the intensity of socialization in the family. For instance, Maria had a Batak mother and a Javanese father. She identified herself as Javanese rather than Batak because she was born and grew up in Java. Her claim was similar to Alhady's, who defined himself as Kutai despite having a Javanese father, because he was born and socialized in his mother's family. He confirmed: "I'm a native of Borneo, Kutai Kartanegara. I was born in a rural, remote area. My father is from East Java; my mother is from Kutai. I've interacted more intensively with Kutai people ever since I was small. So my identity is more Kutai than Javanese."

With regard to religious identity, our respondents in Yogyakarta tended to identify with one of the five official state religions. In Ambon, they referred more to the ethno-religious identity of their residential area. Given this concern with place, we expected them to recognize both their ethnicity and their religion. For instance, a respondent introduced himself: "My name is Passolo from Sepa," meaning that his ethnic group is Sepa and so he should be considered Muslim. Another respondent told us, 'My name is Soselissa. […] My village is called Kampung Silla," thus indicating that he is an Ambonese Christian without actually mentioning his religion. To some extent, family name corresponds to ethno-religious identity; for example, Karepesina is a family name from Kabau. Marabessy, Tuasamu, Tuanany, and Salampessy are names from Haruku Island (Lease). People with these family names are likely to be Muslim.

4.2.1.2. Ethnic languages

The common use of ethnic language in various situations is an important measure of ethnic identification. The assumption is that the more the respondents speak their ethnic language, the stronger their ethnic identification. For the measurement, we set out six situations in which the ethnic language is often used: at home, with the family, with friends, within the community residence, and at university. The reliability of the scale was .70 for Muslims and .81 for Christians, while for the combination of both it was .75.

4.2.1.3. Friends by ethnicity

Friends by ethnicity is the number of ethnic in-group rather than ethnic out-group friends. It is assumed that the more same-ethnicity friends, the more the respondents support violence. The reliability is relatively high as indicated by Cronbach's alpha for Christians (.81), Muslims (.77) and both groups (.88).

4.2.1.4. Ethnic ceremonies

Participation in ethnic ceremonies is a good indicator for ethnic identification. It is assumed that the more respondents participate in ethnic ceremonies, the stronger their identification with their ethnic groups. Ethnic ceremonies refers to birth rituals, wedding rituals, rituals for moving house, rituals around illness, and funeral ceremonies. The option of "other" ceremonies was deleted, because the respondents did not specify what those other ceremonies might be. Cronbach's alpha for the scale was .76 for Muslims and .81 for Christians.

4.2.1.5. Membership of and participation in ethnic organizations

Ethnic identification is also measured by membership of ethnic organizations. We asked whether the respondents were members of such an organization, with three options: "no", "yes, as a supporter only" and "yes, as a member". The second and third options were then combined for the respondents might not differ as members or supporters. After this, we asked about respondents' participation in the activities of the organization. The answer categories were from (1), never, to (5), more than once a week.

4.2.1.6. Religious practices and religious ceremonies

The religious practice questions asked about individuals' habits with regard to reading or reciting Holy Scripture, praying and going to religious services. For religious ceremonies, the questions were about individuals' participation in the ceremonies of their respective religion. Muslim and Christian groups were asked separate questions due to the differences in their ceremonies; for Muslims, they included circumcision, weddings, funerals, fasting, *Idul Fitri*, and *Idul Adha*. Two of the questions for Muslims, regarding *Maulud* and *Isra Miraj*, were discarded because they are not celebrated in several local traditions. For Christians, the ceremonies included baptism, weddings, Christmas, Easter, funerals and fasting. The factor analysis was used to determine the substantial dimensions of the measurement.

The factor analysis was done for Muslims and Christians separately due to the difference in religious ceremonies. In the analysis for Christians, fasting was deleted because of low commonalities (<.20) and baptism was excluded because it loaded highly in two factors (>.30). Two dimensions appeared in the pattern matrix, which were religious ceremonies and services. However, in the analysis for Muslims, three dimensions were found and could not be reduced to two as had been done for Christians; reducing to two would have meant excluding religious practices. Three dimensions to adjust measures between Muslims and Christians were used – collective rituals, rites of passage and religious practices, as presented in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Collective rituals, rites of passage, and religious practices: scales

	Muslims				Christians			
		Factor loading pattern matrix				Factor loading pattern matrix		
	h^2	Collective ritual	Rites of passage	Religious practices	h^2	Collective ritual	Rites of passage	Religious practices
28. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Idul Fitri/ Christmas	.97	.98			.97	.98		
29. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Idul Adha/ Easter	.93	.94			.93	.96		
27. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Fasting	.80	.87						
25. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Weddings	.72		.87		.65		-.83	
24. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Circumcision	.48		.67					
26. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Funerals	.49		.61		.66		-.75	
57. How often do you read or recite the Holy Scripture (Al Quran, Bible, Vedas or Tripitaka)?	.51			.72	.62			.80
38. How often do you pray?	.17			.41	.26			.50
39. How often do you go to religious services in mosques, churches, temple or other places of worship?	.20			.41	.27			.51
Initial Eigenvalues		3.63	1.57	1.23		2.90	.74	1.74
% of variance explained		38.03	11.88	8.43		39.16	6.47	17.08
Reliability		.96	.78	.48		.98	.79	.61

The inter-dimensional correlation was less than .50, so there was no compelling reason to combine these factors. Cronbach's alpha for collective rituals was very high for Muslims (.96) and Christians (.98). Rites of passage were also high for Muslims (.78) and Christians (.79), but for religious practices Christians scored moderately (.60) and the Muslims' score was low (.48).

4.2.1.7. Friends by religion

Religious identification can also be measured by respondents' number of friends of the same or different religion. It is assumed that the more religious in-group friends, and the fewer out-group friends, the stronger the individuals' religious identification. The reliability of the battery was low both for Muslims and Christians, as indicated by the score of .08 for Muslims and .46 for Christians. When tested in both groups together, the reliability increased to .52. To obtain a more normal distribution, the answers "none" and "some" were combined in one score.

4.2.1.8. Membership of and participation in religious organizations

Membership of a religious organization affects the respondents' identification with their religious group. In this measure, members and supporters were brought together into a single category, so we asked respondents only whether they were members or not. This was followed with questions about participation in the organizations' activities. The answer categories ran from (1), never, to (5), more than once a week.

4.2.2. Scores and intergroup differences

For several variables within ethno-religious identification, there were significant differences between Muslims and Christians. Ethnic language, ethnic ceremonies and membership of ethnic organization all showed significant differences in the mean scores between Muslims and Christians. Muslims had higher mean scores than Christians, as shown in table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Ethnic identification: scores and intergroup differences

Ethnic identification	Muslims			Christians					Mean Diff (Muslims as ref.)	t-test	df
	M	S D	N	M	S D	N	Min	Max			
Ethnic languages	2.59	2.08	727	2.00	2.28	545	0.00	6.00	.59	4.73**	1108.83
Ethnic ceremonies	2.59	.90	738	2.32	.98	500	1.00	4.00	.27	4.85*	1009.13
Same-ethnicity friends	3.66	.84	776	3.87	.91	519	1.00	5.00	-.21	-4.18	1293
Membership of org.	.13	.63	822	.12	.58	564	0.00	1.00	.05	1.36*	1262.83
Participation in org.	2.46	1.14	153	2.64	1.17	90	1.00	5.00	-.19	-1.22	241

** Significance at .01 level * Significance at .05 level

Muslims speak their ethnic language (M= 2.59, SD= 2.08) in more situations than Christians (M= 2.00, SD= 2.28). The t-test points to 4.73 and p=.00. Muslims (M= 2.59, SD=.90) also attend ethnic ceremonies more frequently than Christians (M= 2.32, SD= .98). In addition, more Muslims (M= .13, SD=.63) are members of an ethnic organization than Christians (M=.12, SD=.58). The difference is significant (p=.01). On the other hand, Christians (M= 3.87, SD= .91) tend to have more same-ethnicity friends than Muslims (M=3.66, SD= .84), but the difference is not significant. Likewise for participation in ethnic organizations, there is no significant difference between Christians (M= 2.64, SD=1.17) and Muslims (2.46, SD = 1.14).

Our qualitative data suggests that many respondents consider ethnic identification to be an important element of their personal identity. Their ethnic language is the mother tongue that they still use on many occasions. While the quantitative survey makes it clear that Muslims speak their ethnic language more than Christians, this could not be confirmed via the interviews in Yogyakarta; and, the Chinese, who are mostly Christians, do not speak their ethnic (Chinese) language any more. In Ambon, the respondents affirmed that Muslims use their ethnic language more than Christians in daily life. Karrepesina observed: “It’s only in Muslim areas that people still preserve the ethnic language, although it’s mostly used in traditional ceremonies.” In fact, this claim confirms a previous study which found that the declining use of local language in Christian communities is due to the use of Malay-Ambon in Protestant churches (Chauvel, 1990: 4-14).

A number of respondents revealed that ethnic ceremonies related to important life events such as births, weddings and deaths are still practised in their families.

Several Javanese claimed that participations in these rites of passage preserve cultural traditions. They testify that ethnic ceremonies are often blended with religious rituals, such as a mass, at Catholic funerals; while traditional prayers are said at Muslim weddings or funerals. They also mentioned *mitoni*, or the celebration of the seventh month of pregnancy. Nonetheless, Muslim interviewees who are members of Muhammadiah and Protestant interviewees no longer participate in ethnic ceremonies. Maemunah, who belongs to Muhammadiah, said: "I feel uneasy about the contradiction between ethnic ceremonies and Islam. On the one hand, they're our culture, but on the other hand, they're not acceptable in my religious tradition. That's because I'm not a Javanese who follows *Kejawen*[28]. I only practise traditions that don't conflict with the teachings of my religion. So, for example, when the royal palace of Yogyakarta held a ritual in which people try to get the water used in the ceremony because they think that it will bring them good luck, I didn't participate."

In terms of friendship by ethnicity, it is not possible to confirm the quantitative data to show that Muslims have fewer same-ethnicity friends than Christians. Muslim respondents revealed that such friends make them feel accepted. The interviewees who live far from their families also commented that it was easier for them to make friends with students from the same ethnic group. Many interviewees confirmed that they are members of an ethnic organization; several Buginese students belong to the South Sulawesi Family Association (Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan, KKSS); Ambalau students join the Ambalau Students and Youth Forum (Forum Pemuda dan Pelajar Ambalau, Forppemaba); Keiese have Communication Forum of Evav's Student (Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Evav, Fokusmapa), etc. The aim of these ethnic organizations is mainly to unify people or students from certain ethnic groups or areas.

As well as ethnicity, we measured religious identification. Significant differences in the mean scores of Muslims and Christians also appeared in some variables, except for membership and participation in religious organizations. These included respondents' participation in collective rituals, religious practices, rites of passages and friends of the same religion.

28 *Kejawen* is a Javanese religious tradition. It develops from syncretising aspects of animistic, Hinduism Buddhism, and Islam.

Table 4.6 Religious identification: scores and intergroup difference

Religious identification	Muslims			Christians					Mean diff (Muslims as ref.)	t-test	df
	M	SD	N	M	S D	N	Min	Max			
Collective rituals	3.87	.50	825	3.79	.51	587	1.00	4.00	.08	3.04**	1,247.67
Religious practices	5.14	1.56	391	5.00	1.39	270	1.00	7.00	.14	1.21**	618.07
Rites of passages	3.19	.86	823	3.42	.75	558	1.00	4.00	-.23	-5.26**	1,291.23
In-group friends	4.21	.77	842	3.88	.86	595	1.00	5.00	.33	7.58**	1,185.46
Out-group friends	2.05	.79	760	2.58	.78	583	1.00	5.00	-.53	-12.18**	1,261.44
Membership of org.	1.71	.88	828	1.69	.89	580	1.00	3.00	.02	.40	1,406
Participation in org.	2.93	1.37	346	3.23	1.42	230	1.00	5.00	-.30	-2.55	574

** Significance at .01 level

Significant differences between Muslims and Christians appear in Table 4.6. The participation of Muslims (M=3.87 SD=.50) is slightly higher than Christians (M=3.79, SD=.51) in collective rituals. Their participation is mostly for religious reasons, as shown by the proximity of the score to the maximum value. T-test is significant at 3.04. Muslims (M=5.14, SD= 1.56) also pray or attend religious services more often than Christians (M=5.00, SD=1.39). On average, they practise their religion from between more than once a week to once a day, but participate less in rites of passage than Christians. Christians' participation in rites of passages is more for religious reasons (M=3.42, SD= .72), while for Muslims it is for non-religious reasons (M= 3.19, SD= .86). Muslims have more friends of the same religion (M=4.21, SD= 77) than Christians (M=3.88, Sd.86), but the number of friends of different religions is inverted for Christians, who have more out-group friends (M=2.58, SD=.78) than Muslims (M=2.05, SD=.79). Furthermore, there is a slight difference in the mean scores of Muslims and Christians in their membership of religious organizations and participations in their activities, but this is not significant.

Both Muslims and Christians participate in collective rituals because they perceive them to be a religious obligation. Muslims celebrate Idul Fitri to mark the end of the fasting month (Ramadhan) and Idul Adha to commemorate the willingness of the prophet Ibrahim to sacrifice his only son in submission to God's command. Christians celebrate Christmas to celebrate the birth of Jesus Christ and Easter to commemorate his resurrection on the third day after his crucifixion. Both Muslims and Christians affirm that these rituals often find expression in their ethnic and local traditions. During Idul Fitri, Javanese Muslims usually visit their parents, relatives and neighbors to ask for forgiveness. When they visit parents or older relatives, they

kiss their knees as a sign of respect (*sungkem*). Idul Adha is celebrated in Haruku, Lease islands, with *panas pela* (the renewal of an agreement and bond between villages) e.g. Pelauw, Kailolo, Rohomony, Ori, etc.

Our respondents' view is that it is important to participate in collective rituals. Both Muslims and Christians feel obliged to attend, even though some do not go to the regular communal worship such as Friday prayers or Sunday mass. Achmad, a Muslim respondent, revealed that he never misses these events. He said: "From elementary school right up to senior high, I was always involved in collective rituals. Here (in Yogyakarta) I join in with them too. I always go to *tahlilan* (communal prayers). There's a schedule. If I don't go, I feel guilty."

Most respondents actively practice their religion every day. Most Muslims pray at the mosque five times a day, although a few only go to Friday prayers. Some of those who pray five times a day also read Al Qur'an every day. Maemunah says: "My family usually prays together (*sholat berjamaah*) in the evening when everyone is already at home. We usually attend the other four prayer times separately, in the mosque closest to wherever we are at the time. Personally, I read Qur'an in the late evening or after the morning prayer." Some of the Christian respondents also read the Bible every day at morning prayer. A few of them, like Maria, a Catholic, attend daily mass in the afternoon after coming back from campus.

In terms of friendship by religion, both Muslims and Christians have relatively more friends of their own religious group. Having in-group friends makes them feel more secure. Fauzi said that he is more comfortable when he is with his religious friends: "When we meet fellow Muslims, we feel accepted. Whenever I meet new people, if I find out they're Muslims, I feel close to them straight away, even though we've never met before. As a student of UGM, I got to know students from UNPAD and ITB. Because they're Muslims, we immediately felt like old friends, even though I'd only met them once."

Some Muslim respondents limit their interactions with Christians and other religious groups to avoid food contamination from pork, dog meat or amphibians, which they are strictly forbidden to eat. Achmad affirmed: "My concern is about eating pork. Christian and Kong Hu Cu people eat it, right? If we're invited to their homes and food is served, we don't eat it. Even if they serve fried chicken, we can't taste it. We think that the chicken is cooked in the same pan as the pork. Other than food, we don't have any problems."

On the other hand, a Christian respondent told of her difficulty in becoming friends with Muslims, even though she tries not to discriminate. She said: "It's mostly because of their religious principles. In my opinion, going out with a friend of the opposite sex is normal, but, one day, I went to an event with my friend – a boy. We were holding hands. This turned out to be a problem. On another occasion, my friend and I went to deliver an invitation, but when we arrived we weren't allowed

in. He said: 'Stop!' Then when we left, he cleaned the floor. That made me feel pretty uncomfortable because I saw him do it! I hadn't even left; I was still in the yard. What did I do wrong? I was really shocked. Afterwards I went to see another neighbour living close by, still feeling shocked. The neighbour told me that they were an exclusive family, who restrict their relations with other people for religious reasons."

Membership of religious organizations is also a dimension of religious identification. Some of our respondents claimed that their membership of such organizations makes them more devout and helps them to develop their religious network. Abdullah described his experience: "In the beginning I joined the Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI). I didn't even know The Action Group of Indonesia Muslim Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI). I saw HMI as a big Islamic student organization. I was taken to join KAMMI by a senior. I felt more at ease with KAMMI, because some members of HMI have really bad morals – they get involved in romantic relationships, smoking, drinking alcohol etc. KAMMI and the Social Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) are the same, and my friends at the mosque are predominantly KAMMI members. They teach us the basic tenets of Islam, such as Islamic pillars, faith pillars, *sholat*, and how to behave when we meet other people. We're different from the Party of Liberation in Indonesia (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, HTI) who want to prioritize changing the state system. We're told to make changes gradually, little by little, according to Islamic doctrine. As I understand it, we make political changes very gradually because Indonesia practises democracy. We enter parliament and government agencies, even though the final goal remains to have a *khilafah.*[29] It's not the same as HTI. HTI hates the democratic system without taking part in it and helping to change it. We work within the system, and hope to win the general election and transform the system into an Islamic one, which would obviously be much better."

Unlike the training given by KAMMI, which aims to create militant political leaders, most Christian organizations aim to enhance religious spirituality and develop social skills. For instance, a Christian respondent in Ambon, Samuel, described his activities at AM GPM (Angkatan Muda-Gereja Protestan Maluku, Youth Movement of the Moluccan Protestant Church), which aim mainly for spiritual growth and the empowerment of young people. He explained: "We learn to understand and experience the Bible there. At church, there are little kids, teenagers, adolescents, and young men. Middle kids at AM GMP range from the fifth year of elementary school up to age thirteen. The little kids at AM GMP are from kindergarten up to the first or second year of elementary school. It's the little kids who go to the *Tunas*,

29 *Khilafah* (caliphate) is an Islamic state led by a supreme religious as well as political leader known as a successor to Islamic prophet Muhammad.

and the middle kids and adolescents who come to the *Sekolah Minggu*.[30] AM GPM activities focus on deepening understanding of the Bible, and also on learning technical organizational skills. The young people have already learned how to chair a meeting, debate in a forum, and other skills […] Every Thursday we have youth worship."

In general, our qualitative data support the findings of the quantitative data. More specifically, it becomes clear that religious identification is stronger than ethnic identification both in Ambon and Yogyakarta. The interview data reveal that religious identification is now relatively important, especially with regard to participation in religious practices. Most respondents also affirm that their participation in traditional ceremonies and religious rituals is mainly for religious reasons. Compared to Christians, Muslim respondents have more friends from the same religion, and are also more engaged in religious political organizations. Meanwhile, Christians have more friends of different religions, even though their interaction with out-group friends is limited. A few are involved in religious organizations that are less politically active than some of the Muslim equivalents.

4.2.3. Analysis of ethno-religious identification

Several variables for ethno-religious identification show a significant relationship to support for intergroup violence. In this ANOVA test, the results indicate that religious identification has a stronger link to support for harm to persons and property, as well as to support for public criticism and demonstration, than ethnic identification. The relationship is also different for Muslims and Christians. For Muslims, the significant relation appears in several variables such as membership of ethnic organizations, participation in collective rituals and friends by religion. Meanwhile, the significant relation for Christians is present only in the use of ethnic language. The overall result of the test is presented in appendix 2, Table 1 - Table 14.

The relationship between ethnic language use and support for harm is significant. Only Christians express a low level of support ($M = 1.75$; $N = 602$; $p = .01$; $r = -.14$). The relation is also linear in a negative direction. It suggests that Christians who speak their ethnic language in more than one situation are less inclined to support harm to persons and properties. On the other hand, the results do not find any significant relationship between ethnic language use and support for public criticism and demonstrations (see appendix 2, Table 2)

30 *Tunas* is the name of pre-school and kindergarten in Maranatha Church in Ambon. *Sekolah Minggu* is the religious teaching session for the Christian children, that is hold every Sunday. The children are usually gathered in a specific place while their parents participate in the weekly religious service in the Church.

In terms of participation in ethnic ceremonies, Muslims who are more active show more support for demonstrations (M= 3.25, N=734). The relation is significant and linear (r=.07, p=.05) as presented in appendix 2, Table 4.

Muslims who are members of ethnic organizations tend to disagree with support for harm (M=1.70, N=811). The relation is significant with an eta of .08. There is no difference in support for harm between Christians who are and who are not members.

This trend is slightly different from that for participation in activities of ethnic organizations. Both Muslims (M=3.31, N= 152) and Christians (M=3.17, N=89) who participate only on special days show relatively more support for demonstrations. The relation is significant both for Muslims and Christians, but the relation deviates from linearity for Christians (eta=.30, p=.05). For Muslims, r is .24. This indicates that higher participation in ethnic organization activities is related to more support for demonstrations.

Table 4.7 Analysis of variance between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence

Ethno-religious identification	Harm						Demonstrations					
	Muslims			Christians			Muslims			Christians		
	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E
Ethnic self-definition												
Ethnic languages				1.75	602	-.14*						
Ethnic in-group friends												
Participation in ethnic ceremonies							3.25	734	.07*			
Membership of ethnic organizations	1.70	811	.08**									
Participation in ethnic organization activities							3.31	152	.24*	3.17	89	.30*
Religious self-definition							3.26	844	.14*	3.03	602	.14*
Participation in collective rituals	1.70	813	-.07*				3.26	818	.11*			
Participation in religious practices												
Participation in rites of passage							3.26	816	.11**			
Friends by religion (in-group)	1.70	830	.17**				3.26	835	.07*			
Friends by religion (out-group)	1.70	753	.10*				3.24	756	-.10**			
Membership of religious organizations							3.27	822	0.7*			
Participation in religious organizations							3.31	345	.15*			

** Significance at .01 level * Significance at .05 level

Correlation: Pearson's r for ordinal variables (R), eta for nominal variables (E)

For various indicators of religious identification, Muslims also show more significant relations. For Christians significant relations are only apparent for self-definition of religion and support for demonstrations. Participation in collective rituals has a significant relationship to support for harm (r = -.07, p = .05). The result shows a negative relationship – that is, those who participate more often in collective rituals are less likely to support harm to persons and property. On the other hand, the

relationship between participation in collective rituals and support for public criticism and demonstrations was also found to be significant, linear and in a positive direction (r=.10, p= .00). It indicates that the higher the participation in collective rituals, the greater the support for public criticism and demonstrations. As for participation in religious practices, the results of the analysis do not find any significant relationship to either support for harm or support for demonstrations. This is true for both Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, the relationship between their participation in rites of passage and support for harm is not significant, but the relationship to support for demonstrations is significant only among Muslims. The relationship is linear (r=.11, p= .00), that is, the more frequent their participation in rites of passage, the more likely they are to support public criticism and demonstrations. The details of the variance analysis results are presented in appendix 2, Table 7 - Table 10.

A significant relationship is also found between in-group friends and support for harm among Muslims. The relationship is deviant from linearity with eta = .17, p= .00. On the other hand, the relationship between in-group friends and support for public criticism and demonstrations is significant, but linear (r =. 10, p=.04). So, the more same-religion friends that Muslims have, the more they support violence. For Christians, there is no significant relationship (see appendix 2, Table 11).

The trend for religious in-group friends is the same as for religious out-group friends. The relationship to support for harm is significant and deviant from linearity (eta=.10, p=.04). Muslims who have none or some Christian friends show more support for harm to persons than those who have relatively more Christian friends. However, Muslims whose friends are mostly Christian also show more support for harm to persons and property. The relationship to support for demonstrations is significant and linear (r= -.10, p=.00). Furthermore, Muslims who have more Christian friends show less support for demonstrations. Among Christians, the results are non-significant, as presented in appendix 2, Table 12.

Membership of religious organizations has no significant relationship to support for harm. Only among Muslims does such membership have a significant relationship to support for demonstrations (eta = 07, p=.05); Muslims who are members of religious organizations are more likely to support demonstrations. Among Muslims, the relationship between participation in religious organization activities and support for demonstrations is also significant (eta=.15, p=.05). If Muslims participate more than once a week in such activities, they support demonstrations significantly more (see appendix 2, Table 13 and Table 14).

4.3. Social position and support for violence

Social position constitutes demographic and social variables that might influence individual attitudes to support for violence. They consist of gender, parents' religion, parents' education, parents' occupational status, parents' job, and monthly

household income. Parents' religion is reconstructed into two scales to make the analysis more relevant to the homogenous or heterogamous nature of religion in the family. The values of social position variables (except for gender) are recoded to avoid low frequencies and to create a normal distribution.

4.3.1. Construction of the measurement

We constructed the measurement for social position from several indicators that we assumed to affect the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. Besides gender and homogamy of parents, the extent to which social economic status of the respondents' household affects attitudes was also estimated. This was measured by parents' education, occupation and household income.

4.3.1.1 Gender

Gender refers to men and women.

4.3.1.2. Homogamy

Parents' religion encompasses the religion of the respondents' father and mother. If the religion of at least one of the parents was different from that of the respondent, we considered it to be a heterogenous family ('heterogamy'). If the religion of both parents was the same, we defined the family background as religiously homogenous ('homogamy'). We assumed that homogamy affects respondents' support for violence, so we recoded the answers regarding fathers' and mothers' religion into the new scale for homogamy. The first step was to combine father and mother whose religion was Islam, or whose religion was Christian. Then, the next step was to calculate the number of respondents whose religion was similar to that of both of their parents. By computing for homogamy, the result shows that 1,453 respondents (96.87%) came from homogamous households. Specifically, Table 3.8 presents the composition of respondents' homogamy and heterogamy; 98.83% of Muslim and 96.18% of Christian households were homogamous.

Table 4.8. Homogamy and heterogamy of respondents' families

Religion in family	Muslims		Christians	
	N	%	N	%
Homogamy	843	98.83	605	96.18
Heterogamy	10	1.17	24	3.82
Total	853	100.00	629	100.00

4.3.1.3. Parents' educational attainment

The parents' educational level was presupposed to have influenced the respondents' attitude to support for violence. Fathers' education and mothers' education was computed into a single measure for parents' education. The level of education consisted of low, middle and high. Low level corresponded to no formal education or only elementary school, the middle included junior and senior high school, and higher education encompassed university and polytechnic school.

4.3.1.4. Parents' occupational status and parents' occupation

The parents' occupational status followed the job status categories used in the national census by Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS, Statistics Indonesia); it was recoded into four categories. The new categories consisted of self-employed, labourer/officer, informal worker and unpaid worker. The measurement also combined fathers' occupational status and mothers' occupational status into parents' occupational status. For the parents' occupation we used the original categories from the BPS national statistics. The scale was nominal.

4.3.1.5. Household income

Household income is an indicator of social class and status. The respondents' attitude to support for violence might be influenced by the social status of the family. The question for household income was set up in eight interval categories from lower than IDR 500,000,- to higher than IDR 6,000,000,-. We recoded this into three categories consisting of low, middle and high levels of income. The low level corresponded to earnings of less than IDR 999,999,-; the middle from IDR 1,000, 000,- to 4,999,999,- and the high, more than IDR 5,000,000,-.

4.3.2. Intergroup differences and analysis of variance

There were significant differences between Muslims and Christians across all control variables except for parents' education. There were more female Muslims respondents (M=1.50, SD=.50) than female Christians (M=1.44, SD=.50), which is a significant difference if we look at the t-test score (2.26; p=.00)

The religious composition of respondents' families was slightly different for Muslim and Christian respondents. More Muslims had homogamous families (M=.99, SD=.11) than Christians (M=.96, SD=.19). The t-test score was 3.11 (p=.00). The parents' highest educational attainment was lower for Muslims (M=1.98, SD=.73) than for Christians (M=2.25, SD=.66). However, the difference between Muslims and Christians was not significant.

Parents' occupational status differed significantly between Muslims and Christians. Muslims had lower occupational status (M=1.68, SD= .85) than Christians

(M=1.75, SD=.79). The t-test score was -1.64 (p=.00). The household income of Muslims (M=1.80, SD= .72) was also lower than that of Christians (M=1.94, SD=.71). The difference between the two religious groups is significant (t-test=-.363, p=.00). Nonetheless, the parental occupational status of Muslim respondents (M=6.23, SD=1.69) was higher than that of Christians (M=5.97, SD=1.99). Parents' occupation is arranged hierarchically from (1), absent/dead, to (6), manager. The difference between Muslims and Christians is significant (t-test=2.23, p=.00).

Table 4.9 Social characteristics: scores and inter-group difference

Social positions	Muslims			Christians					Mean Diff (Muslims as ref.)	t-test	Df
	M	SD	N	M	S D	N	Min	Max			
Gender	1.50	.50	838	1.44	.50	621	1.00	2.00	.06	2.26**	1,341.39
Homogamy	.99	.11	853	.96	.19	629	1.00	2.00	.03	3.11**	917.64
Parents' education	1.98	.73	568	2.25	.66	415	1.00	3.00	-.27	-5.99	981
Parents' occupational status	1.68	.85	682	1.75	.79	444	1.00	4.00	-.08	-1.64**	999.21
Parents' occupation	6.23	1.69	624	5.97	1.99	438	1.00	11.00	.26	2.23**	839.17
Household income	1.80	.72	823	1.94	.71	583	1.00	3.00	-.14	-3.63**	1,265.23

** Significance at .01 level

We found the relationship between social position and support for violence to be barely significant. The results of ANOVA show that only household income has a significant relationship to support for harm. On the other hand, gender and parents' education have a significant relationship to support for demonstrations, but for Christians only.

Table 4.10 Analysis of variance between social position and support for intergroup violence

Social positions	Support for harm						Support for Public Criticism and Demonstrations					
	Muslims			Christians			Muslims			Christians		
	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E
Gender										3.03	594	.12**
Homo-gamous family												
Parents' education										3.02	404	.10*
Parents' occupa-tional status												
Parents' occupation												
Household Income	1.71	813	-.09*	1.74	575	-.15**						

Significance at .01 level * Significance at .05 level

Among Christians, support for criticism and demonstrations (M 3.03, N=594) is related to gender, with men showing significantly more support than women. (eta =.12, p=.00). There is also a significant relationship between parents' education and support for demonstrations (M=3.02, N=404), a linear relationship with r =.10. The higher the educational attainment of parents, the greater the support for demonstrations (see appendix 2, Table 17).

The relationship between household income and support for harm to persons and property is significant for both Muslims and Christians. Muslims (M=1.71, N=813) showed lower levels of support for violence than Christians (M=1.74, N=575). The relationship between household income and support for violence showed the same tendency for both Muslims and Christians, although it was somewhat deviant from linearity among Muslims. Overall, the relationship indicates that respondents from higher income households show less support for harm to persons and property. The correlation of Christians (r = -.15, p=.00) is stronger than that of Muslims (eta=.09, p=.03. The detail of the analysis is presented in appendix 2, Table 20.

4. 4. Support for violence and intermediary variables

There were nine intermediary variables in the study: perceived group threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and intergroup distrust. But before we present their relationship to the dependent variables, we will briefly discuss the

factor analysis to obtain scales for the respective intermediate variables. This section therefore describes the scale construction of the intermediate variables, followed by the intergroup differences between Muslims and Christians based on the analysis of variance.

4.4.1. Construction of the measurements

We subjected some intermediate variables to factor analysis for data reduction to construct latent variables. These variables were perceived group threat, salience of identity, quality of contact, perceived discrimination, religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality, intra-textual fundamentalism versus symbolic interpretation, nationalism and regiocentrism. Some other variables were computed for their descriptive features, such as quantity of contact, individual memory of violence and intergroup distrust. The results of the factor analyses are presented in appendix 1.

4.4.1.1. Perceived group threat

Perceived group threat originally contained eleven items. Two were then removed – q157, "The day will come when members of other religious groups will occupy crucial positions in government," and q162, "I am afraid of increasing violence in my neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups." Question 157 was deleted for its low communality (h^2 = .24) and q162 was deleted for double loadings in two factors when tested in the Muslim group. Appendix 1, Table 1 shows that two factors were combined into a single solution because in the pattern matrix, they had a strong correlation (.56). The reliability of the scale for Muslims is .91 and for Christians is .92.

4.4.1.2. Salience of identity

Salience of identity was originally constructed in two dimensions: ethnic and religious; each had six questions. The two dimensions had been validated by the factor analysis (see appendix 1, Table 2). However, two questions were excluded because they loaded highly in two factors (>.30). These were q40, "My religious identity is very important to me," and q41, "I see myself as a committed member of my religious group." Since the correlation was lower than .60, the factor was retained in two dimensions. For Muslims, ethnic salience explained 34.01% of variance and religious salience explained 20.63%. So, ethnic and religious salience for Muslims explained 54.64% of variance. It was not greatly different among Christians, in that ethnic salience explained 36.33% of variance and religious salience 15.82%, giving a total variance of 52.15%. The reliability of ethnic salience for Muslims was .81 and .82 for Christians; for religious salience, it was .84 for Muslims and .77 for Christians.

4.4.1.3. Actual intergroup contact

Quantity of contact

Actual intergroup contact was conceptually constructed in two dimensions: quantity of contact and quality of contact. Quantity of contact measured the frequency of contact with relatives, close friends, neighbours, classmates, and board or housemates. The scale was set from never, at least once a month, once a week, more than once a week, once a day, several times a day, and not applicable. The answer "not applicable" was counted as missing value. We did not carry out a factor analysis because the measure had been constructed in one dimension. Cronbach's alpha for Muslims was .89 and .84 for Christians.

Quality of contact

Quality of contact was originally set up in four dimensions, consisting of evaluation, closeness, equality and cooperativeness. Each dimension had five items, with five answer categories from very negative to very positive. The factor analysis suggested three factors for Muslims and Christians together ("national"). The items on closeness and cooperation were merged into one dimension. However, the correlation between all three dimensions was very high (>.60), suggesting that a single dimension was adequate. For Muslims, the correlation between closeness and cooperation and evaluation was .68; between closeness, cooperation and equality -.80; and between evaluation and equality -.64. The test for Christians resulted in four factors, but it was then constructed in three because the correlation between closeness and cooperation was so high (>.60). The correlation for Christians between closeness, cooperation and evaluation was -.55; between closeness, cooperation and equality -.56; and between evaluation and equality .38. In order to find a comparable solution for Muslims and Christians, we decided to use a single measurement. The reliability of the scale was .97 for Muslims and .95 for Christians. The result of the factor analysis is presented in appendix 1, Table 3.

4.4.1.4. Individual memory of violence

Memory of violence was constructed with twelve items, categorized into three dimensions: memory of violence, direct experience of violence, and indirect experience of violence. Memory of violence included individuals' memory of a place where violence had taken place, socialization and witnessing of violent incidents. Direct violence encompassed the physical injury of family or relatives, while indirect experience accounted for friends and neighbours who had been victims of conflict. All items were composed with open-ended questions, so had to be recoded to make the scale computation. The reliability of the measure for Muslims and Christians was not greatly different. Cronbach's alpha of individual memory for Muslims was .71

and for Christians was .65. Cronbach's alpha of direct experience of violence was .81 for Muslims and .79 for Christians, while for indirect experience it was .75 for Muslims and .76 for Christians. We use the three scales for the data analysis. The general description of the variable is presented in appendix 1, Table 4.

4.4.1.5. Perceived discrimination

The scale for perceived discrimination contained seventeen items, but four were removed for double loadings when it was tested via factor analysis. Three items were deleted when the measurement was examined among Muslims: q195, "Limitations on public observance of religious festivals," q198, "Limitations on building places of worship," and q204, "Limitations on the observance of religious laws on marriage and divorce." Question 197, "Limitations on marriage," was deleted for Christians. The result showed two factors, but since the correlation was high (>.63), it was made into a single scale (see appendix 1, Table 5). Cronbach's alpha for Muslims was .91 and for Christians was .95.

4.4.1.6. Religiosity

Our measurements of religiosity included tests for religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality and intra-textual fundamentalism versus symbolic interpretation. We tested these variables with factor analysis to verify the conceptual variables.

Religiocentrism

Religiocentrism was constructed in two dimensions containing six items for both Muslims and Christians. The factor analysis resulted in two dimensions: negative out-group attitudes and positive in-group attitudes (see appendix 1, Table 6). For Muslims, the initial Eigenvalue for the first factor was 2.80 and 1.16 for the second. The first factor explained 39.55% of the total variance and the second factor was added to explain 11.71% of variance. For Christians, the first Eigenvalue was 2.95 and the second was 1.16. The first factor explained 42.20% of variance and the second explained 12.56%. The reliability was .80 for Muslims' negative out-group attitudes and .62 for positive in-group attitudes. The reliability for Christians was .78 for negative out-group attitudes and .74 for positive in-group attitudes. The correlation between the first and second factor was .48 for Muslims and .50 for Christians, so the factor solution was retained in two dimensions.

Attitudes towards religious plurality

Attitudes towards religious plurality were originally examined via three dimensions: monism, pluralism and relativism. Each dimension had four items. In the factor analysis, one item was deleted for low commonality (h^2 =.18): "In religious traditions,

different aspects of God are revealed." Overall, the factor analysis resulted in two dimensions: monism and pluralism (see appendix 1, Table 7). The items on relativism were merged with pluralism. The initial Eigenvalues were 3.94 for pluralism and 2.09 for monism among Muslim respondents, and 26.02 and 18.58 respectively among Christian respondents. The pluralism scale explained 31.15 % of variance, and monism explained a further 13.65% of variance for Muslims. Among Christians, pluralism explained 26.02% of variance and monism added 18.58%. Cronbach's alpha for pluralism was .83 and .80 for Muslims and Christians, and for monism .74 and .81 for Muslims and Christians respectively. The correlation between the two dimensions was <.50.

Religious fundamentalism

The intra-textual fundamentalism measurement originally consisted of five items, while hermeneutic interpretation of texts had three. Two items were then removed in the analysis to make identical dimensions for both religious groups: q64, "Sacred writing is not really the word of God, but the word of man," and q67, "I think that sacred writings should be taken literally, as they were written," were removed, the former because of the negative value when it was run for Christians, and the latter for its low communality (h^2<.20) when it was run for Muslims. The result of the analysis shows two dimensions as presented in appendix 1, Table 8. We retained intra-textual fundamentalism for the first dimension, and hermeneutic interpretation for the second. The Eigenvalue for Muslims was 2.41 for the first factor and 1.20 for the second, while the Eigenvalue for Christians was 2.61 for the first factor and 1.27 for the second. The first factor for Muslims explained 32.17% of variance and the second factor added 7.02%. The first factor for Christians explained 36.97% of variance and the second added a further 10.61%. For Muslims, Cronbach's alpha was .77 for the first factor and .33 for the second, while for Christians it was .78 for the first factor and .40 for the second.

4.4.1.7. Nationalistic attitudes

Nationalism and regiocentrism

There were fourteen items in total for the measurements of nationalism and regiocentrism. During factor analyses, q146, q148, q149 were removed for low communalities (h^2<.20) and q143 and q147 were discarded for double loadings in two factors. Q145 was also deleted, as it had been placed in an inappropriate dimension. The factor analysis resulted in two dimensions: nationalism and regiocentrism, with a correlation between the factors of lower than .20 (see appendix 1, Table 9). The Cronbach's alpha for nationalism was .66 and regiocentrism .62.

National pride

The measurement for national pride was made on the basis of q136, "How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievement in history?" and q137, "How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievement of equal treatment of all groups in society?" These were separated from nationalistic attitudes above because the questions had different answer categories: from (1) not proud at all to (5) very proud. The reliability was .56 for Muslims and .58 for Christians.

4.4.1.8. Intergroup distrust

Intergroup distrust comprised ten items. It originally consisted of four items for trust (q208, q209, q210, q211) and six for distrust (q212, q213, q214, q215, q216, q217). Muslims were asked to what extent they trust or distrust Christians, and Christians were asked the opposite. The items on trust were recoded by reversing the answer categories, so that the scale ran in the same direction as distrust. So, the higher the score, the higher the distrust of the religious out-groups. The reliability of the measure was .71 for Muslims and .69 for Christians (see appendix 1, Table 10).

4.4.2. Scores and intergroup differences

Next, intergroup differences based on independent t-test samples were calculated. Only significant differences are reported in table 4.11 below. In our set of intermediate determinants, several showed significant differences between Muslim and Christian respondents. We found highly significant intergroup difference ($p< .01$) for perceived group threat, quantity of contact, memory of violence, direct and indirect experience of violence and regiocentrism. We found significant ($p<.05$) intergroup differences for quality of contact, religiocentrism (positive in-group), and intra-textual fundamentalism.

Muslims (M=2.16, SD=.70) perceive more group threat than Christians (M=2.05, SD=.66). The differences are significant (t-test=2.93, $p<.01$). Likewise, they also have stronger positive in-group attitudes (M=3.39, SD=.96) and more inter-textual fundamentalist attitudes (M=4.10, SD=.97) than Christians (M=3.42, SD=1.07). Christians have more actual intergroup contact in terms of both quantity and quality than Muslims. For quantity of contact, the mean score for Christians (M=3.51, SD=1.82) is higher than for Muslims (2.30, SD=1.65). The quality of contact is also higher among Christians (M=2.39, SD=.57) than among Muslims (M=1.96, SD=.65). This indicates that Christians have more frequent contact with Muslims and are more positive in their response than vice versa.

Table 4.11 Intermediate variables: scores and intergroup differences

Intermediate determinants	Muslims			Christians			Mean Diff (Muslims as ref.)	t-test	df
	M	S D	N	M	S D	N			
Perceived group threat	2.	.70	820	2.05	.66	593	.11	2.93**	1,316
Salience of ethnic identity	2.20	.78	732	2.19	.80	530	.01	.18	1,260
Salience of religious identity	3.12	.94	646	3.11	.95	489	.01	.22	1,133
Quantity of contact	2.30	1.65	575	3.51	1.82	417	-1.21	-10.78**	841.07
Quality of contact	1.96	.65	372	2.39	.57	288	-.43	-9.12*	647.78
Individual memory of violence	1.38	1.18	836	1.78	1.12	595	-.40	-6.43**	1,318.77
Direct experience of violence	.57	1.04	830	.76	1.12	604	-.18	-3.15**	1,240.40
Indirect experience violence	.42	.85	834	.66	1.01	618	-.23	-4.65**	1.186.99
Perceived discrimination	1.86	.62	833	1.99	.71	590	-.13	-3.65	1,421
Religiocentrism in-group	3.39	.96	652	2.99	1.00	526	.39	6.75*	1,104.92
Religiocentrism out-group	2.47	.87	791	2.36	.85	580	.10	2.15	1,369
Religious pluralism	2.74	.82	748	3.29	.77	422	-.55	-11.12	1,168
Religious monism	3.16	.88	659	2.45	.87	577	.70	14.09	1,234
Intra-textual fundamentalism	4.10	.97	551	3.42	1.07	467	.68	10.55*	948.49
Hermeneutic interpretation	3.31	.95	743	3.72	.91	526	-.41	-7.66	1,267
National pride	3.75	.95	701	3.46	.98	536	.29	5.29	1,235
Nationalistic attitudes	2.70	.81	569	2.62	.77	465	.08	1.65	1,032
Regiocentrism	2.25	.86	827	2.38	.93	609	-.14	-2.89**	1,251.72
Intergroup distrust	1.51	.63	842	1.50	.60	600	.01	.37	1,440

** Significance at .01 level; *Significance at .05 level

For memory of violence, Christians have slightly higher mean scores (M=1.78, SD=1.12) than Muslims (M=1.38, SD=1.18). They have also experienced more direct and indirect violence than Muslims. In terms of regiocentrism, Christians (M=2.38, SD=.93) also score higher than Muslims (M=2.25, SD=.86).

4.4.3. Analysis of variance

The ANOVA results show that some intermediate variables are significantly related to support for violence. These are perceived group threat, religiocentrism (negative out-group), monism, perceived discrimination and distrust. Others are related to support for violence only for Muslims or Christians, either support for harm to persons and property, or support for demonstrations. The overall result for the variance analysis of these variables is presented in appendix 2.

The relationship between perceived group threat and support for harm is significant for both Muslims and Christians (<.05). It is also linear for Muslims (r = .23) and Christians (r = .30). In relation to support for demonstrations, the relationship is also significant and linear both for Muslims (r. 19) and Christians (r = 10). It indicates that the more the respondents perceive threat to their religious in-group, the more they support violence. The analysis of variance is presented in appendix 2, Table 21.

The relationship between salience of ethnic identity and support for harm show that the correlation is significant and linear for Muslims only: Pearson r is .11. So, the higher the salience of ethnic identity for Muslims, the more they support harm. It can also be affirmed that salience of ethnic identity is related to support for demonstrations. The relationship is significant and linear for both Muslims (r=.16) and Christians (r=.18). So, the higher the salience of ethnic identity, the greater the support for demonstrations.

The relationship between salience of religious identity and support for demonstrations is only significant among Muslims: the relationship is linear (r = .09) which means that higher salience of religious identity among Muslims is related to more support for demonstrations. The analysis of variance is shown in appendix 2, Table 23.

The relationship between quantity of contact and support for harm is only significant for Christians, and is deviant from linearity (eta = .19). But there is a clear positive linear relationship between quality of contact and support for harm (r=.18) among Christians; more contact with Muslims is related to more support for harm. The relationship between quantity of contact with support for demonstrations is only significant for Muslims. It is linear, but in a negative direction (r= -.10), so more contact with Christians is related to less support for demonstrations (see appendix 2, Table 24).

Table 4.12 Variance analysis of intermediate determinant variables

Variables	Harm						Demonstrations					
	Muslims			Christians			Muslims			Christians		
	M	N	R/ E	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E	M	N	R/E
Perceived group threat	1.70	810	.23**	1.75	582	.30**	3.25	815	.19**	3.02	582	.10*
Salience of ethnic identity	1.71	724	.11*				3.23	729	.16**	3.01	526	.18**
Salience of religious identity							3.26	641	.09*			
Quantity of contact				1.72	409	.19*	3.21	571	-.10*			
Quality of contact				1.81	282	.18*						
Individual memory of violence										3.02	577	.11*
Direct experience of violence												
Indirect experience of violence												
Perceived discrimination	1.70	824	.32**	1.73	580	.25**	3.26	829	-.08*	3.01	580	-.09*
Religiocentrism (in-group)				1.74	511	.20**	3.25	647	.14**	3.02	511	.15*
Religiocentrism (outgroup)	1.70	781	.19**	1.76	560	.12*	3.26	786	.13**	3.06	560	.14*
Monism	1.72	652	.13*	1.71	563	.27**	3.23	656	.24**	2.99	563	.19**
Pluralism												
Intra-textual fundamentalism	1.74	543	.17*	1.73	453	.14**	3.25	547	.14**			
Hermeneutic interpretation							3.24	739	.21**			
National pride				1.76	519	.04*				3.07	519	.14*
Nationalism	1.76	563	.14*	1.78	456	.15*	3.24	566	.20**			
Regiocentrism	1.70	816	.34**	1.76	591	.26**						
Intergroup distrust	1.84	223	.15**	1.81	182	.13*	3.25	224	.10**	3.03	593	.11**

** : $p < .01$, * : $p < .05$

Individual memory of violence only relates significantly to support for demonstrations among Christians. The relationship is linear and positive (r = .11). This indicates that Christians, who have greater memory of violence, are more supportive of demonstrations. The analysis of variance is presented in appendix 2, Table 26.

Perceived discrimination has a significant relationship to support for intergroup violence both for Muslims and Christians. In terms of support for harm to persons and property, the relationship is linear for Muslims (r= .32) and for Christians (r= .25); the more they perceive discrimination against their group, the more they support harm to persons and property. The relationship between perceived discrimination and support for demonstrations is also significant for both religious groups. The relationship is deviant from linearity for Muslims (eta= .10) and linear for Christians (r = -.09). So the direction for Muslims is different from that for Christians; the more that Muslims perceive discrimination, the higher their support for demonstrations, but the more that Christians perceive discrimination, the lower their support for demonstrations. The analysis of variance is in appendix 2, Table 29.

In relation to religiocentrism, Christians with relatively more positive in-group attitudes show more support for violence. The correlation is significant and linear for harm to persons and property (r=.20), but deviant from linearity for support for demonstrations (eta=.15, p=.02). For Muslims, the correlation is significant only in terms of support for demonstrations (r=.14). Positive in-group attitudes are related to more support for demonstrations among Muslims.

The relationship between negative out-group attitudes and support for violence shows significant correlations for both Muslims and Christians. In terms of support for harm to persons and property, r is .19 for Muslims and .12 for Christians. A slight difference occurs in the relationship to support for demonstrations. The correlation is linear for Muslims (r=.13), but deviant from linearity for Christians (eta=.14). This overall relationship indicates that the stronger the negative out-group attitudes, the greater the support for violence. The analysis of variance on religiocentrism is presented in appendix 2, Table 30 and Table 31.

For monism, the relationship to support for violence is similar to that for negative out-group attitudes. Both for Muslims and Christians, it is significantly positive and linear. For support for harm to persons and property, r is.14 for Muslims and .17 for Christians. For support for public criticism and demonstrations, r is .24 for Muslims and .11 for Christians. The correlation indicates that monism is related to more support for violence, both among Muslims and Christians (see appendix 2, Table 32).

The relationship between intra-textual fundamentalism and support for violence is significant for Muslims while for Christians it is significant only in terms of support for demonstrations. For support for harm to persons and properties, r is .17 for Muslims and .14 for Christians. This indicates that intra-textual fundamentalism is related to greater support for harm to persons and property. For Muslims, intra-textual fundamentalism is also related to greater support for public criticism and demonstrations (r=.14).

The relationship between hermeneutic interpretation and support for violence shows a significant correlation among Muslims, but only for the lower level of violence, i.e., support for demonstrations (eta=.21). The analysis of variance for fundamentalism is presented in appendix 2, Table 35.

The relationship between national pride and support for violence is only significant for Christians. For support for harm, the relationship is significant and linear (r = .04); for support for demonstrations, the relationship is deviant from linearity (eta=.14). In general, the prouder that Christians are of their country, the greater their support for violence.

The relationship between nationalism and support for violence is also significant, except in terms of Christians' support for demonstrations. For both Muslims and Christians, the relationship to support for harm is deviant from linearity. Eta scores .14 for Muslims and .15 for Christians. On the other hand, the relationship between nationalism and support for demonstrations is significant and linear only for Muslims (r=.20). Muslims who are more nationalistic are more supportive of demonstrations (see appendix 2, Table 37).

Regiocentrism shows a relatively strong correlation to support for harm; both Muslims and Christians who are more regiocentric show more support for harm. The relationship is also linear for Muslims (r=.34) and Christians (r=.26).

The relationship between out-group distrust and support for harm is also significant. The analysis of variance is presented in appendix 2, Table 39. For Muslims, it is linear (r=.15) and deviant from linearity for Christians (eta=.13). On the other hand, the relationship between out-group distrust with support for demonstrations is significant and linear both for Muslims (r=. 10) and Christians (r=.11). So, the more they distrust the out-group, the greater their support for harm.

4.5 Summary

In this chapter, we have tested the validity and reliability of the measurements of our main variables through factor analysis. The dependent variable results in two dimensions: support for harm to persons and property, and support for public criticism and demonstrations. Some variables have been reduced to more parsimonious factors, such as participation in religious ceremonies and practices, attitudes towards religious plurality, perceived threat, intergroup contact, memory of violence, perceived discrimination and nationalism. The result of the factor analyses for some other variables confirmed that our hypothetical constructions were valid for factors including participation in ethnic ceremonies, salience of identity, religiocentrism, religious fundamentalism versus hermeneutic interpretation of texts, and distrust.

Both Muslims and Christians show the same general patterns in their attitudes to support for violence. They tend to disagree with supporting harm to people and properties, but agree with supporting demonstrations. Compared to Christians,

Muslims have stronger ethno-religious identification that in turn relates to the two dimensions of support for violence. In general, there are stronger and more significant correlations of the tested variables among Muslims than among our Christian respondents.

Furthermore, the analysis of variance between both dimensions of support for violence as the dependent variables, with the set of independent control and intermediary variables, shows that some relations are significant, but others are not. In these analyses, the relationships of the two dimensions of the dependent variables are examined via comparison between Muslims and Christians.

In terms of ethno-religious identification, we find that Christians' participation in ethnic organization activities and self-definition of religion are positively related to support for demonstrations, whereas the use of ethnic languages is negatively related to support for harm to persons and property. Among Muslims, it is seen that support for harm can be found mainly among those who are members of ethnic organizations, and who have more friends (both belonging to the religious in-group and the religious out-group), but to a lesser degree among respondents who participate more frequently in collective rituals. It is also seen that support for public criticism and demonstrations can be found among Muslims who participate in ethnic ceremonies, ethnic organization activities, collective rituals, rites of passage, as well as those who have more Muslim friends, members of religious organizations and those who participate more frequently in the activities of religious organizations. However, Muslim respondents who have fewer Christian friends show greater support for criticism and demonstrations.

Regarding social positions, a significant negative relation is found among Muslims and Christians between support for harm and household income. It indicates that the respondents who tend to support harm are from the lower social economic strata, i.e. from families with relatively low household income. Support for public criticism and demonstrations has a significant relationship to gender and parents' education only among Christians. Men support demonstrations more than women. Further, the higher the level of education of Christian respondents' parents, the more they support demonstrations.

For the intermediary variables, among Christians it is found that perceived group threat, quantity of contact, quality of contact, perceived discrimination, religiocentrism (both postive in-group attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes), monism, intra-textual fundamentalism, national pride, nationalism and regiocentrism are positively related to support for harm to persons and property. Likewise, we find that salience of ethnic identity, perceived group threat, religiocentrism (in-groups and out-groups), memory of violence, national pride and distrust are positively related to support for public criticism and demonstrations, whereas perceived discrimination is negatively related to support for demonstrations.

Among Muslims, we find that support for harm to persons and properties can be identified mainly among those for whom ethnic identity is salient, who perceive relatively more group threat, and have higher scores for religiocentrism (out-groups), and who demonstrate monism, intra-textual fundamentalism, nationalism, regiocetrism and intergroup distrust. By the same token, we also find that support for public criticism and demonstrations can be found among Muslims whose ethnic and religious identities are salient, who perceive more group threat, who have relatively higher scores for religiocentrism (in-group and out-group), and who demonstrate monism, fundamentalism, symbolic interpretation, nationalism and intergroup distrust, but to a lesser degree among respondents who have good quality of contact and perceived discrimination.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES

This chapter presents the results of the multivariate regression analyses. These analyses are used to examine the relationship between ethno-religious identification (and some other predictors) and individuals' support for intergroup violence. In order to make theoretical sense of the results of the study, we first review several theories and hypotheses. We then delineate methods and strategies of regression analyses to develop four empirical models. We go on to reveal the findings of the analyses, present some of the interviews of the respondents, and triangulate between the quantitative and qualitative results. Finally, we discuss these results in the context of the wider theoretical background.

5.1. Theoretical models and hypotheses

There are several theories from which hypotheses can be derived for this study. The main theory used is ethnic competition theory, which has been developed from social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory. It integrates 'the dispositional notions from social identity theory with the situational notions from realistic group conflict theory into one theoretical framework' (Coenders et al., 2004: 16). Social identity theory emphasizes that social identities are fundamentally important to individuals' needs. In order to develop in-group identities, individuals associate themselves with positive in-group characteristics; they dehumanize the out-group and dissociate themselves from it. In their study, Tajfel and Turner (1986) point out that this positive identification can become intense even if there is little or no competition. Based on this theory, we assume that in-group favouritism increases out-group prejudice, which can in turn affect an individual's support for intergroup violence. On the other hand, realistic group conflict theory holds that conflict arises out of competition between individuals or groups for scarce resources (Coser, 1956). This competition creates incompatible goals for different groups and brings about prejudice as well as antagonism between them. The competition induces perceived threat, which results in exclusionary attitudes towards out-groups while strengthening in-group solidarity (Coenders et al., 2004: 16-20). In this study, we examine whether stronger ethno-religious identification increases the level of support for intergroup violence.

Ethno-religious identification refers to an individual's construction of their identity on the basis of their ethno-religious group, along with the values and emotional significance of that group (Gijsberts et. al., 2004: 10). In order to measure ethno-religious identification, we construct a set of variables based on inventories from previous studies. We begin with those of Phinney (1992) and Phinney and Ong (2007) on ethnic identification; however, given that religious identities have become an important factor in Indonesia over the last decade (Hefner, 2000: 11; Bertrand, 2010: 94), we also go on to consider religious identification as a measure. Basing their theory on Phinney's (1992) previous study of the concept of multi-group ethnic identity and how it can be measured, Phinney and Ong (2007) point out that any measure of ethnic identification should include, among other factors, individuals' own definition of ethnic groups, together with their commitment and attachment to their group, an exploration of their ethnic tradition and heritage (i.e. their cultural practices and attendance of ethnic ceremonies), their behavioural involvement (i.e. their use of ethnic language and association with members of their in-group), and their beliefs and values. These dimensions were included because ethnic identity is a multi-dimensional construct and because an individual's identity can change over time in different contexts (Phinney, 2007: 279).

The Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) model developed by Phinney (1992) and Phinney and Ong (2007) is used as the foundation for measuring ethno-religious identification. Although it was originally devised in relation to ethnicity, several dimensions of MEIM are applicable to religious identification. For instance, exploration of ethnic traditions can be extended to participation in collective rituals, rites of passage and religious practices. Likewise, friendships among people of the same religion and membership of religious organizations can be inferred from the measure's behavioural dimension.

Another measurement derived from previous studies concerns the ritualistic aspect of religion (Allport and Ross, 1967; Scheepers et al., 2002b). These studies investigated increasing levels of prejudice and exclusionary attitudes among religious groups. Therefore, we constructed ethno-religious identification by taking several factors into account, including self-definition of ethnicity and religion, ethnic language use, the tendency to seek friends from the same ethnic and religious community, participation in ethnic ceremonies, collective rituals, religious practices and rites of passage, as well as membership of ethnic and religious organizations and participation in their activities.

An individual's self-definition of ethnicity and religion refers to the combination of their own self-categorization of ethnic and religious identities. Hypothesis 1 asserts: *ethno-religious groups differ in their support for intergroup violence*.

Hypothesis 2 advances that *the stronger the level of ethno-religious identification, the greater the support for intergroup violence.* We propose that

ethnic language be used as an aspect of ethno-religious identification and hence as a predictor variable. It measures the extent to which respondents use their ethnic language, the assumption being that such use reflects a connection with the ethnic group, which in turn could increase support for intergroup violence. In earlier measures of ethnic identification, the use of ethnic language is pinpointed as part of the behavioural dimension, and is considered to be a key aspect of ethnic identity (Phinney and Ong, 2007: 272). Hence, Hypothesis 2a states that: *the more people use their ethnic language, the more they support intergroup violence*.

Furthermore, we examine the respondents' participation in ethnic ceremonies, their number of same-ethnicity friends, and membership of ethnic organizations as indicators of ethnic identification. Participation in ethnic ceremonies or other cultural activities is considered to be an individual exploration of ethnicity, whereby people can strengthen their attachment to their ethnic identity. The number of same-ethnicity friends and membership of ethnic organizations can be categorized as part of the behavioural dimension, since these variables are considered to be the expression of ethnic identity (Phinney and Ong, 2007: 272-273). We set out to test the following hypotheses regarding these dimensions:

2b. *The higher the frequency of participation in ethnic ceremonies, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

2c. *The higher the number of respondents' ethnic in-group friends, the greater their support for intergroup violence.*

2d. *Members of ethnic organizations support intergroup violence more than non-members.*

2e. *The higher the level of participation in the activities of ethnic organizations, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

By the same token, we also measure the respondents' religious identification via their participation in religious practices, collective rituals and rites of passage, as well as their number of friends of the same religion, their membership of religious organizations and their involvement in the activities of those organizations. We anticipate that support for violence will be greater among those who participate more in religious practices, collective rituals and rites of passage. The hypotheses are as follows:

2f. *The higher the level of activity in religious practices, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

2g. *The higher the level of participation in collective rituals, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

2h. *The higher the level of participation in rites of passage, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

2i. *The more religious in-group friends held by respondents, the greater their support for intergroup violence.*

2j. *The more religious out-group friends held by respondents, the weaker their support for intergroup violence.*

2k. *Membership of religious organizations induces more support for intergroup violence than non-membership.*

2l. *The higher the level of participation in organized religious activities, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

Studies of intergroup relations also show the considerable influence of social position. Ethnic competition theory suggests that competition over scarce resources varies between people of different social positions. Individuals who are vulnerable both in society and in the labour market perceive more intergroup competition, and hence hold stronger negative attitudes towards subordinate and out-group populations. Competition is greatest among people with a socio-economic position similar to that of ethnic minorities – those who hold weak or very weak socio-economic positions and generally have a low level of education (Scheepers et al., 2002a). Moreover, Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers (2003b), in their analysis of the determinants of immigrant exclusionism, found that people with lower educational levels and lower income levels, elderly people or those who depend on social security have more negative, exclusionist attitudes. Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers (2007: 233) provide further evidence that people of lower educational levels, including manual workers and some sectors of the self-employed, avoid all social contacts with immigrants. Some earlier studies of ethno-religious conflict have also revealed a difference between men and women's support for violence (Moser and Clark, 2001; Putranti and Subagya, 2005). Although these studies demonstrate the influence of an individual's characteristics, this study proposes that ethno-religious identification takes precedence over social position. Specifically, religious identification has a strong influence on the daily lives of Indonesian people, as is already clear from the Indonesian government's requirement that citizens identify their religion; they cannot claim to have no religion at all. Based on our proposition about the effect of social position on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence, we test Hypothesis (3) which holds that *the stronger the level of ethno-religious identification, the greater the support for intergroup violence, even after controlling for other individual-level determinants.*

The indicators for social position refer to *gender* (3a), *educational attainment of parents* (3b), *homogamy* (3c), *parental occupations* (3d), *occupational status of parents* (3e) and *household income* (3f). The educational attainment of parents is measured by the highest level of education achieved by the father and the mother, from pre-school at the lowest level to post-graduate study at the highest. Homogamy measures whether family members have the same religious background. The occupational status of parents is categorized according to the classification criteria used by Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS). Likewise, parents'

occupation adopts a similar classification. Family household income is ranked as low, middle or high. In chapter 4, these categorizations are described in more detail.

This study also examines a set of intermediary variables affecting the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. Hypothesis 4 states that: *the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence can be explained by particular intermediate determinants.* We consider several theories from which to derive hypotheses for the intermediary variables.

Perceived group threats are expected to have a strong influence on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. Ethnic competition theory suggests that perceived threat acts as a mediating determinant between, on the one hand, individual and contextual-level determinants referring to competitive intergroup conditions, and, on the other hand, unfavourable out-group attitudes. Perceived group threat intensifies the processes of social identification and social contra-identification (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Coenders et al., 2004). The perception of ethnic threat might intermediate the relation between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. Therefore, the higher the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the perception of out-group threat, which may induce support for intergroup violence.

The salience of identity concerns the importance of a single identity for individuals, since individuals often associate as members of a group. The difference in degree of social identification affects an individual's attitudes towards their in-group and the other out-groups (Phinney, 1990: Duckit, 2006). In this study, we differentiate between ethnic and religious aspects when considering the salience of identity. Ethno-religious salience might intermediate the relation between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We expect that the higher the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the salience of identity, which may induce support for intergroup violence.

The most fundamental proposition of intergroup contact theory is that contact between groups can effectively reduce negative attitudes toward out-groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Brown et al., 2007). Based on this theory, it can be expected that contact between ethno-religious groups reduces negative attitudes toward out-groups and in turn decreases support for ethno-religious violence. In this study, contact is measured in two different ways: in terms of its quantity and its quality (see Chapter 4). It proposes that the greater their level of ethno-religious identification, the less contact individuals have with out-groups, and that this may therefore induce support for intergroup violence.

Memories of past violence influence individuals' attitudes concerning present social relations (Cairns and Roe, 2003; Sahdra and Ross, 2007). Conflict can arise or be recreated when people deal with the present based on their past experiences.

Individuals who have lost their families or valuable belongings as a result of past violence suffer more intense pain from their traumatic memories than those who have not (Cairns and Roe, 2003: 3-5). This variable is measured in three dimensions: memories of violence, direct experience and indirect experience of violence. Memories of violence can include frequent talk of violence, direct experiences refers to violence in which family members and relatives were victims, and indirect violence is that experienced by friends and neighbours who were killed or injured as a result of intergroup violence. We anticipate that the greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the memories of past violence, which may induce support for intergroup violence.

Perceived discrimination is the perception by individuals or groups of being treated unfairly because of their membership of those groups. Previous studies of such perceptions have shown that those who perceive discrimination are more likely to have negative attitudes towards out-groups (Romero and Roberts, 1998; Vancluysen and Van Craen, 2010). Hence, perceived discrimination is expected to explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We propose that the greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the perception of being discriminated against, and that this may induce support for intergroup violence.

Religiosity expresses an individual's attachment to their religion. It has several dimensions, linked to prejudice, by which religious adherents favour the truth claims and convictions of their in-group while dissociating themselves from the negative attributes of religious out-groups (Scheepers et al., 2002b; Sterkens and Anthony, 2008: 63). In this study, religiosity is considered to refer to three core dimensions, namely, religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality and fundamentalism. Religiocentrism refers to positive perceptions of the in-group religion and negative perceptions of the out-groups. As a result, we expect that the greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the religiocentrism, and that this may therefore induce support for intergroup violence.

Attitudes towards religious plurality measure individuals' attitudes towards other religious traditions, i.e. inclusive and exclusive perceptions of other religious groups versus openness towards plurality (Anthony et al., 2005). In this study, we use two dimensions based on the result of the factor analysis (see chapter 4): monism and pluralism. We expect that the greater the ethno-religious identification, the more likely individuals are to embrace monism. It is expected that with higher levels of monism, there will be more support for violence; but that conversely, the more that individuals support pluralism, the less they support violence.

Religious fundamentalism is characterized by dogmatism. The measure of fundamentalism is adapted from the intra-textual fundamentalism scale of Williamson et al. (2010: 738) and contrasted with a hermeneutic interpretation scale (Duriez et

al., 2005: 854). The results of our factor analysis identified two dimensions to this: intra-textual fundamentalism and hermeneutic interpretation. We expect that the greater the ethno-religious identification, the stronger the level of fundamentalism, which in turn may induce support for intergroup violence.

Nationalist attitudes are favourable attitudes toward people's own nation or country and the national in-group. It comprises two dimensions: chauvinism and patriotism. While chauvinism relates to blind, uncritical attachment, patriotism stems from a more critical assessment of the national group and country (Coenders, 2001; Coenders et al., 2004; Todosijevic, 2001). Nationalist attitudes are measured by two scales consisting of nationalism and national pride. We anticipate that the greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the weaker nationalistic sentiments will be, and that this may therefore induce support for intergroup violence.

In this study, we measure regiocentrism in addition to nationalist attitudes, adapting the nationalism scale to assess regionalist perspectives. We expect that the greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger regiocentrism will be, and that this may therefore induce support for intergroup violence.

Trust is mutual faithfulness and is what binds all social relationships together. In the institution of trust, individuals learn to rely on others. Trust is present in all spheres of everyday life and is what enables individuals to interact with others and institutions (Parsons, 1970: 142; Tropp et al., 2006: 771; Tam et al., 2009: 46). People tend to trust their in-groups, but not their out-groups. It is often presumed that trust fades during times of conflict. In this study, we specifically measure out-group distrust. We propose that the greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the more distrust there will be of out-groups and that this may therefore induce support for intergroup violence.

Based on the theoretical rationales outlined above, we frame the following hypotheses as intermediate determinants of the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence.

4a. *The more an in-group perceives ethnic threat, the more it supports intergroup violence.*

4b. *The higher the salience of ethno-religious identities, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

4c. *The less contact with other ethno-religious groups, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

4d. *The more individual memories of violence, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

4e. *The greater the perceived discrimination, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

4f. *The more religiocentrism (positive in-groups), the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

4g. *The more religiocentrism (negative out-groups), the greater the support for intergroup violence.*
4h. *The more openness towards plurality (i.e. pluralism), the less support for intergroup violence.*
4i. *The stronger the fundamentalist views held, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*
4j. *The weaker the nationalism held, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*
4k. *The weaker the pride in country, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*
4l. *The more regiocentrism, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*
4m. *The more distrust in out-groups, the greater the support for intergroup violence.*

5.2. Methods of analyses

Multivariate regression analysis is applied to test theoretical models that explain the relationships between observed variables. It predicts the value of dependent variables from predictor variables (Field, 2009:198: te Grotenhuis and Van der Weegen, 2009:109). In this study, we are curious to discover the predictors of support for violence, as determined by ethno-religious identification, social position and a set of intermediary variables.

Prior to the analysis, we computed self-definition of ethnicity and religion into one variable, namely ethno-religious self-definition. We identified 28 ethno-linguistic groups in addition to the 12 major groups that are the focus of our study. In this computation, we determined that each ethno-religious group must have at least 30 respondents to be included in the analyses. Groups with fewer than 30 respondents were separated into 'Muslim rest' and 'Christian rest' respectively. We differentiated 'Muslim rest' and 'Christian rest' from 'other Muslims' and 'other Christians' because the former categories contained the religious minorities who belong to the 12 ethno-linguistic groups of our study; they might be individual migrants in the research areas. The latter categories consisted of ethnic groups that were excluded from this study because they were too small in number, including among others the Dayak, Papua, Banjar and Timorese. In total, other Muslims or other Christians comprised 104 respondents. The category of Muslim rest consists of Minangkabau, Buginese, Chinese, Bataknese and Makassarese, while the category of Christian rest consists of Sundanese, Toraja, Minahasa and Makassarese Christians. Based on the computation, we found 13 ethno-religious categories as presented in Table 5.1. In this analysis, we decided that we would choose as the reference category the ethno-religious group with the largest number of respondents, which was Javanese Muslims.

Table 5.1 Ethno-religious identification of support for violence

Ethno-religious groups	Mean		N	%
	Harm	Demonstrations		
Javanese Muslims	1.69	3.25	348	24.10
Ambonese Muslims	1.69	3.28	241	16.69
Butonese Muslims	1.78	3.26	95	6.58
Other Muslims	1.69	3.33	44	3.05
Sundanese Muslims	1.57	3.17	36	2.49
Madurese Muslims	1.89	3.25	36	2.49
Muslim rest	1.73	3.23	32	2.22
Ambonese Christians	1.80	3.04	346	23.96
Javanese Christians	1.56	2.93	104	7.20
Other Christians	1.70	3.02	56	3.88
Chinese Christians	1.77	3.02	43	2.98
Batak Christians	1.74	3.23	35	2.42
Christian rest	1.68	3.04	28	1.94
Total	1.72	3.16	1,444	100.00

Note: 1=totally disagree; 2= disagree; 3=neither disagree nor agree; 4=agree; 5=totally agree

The Muslim ethnic groups consist of Javanese, Ambonese, Butonese, Sundanese and Madurese in addition to a combination of several ethnic minorities. Javanese and Ambonese Muslims make up 40.79 % of the respondents. Javanese and Ambonese also make up the majority among the Christian ethnic groups in addition to the Chinese and the Batak. However, the Javanese are the largest Muslim ethnic group while the Ambonese are the largest Christian ethnic group.

We measure support for intergroup violence based on the social domains and the level of violence as the result of the factor analysis, as elaborated in chapter 4. The level of violence refers to the level of the intensity of people's support for violence: support for harm of others (corporal and material) and support for public criticism and demonstration. F-statistics show no significant difference between Muslims and Christians with regard to support for harm (p=.33). On the other hand, there is a significant difference between Muslims and Christians with regard to support for public criticism and demonstrations (p=.00). Several Muslim and Christian ethnic groups score higher than average with regard to support for harm (1.72). These Muslim ethnic groups include Butonese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Buginese, Chinese, Batak and Makassarese, while the Christian ethnic groups include Ambonese, Chinese and Batak. All Muslim ethnic groups are more willing to support

demonstrations and public criticism, while Christian groups are generally less willing, with the exception of Batak Christians who show somewhat more support.

As we carried out the analysis of variance in the preceding chapter, we can recognize whether the significant relationships between support for violence as a dependent variable, with ethno-religious identification as an independent variable and intermediate determinants was either linear or deviant from linearity. Linear relationships between variables is the crucial assumption of linear regression analysis. When the relationship was linear, we retained the variable as a metric determinant. However, if the relation was deviant from linearity, we set up the variable with a set of dummies. The nominal and ordinal scales of the variables were also constructed with dummies. In addition, all intermediate variables were treated as metric.

As collinearity diagnostics, we conducted a correlation test among the predictor variables and computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) which detects strong linear relationships between one predictor and another. Multi-collinearity can cause problems when drawing inferences about the relative contribution of each predictor variable. As a rule of thumb, the correlation must be lower than .80. If we rely on the VIF, the value must be below 10 or the tolerance scores below .01 (Field, 2009: 223-224). The result of the correlation test is that multi-collinearity does not occur because the highest correlation is .49, that is between religious in-group friends and the amount or the quantity of contact. Moreover, the VIFs showed that there was no value higher than 10 on the tested variables.

We set up four models for the regression analyses. The first model is the regression test of the combination between ethno-religious self-definition and support for intergroup violence (harm of others and demonstrations). The second model is the test between support for intergroup violence and ethno-religious definition, where we added a set of ethno-religious identification variables. The third model tests support for intergroup violence with ethno-religious identification variables that are controlled by social position variables. The fourth model tests support for intergroup violence with ethno-religious identification, along with a set of social position variables as well as intermediate determinants. Overall, the regression model equations can be schematically formulated as follows:

Model 1: $Y = B_0 + B_1 ERD + e.$
Model 2: $Y= B_0 + (B_1ERD + B_2EI + B_3RI) + e.$
Model 3: $Y = B_0 + (B_1ER + B_2EI + B_3RI) + (B_4SP_1 + B_4SP_2) + e.$
Model 4: $Y = B_0 + (B_1ER + B_2EI + B_3RI) + (B_4SP_1 + B_4SP_2) + (\beta_5IM_1 + \beta_5IM_2 + \beta_5IM_3) + e.$

Y= Support for intergroup violence
EI= Ethnic identification
SP= Social Positions
e=error
ERD= Ethno-religious self-definition
RI= Religious identification
IM=Intermediate determinant variables

The method of regression analysis is “enter” (and not “stepwise”) because the analysis is used to examine the theoretical framework rather than to explore relationships among variables. The “enter” method enters all variables at the same time, although in a step-wise fashion. This makes no assumptions about the relative importance of each predictor variable (Field, 2009: 212).

Following the backward procedure, we entered each set of variables in a sequence. If adding the variable contributed significantly to the model, then it was retained, but all other variables were then retested to see if they still contributed to the model. If they no longer contributed significantly, model trimming or removal was applied. These procedures produce a parsimonious model with the smallest possible set of predictor variables included in the test (Agresti and Finlay, 2008: 632).

The process of model trimming was repeated, excluding one at a time any insignificant variable from the model with the largest *p* value or the smallest *t* value. The F-Test was used to test the set of dummy variables. For the metric variables, the t-value was the critical statistic, whether the variable was retained or removed from the model. If the F-test of any of the insignificant dummy variables yielded a higher F-value, thus making it significant, we changed the reference category from one extreme category to the other (e.g. from never to always). After changing the reference category, we replaced the dummy variables for another round of regression analyses. All significant variables in Model 2 were carried into Model 3, and similar procedures were conducted from Model 3 to Model 4. In this process of model trimming, we used the significance level of .05 and one tailed test, except for the dummy variables which used the two-tailed test (te Grotenhuis and Van der Weegen, 2009:114-115).

Therefore, we started the regression analysis in Model 1 by examining support for violence with ethno-religious self-definition. Model 2 tested the relationship between support for violence and ethno-religious identification. Model trimming was begun based on the results of Model 2. These results were included in the analysis of Model 3, which examined support for violence only using the significant relations of the previous model and social position as control variables. The model trimming was begun once again using the control variables, and after that on the remaining ethnic and religious identification which turned to non-significance due to the inclusion of the social position variables. These results were used as the basis for further analyses in Model 4. In the analysis of Model 4, we set up the significant relations in Model 3 plus intermediary variables as predictors. The model trimming was conducted once again, but only on the intermediate variables, until it ended up with all significant variables.

5.3. Empirical models

The analysis of regression is made on two dependent variables consisting of support for harm to persons and properties (higher level of violence) and support for public criticism and demonstrations (lower level of violence). This section describes the process whereby analyses discovered determinant variables of support for violence based on the theoretical models proposed in this study. We will describe the findings of our regression analyses in more detail. However, the trimming procedures that we applied to these models eventually produced more parsimonious regression models that we will describe further in Section 5.4. The complete results of the analysis are displayed in Appendix 3.

5.3.1. Support for harm to persons and properties

The result of the first analysis on support for harm to persons and properties is in Appendix 3, Table 1 shows the adjusted R^2= .01, whereas R^2= .11. The intercept is 1.69 which holds for Javanese Muslims. Sundanese Muslims, Javanese Christians and Christian rest show less support than the Javanese Muslims, but the differences from the reference category are not significant. Significant differences appear among Madurese Muslims (B_1= .20, p< .05) and Ambonese Christians (B_1=.12, p< .05).

The second round of analyses began with the entering of ethno-religious self-definition and ethnic identification. The analysis explained 2% of the support for harm variance. The significant relations appeared with reference to friends by ethnicity and to membership of an ethnic organization. The second step included other variables related to religious identification as the predictor variables. The analysis showed the adjusted R^2 to be 1.10%. The significant relation appeared to be membership of a religious organization.

Model 2 shows different results from the previous step of the analysis once all the variables of ethno-religious identification had been included. The results of this analysis indicate that the adjusted R^2 is 2%. The remaining significant predictor was that of religious in-group friends. The Javanese Christians (B1=-.15, p=.03) showed less support for harm than Javanese Muslims. Likewise, it held for Madurese Muslims (B1=22, p=.04) and Ambonese Christians (B1=11, p=.02), who showed more support for harm than Javanese Muslims and were also affected by the number of their religious in-group friends. We excluded several determinants from the analysis due to non-significance. The trimming of this model began with out-group friends (p=.24), followed by rites of passage (p =.29) and membership of ethnic organizations (p=.98). Then, we continued trimming collective rituals (p= .93), religious practices (p=.66), ethnic language (p=.88), member of religious organizations (p=. 38), same-ethnicity friends (p=.42) and ethnic ceremonies (p=.62).

Model 3 included religious in-group friends and social positions as the predictor variables. The initial results showed the adjusted R^2 was 8%. Significant relations appeared with regard to the occupational status of parents, parental occupation and household income. The variables were trimmed down in order to exclude the non-significant determinants. Parental education was the first variable to be excluded (p =. 93). Next was homogamy (p=.89). Following the trimming procedure, we should have excluded household income as well. The F-test showed that the change of R^2 was .01 and p =.04. The relation became significant by changing the reference category from the highest level to lowest level of income. Therefore, we retained the variable and continued trimming with gender (p=.44). Eventually, the results of the analyses showed that the occupational status of parents, parental occupations and household income were the remaining significant intermediary determinants between ethno-religious identification and support for harm.

The further analysis of Model 4 incorporated the results of Model 3 and a set of intermediate variables. The final equation found that the adjusted R^2 increased to 20%. Ethno-religious self-definition and religious in-group friends became non-significant. The results indicate that support for harm was affected by ethno-religious identification while taking into account parental occupations, perceived group threat, religiocentrism (positive towards in-group), pluralism and nationalistic attitudes. This is the result of declining values when these intermediate variables were included in the analysis. In this analysis, we discarded intermediate variables by considering the lowest t-value. The first deletion was religious salience (t=.02, p=.98) followed by intra-textual fundamentalism (t=.-.03, p=.97), ethnic salience (t=-.10, p=92), quantity of contact (t=-.06, p=.96), perceived discrimination (t=.06, p=.95), out-group distrust (t=.09, p=.93), memory of violence (t=.-28, p=.78), indirect experience of violence (t=.-51, p=.65), direct experience of violence (t=.43, p=.67), monism (t=.35, p=.73), regiocentrism (t=.52, p=.62), quality of contact (t=.61, p=.54), hermeneutic interpretation (t=.40, p=.69), religiocentrism, i.e., negative stances towards out-groups (t=.1.16, p=.25) and national pride (t=.1.07, p=.29). Four intermediate variables remained as the strong predictors, namely perceived group threat (p=.00), religiocentrism, i.e., positive stances towards the in-group (p=.01), pluralism (p=.01) and nationalistic attitude (p=.00).

5.3.2. Support for demonstrations

The analysis of Model 1 regarding individual's support for demonstrations showed that the intercept was 3.25 (p=.00). The adjusted R^2 was 2%. The analysis indicated that Muslim groups, with the exception of Sundanese Muslims and the Muslim rest, support public criticism and demonstrations more than Javanese Muslims. On the other hand, the Christian groups were less supportive of demonstrations than Javanese Muslims.

The regression analysis for Model 2 underwent three stages as presented in appendix 3, Table 2. The first stage was Model 2a. The adjusted R^2 was 4%. Among the ethno-religious identification predictors, only the use of the ethnic language on five to six occasions (as compared to the reference category 'never') was significant. It indicated a strong relation between the use of ethnic language and support for demonstrations; people who used their ethnic language on five to six occasions were more supportive of demonstrations than respondents who never did so. The results of the second stage Model 2b showed that R^2 was 7%. All ethno-religious groups in this test were less supportive of violence than Javanese Muslims as the reference category. The final Model 2c showed that, except for Sundanese Muslims and the Muslim rest, the Muslim ethno-religious groups were more supportive of demonstrations than Javanese Muslims. Except for Batak Christians, all Christian ethno-religious groups were less supportive of demonstrations than Javanese Muslims. Regarding the ethno-religious identification variables, the significant correlations were found to be rituals (p=.00) and membership of religious organizations (p=.02).

Based on the results of the previous model, Model 3 introduced social positions as control variables. The result showed that the adjusted R^2 was 7%. Collective rituals remained significant (p=.00) – the more individuals participate in collective rituals, the more supportive they are of public criticism and demonstrations. Across the various social positions, women were less supportive than men. Respondents whose parents were unpaid workers were more supportive of public criticism and demonstrations (p=.01). Those whose parents were managers (p=.02), clerks (p=.02), traders (p=.04), machine operators (p=.04), and special labourers (p= .01) were less supportive of violence than those whose parents were farmers. Moreover, respondents with a medium level of household income were more supportive of harm than those whose household income was low.

The results of Model 4 came with an adjusted R^2 of 12%. All ethno-religious groups, except for Madurese Muslims, were less supportive of public criticism and demonstrations than Javanese Muslims. A significant correlation was found only among the Ambonese Christians (p=.01). Collective rituals were significant (p=.00). Parental occupation and household income were also significant. Respondents whose parents were professionals (p=.03), clerks (p=.01) and special workers (p=.02) were less supportive of public criticism and demonstrations than respondents whose parents were farmers. Respondents with medium-level household income (p=. 04) were more supportive of public criticism and demonstrations than those with low-level income. Moreover, we found that the salience of ethnic identity (p=.00) and hermeneutic interpretation (p=.00) became strong intermediate determinants. The results indicate that support for public criticism and demonstrations were affected by participation in collective rituals, while taking parental occupation, the salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation into account.

5.3.3. Discussion and interpretation of the results

The regression of both aspects of support for intergroup violence showed different, but often related tendencies. On the one hand, support for harm to persons and properties was affected by the possession of religious in-group friends, while taking into account parental occupation and perceived group threat, religiocentrism (positive towards in-groups), pluralism and nationalist attitudes. On the other hand, support for public criticism and demonstrations was affected by the respondents' participation in collective rituals, while taking into account parental occupation, salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation.

The ethno-religious groups showed on average little support for harming others. There was no specific ethno-religious group that showed significantly more or less support for harm than Javanese Muslims as the reference category, when it was controlled by the occupational status of parents, parents' occupation, perceived group threat, religiocentrism (positive towards in-group), pluralism and nationalism.

The respondents whose parents worked as managers, professionals, technicians, clerks, traders or labourers showed less support for harm than respondents whose parents were farmers. Respondents who perceived an increasing threat from other ethno-religious groups tended to increase their support for harm. Similarly, those with a stronger attachment to their positive in-groups were more likely to support harm. Surprisingly, the respondents who showed more affinity with pluralism also showed more support for harm. This shows that support for violence is not merely induced by religious dogmatism, as we previously assumed. The study also revealed that nationalism reduced support for harm.

Support for public criticism and demonstrations appeared to be more acceptable among respondents than support for harm to persons and properties. In terms of ethno-religious groups, the Muslim ethno-religious groups showed more support for public criticism and demonstration than Javanese Muslims, while all Christian ethnic groups showed less support than Javanese Muslims. Support for demonstrations was connected to participation in collective rituals; the more the respondents participated in such rituals, the more they supported public criticism and demonstrations. Respondents whose parents were professionals, clerks or special workers were less supportive of public criticism and demonstrations than those whose parents were farmers. Moreover, support was also connected to the salience of ethnic identity and to favouring hermeneutic interpretation; respondents who gave ethnic identity a greater degree of salience, and those with a more hermeneutic approach to religiosity, were more supportive of public criticism and demonstrations.

5.4. Summary of findings

The study reveals several important points. Some findings met our expectations and offered support for the theories from which we derived our hypotheses; however, others did not. We present the trimmed-down, and hence crucial, parsimonious findings of the study below.

5.4.1. Support for harm to persons and for damaging property

The final outcome of the multivariate regression analyses results in a model containing significant predictors of the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for harm.

In Model 1, the Madurese Muslims and Ambonese Christians show more support for harm to persons and properties than Javanese Muslims. Except for Sundanese Muslims and Javanese Christians, other groups also show more support, but the differences among these groups as compared to the reference group are not significant.

The relation between ethno-religious groups and support for harm changes slightly when other ethno-religious identification variables are added to the analysis. It shows the influence of religious in-group friends. Those with relatively more in-group friends show less support for harm than those without such friends. It rejects Hypothesis *2i*: *The more religious in-group friends held by respondents, the greater their support for intergroup violence*.

Table 5.2 Summary of regression analysis findings on support for harm

No		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Constant	1.69**	2.07**	2.09**	1.66**
	Ethno-religious self – definition (Javanese Muslim = ref.)				
	Sundanese Muslim	-.12	-.09	-.07	.18
	Madurese Muslim	.20*	.22*	.08	-.04
	Ambonese Muslim	.00	.03	-.02	-.04
1	Buton Muslim	.09	.12	.13	.09
	Muslim Rest	.04	.06	.11	.13
	Javanese Christian	-.13	-.15*	-.07	.10
	Ambonese Christian	.12*	.11*	.13	.03
	Chinese Christian	.08	.06*	.07	.23
	Batak Christian	.06	.02	-.03	.05
	Christian Rest	-.01	-.02	-.06	-.01
	Religious in-group friends (none to some = ref.)				
2	Relatively many		-.36**	-.32*	-.10
	Almost all		-.41**	-.32*	-.17
	All		-.44**	-.36*	-.17
	Parents' occupational status (self-employed = ref.)				
	Officer			-.13	-.17
	Informal worker			-.18*	-.17*
	Unpaid worker			-.27	-.19
	Parents' occupation (farmer = ref.)				
	Manager			-.55*	-.63*
	Professional			-.52*	-.66*
	Technician			-.00	-.45*
3	Clerk			-.09	-.32*
	Service worker			-.10	-.22
	Trade			-.20*	-.28*
	Operator			-.16	-.05
	Labourer			-.23*	-.27*
	Special			-.06	-.13
	Absent/ deceased			-.40	-.57
	Household income (low = ref.)				
	Medium			.06	-.18
	High			.17*	.07
	Perceived group threat				.17**
4	**Religiocentrism positive towards in-group**				.15*
	Pluralism				.17*
	Nationalism				-.22**
	R^2	.11	.15	.24	.45
	Adjusted R^2	.01	.02	.06	.20

*p < .05 ** p < .01

The differences between ethno-religious groups decrease to non-significance when we include social position variables as predictor variables. Madurese Muslims and Ambonese Christians show stronger support for harm, but not to a significant extent. The occupational status of parents and household income influence the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for harm. In particular, respondents whose parents are labourers show less support for harm than those whose parents are farmers. Respondents whose parents are managers, professionals, traders or labourers show less support for harm than respondents whose parents are farmers. We can also identify that those with higher household income show more support for harm than respondents with lower income. These variables are the only positional determinants that reach significance. Therefore, support for violence can only partially be explained by parental occupation and household income. Overall, including these social position variables reduces the differences between ethno-religious groups in all cases to non-significance. This finding implies that we have to accept Hypothesis 3. We must conclude that ethno-religious identification overrides individual determinant factors.

The inclusion of intermediate determinants in the analysis in Model 4 affects the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for harm to persons and properties. After including these intermediate determinants, ethno-religious groups no longer show any significant difference in their support for harm; this also goes for having religious in-group friends. This actually implies that prior differences between ethno-religious groups are to some extent explained by these intermediate determinants. On the other hand, the significant differences regarding the occupational status of parents and parental occupation persist. We find that support for harm to persons and properties is influenced by the perceived group threat, religiocentrism (i.e., positive attitudes towards in-group), pluralism and nationalistic attitudes. The findings corroborate Hypotheses 4a, 4f and 4j, but contradict Hypothesis 4h. The more that people subscribe to perceived group threat and religiocentrism, the more likely they are to support harm to persons and properties. Agreement with pluralism also induces support for harm, while we expected this relationship to be negative. Seemingly, pluralism also serves as an indicator for ethno-religious identification. Moreover, the support is stronger when nationalism decreases. In other words, the weaker the respondents' support for nationalism, the greater their support for harm to people and properties.

This demonstrates that support for harm will increase when perceived group threat and religiocentrism (positive stances towards the in-group) are stronger. This support might not be linked only to fundamentalist views, as we might expect, but to pluralist views as well. Moreover, it is also plausible in an Indonesian context that support for harm also relates to less nationalistic attitudes. It proves that the rampant

ethno-religious conflict of the last decade is closely connected to the erosion of nationalism due to globalization and the process of decentralization.

5.4.2. Support for demonstrations

Differences in support for public criticism and demonstrations are slightly larger among the various ethno-religious groups. Muslim ethno-religious groups show more support for public criticism and demonstrations than Javanese Muslims, except for the Sundanese Muslims and other Muslims. However, these differences are non-significant. Almost all Christian groups show less support for public criticism and demonstrations than Javanese Muslims. This finding is true at least for Javanese, Ambonese, Chinese and other Christians, as indicated by the significance of the relation. Batak Christians do not differ from the reference category. Table 5.3 shows the summary of the regression analysis and the details are presented in appendix 3, Table 2.

Table 5.3 Summary of the regression analyses findings regarding support for public criticism and demonstrations

No		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Constant	3.25**	2.58**	2.64**	2.03**
1	**Ethno-religious self -definition** (Javanese Muslim = ref.)				
	Sundanese Muslim	-.08	-.07	-.11	-.17
	Madurese Muslim	.00	.10	.02	.05
	Ambonese Muslim	.04	.04	.03	-.08
	Buton Muslim	.01	.02	.03	-.04
	Muslim Rest	-.02	-.06	.02	-.07
	Javanese Christian	-.31**	-.28**	-.27*	-.16
	Ambonese Christian	-.20**	-.18*	-.16*	-.26*
	Chinese Christian	-.22*	-.19	-.29*	-.27
	Batak Christian	-.02	.02	-.03	-.15
	Christian Rest	-.21*	-.18*	-.13	-.05
2	**Ritual**		.10**	.14**	.11*
	Member of religious organization (not member = ref.)		.10*		
	Women (men = ref.)			-.17**	-.10
3	**Parent occupational status** (self-employed = ref.)				
	Officer			.03	.08
	Informal worker			-.11	-.14
	Unpaid worker			.53*	.45*
	Parents' occupation (farmer= ref.)				
	Manager			-.80*	-.65
	Professional			-.35	-.57*
	Technician			-.23	-.20
	Clerk			-.25*	-.35*
	Service worker			-.08	-.28
	Trade			-.16*	-.08
	Operator			-.29*	-.31*
	Labourer			-.07	-.19
	Special			-.42*	-.39*
	Absent/ deceased			-.25	-.43
	Household income (low = ref.)				
	Medium			.17*	
	High			-.01	
4	**Ethnic salience**				.15**
	Hermeneutic interpretation				.13**
	R^2	.15	.18	.26	.34
	Adjusted R^2	.02	.03	.07	.12

*p < .05; ** p < .01

When the other dimensions of ethno-religious identification are included in the analysis, the tendency changes only slightly, in that Chinese Christians are no longer significantly different from the reference category. However, all other differences remain. Collective rituals show up as the strong predictor for support for public criticism and demonstrations. It confirms Hypothesis 2g: that the more actively people participate in collective rituals, the more they support demonstrations. In addition, membership of religious organizations is shown to result in more support than non-membership (Hypothesis 2k).

The inclusion of social positions in the analysis makes the difference between the reference category and other Christians insignificant. However, the inclusion of social positions results in a significant difference between Chinese Christians and the reference category. Collective rituals remain significant, but membership of religious organizations is no longer so. Hence, controlling for social position variables does not reduce differences between ethno-religious groups, which provides evidence for Hypothesis 3. Women show less support for public criticism than men. Respondents whose parents are unpaid workers show more support than those whose parents are self-employed. More specifically, respondents whose parents work as managers, clerks, traders, machine operators or special workers show less support for public criticism than farmers. Support for demonstrations is also higher among respondents with medium-level household income.

In this analysis, respondents' participation in collective rituals continued to strengthen their support for demonstrations. It provides evidence for Hypothesis 2g. The more often people participate in collective rituals, the more they support public criticism and demonstrations. Hypothesis 3d is also corroborated. Support is weaker among respondents whose parents work as professionals, clerks, machine operators or special workers compared with farmers. Moreover, we find only two strong intermediate determinants in the analyses, which are salience of ethnic identity and support for hermeneutic interpretation. Thus, Hypothesis 4b and 4i are supported. The more that respondents accept the salience of ethno-religious identities, and the more they adopt a hermeneutic interpretation of religiosity, the more they support demonstrations.

5.4.3. Modification and improvement: the evaluation of hypotheses

There are differences between the ethno-religious groups regarding support for harm to persons and properties. However, the inclusion of several variables in the analysis overrides these. In particular, although Madurese Muslims and Ambonese Christians initially showed more support for harm than Javanese Muslims, this became non-significant when the intermediary determinant variables were added to the analysis. On the other hand, except for Sundanese Muslims, all Muslim ethno-religious groups show more support for public criticism and demonstrations, but

these differences are non-significant. All Christian ethno-religious groups show less support for public criticism and demonstrations.

We found that the number of religious in-group friends possessed by respondents influences their support for harm to persons and properties. This finding rejects Hypothesis *2i*, which states that the more religious in-group friends held by respondents, the more they will support harm. The finding is different in relation to support for public criticism and demonstrations. Participation in collective rituals and membership of religious organizations affect the respondents' support for demonstrations. The study shows that the more active individuals' participation in collective rituals, the more likely they are to support violence. Similarly, this is also the case for respondents who are members of religious organizations.

The inclusion of social positions as control variables makes no significant difference among ethno-religious groups in relation to support for harm. The social positions that do influence this are the occupational status of parents, parental occupations and household income. Therefore, the third hypothesis is only partly supported; specifically, hypotheses *3d*, *3e* and *3f*.

Regarding support for public criticism and demonstrations, we found that the Christian ethno-religious groups, especially the Javanese, Ambonese and Chinese, show less support for demonstrations. However, their attitudes are affected by their participation in collective rituals, which indicates a positive association. Hence, this is evidence for Hypothesis *2g*. Social positions are only significant with regard to the occupational status of the parents and the parents' occupations (Hypothesis *3d* and *3e*).

Perceived group threats, religiocentrism (i.e. positive stances towards the in-group), pluralism and nationalism are intermediate determinant variables that can explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for harming people and property. Even though there are minor differences among the ethno-religious groups in their support for harm, the relationships are no longer significant once these intermediate determinants are included. We found that the more respondents perceived threats from out-groups, the more they agreed with positive in-group attitudes and the more pluralist they were, then the more they tended to support harm. Moreover, the less nationalist the respondents were, the more they supported harm.

Regarding the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for public criticism and demonstrations, the significant intermediate determinants were salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation. This finding provides evidence for Hypothesis *4b* – that the more salient ethnic identities are for the respondents, the more support they give to demonstrations. With regard to religiosity, a hermeneutic interpretation of sacred texts also mediates the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for demonstrations. It corroborates

Hypothesis *4i* in which the more hermeneutic their interpretation of religiosity, the greater respondents' support for public criticism and demonstrations.

5.4.4. Perceived group threat, religiosity and nationalism

Our qualitative data support the findings of the survey. In this section, we will describe the respondents' opinions about the threats they perceived, along with their views about religiosity and nationalism.

Perceived group threat

Our respondents perceive the presence of religious out-groups and migrants as a threat to their in-group. They consider the presence of migrants of the religious out-group as contributing to competition in both schools and the job market. For the Christian minority, the increase in Muslim migrants makes them anxious if they are dominant both in Ambon and Yogyakarta.

Maria expressed her anxiety about the presence of migrants in Yogyakarta. When I asked whether she is concerned about the increase in Muslims in the city, she replied: "As you see, for example, the number of non-Muslims accepted in public universities is now restricted, in public high schools, too. Sometimes, the non-Muslims are even not allowed to apply. I'm worried. We are excluded, and the situation is getting worse."

Ironically, Muslims who are among the majority also feel threatened by the presence of Christians. Their concern is Christianization. Fauzi said: "Well, I see it this way. Every religion has a mission to proselytize. When it comes to the election of local leaders, religious groups compete with each other." Another respondent, Achmad, added that the problem for Muslims has more to do with how to keep their religion pure. He remarked, "I think it's down to conservatism, especially among the fundamentalist groups. Muslims are in the majority, but to them, the presence of a church affects the purity of Islam. They think that those people are *kafir* (infidels)."

The fact that Maria's dogs were killed by a neighbour is not only an example of direct violence, but also shows that the whole (Christian) religious community is under threat. Some Muslims consider dogs dirty animals (*najis*) that must be avoided. Maria told me how upset she was. She said: "What I don't understand is that, according to the neighbours, the people who killed my dogs were from the neighbouring kampong. But how could they know that there's a non-Muslim family living in this kampong? What's more, my dogs weren't noisy. They were always kept inside the house. Small dogs are usually noisy, but my dogs were the golden or husky types."

In Ambon, Christians are historically dominant in the field of education. At the first and biggest university of the city, the State University of Pattimura [Unpatti], a large number of lecturers and students have been Christians ever since its foundation

in 1962. The greater proportion of Christians has raised suspicion among Muslims that Christianization goes on at the university, and leads some Muslim parents to forbid their daughters from studying there. Karim revealed, "In my village, my parents are a bit concerned about that. But according to our friends, they can't harm us because we're boys. We don't allow [Muslim] girls to study there. It's not allowed. That's our culture. That's what our parents drum into us. Boys are considered better able, physically and mentally, to deal with it. That's why we [Muslim boys] are allowed [by their parents] to go there [Unpatti]. That's how we see it, from a religious and cultural point of view. All the same, I go to Unpatti because in Maluku society, we're proud of this university for its high quality. But there are still some issues that I'm worried about."

Salience of ethnic identity

The salience of ethnic identity refers to the strong attachment of individuals to their ethnic group. It measures individuals' awareness of their ethno-religious affiliations and identity, and the importance of their ethno-religious differences to them personally (Duckit, 2006: 154). The results of the survey show that the salience of ethnic identity is relatively high among both Muslims and Christians and that ethnic identity is more salient among the respondents of Ambon than Yogyakarta. The multivariate analysis also identified ethnic salience as an intermediate determinant in the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for demonstrations.

For some of our respondents, the salience of ethnic identity was closely associated with their cultural adaptation to their social environment. For instance, Maria's father was Javanese and her mother was Batak. She defines herself as Javanese, and claims that her Javanese identity is more important to her than her religious identity as a Catholic. She argues: "I was born and brought up in Java. […] What I mean is that, according to the concept of '*empan papan*' (adapting to the environment), we have to see ancestral tradition as central to our lives." Another informant, Fauzi, comments that his ethnic identity makes it easier for him to interact with others in new social environments. As a student from East Java studying in Yogyakarta, he finds that people are more friendly when he speaks his ethnic language, which he uses as an expression of his ethnic identity. He says: "For example, if I want to shop in Malioboro, it's an advantage to be able to speak Javanese fluently (buyers who speak Javanese usually get lower prices). The seller will also be more friendly towards us." Another respondent, Maemunah, is a student from Sumatera whose parents are Javanese. She reveals she feels more comfortable making friends of the same ethnic group: "In friendships, I tend to choose and feel more comfortable with the Javanese. Perhaps it's just because of the similarities in our values. Different values make me feel uncomfortable."

Ethnic salience is very strong in Ambon because of its rigid social and spatial segregation of Muslims and Christians. When people interact across religious boundaries, they often refer to ethnic identity. Iskandar explains the important role of ethnic identity in unifying people since their community was torn apart by religious conflict. He affirms: "Ethnic identity is important. It is very important for *pela gandong*. Whenever we celebrate the anniversary of Ambon city, or Pattimura Day, these are annual rituals of togetherness. But it goes beyond Maluku, too. Back home, we have *Aroha*. *Aroha* is a traditional ceremony held by four villages. To me, the most important thing is togetherness. Many people who have left the villages come home to celebrate it, including non-Muslims and those who have lived in the Netherlands."

The experience of Eric, a respondent from Kei, is also relevant here. Eric points out that the solidarity of his ethnic group overrides religious identification. Eric is a Catholic, yet he told us he was often helped by Keinese Muslim friends. He said: "If we have economic or academic problems, a lecturer of the same ethnicity would certainly help us, even if he had a different religion. For example, the third deputy-rector UNPATTI is a Muslim Keinese. If I had problems, he would definitely help me. Whatever problem I have, he would help out [...]". Another respondent, Karim Passalo from Sepa, also expressed his pride in being Sepanese. He was proud that, whether Muslim or Christian, Sepanese have always been able to work together and that the two groups have never fought each other in violent conflict. He said, "I'm proud of being Sepanese because we are a people who are willing to cooperate and work for the common interest. For example, we'd meet each other and join in common activities even though we were still in conflict [shortly after the war]. We could work together for common interests such as the renovation of the mosque, building a drainage system, etc."

The significance of ethnic salience in intermediating the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for demonstrations might be because ethnicity is still important for its networking capacities, and as a means to mobilize people. Ethnicity is often manipulated by the elite to gain support for their interests.

Religiosity

The multivariate analysis pinpointed a significant relation between support for violence and religiosity. Religiocentrism and pluralism are intermediary determinants for the support for harm, while hermeneutic interpretation is the intermediary determinant for the support for demonstrations. Because of the significant contribution of these variables to support for violence, we looked at the respondents' responses, opinions and understanding about religiosity, based on our interviews.

Religiocentrism (positive stances towards the in-group)

The quantitative data indicated that positive in-group attitudes were significantly related to support for violence. Such attitudes result in a view of the religious norms and values of the in-group as superior to those of religious out-groups (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008). This contributes to intolerance between religious groups; it can lead to out-group antagonism and hostility towards religious out-groups.

An example of positive in-group attitude is best illustrated in our interview with Habib, a Muslim respondent in Yogyakarta. Based on his understanding of Islam, he believes it is important that his life should reflect Islamic values. Given his perspective, it is not surprising that all his friends are Muslim. In his opinion, his religious group is better than others because it follows a set of religious rules. He says: "For example, relations between men and women cannot get too intimate. In short, the Hadith offers guidance […]. I could see how polite they are in the way they speak and dress. I sometimes feel uneasy when someone dresses improperly, especially women [...] Well, I rarely meet men wearing anything improper, especially where I live, but I hate women to dress improperly."

He prefers to live in a religiously homogenous rather than a heterogeneous area. He argues: "In a homogeneous environment, I feel there are more people who share the same ideas. We, Muslims, cannot always involve other religious groups in every activity. There are restrictions. For example, they can't join in with our discussions about Islam, or with activities at the mosque. When I ask them to talk about the Koran, they refuse because they believe in something different." Habib's view of leadership emphasizes that a leader must be from his own religious group, because the leader influences decision-making and policies in society. He says: "Leaders' policies must be based on Islamic sharia law. We also know that MUI [*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, Council of Indonesian Ulama] has voiced their opinion about this, but non-Muslims don't respect it. Islamic teachings must be practised in every aspect of life."

Christian respondents also described positive in-group attitudes. Beatrice, one of our respondents in Ambon, pointed out: "First of all, Christian solidarity is very strong. We have to share even the smallest things with others, just as in the proverb *sagu salempang patah dua* (a tiny sago divided by two). *Hiti-hiti hala-hala ale rasa beta rasa* (what you feel, I feel). Second, we Christians must respect each other and avoid causing trouble [...] Third, we have to show mercy to each other, through *pela gandong*. Although we may have different religions, we should help others because they are family."

Pluralism

Pluralism is an attitude of openness towards different religions (Anthony et al., 2015). Some of our respondents revealed that the pluralist attitudes embedded in their religion helped them to deal with religious diversity. For instance, Maria claimed that the inclusive perspective of her religion, which embraces a universal concept of humanity, makes it possible for her to communicate with people from other religions. She says:"I just feel that the teachings of Catholicism are relevant. What I mean is that I'm not that religious. I don't completely understand Catholicism. It is just the concept of humanity. That's the value I want to share with other people, including respecting people with different religious identities because not everyone is called to be a Catholic. I think this religious education is important for me." Respect for other religious traditions in Maria's family was displayed when her grandmother passed away; her family and neighbours held both Muslim and Christian funeral rituals. Since Maria's family was the only Catholic family in the neighbourhood, they conducted the Catholic funeral ceremony first, followed by the Muslim ceremony (*tahlilan*) with their neighbours. The Muslim ceremony was held to give her neighbours an opportunity to pray for her grandmother in their own way. She recalls: "At that time, a mass was held before the funeral. Our neighbors were reluctant to come. So we decided to hold a *tahlilan*. We also held a *tahlilan* to commemorate the 1,000th day after my grandmother's death. We only provided the place […] At the beginning of the gathering, we mentioned that the prayer was meant for my grandmother. Then a Muslim leader proceeded with the rituals." Syamsuddin, one of our Muslim respondents, also revealed that his religion taught him to respect other religions. He notes: "I hold a tolerant position. My lecturer Mr. Syafin said that all religions are mostly the same on the level of humanity. Islam embraces all, so Christians are also included in this Islamic principle. Second, there are many verses in Al Quran that show respect for differences and respect all religious values, and belief in former prophets including those described in the Christian Holy Scriptures. But I don't know whether the current Bible is the same as the Bible in the past." Although his testimony could be qualified as theologically inclusivistic, his openness towards other religious traditions is clear enough. Romdlon expresses his respect for plurality by referring to his contact with his neighbours, saying that he prefers to live in a heterogeneous environment. He argues: "I think we can learn more from our surroundings. We're not restricted to just one area; we can learn about other people's culture or religion. They give us a broader experience. If one day we go to somewhere unfamiliar, we'll find it easier to mingle."

Hermeneutic interpretation of religious texts

A hermeneutic interpretation of sacred texts is the interpretive process through which the truth of a text is derived not only from the sacred text itself, but in consultation with other authoritative texts (e.g. science, history, scholarly criticism) or traditions that offer insights into its meaning, and against the historical background in which the text was written. It stands in contrast to intra-textual fundamentalism, which takes a literal view of the religious text (Williamson et al., 2010: 273). The survey found that Muslims are more fundamentalist than Christians in their understanding of their sacred scriptures. In the multivariate analysis, results showed that the more respondents agree with a hermeneutic interpretation of their religious texts, the more they tend to support demonstrations. These interviews support the findings of the quantitative analysis.

We can look at respondent Agustina's experience as an example. She is Catholic and studies natural sciences at the state university in Yogyakarta. She claims that she is a religious person, as testified by her involvement in Church activities and religious practices. In her opinion, the Holy Scripture must be understood according to the historical and social context. She says:" The Bible is man-made too. It is impossible for God to have written it by himself. Perhaps a lot of people think differently to me. But we can't take the meaning of the Bible literally because this age isn't like the time of writing. If we understand it as it was written, it would be weird and odd."

Heribertus, a Christian theology student, has a similar understanding of sacred texts. He explains that we need to interpret the Bible by searching for its meaning, because the context in which it was written is different from ours. Regarding the importance of the Bible for his faith, he explains that "The Bible is very important. It cannot be understood literally. The context of the story is the past, which is different from the present. To me, the Bible is a testimony of faith. We have to learn from the testimony by ourselves."

Nationalistic attitudes

Nationalistic attitudes are favourable attitudes towards one's own country. Nationalism has two dimensions: patriotism (romantic nationalism) and chauvinism (ethnocentric nationalism). Patriotism refers to feelings of pride in one's country. Chauvinism is the view that the home country is unique and superior, and it therefore disparages other countries in comparison (Coenders, 2001: 64; Coenders et al., 2004: 29-32). The results of the survey indicated that Muslims showed more patriotism. All respondents strongly agreed that it is important to respect their nation, but not all were committed to putting national interests above their ethno-religious groups. Moreover, the multivariate analyses uncovered the determinant of nationalist attitudes in the relationship between ethno-religious identification and

support for harm. The greater the degree of people's nationalism, the less likely they were to support harm to people and property.

Our qualitative data also reveal that our respondents appear to demonstrate strong patriotism, although some are critical of the present government. Maria, who often goes abroad for singing festivals, expressed her feelings by saying: "It doesn't matter how bad my country is, I'm proud to be an Indonesian. When I went to Malaysia and China, I was proud to reveal my identity. Like it or not, it's our home. I sometimes feel annoyed when an Indonesian abroad says bad things about his own country. So, it doesn't matter how damaged our country is, it's our own business, and it's our responsibility to fix it. Anyway, I'm still proud of my country."

Another respondent, Iskandar, comments: "I am proud to be a citizen of the country although there are still problems of development to solve. It's a result of being a country that has so many islands. It's not just a central government problem. Local problems also have an impact on development." Alhady shared Iskandar's sentiments. He said: "Well, there is a good system in this country, but in practice it has its difficulties. It's been more than 60 years since independence, but it's still far from what was expected, in terms of political elites, society, political education, social education. I still see many things that need improving. For example, the business of *Ahmadiyah.* I am against *Ahmadiyah*, but I can't accept being physically attacked.[31] The government still can't handle this, or many other conflicts. This shows that the government is not yet successful in handling issues of people's welfare."

Some of the Muslim respondents added that they have to be nationalists, because nationalism is considered a religious obligation. Alhandy said: "According to Islam, loving our country is important. Fixing what's wrong is an important agenda. In my opinion, religion and the country are linked together. If religion is strong, the country will also be strong and vice versa. I think every religion has this concept." When he was asked further about how he would balance his values between national interest and his religion, he replied: "Honestly, I would want to prioritize national interests, but I think I'd have to prioritize my religious group because from there we can develop ourselves and our environment." A similar opinion was expressed by Habibie who put religious interests above nationalism. Habibie explained: "My religion teaches about both worldly and heavenly matters. There are rules for both. So, my physical and spiritual needs are fulfilled. The country only fulfills my physical

31 Ahmadiyah is an Islamic religious movement founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in British India at the end of the 19th century. In Indonesia, the Council of Indonesian Ulama banned the movement in 1980, declaring it to be heretical and contrary to the teachings of Islam. As Ahmadiyah continues to gain support in some regions, in 2008 conservative Muslims put pressure on the government to forbid their religious activities. With violence and large demonstrations, these groups attacked and harassed Ahmadiyah followers in Lombok, Madura and Cikeusik.

needs, which are temporary. We all begin from willingness and end at satisfaction." He was therefore implicitly emphasizing the importance of religion over nationalism.

The findings of our interviews support the quantitative analysis. We found among both Muslims and Christians a strong perceived threat. Religiocentrism (and more specifically positive in-group attitudes), attitudes towards religious plurality, and modes of interpreting sacred texts also seem to play a – positive or negative – role in support for ethno-religious violence. Next, ethnic salience and nationalist attitudes influence the level of support for ethno-religious violence, either positively or negatively. The qualitative data therefore provide additional evidence for, and elaboration of, the survey findings.

5.5. Discussion of the findings in a wider theoretical context

This study contributes to the theoretical discussions regarding ethno-religious identification and support for violence. The main theories suggest that in-group favouritism can lead to exclusionary reactions. Empirical studies find support for the proposition that in-group favouritism is enhanced by social identification and social contra-identification (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, et al., 2004; Coenders et al., 2009: Savelkoul et al., 2010). In this study, we assume that support for violence constitutes the expression of an exclusionary reaction. Support for violence is measured at a higher level (support for harm of people and property) and at a lower level (supporting public criticism and demonstrations). In the anticipation of distinguishing factors to explain support for violence, this study also examines other theories to account for different levels of support among ethno-religious groups. These theories refer to, among others, perceived group threat, intergroup contact, religiosity and nationalistic attitudes which are relevant to the phenomenon of people's support for violence.

The study finds evidence that support for violence varies from one ethno-religious group to another. Most ethno-religious groups, except for Sundanese Muslims and Javanese Christians, are more likely to support harm to people and property than Javanese Muslims, although not all differences are actually significant. The most support is given by the Madurese Muslims and the Ambonese Christians. This pattern is different in relation to lower levels of violence, of which Muslim ethno-religious groups are more supportive while Christian ethno-religious groups are less supportive than the Javanese Muslims.

In this study, we uncovered important findings regarding the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We found that people who have more friends within their religious in-group are less likely to support harm than those who have few or no friends within their religious in-group. This finding is consistent with the social identity theory that proposed that individual members of groups always attempt to place the group in a positive light.

Those who have stronger identification with the in-group, such as individuals with more friends of the same religion, will maintain its superiority. They will protect their group from the negative image that would result from harming others or damaging property. Therefore, it is plausible that those with more in-group friends of the same religion are less supportive of harm because harming persons and properties have negative connotations that would damage the in-group status.

Regarding support for public criticism and demonstrations, we found that people who participate in collective rituals are more likely to support public criticism and demonstrations than people who never do so. Similarly, people who are members of religious organizations are more likely to support public criticism and demonstrations than people who are not; they see demonstrations as acceptable in democratic society. These findings confirm the second hypothesis: that the stronger people's sense of social identification (participation in collective rituals and being a member of religious organizations), the more likely they are to support intergroup violence.

The findings strengthen our theoretical foundation, which is that people always attempt to construct a positive social identity within their in-groups and at the same time disassociate themselves from out-groups. This supports social identity theory, which holds that individuals are motivated to search for positive group distinctiveness by defining group membership together with in-group favouritism (having more in-group friends of the same religion) and emotional attachment to the group (participation in collective rituals) (Tajfel, 1981: Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

The process of ethno-religious identification even overwhelms individual social position. We found that Hypothesis 3 was confirmed, since ethno-religious identification continues to have significantly strong effects on support for violence, i.e. public criticism and demonstrations, even after controlling for individual social positions. The number of religious in-group friends continues to have a significant relationship to support for harm; also, whether a person participates in collective rituals still has a significant relationship to their support for demonstrations. Among the specific characteristics, only parents' occupation and household income appear to be significant. Respondents whose parents are farmers are more inclined to support violence than those whose parents work as managers, professionals, technicians, clerks, traders or labourers. However, people who support violence do not necessarily come from families with a lower income level.

Our findings indicate that supporters of violence come from the more marginal groups in society. In Indonesia, farmers or agricultural workers belong to those groups, since most work on relatively small tracts of agricultural land. The average farmer in Indonesia owns only .25 ha. In Java, more than half of all farmers are landless. The marginalization of farmers has also increased because of modernization and the implementation of the green revolution during the Indonesian New Order, which

makes agricultural activities dependent on the market and capital. Even though the income of farmers is relatively high, their insecurity is also great due to fluctuations in crop prices. Farmers are more sensitive to the presence of the other groups because of competition for limited resources. Our findings support realistic conflict theory, which posits that conflict arises from increasing competition for scarce resources, and also confirms ethnic group conflict theory, which states that intergroup competition, both actual and perceived, results in exclusionary reactions.

The multivariate test for the fourth general set of hypotheses finds four determinants that significantly intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for harm of people and property. These intermediate determinants include perceived group threat, religiocentrism (positive stances towards the in-group), pluralism and nationalism. On the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for public criticism and demonstrations, we find two significant intermediate determinants: the salience of ethnic identity and the acceptance of a hermeneutic interpretation of religious texts. In regard to support for harm to people and properties, the findings corroborate Hypothesis *4a*, *4f* and *4j* while modifying Hypothesis *4h* in the opposite direction. The proposition of ethnic group conflict theory is accepted, since an increase in perceived threats brings about support for exclusionary reactions (Bobo, 1988; Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Coenders et al., 2009). The findings also provide evidence that religiocentrism – the combination of positive in-group attitudes and negative out-group attitudes – induces more support for violence (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008: 51); they likewise support the proposition about nationalistic attitudes. Consistent with earlier theory (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001), this study suggests that a decline in nationalism increases support for violence. This provides evidence for the theoretical discussion about violent conflict in Indonesia, since the erosion of nationalism has contributed to ethno-religious violence. The decline in nationalism relates to the democratic transition in Indonesia in which various groups have been allowed to play a role in the new political landscape, but struggle only for their own ethno-religious groups (Aspinal and Fealey, 2003: 6-9; Van Klinken, 2006: 138-143).

However, out results lead us to revise our assumption that more agreement with pluralism is related to less support for violence. We found evidence that the opposite is true. Individuals who accept pluralism are also more likely to support violence. In other words, people who hold a pluralistic religious view can also become supporters of violence. Seemingly, pluralism is also an indicator for involvement with the religious in-group; or people's non-religious reasons for supporting violence are greater than their religious reasons.

At the lower level of support for violence, ethnic salience and hermeneutic interpretation are the determinant variables. The greater the salience of ethnic identity for individuals, the more likely they are to support violence. In terms of how

the respondents' support for violence is spread and organised, ethnicity is the core factor; this probably reflects the migrant element among respondents, as migrants form their support groups based on their ethnicity or place of origin. The acceptance of a basically hermeneutic approach to religiosity has an influence on support for violence. This is consistent with previous findings, which showed that religion can be used instrumentally to drive people to support violence (Sidel, 2006; Steward, 2009:14; Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009: 69-77).

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

Ethno-religious violence has been the subject of scholarly discussion in Indonesia ever since the outbreak of violence in the 1990s. An enormous amount of literature on ethno-religious conflicts in the country has emerged as a result of research from a wide range of theoretical frameworks and the application of a variety of methods. This study adds new insights to this body of knowledge by focusing on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. Support for violence is assumed to be one dimension of latent conflict that arises as an unintended consequence of dysfunctional systems of social cohesion. As a latent conflict, support for violence emerges as one of the consequences of ethno-religious identification. A review of previous literature shows that individuals' identification with their ethno-religious group induces exclusionary attitudes and antagonism towards out-groups (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Phinney and Ong, 2007). Ethno-religious identification creates major rifts between different ethno-religious groups (Sterkens et al., 2009). In this study, we measure support for violence by asking to what extent respondents would support violence to realize the economic, political or socio-cultural interests of the religious in-group. Support for violence may also vary in level of intensity. We distinguish between a low level, i.e., support for public criticism and demonstrations against out-groups, and a high level, i.e., harm to people and property for the purpose of realizing in-group aims.

This study fills a gap in the literature on ethno-religious identification and support for violence at the individual level. As stated above, the growing literature on conflict studies in Indonesia has emphasized political and economic issues within these conflicts, but has paid less attention to individuals' perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Most previous studies have looked for commonalities in detailed case studies of specific outbreaks of violence between religious groups. As a result, they have not generated sufficiently theoretical insights into the partial and differential role of ethno-religious identification within these conflicts (Varshney, 2010:2). This study is complementary to these previous studies in seeking to explain individuals' attitudes to support for intergroup violence. It employs a cross-cultural comparative research design involving Muslim and Christian respondents from different ethnic groups in two research areas. One of these areas, Ambon, experiences frequent eruptions of inter-group violence, while the other, Yogyakarta, is relatively peaceful.

In Ambon, the division between Muslims and Christians clearly defines their living space and their social activity. Both groups have established boundaries, and seldom interact across the demarcation of religious belonging. Their ethno-religious identification is so strong that tensions between Muslims and Christians have led to intergroup violence. In contrast, the relationship between ethno-religious groups in Yogyakarta is relatively peaceful; while disputes have occurred occasionally, they have not led to massive intergroup violence. In the early stages of political reformation, when Ambon experienced protracted violence between religious groups, Yogyakarta was able to prevent its escalation.

This research uses a mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches. It provides a large dataset stemming from a survey that included respondents who were followed up with qualitative interviews. The research sample was randomly drawn from the student population of six universities. At each research site, we choose one Christian university, one Muslim university and one state university. Overall, 1,500 respondents, equally distributed over these universities, became the research sample. The key informants for the interviews were selected from both respondents and non-respondents of the survey; for the respondents, the interviews were conducted after they had agreed to follow up their statements. They were asked to expand on their reasons and give additional explanations concerning the research topics.

The survey was prepared by searching for previous valid and reliable measuring instruments to use as a benchmark, which we then improved. We revised the measurements for the Indonesian context before translating them into Bahasa Indonesian. Important points that were underexposed in the quantitative survey were elaborated via the development of a topic list for the interviews. This was used to further illustrate relevant topics, and to look for additional means of explaining support for violence. The results of both surveys and interviews were triangulated in the analysis.

In this study, we examine theories of ethno-religious identification and exclusionary attitudes that have been tested and partially validated in Western societies. We were curious to discover whether these theories are applicable in Indonesia, whether they would receive further confirmation or would be rejected. The main example is ethnic group conflict theory, which has been repeatedly tested by various academic researchers in many countries. Its main proposition is that intergroup competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, reinforces the mechanisms of social identification and contra-identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Schneider, 2007; Coenders et al., 2009: Savelkoul et al., 2010). The other theories that we test are intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Brown et al., 2007), the influence of salience of identity (Phinney,

1990: Duckit, 2006), memory of violence (Cairns and Roe, 2003; Sahdra and Ross, 2007), perceived discrimination (Romero and Roberts, 1998; Vancluysen and Van Craen, 2010), religiocentrism (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008), nationalistic attitudes (Coenders, 2001; Coenders et al., 2004; Todosijevic, 2001) and intergroup distrust (Parsons, 1970: 142; Tropp et al., 2006: 771; Tam et al., 2009).

This chapter presents a summary of the research findings and conclusions based on the empirical answers to our crucial questions. It also sketches the progress and innovations made in the research process that will contribute to future studies on ethno-religious conflict and violence.

6.2 Crucial questions

The substantial questions of the research include both descriptive and explanatory aspects. The descriptive questions ask about the presence of ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta; also about the ways in which ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence among Muslims and Christians is observable in the two cities. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed to answer these questions.

The explanatory questions address three issues. The first examines the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. The second assesses the influence of social characteristics such as gender, parents' occupation or household income on this relationship, and the third tests whether the relationships are affected by intermediate determinants such as perceived group threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, memory of past violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and distrust. The set of explanatory questions can be formulated as follows:

1. To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup violence?
2. To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup violence considering other individual-level determinants?
3. To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup violence with particular intermediate determinants?

6.3 Empirical answers

The analyses of the large data set – 1,500 respondents and 18 more in-depth interviews --provide evidence for ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta. Respondents came from a range of ethnic groups. A large number of Muslims were Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Ambonese or Butonese, while the Christians were predominantly Ambonese, Javanese, Bataknese or Chinese. Smaller ethnic groups were also represented in our sample, such as Minangkabau, Minahasa, Toraja, Timorese, Buginese, Makassarese and Papua. In general, religious identification was found to be stronger than ethnic identification among both Muslim and Christian ethnic groups, as elaborated below.

We assessed ethno-religious identification with a set of measurements. These included ethnic language use, participation in ethnic ceremonies, having in-group and out-group ethnic friends, membership of ethnic organizations, participation in collective religious rituals, rites of passage, religious practices, having in-group religious friends and membership of religious organizations.

All the ethno-religious groups consider ethnic identification to be an important element of their identities, but Muslims show stronger ethnic identification than Christians. They speak their ethnic language more frequently and attend ethnic ceremonies more often. More Muslims are also members of ethnic organizations. Regarding religious identification, Muslims participate in collective rituals more often than Christians. They also pray and attend religious services more frequently. Only in terms of rites of passage is Muslim participation lower; those who do attend the ceremonies do so mainly for non-religious reasons, such as solidarity with neighbours, or to respect the invitation of their relatives. Muslims also have more religious in-group friends and less religious out-group friends.

Our qualitative data support the findings of the quantitative analyses. Ethnic identification among Muslims is stronger than among Christians. In Ambon, Muslims speak their ethnic language more often than Christians; this is particularly the case in traditional ceremonies in Muslim villages. Christians use the Indonesian language more frequently than their ethnic tongue. The qualitative data also show that religious identification is stronger than ethnic identification in both Ambon and Yogyakarta. The interviews reveal that personal religious expression and religious practices have become increasingly important over the last decade. Most of the interviewees confirmed that they participate in traditional ceremonies and religious rituals and gave religious reasons for doing so. Only in rites of passage do religious rituals blend with ethnic rituals; more specifically, in marriage and funerary rituals. Here participation also stems from non-religious reasons. Compared to Christians, Muslims are more involved in religious organizations or religiously affiliated political organizations. A few of the Christians also claim to engage in religious organizations, but these organizations have political interests. Both quantitative and qualitative

data confirm that religious identification is stronger and more important than ethnic identification, and that overall, Muslims show stronger religious identification than Christians.

The second research question, on support for intergroup violence, is also answered via both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The measurement of support for violence underwent rigorous factor analyses. We found that such support has two dimensions: support for public criticism and demonstrations, and support for harm to persons and property. In general, respondents tend to support public criticism and demonstrations but reject support for harm to persons and property. When the comparison is made between Muslims and Christians, Muslims are more supportive of demonstrations and relatively less supportive of harm to persons and property than Christians. Our interviews elaborate the findings of the quantitative analyses: that Muslims support harm less, but support demonstrations more than Christians. In Ambon, all informants, Muslims as well as Christians expressed support for harm, especially those who had strong memories and past experiences of violence. Most of them also agreed with supporting harm to persons and property as an act of self-defence. The data triangulation affirms that both Muslims and Christians support public criticism and demonstrations more than harm to persons and property.

The first explanatory question, on the relationship between self-definition of ethno-religious groups and support for harm, shows that most ethno-religious groups, the exceptions being Sundanese Muslims and Javanese Christians, are more likely to support harm than Javanese Muslims. Most support is given by the Madurese Muslims and the Ambonese Christians. On support for demonstrations, Muslim ethno-religious groups are more supportive while the Christian ethno-religious groups are less supportive than the Javanese Muslims.

The second explanatory question is answered by testing the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We found that respondents' support for harm is influenced by their number of friends of the same religion. Those who have many friends of the same religion show less support for harm. On support for demonstrations, we found that participation in collective rituals and membership of religious organization are strong determinants. The more actively people participate in collective rituals, the more they support demonstrations. In addition, those who are members of religious organizations also show more support for demonstrations than non-members.

Individual determinants, such as education and profession of parents, or gender of respondents, do not significantly affect the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence; the results are similar for support for harm and support for demonstrations. Respondents whose parents are farmers show more support than respondents whose parents work as managers, clerks, traders, machine operators or manual labourers. Respondents from relatively higher

income levels show more support than those with lower income levels. In general, the findings demonstrate that support for violence can only partially be explained by individual socio-economic status; ethno-religious identification persists as a strong determinant after taking these individual characteristics into account.

The third research question was answered by testing the influence of intermediary variables on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. These variables were derived from diverse theoretical insights, and comprised perceived group threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity (including attitudes towards religious plurality, religiocentrism and fundamentalism), nationalistic attitudes and distrust. Concerning support for harm, we found that perceived group threat, religiocentrism (i.e. positive in-group attitudes), pluralism and nationalistic attitudes influence the relationship. The more that people perceive group threat and the more they have positive in-group attitudes, the more likely they are to support harm to persons and property, which supports our hypotheses in this respect. Contrary to our expectations, people with a pluralistic religious view show more support for harm. Support for harm is also stronger when nationalism is relatively low. Concerning support for demonstrations, the relevant intermediate determinants were salience of ethnic identity and acceptance of hermeneutic interpretations: the more the respondents accept the salience of ethnic identity and the more they agree that Holy Scriptures need hermeneutic interpretation (contrary to fundamentalism), the more they support demonstrations.

Overall, the findings support the main theories and add explanations for other theories that we examined in this study. The study provides evidence for social identity theory, which holds that individuals always attempt to construct a positive social identity for their in-groups, and to disassociate themselves from out-groups (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). We find stronger identification with religion than with ethnicity. When we compare the groups, Muslims show greater ethno-religious identification than Christians. These findings provide confirmation of previous studies in Indonesia that show the growth of religious identification, especially among Muslims since the 1990s (van Bruinessen, 2003; Sidel, 2006; Hefner, 2011).

The findings on perceived group threat validate ethnic group conflict theory, in which perceived threat is the strongest determinant for prejudicial and exclusionary attitudes towards out-groups (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Coenders et al., 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2011). It suggests that this theory, which is able to explain exclusionary phenomena in Western countries, is also applicable to Indonesian society. Nonetheless, this study has not tested the contextual level that is part of the theory and which includes the influence of actual competition, migration and relative group size (majority and minority status).

We also present evidence for the proposition regarding religiocentrism by Sterkens and Anthony (2008), in which a positive evaluation of the religious in-group is related to in-group identification and induces derogatory attitudes towards out-groups. However, in relation to religious attitudes towards plurality, our findings contradict earlier studies. While these studies have shown that pluralism reduces prejudice and hostility towards out-groups (Anthony et al., 2005; cf. Anthony et al. 2015), our study finds evidence that people who have a pluralistic religious view do support violence. Seemingly, pluralism can be as much an indicator for religious identification as monism.

These findings are consistent with propositions concerning nationalistic attitudes (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001), which suggest that increased ethno-religious identification reduces nationalism (i.e. commitment to the national Indonesian state, and therefore opposition to appeals for regional autonomy). Lower levels of nationalism in turn lead to greater support for violence, which in our research contexts is mostly related to the struggle for emancipation by specific ethno-religious groups. The findings therefore support the theoretical proposition that the degradation of nationalism contributes to the outbreak of ethno-religious violence. Bertrand (2004), for instance, observed that the democratic transition in Indonesia gave rise to a more influential role for various ethno-religious groups in the new political landscape, but their tendency was to struggle only for more regional autonomy and to downplay national interests.

At the lower level of support for intergroup violence, i.e. support for protests and demonstrations, we found ethnic salience and hermeneutic interpretation to be relevant intermediate determinant variables. Our study validates earlier studies that show a significance correlation between ethno-religious identification and ethnic salience: the greater the salience of ethnic identity, the higher the likelihood of support for violence. Moreover, the acceptance of hermeneutic interpretations at the root of religiosity also increases support for violence. This finding contradicts an earlier study, which suggests that only fundamentalist interpretations of religious texts induce support for violence (Williamson et al., 2010).

6.4 Innovation and progress

This study makes an innovative contribution to the theoretical and methodological development of research on ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia. We will discuss this contribution in terms of the research questions, the measurements and the data analysis.

First, we set out to answer descriptive questions about ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence, and explanatory questions on the relationship between these variables with individual characteristics as well as intermediate determinants. These questions have not been explored in previous

studies on conflict in Indonesia; most have paid more attention to the wider context of economic and political developments, e.g. the three influential studies of Bertrand (2004), Sidel (2006) and Van Klinken (2007). While their studies certainly contribute to the overall understanding of the causes and effects of violence in Indonesia, they do not provide adequate explanations as to why individual people support violence, neither do they test theories about intergroup violence in relation to other theories. This study seeks to complement previous studies by explaining the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We tested hypotheses regarding the influence of individual determinants and different measures for religious identification, support for intergroup violence as well as intermediary variables.

This study is not alone in seeking to explain support for violence in Indonesia via the analysis of individuals, but it is the only one to use mixed methods: quantitative methods with a large number of respondents, and qualitative methods with semi-structured interviews with a selection of these respondents. One of the previous investigations of the individual angle was conducted by Adam (2010b) who examined how ordinary people became involved in the Ambon conflict. Via case studies carried out in the villages of Hila, Kaitetu and Waai, he described the involvement of people in the conflict as the result of long-standing competition along religious lines over land and jobs. The competition between Ambonese and immigrants, and between Muslims and Christians made up the context in which violence erupted. His findings, however, are limited to the areas in which he made his observations. Being based in specific contexts, his study lacks standardised measurements for intergroup comparisons. Unlike previous studies, our work integrates qualitative or quantitative approaches in the research design, methods and analyses. The quantitative approach provides general findings, which are elaborated in more detail with the help of interviews. We did not find contradictory results between quantitative and qualitative data. Triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative data gives the findings greater validity and reliability.

Second, we developed measurements that were guided by theories related to Western countries. As mentioned earlier, these were primarily social identity theory, realistic conflict theory and ethnic group conflict theory; we made additional use of theories related to salience of identity, intergroup contact, memory of violence, perceived discrimination, attitudes towards plurality, religiocentrism, fundamentalism, nationalistic attitudes and distrust. On this basis, we made inventories of measurements that have been repeatedly tested in Western (and in some cases also Asian) countries. Reliability as indicated by Cronbach's alpha is the main consideration for the inclusion of specific measurements. We then assessed the standardised measurements and adjusted them for their application to our Indonesian research context. Some measurements that we could not find

in previous studies were explored through meticulous discussions of the variables. For instance, the measure for ethno-religious identification was adapted from the ethnic identification measure from Phinney (1992) and Phinney and Ong (2007). We added religious identification to the measure by taking into account the ritualistic dimension of religion (Allport and Ross, 1967; Scheepers et al., 2002b). In order to make the measures for ethno-religious identification applicable to Indonesia, we referred to the Tuti (2007) questionnaire when making our revisions.

We also made improvements to our measurement of support for violence. Since we could not find appropriate measurements from Western societies, we used the measurement of Hadiwitanto et al. (2007) as a starting point. His questionnaire is relevant as he investigated religion, social trust and conflict in Ambon, but his measurement of support for violence was inadequately developed since the levels of violence he distinguished were unequally distributed over different societal domains (political, economic, socio-cultural and religious). This imbalance would affect the results, possibly eliminating important factors before data gathering. We therefore modified the measurements so that they were distributed evenly over the economic, political, cultural and religious domains. Each domain was then assessed in terms of four dimensions of support for violence: support for public debates, for demonstrations, for corporal and for material harm.

For individual characteristics and intermediate variables, we applied the same strategy of adapting measurements from earlier studies. In order to assess the measurement and test the validity of the questionnaire, a pilot survey was conducted in our six selected universities, three in Ambon and three in Yogyakarta. The result of this survey was then evaluated by checking the correlations; if any were very low or extremely high, the items were reformulated or simply removed from the survey. If, according to respondents, the wording of questions and translations was unclear, we made them more straightforward and simple to prevent misunderstandings.

Third, we used rigorous data-reduction methods to analyse the data. We began by observing the central tendency of the data and its dispersion. This was important for discovering its general pattern and variability. Next, we ran factor analyses to identify the important dimensions of the observed variables and to test the validity and reliability of the scale dimensions. In order to find a comparable model solution for both Muslims and Christian, we ran three sets of factor analyses on the observed variables, filtering them past Muslims, Christians and the combination of the two religious groups. In the process, the outcomes of communality, Eigenvalue, structure of the pattern matrix and item-correlation were the focus for data interpretation.

In relation to support for intergroup violence, we found two dimensions: a high level of support, i.e., support for harm to persons and property, and a low level of support, i.e., support for public criticism and demonstrations. For independent variables, factor analyses were run for religious practices and religious ceremonies.

Muslims and Christians were given similar measurement items, even though the two religious groups differ in their ceremonies. For Muslims, the ceremonies included circumcision, weddings, funerals, fasting, *Idul Fitri* and *Idul Adha*. For Christians, the questions about ceremonies included baptism, weddings, Christmas, Easter, funerals and fasting. The result was three dimensions to use as comparable model solutions for both Muslims and Christians: collective rituals, rites of passage and religious practices. For intermediary determinants, we found that perceived group threat was concentrated in two dimensions: politics and economy on the one hand and socio-cultural factors on the other. Salience of identity also had two dimensions: ethnicity and religion. Intergroup contact was measured by quantity and quality of contact. Quantity was clearly constructed in a single dimension. We also decided to use a single dimension for quality of contact, since the factor analysis determined two dimensions with a high correlation: closeness and cooperation, evaluation and equality. Other intermediary determinants such as perceived discrimination, religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality, religious fundamentalism and nationalistic attitudes had two dimensions respectively (see appendix 1 Table 5 - Table 9).

To analyze the differences between Muslims and Christians, and the variation between ethno-religious groups, we compared their means and made t-tests. An analysis of variance was also made by testing all dimensions to reveal their correlation and tendencies. For this, we took into account of the statistic of F, the significance level, and the correlation among the tested variables. The analysis of variance specifically looked into the (linear versus non-linear) nature of the relationships between the dependent variable(s) and independent variables as well as relationships with control and intermediary variables.

Finally, we conducted multivariate regression analyses. This study demonstrates the relevance of certain theories in Indonesia. We provide evidence that ethnic competition theory can explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence in Indonesia. The level of ethno-religious identification actually overwhelms the individual determinants, which has not been shown in Western countries. We find evidence that the perception of out-group threat, positive attitudes towards religious in-groups and nationalistic attitudes intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. Hence, the stronger the ethno-religious identification, the stronger the perceptions of out-group threat that induce support for harm. The stronger the level of ethno-religious identification, the higher the positive in-group attitudes that induce support for harm. Another interesting result is the negative influence of nationalism on support for violence, consistent with previous studies in Western contexts (Coienders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001; Coenders et al., 2004). This study shows that declining nationalism increases support for harm. This is true in

Indonesia; nationalism continues to decrease due to the struggle for local autonomy. Local conflicts such as those in Ambon are largely to do with the pursuit of greater local autonomy, as opposed to national interests. The devolution of power as a result of local autonomy has opened up competition over economic resources, and elite contestation of political power for their own interests. In order to maintain their power while adjusting to decentralization, the elites have often mobilized their followers through ethnic ties or religious networks to attain their objectives (Aspinal and Fealey, 2003: 6-9; Van Klinken, 2006: 138-143).

However, the study revises a previous theory on pluralism. In earlier studies, pluralism is described as the individual's positive appreciation of religious plurality, either in the acceptance of underlying common elements of different religious traditions, or by stressing the value and richness of differences between religious traditions (Anthony et al., 2005; 2015). Therefore, pluralism is expected to have a negative association with support for harm. Our result points towards a positive relation, i.e., the more that individuals agree with pluralism, the more they support harm. This implies support for harm among respondents with an explicit personal (religious) interpretation of religious plurality. This support has no connection with the positive attitudes towards religious plurality. It could arise from other factors–i.e. that respondents have their own, personal agenda in relation to support for violence. The support for violence has nothing to do with their pluralistic view.

In the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for demonstrations, salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation are intermediate determinants. Ethnic salience is the awareness of individuals of their ethnic categorization and identity and the importance of this ethnic identification to them (Phinney, 1990; Duckit, 2006: 154). As we predicted, this study provides evidence that ethnic salience mediates the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for demonstrations. It highlights the ongoing importance of ethnicity in Indonesia. In addition, relatively more agreement with hermeneutic interpretations of sacred texts induces support for demonstrations. It means that support for demonstrations is also given by people who have a critical, but committed, attitude towards their own religious texts.

6.5. New research issues

Based on the study findings, we propose new research topics as follows:

The repetition of the study with the extension of research sites and samples, with multilevel analyses that consider the typical characteristics of these sites.

This study has provided explanations for latent conflict in Indonesia by showing that support for intergroup violence is a dimension of exclusionism. Although we

adopted ethnic group conflict theory as the basis for a number of our hypotheses, the contextual level, which is the integral part of the theory, has not yet been tested. An analysis of this in future studies will make the corroboration of the theories more reliable. We are still curious to discover the extent to which contextual factors (e.g. actual competition, relative group size and migration) influence the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence in Indonesia; we could take into account actual competition over scarce resources, such as in the labour market, and power differences within historical and contemporary conditions. Relative group size is also relevant to an understanding of group relations, along with power and status differences between groups that potentially influence individual attitudes to group identification. The individual-level analysis would be more meaningful and comprehensive if it were connected to contextual-level analysis. We also recommend repeating this study with the same design, and expanding the research sites to other areas. Repetition would provide longitudinal data, while the expansion to different research sites would give a variety of findings comparable to those of this study, and thereby corroborate the theories.

To give a complete picture of latent conflict in Indonesia, further studies should also include other areas where intergroup tensions run high, particularly areas where ethno-religious violence have ever taken place. For instance, in Sambas, Balikpapan, Sampit and Palangkaraya in Kalimantan, ethno-religious violence has had a strong ethnic dimension that involved Malay, Dayak and Madurese. In Jakarta, Surakarta and Medan, Chinese groups are repeatedly the target of looting and harassment. Aceh, Timika and Wamena in Papua experience protracted insurgencies against the national government of Indonesia. Besides these, the research should include areas of relatively peaceful coexistence such as Surabaya, Bali, Malang, Semarang, Padang, and Makassar. In order to extend the reach of the research, the sample should be drawn randomly from various groups in society and should not be limited to the student population.

Ethno-religious identity and religious intolerance

We have found evidence that religious identification is stronger than ethnic identification. Our study has shown that people are more likely to participate in religious rituals and other practices than to participate in ethnic ceremonies. Support for violence is also stronger among respondents with higher levels of positive in-group attitudes (religiocentrism), more agreement with pluralism and more agreement with a hermeneutic interpretation of Holy Scriptures. These findings reveal the importance of religion in Indonesia, contrary to its limited role in Western, more secular societies. Previous studies have already pointed to the increasing role of religion in the political landscape of Indonesia since the 1990s (Van Bruinessen, 1996; Sidel, 2006; Hefner, 2011). As a consequence of this, religion is not only relevant to

the construction of individual identities, but can also lead to religious intolerance in society as a whole. Our findings show that ethno-religious identification influences support for intergroup violence directly or indirectly. However, we have not investigated the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intragroup violence, i.e. violence within religious groups. So far, few studies have focused on this phenomenon, although it has dramatically increased in recent years, for instance in the conflicts between mainstream Muslim groups such as Muhamadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) on the one hand and Ahmadiyah and Shiah on the other.

Religion and nationalism

Since we have found that lower levels of nationalism induce support for intergroup violence, it would be worthwhile to explore the relationship between religion and nationalism. Recent studies of Indonesia have discussed the increasing importance of religious identity (Van Bruinessen, 1996; Hefner, 2011), and the decline of nationalism since the reformation (Anderson, 1999; Bertrand, 2004), but the relationship between these issues has been paid little attention (Menchik, 2014). So, a future study could explore the religious factors that make nationalism stronger or weaker among different groups. We could test the relationship between ethno-religious identification and nationalism in the context of regionalism and globalism. It would be interesting to know whether ethnicity or religion determines nationalism in Indonesia. Such a study should expand research samples in representative areas of Indonesia.

Ethno-religious identification and peace-making

Future research could also address the relationship between ethno-religious identification and peace-making. Our findings show that support for intergroup violence is present both in Yogyakarta and Ambon. We have learned that perceived group threat, religiocentrism (i.e. positive in-group attitudes), pluralism, nationalism, salience of ethnic identity and favouring a hermeneutic interpretation of sacred texts mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. We also predict that conflict will decline when conditions for the support for intergroup violence are reduced. Nonetheless, it would be meaningful to set up systematic research for conflict prevention and resolution. Many efforts have been made by academics and social workers, such as the revitalization of local wisdom regarding peace- or trust-building between conflicting groups, but with limited effect (Bräuchler, 2009; Subagya, 2009). Besides exploring the tradition of peace-making within communities, we should look into potential variables that not only reduce prejudice and hostility against the out-groups, but also develop trust between them.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Factor analyses

Table 1 Perceived group threat

	Muslim			Christian		
	h^2	Factor loading pattern matrix		h^2	Factor loading pattern matrix	
		Political economy	Socio-cultural		Political economy	Socio-cultural
153. The migration of people of different religious groups to my community is a threat to my own religious groups	.71	.91		.75	.95	
152. I am afraid that customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups	.59	.84		.53	.78	
154. I am worried that job prospects for members of my group would decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.64	.81		.71	.83	
158. I am worried that the security in my neighbourhood will decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.64	.75		.69	.59	
156. I am worried that security in my university will decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.64	.68		.62	.78	
159. The religious practices of people from other religious groups threaten our own way of life	.59	.64		.55	.54	
155. I am worried that study grant opportunities will decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.54	.56		.59	.73	
163. The chances of getting space in a boarding house will decline due to the presence of other groups	.41	.47		.54	.61	
160. People from other religious groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities	.67		.78	.64		.80
161. Members of other religious groups are in control of business opportunities	.59		.75	.74		.81
Initial eigenvalues		5.66	1.11		5.93	1.13
% variance of squared loadings extraction		52.68	7.40		55.69	8.06
Reliability		.91			.92	

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Political economy	Socio-cultural
Political economy	1.00	.57
Socio-cultural	.57	1.00

Factor correlation matrix (Christians)

Factor	Political economy	Socio-cultural
Political economy	1.00	.58
Socio-cultural	.58	1.00

Table 2 Salience of identity

	Muslims			Christians		
	h^2	Factor loadings pattern matrix		h^2	Factor loadings pattern matrix	
		Ethnicity	Religion		Ethnicity	Religion
260. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions	.59	.76		.56	.76	
259. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence in my daily life	.56	.76		.64	.80	
261. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I relate with others	.52	.70		.45	.64	
257. My ethnic identity is very important to me	.42	.64		.39	.62	
258. I see myself as a committed member of my ethnic group	.29	.55		.42	.65	
43. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions	.64		.89	.67		.82
42. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence in my daily life	.77		.81	.58		.78
44. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I relate with others	.56		.73	.46		.64
Initial eigenvalues		3.18	2.03		3.38	1.70
% variance of squared loadings extraction		34.01	20.63		36.33	15.82
Reliability		.81	.84		.82	.77

Factor Correlation Matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Ethnicity	Religion
Ethnicity	1.00	.22
Religion	.22	1.00

Factor Correlation Matrix (Christians)

Factor	Ethnicity	Religion
Ethnicity	1.00	.35
Religion	.35	1.00

Table 3 Quality of contact

	Muslims				Christians			
	h^2	Factor loadings pattern matrix			h^2	Factor loadings pattern matrix		
		Quality of contact				Quality of contact		
		1*	2*	3*		1*	2*	3*
133. How much do you cooperate with your board/ dorm/ housemates from other religious groups?	.76	.91			.55	.70		
131. How much do you cooperate with your neighbours from other religious groups?	.64	.88			.44	.48		
121. How close are you with your neighbours from other religious groups?	.63	.83			.56	.69		
135. How much do you cooperate with your relatives from other religious groups?	.75	.83			.60	.61		
123. How close are you with your board/dorm/housemates from other religious groups?	.67	.80			.63	.70		
134. How much do you cooperate with your close friends from other religious groups?	.78	.79			.70	.82		
124. How close are you with your close friends from other religious groups?	.78	.66			.69	.78		
117. How would you rate your contact with them? As classmates	.88		.92		.64		-.77	
119. How would you rate your contact with them? As close friends	.84		.89		.81		-.83	
116. How would you rate your contact with them? As neighbours	.86		.89		.79		-.80	
120. How would you rate your contact with them? As relatives	.79		.89		.76		-.78	
118. How would you rate your contact with them? As board/dorm/housemates	.80		.86		.77		-.78	
129. How equal would you say you are with your close friends from other religious groups?	.89			-.96	.76			-.81
127. How equal would you say you are with your classmates from other religious groups?	.88			-.92	.75			-.81
128. How equal would you say you are with your board/ dorm/ housemates from other religious groups?	.85			-.88	.68			-.75
126. How equal would you say you are with your neighbours from other religious groups?	.76			-.85	.75			-.82
130. How equal would you say you are with your relatives from other religious groups?	.81			-.81	.74			-.78
Initial eigenvalues		13.31	1.73	1.12		10.53	2.07	1.79
% variance of squared loadings extraction		65.47	7.96	4.53		51.06	8.95	7.36
Reliability			.97				.95	

*1= closeness and cooperation; 2= evaluation; 3= equality

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Closeness and cooperation	Evaluation	Equality
Closeness and cooperation	1.00	.68	-.80
Evaluation	.68	1.00	-.64
Equality	-.80	-.64	1.00

Factor correlation matrix (Christians)

Factor	Closeness and cooperation	Evaluation	Equality
Closeness and cooperation	1.00	-.55	-.56
Evaluation	-.55	1.00	.38
Equality	-.56	.38	1.00

Table 4 Individual memory of violence

	Dimension	Reliability		
		National	Muslims	Christians
58a. Did any acts of ethno-religious violence occur in the province where you came from in the past 10 years?	Memory of violence	.69	.71	.65
59a. In your family, did you talk about ethno-religious violence that happened in your province?				
60a. Did you witness violence, for example fighting or rioting (related to ethno-religious conflict), in the past 10 years?				
61a. Have you suffered any kind of physical injury due to the violence in the past 10 years?	Direct experience of violence	.80	.81	.79
70a. Were any of your immediate family members injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
71a. Did any of your immediate family members lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
72a. Were any of your relatives injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
73a. Did any of your relatives lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
74a. Were any of your close friends injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?	Indirect experience of violence	.76	.75	.76
75a. Did any of your close friends lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
76a. Were any of your neighbours injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
77a. Did any of your neighbours lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
All questions		.86	.85	.85

Table 5 Perceived discrimination

	Muslims			Christians		
	h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Public	Private		Public	Private
190. Limitations on access to government subsidy	.62	.83		.66	.76	
199. Limitations on access to job market	.62	.80		.72	.77	
201. Limitations on recruitment as a civil servant	.52	.76		.77	.97	
188. Limitations on freedom of expression	.49	.74		.59	.69	
191. Limitations on freedom to choose a place of residence	.55	.71		.56	.62	
203. Limitations on attaining higher positions in government offices	.53	.69		.75	.94	
189. Limitations on celebration of group's ceremonies	.49	.66		.55	.68	
196. Limitations on access to the housing market	.55	.65		.67	.57	
202. Limitations on running of religious schools	.45	.62		.70	.87	
193. Limitations on participation in the local market	.59	.61		.66	.56	
200. Forced observance of religious laws of other group	.30	.57		.61	.82	
192. Limitations on dress	.69		.84	.74		.84
194. Limitations on behavior	.58		.72	.59		.73
Initial eigenvalues		6.54	1.30		8.16	1.09
% variance of squared loadings extraction		46.76	7.09		60.23	5.88
Reliability		.91			.95	

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Public	Private
Public	1.00	.49
Private	.49	1.00

Factor correlation matrix (Christians)

Factor	Public	Private
Public	1.00	.63
Private	.63	1.00

Table 6 Religiocentrism

	Muslims			Christians		
	h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Negative out-group	Positive in-group		Negative out-group	Positive in-group
48. When it comes to religion. Christians are less tolerant /54. Muslim	.70	.84		.72	.90	
50. Christians are often the cause of religious conflict/56. Muslim	.62	.79		.48	.64	
46. Christians only talk about doing good deeds without practicing them/52. Muslim	.44	.64		.47	.65	
45. Muslims respond to God the most faithfully/51. Christian	.51		.77	.41		.68
49. Muslims are best able to talk meaningfully about God/55. Christian	.64		.72	.85		.89
47. Thanks to their religion. Most Muslims are good people/53. Christian	.16		.32	.35		.47
Initial eigenvalues		2.80	1.16		2.95	1.16
% variance of squared loadings extraction		39.55	11.71		42.20	12.56
Reliability		.80	.62		.78	.74

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Negative out-group	Positive in-group
Negative out-group	1.00	.48
Positive in-group	.48	1.00

Factor correlation matrix (Christians)

Factor	Negative out-group	Positive in-group
Negative out-group	1.00	.50
Positive in-group	.50	1.00

Table 7 Attitudes towards religious plurality

	Muslim			Christian		
	h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Pluralism	Monism		Pluralism	Monism
83. All religions are equally valid paths to liberation	.59	.68		.57	.72	
85. Differences between religions provide more knowledge of God	.40	.64		.37	.61	
88. Differences between religions are a source of spiritual development	.39	.64		.40	.63	
89. At the deepest level. all religions are the same	.54	.63		.39	.59	
86. Everything what is said about God in other religions has the same values	.47	.61		.33	.57	
80. All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth	.51	.59		.42	.63	
82. Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment	.33	.58		.29	.53	
84. The truth about God is found only in my religion	.55		.71	.64		.79
81. Other religions do not provide as deep a God-experience as my religion	.51		.69	.52		.72
78. Compared with other religions. my religion offers the surest way to liberation	.31		.57	.43		.65
87. Compared with my religion. other religions contain only partial truths	.31		.56	.54		.73
Initial eigenvalues		3.94	2.09		3.42	2.55
% variance of squared loadings extraction		31.15	13.64		26.02	18.59
Reliability		.83	.74		.80	.81

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Pluralism	Monism
Pluralism	1.00	-.19
Monism	-.19	1.00

Factor correlation matrix (Christians)

Factor	Pluralism	Monism
Pluralism	1.00	-.09
Monism	-.09	1.00

Table 8 Intra-textual fundamentalism and hermeneutic interpretation

	Muslim			Christian		
		Factor loadings Pattern matrix			Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
	h^2	Intra-textual	Hermeneutic inter-pretation	h^2	Intra-textual	Hermeneutic inter-pretation
62. Everything in the Sacred Writing is absolutely true without question	.75	.86		.81	.90	
63. The Sacred Writing should never be doubted. even when scientific or historical evidence outright disagrees with it	.52	.72		.75	.87	
65. The truths of the Sacred Writing will never be outdated. but will always apply equally well to all generations	.34	.60		.32	.55	
66. The Sacred Writing is the only one that is true above all Holy Books	.29	.54		.25	.50	
68. The meanings of the Sacred Writing are open to change and interpretation	.21		.46	.30		.54
69. The Sacred Writing holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection	.21		.45	.42		.56
Initial eigenvalues		2.40	1.20		2.61	1.27
% variance of squared loadings extraction		32.17	7.02		36.97	10.61
Reliability		.77	.33		.78	.40

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Intra-textual	Hermeneutic interpretation
Intra-textual	1.00	.04
Hermeneutic interpretation	.04	1.00

Factor correlation matrix (Christians)

Factor	Intra-textual	Hermeneutic interpretation
Intra-textual	1.00	.08
Hermeneutic interpretation	.08	1.00

Table 9 Nationalism and Regiocentrism

	Muslims			Christians		
	h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		h^2	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Nationalism	Regiocen-trism		Nationalism	Regiocen-trism
140. Renewing national ideas is our national task	.48	.69		.55	.74	
138. I should respect my nation and its tradition	.48	.69		.33	.57	
139. I should always put natioal interest above ethno-religious group interest	.30	.55		.41	.64	
141. I would rather be a citizen of Indonesia than of any other country in the world	.23	.47		.24	.46	
142. I should support my district even if my district is wrong	.47		.68	.55		.73
144. I should always put district interest above national interest	.34		.59	.41		.64
Initial eigenvalues		2.08	1.42		2.09	1.51
% variance of squared loadings extraction		24.66	13.82		25.15	16.45
Reliability		.67	.57		.66	.62

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Nationalism	Regiocentrism
Nationalism	1.00	-.00
Regiocentrism	-.00	1.00

Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)

Factor	Nationalism	Regiocentrism
Nationalism	1.00	.03
Regiocentrism	.03	1.00

Table 10 Intergroup distrust

	Dimension	Reliability		
		National	Muslim	Christian
208. On the whole one can trust Muslims*	Out-group distrust	.70	.71	.69
209. On the whole one can trust Christians*				
210. On the whole one can rely on Muslim*				
211. On the whole one can rely on Christians*				
212. It is better to be careful if one is dealing with Muslims				
213. It is better to be careful if one is dealing with Christians				
214. Most Muslims would exploit me if they had the opportunity				
215. Most Christians would exploit me if they had the opportunity				
216. Most of the time, Muslims attempt to act in their own interest				
217. Most of the time, Christians attempt to act in their own interest				

* Q208 to q211 on trust is changed into negative statements to make the same measures of distrust.

APPENDIX 2

Analyses of Variance

Ethno-religious identification and support for violence

Table 1 Ethnic self-definition and support for violence

Ethnic self-definition	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Javanese	1.69	344	1.56	102	3.25	345	2.93	103
Sundanese	1.57	35	2.50	2	3.17	36	2.50	2
Madurese	1.89	36			3.25	36		
Minangkabau	1.76	17			3.06	17		
Ambonese	1.69	235	1.80	322	3.28	237	3.04	322
Buginese	1.90	10			3.30	10		
Makassarese	1.50	2	2.00	1	3.50	2		
Buton	1.78	94			3.26	94		
Toraja			1.65	20			3.15	20
Minahasa			1.20	5			3.20	5
Chinese	2.00	1	1.77	43	3.00	1	3.02	43
Batak	1.50	2	1.74	35	2.00	2	3.23	35
Other ethnic groups	1,69	42	1.70	56	3.33	43	3.02	56
Total	1.71	818	1.74	586	3.25	823	3.03	587
		Sign		Sign		Sign		Sign
F	.70	.73	1.74	.09	.77	.66	.79	.61
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

Table 2 Ethnic languages use and support for violence

Ethnic Languages*	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Never	1.75	277	1.84	321	3.24	279	3.01	320
One - two occasions	1.71	266	1.73	88	3.26	268	3.08	89
Three – four occasions	1.66	80	1.61	65	3.19	81	3.09	65
Five-six occasions	1.68	216	1.60	128	3.31	216	3.01	128
Total	1.71	839	1.75	602	3.26	844	3.03	602
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.53	.66	3.91	.01	.47	.70	.31	.82
Linearity			11.25	.00				
Deviance								
R			-.14					
Eta								

*The occasions : at home; in family gatherings; in university; in dealing with government offices; in the community of residence and talking with close-friends.

Table 3 Friends by ethnicity and support for violence

Friends by ethnicity	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
None to Some	1.78	59	1.88	34	3.20	59	3.06	34
Relatively many	1.65	254	1.73	130	3.23	256	3.00	130
Almost all	1.70	337	1.76	216	3.28	337	3.08	217
All	1.81	119	1.62	131	3.19	120	3.00	131
Total	1.71	769	1.72	511	3.24	772	3.04	512
		Sign		Sign		Sign		Sign
F	1.81	.114	1.51	.21	.47	.70	.38	.77
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

Table 4 Participation in ethnic ceremonies and support for violence

Participation in ethnic ceremony	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
No knowledge	1.64	90	1.74	114	3.04	91	2.90	113
I do not participate in it and neither does my family	1.66	238	1.72	170	3.27	239	3.05	170
I do not participate in it but my family does	1.71	286	1.72	138	3.29	286	3.06	139
I do participate	1.77	117	1.67	64	3.28	118	2.95	64
Total	1.70	731	1.72	486	3.25	734	3.01	486
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.94	.42	.12	.95	2.60	.05	1.04	.37
Linearity					3.98	.05		
Deviance					1.91	.15		
R					.07			
Eta								

Table 5 Membership in ethnic organization and support for violence

Membership in Ethnic organization	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
No	1.73	663	1.74	474	3.25	666	3.02	473
Member	1.59	148	1.74	85	3.29	149	3.16	85
Total	1.70	811	1.74	559	3.26	815	3.04	558
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	5.31	.02	.00	.97	.31	.58	2.12	.15
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta		.08						

Table 6 Participation in ethnic organization activities and support for violence

Participation in ethnic organization activities	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Never	1.47	19	1.88	8	2.89	19	2.75	8
Only on special days	1.57	89	1.66	47	3.26	89	3.15	47
At least once a month	1.64	14	1.94	16	3.43	14	3.56	16
Once a week and more than once a week	1.76	29	1.89	18	3.63	30	3.06	18
Total	1.60	151	1.78	89	3.31	152	3.17	89
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.82	.49	.92	.44	3.28	.03	2.77	.05
Linearity					9.19	.00	.84	.36
Deviance					.83	.48	3.73	.03
R					.24			
Eta							.30	

Religious identification and support for violence

Table 7 Religious self-definition and support for violence

Religious self- definition	Harm		Demonstration	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
Muslim	1.71	839	3.26	844
Christian	1.75	602	3.03	602
Total	1.73	1.441	3.16	1.446
		Sign.		Sign.
F	.95	.33	28.50	.00
Eta			.14	

Participation on religious activities and support for violence

Table 8 Collective rituals and support for violence

Participation in Collective rituals	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
I do not participate in it and neither does my family	1.71	14	1.57	7	2.79	14	2.57	7
I do not participate in it but my family does	2.00	16	2.14	7	2.81	16	2.57	7
I do participate but for non-religious reasons	1.94	34	1.81	89	3.18	34	3.00	90
I do participate for religious reasons	1.68	749	1.73	466	3.28	754	3.06	465
Total	1.70	813	1.74	569	3.26	818	3.04	569
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	2.82	.04	1.10	.35	3.82	.01	1.57	.20
Linearity	3.79	.05			10.79	.00		
Deviance	2.33	.10			.33	.72		
R	-.07				.11			
Eta								

Table 9 Religious practices and support for violence

Religious practices	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Only on feast days or special holy days	1.59	22	1.88	16	3.05	22	3.25	16
Once a month to once a week	1.73	94	1.85	59	3.28	95	2.93	59
More than once a week	1.70	102	1.72	75	3.18	103	2.92	75
Once a day	1.60	60	1.76	82	3.33	60	2.89	82
Several times a day	1.63	103	1.74	27	3.30	104	3.19	27
Total	1.67	381	1.77	259	3.26	384	2.96	259
		Sign		Sign		Sign		Sign
F	.61	.65	.31	.87	.83	.50	1.14	.34
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

Table 10 Rites de passage and support for violence

Participation in Rites de passage	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Never	1.83	23	1.33	9	2.83	23	3.11	9
Only on feast days or special holy days	1.76	165	1.92	60	3.11	167	3.017	60
At least once a month	1.65	254	1.68	169	3.33	256	3.08	170
Once a week	1.71	369	1.78	303	3.30	370	3.03	302
Total	1.70	811	1.75	541	3.26	816	3.04	541
		Sign		Sign		Sign.		Sign.
F	1.15	.33	2.46	.06	5.51	.00	.17	.92
Linearity					9.92	.00		
Deviance					3.30	.04		
R					.11			
Eta					.14			

Friends by religion and support for violence

Table 11 In-group friends and support for violence

In-group friends	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Some	2.47	17	1.85	26	2.82	17	3.08	26
Relatively many	1.74	112	1.70	177	3.29	112	2.94	177
Almost all	1.65	376	1.77	230	3.22	377	3.11	231
All	1.72	325	1.69	151	3.32	329	3.02	151
Total	1.70	830	1.73	584	3.26	835	3.03	585
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	8.32	.00	.71	.55	2.81	.04	1.31	.27
Linearity	3.23	.07			3.50	.06		
Deviance	10.861	.00			2.46	.09		
R					.07			
Eta	.17				.10			

Table 12 Out-group friends and support for violence

Out-group friends	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
None	1.78	180	1.83	23	3.24	182	3.17	23
Some	1.70	384	1.78	259	3.31	385	3.01	259
Relatively many	1.59	160	1.69	235	3.18	160	3.06	236
Almost all	1.86	29	1.66	56	2.65	29	3.16	56
Total	1.70	753	1.73	573	3.24	756	3.05	574
		Sign.		Sign		Sign.		Sign.
F	2.75	.04	.84	.50	6.88	.00	.52	.72
Linearity	2.42	.12			7.07	.01		
Deviance	2.92	.05			6.79	.00		
R					-.10			
Eta	.10				.16			

Religious organization and support for violence

Table 13 Membership in religious organization and support for violence

Membership in religious organization	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
No	1.72	466	1.76	344	3.22	469	3.01	344
Yes	1.71	352	1.72	231	3.33	353	3.07	230
Total	1.72	818	1.75	575	3.27	822	3.04	574
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.11	.75	.43	.52	3.91	.05	.69	.41
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta					.07			

Table 14 Participation in religious organization and support for violence

Participation in religious organization activities	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Never	1.71	35	1.83	24	3.26	35	2.75	24
Only on special days	1.65	152	1.64	75	3.32	152	3.13	75
Once a month to once a week	1.85	79	1.64	67	3.15	80	3.10	67
More than once a week	1.64	78	1.87	62	3.49	78	3.25	61
Total	1.70	344	1.72	228	3.31	345	3.11	227
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	1.70	.17	1.42	.24	2.57	.05	1.70	.17
Linearity					.50	.22		
Deviance					3.11	.05		
R								
Eta					.15			

Social position and support for violence

Table 15 Gender and support for violence

Gender		Harm				Demonstration			
		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Men		1.74	419	1.77	337	3.31	419	3.11	337
Women		1.67	406	1.68	257	3.21	411	2.91	257
Total		1.70	825	1.73	594	3.26	830	3.03	594
			Sign		Sign		Sign		Sign
	F	2.31	.13	2.03	.16	2.97	.09	8.26	.00
	Linearity								
	Deviance								
	R								
	Eta							.12	

Table 16 Parent's religion (homogamy) and support for violence

Family Homogamy		Harm				Demonstration			
		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
		Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
No		1.70	10	2.05	22	3.40	10	2.82	22
Yes		1.71	829	1.74	580	3.26	834	3.04	580
Total		1.71	839	1.75	602	3.26	844	3.03	602
			Sign		Sign		Sign		Sign
	F	.00	.96	.3.60	.06	.33	.57	1.43	.23
	Linearity								
	Deviance								
	R								
	Eta								

Table 17 Parent's education and support for violence

Parent's education	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Low	1.80	158	1.71	49	3.31	159	2.98	49
Middle	1.67	255	1.79	204	3.30	258	2.94	203
High	1.65	147	1.68	151	3.19	147	3.15	152
Total	1.71	560	1.74	404	3.28	564	3.02	404
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	2.24	.11	1.09	.34	.99	.37	3.06	.05
Linearity							3.99	.05
Deviance							2.13	.15
R							.10	
Eta							.12	

Table 18 Parent's occupational status and support for violence

Parent's occupational status	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Self employee	1.77	367	1.81	188	3.29	370	2.98	187
Labour/ officer	1.63	168	1.70	172	3.21	168	3.06	173
Informal worker	1.67	120	1.66	64	3.13	121	3.00	64
Unpaid worker	1.65	17	1.89	9	3.59	17	3.11	9
Total	1.71	672	1.75	433	3.25	676	3.02	433
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	2.01	.11	1.07	.36	2.40	.07	.33	.80
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

Table 19 Parent's occupation and support for violence

Parent's occupation	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Manager/ executive	1.20	5	2.00	1	2.60	5	2.00	1
Professionals	1.80	5	1.00	6	3.00	5	3.17	6
Technicians and Associate Professionals	1.85	13	1.60	15	3.31	13	3.00	15
Clerks	1.67	91	1.78	123	3.08	91	3.11	124
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers	1.88	25	1.96	27	2.96	26	3.30	27
Farmers. Forestry Workers and Fishermen	1.85	239	1.84	84	3.35	240	2.96	83
Trades and Related Workers	1.65	136	1.74	105	3.27	138	2.94	105
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	1.71	38	1.71	14	3.18	38	3.07	14
Laborers and Unskilled Workers	1.62	37	1.61	18	3.30	37	3.00	18
Special Occupations (specify)	1.68	19	1.80	30	3.16	19	2.77	30
Dead/absent	1.33	6	1.60	5	3.00	6	3.20	5
Total	1.74	614	1.77	428	3.24	618	3.02	428
		Sign		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	1.61	.10	1.02	.43	1.62	.10	1.02	.42
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

Table 20 Household income and support for violence

Household income	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Low	1.71	303	1.87	159	3.26	306	2.97	159
Middle	1.76	364	1.75	289	3.25	365	3.05	288
High	1.58	146	1.54	127	3.25	146	3.09	128
Total	1.71	813	1.74	575	3.26	817	3.04	575
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	3.46	.03	7.04	.00	.02	.98	.85	.43
Linearity	1.96	.16	13.54	.00				
Deviance	4.97	.03	.53	.47				
R			-.15					
Eta	.09							

Intermediary variables and Support for violence

Table 21 Perceived group threat and support for violence

Perceived Group threat	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.41	116	1.38	98	3.06	116	2.95	98
Disagree	1.67	479	1.75	367	3.19	481	3.00	367
Neither disagree nor agree	1.92	186	1.99	104	3.44	189	3.10	104
Agree	1.93	29	2.69	13	3.69	29	3.62	13
Total	1.70	810	1.75	582	3.25	815	3.02	582
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	15.67	.00	20.16	.00	10.74	.00	2.81	.04
Linearity	44.15	.00	56.89	.00	30.85	.00	5.24	.02
Deviance	1.42	.24	1.75	.17	.68	.51	1.60	.20
R	.23		.30		.19		.10	
Eta								

Salience of identities and support for violence

Table 22 Ethnic salience and support for violence

Ethnic salience	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Disagree	1.56	124	1.72	89	3.02	125	2.83	89
Neither disagree nor agree	1.72	367	1.72	286	3.19	370	2.94	286
Agree	1.77	196	1.92	112	3.40	197	3.17	112
Totally agree	1.89	37	1.87	39	3.35	37	3.38	39
Total	1.71	724	1.78	526	3.23	729	3.01	526
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	3.46	.02	2.20	.09	7.22	.00	6.37	.00
Linearity	9.26	.00			19.16	.00	18.37	.00
Deviance	.56	.57			1.26	.29	.37	.69
R	.11				.16		.18	
Eta								

Table 23 Religious salience and support for violence

Religious salience	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.40	10	1.60	5	3.30	10	2.80	5
Disagree	1.76	34	1.39	28	2.97	34	2.96	28
Neither disagree nor agree	1.71	119	1.66	94	3.13	119	2.97	94
Agree	1.79	194	1.79	144	3.33	195	3.02	144
Totally agree	1.68	280	1.81	204	3.31	283	3.15	203
Total	1.72	637	1.75	475	3.26	641	3.06	474
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	1.29	.27	2.32	.06	2.44	.05	1.09	.37
Linearity					5.45	.02		
Deviance					1.44	.23		
R					.09			
Eta								

Actual intergroup contact and support for violence

Table 24 Quantity of contact and support for violence

Quantity of contact	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Never	1.77	276	1.78	69	3.30	277	3.12	69
Almost once a month	1.68	93	1.71	65	3.24	93	2.86	65
Once a week	1.73	85	1.58	96	3.08	85	2.93	96
More than once a week	1.59	32	1.98	43	2.91	32	3.23	43
Once a day	1.73	33	2.03	29	3.21	33	3.10	29
Several times a day	1.57	51	1.62	107	3.12	51	2.97	107
Total	1.72	570	1.72	409	3.21	571	3.00	409
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	1.13	.35	3.07	.01	2.43	.03	1.48	.20
Linearity			.17	.68	6.08	.01		
Deviance			3.80	.01	1.52	.20		
R					-.10			
Eta			.19					

Table 25 Quality of contact and support for violence

Quality of contact	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Negative	1.85	86	1.75	8	3.21	86	3.25	8
Neither negative nor positive	1.73	213	1.67	150	3.11	215	3.04	151
Positive	1.86	69	1.98	124	3.19	69	3.06	124
Total	1.78	368	1.81	282	3.15	370	3.05	283
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	1.27	.28	5.35	.01	.65	.52	.24	.78
Linearity			9.12	.00				
Deviance			1.59	.21				
R			.18					
Eta								

Individual memory of violence and support for violence

Table 26 Individual memory of violence and support for violence

Memory of violence *	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
No memory	1.75	273	1.82	108	3.32	275	290	109
One occasion	1.68	165	1.63	123	3.16	165	2.99	123
Two occasions	1.67	180	1.69	140	3.26	183	2.96	140
Three occasions	1.73	205	1.77	205	3.22	205	3.15	205
Total	1.71	823	1.73	576	3.25	828	3.02	577
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.55	.65	1.86	.14	1.66	.18	2.85	.04
Linearity							6.59	.01
Deviance								
R							.11	
Eta								

*Memory: place and witness

Table 27 Direct violence and support for violence

Direct violence	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
No experience	1.69	599	1.75	377	3.24	603	2.99	378
One experiences	1.79	57	1.79	63	3.42	57	3.05	63
Two occasions	1.78	73	1.69	62	3.23	73	3.03	62
More than three occasions	1.77	89	1.71	82	3.30	89	3.16	81
Total	1.71	818	1.74	584	3.26	822	3.02	584
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.95	.42	.22	.88	1.08	.36	.95	.41
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

*Physical injury; family injury; family lost; relative injury; relative lost

Table 28 Indirect violence and support for violence

Indirect violence	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
No experience	1.20	626	1.73	391	3.26	630	2.99	391
One occasion	1.74	87	1.72	76	3.28	87	2.93	76
Two occasions	1.73	67	1.73	74	3.31	68	3.23	74
Three and four occasions	1.80	41	1.94	53	3.17	41	3.13	53
Total	1.71	821	1.75	594	3.26	826	3.03	594
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.16	.92	1.72	.17	.28	.84	2.23	.08
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

*close friend injury; close friend lost; neighbor injury; and neighbor lost

Table 29 Perceived discrimination and support for violence

Perceived discrimination	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.42	217	1.40	131	3.37	217	3.21	131
Disagree	1.73	510	1.78	334	3.22	515	2.95	334
Neither disagree nor agree	2.18	91	1.97	100	3.19	91	2.98	100
Agree	2.33	6	2.00	15	3.67	6	3.00	15
Total	1.70	824	1.73	580	3.26	829	3.01	580
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	32.49	.00	14.56	.00	2.71	.04	3.36	.02
Linearity	95.41	.00	39.11	.00	3.55	.66	4.61	.03
Deviance	1.03	.36	2.27	.11	2.29	.10	2.73	.07
R	.32		.25		-.08		-.09	
Eta					.10			

Religiosity and support for violence
Religiocentrism and support for violence

Table 30 Positive in-groups and support for violence

Positive ingroup	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.31	13	1.26	23	3.00	13	3.13	23
Disagree	1.78	83	1.67	140	3.01	83	3.12	139
Neither disagree nor agree	1.68	291	1.71	222	3.22	294	2.97	222
Agree	1.74	155	1.88	77	3.39	155	2.81	78
Totally agree	1.80	102	2.04	49	3.35	102	3.22	49
Total	1.72	644	1.74	511	3.25	647	3.02	511
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	2.21	.07	6.18	.00	3.89	.00	2.87	.02
Linearity			20.91	.00	12.47	.00	.65	.42
Deviance			1.27	.28	1.03	.38	3.61	.01
R			.20		.14			
Eta							.15	

Table 31 Negative out-groups and support for violence

Negative outgroup	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.42	84	1.52	79	3.04	84	3.20	78
Disagree	1.66	353	1.76	242	3.21	354	2.97	243
Neither disagree nor agree	1.76	267	1.84	206	3.32	269	3.06	206
Agree	1.91	57	1.91	22	3.54	59	3.14	22
Totally agree	2.05	20	1.82	11	3.30	20	3.64	11
Total	1.70	781	1.76	560	3.26	786	3.06	560
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	7.49	.00	2.85	.02	4.31	.00	2.68	.03
Linearity	28.35	.00	8.37	.00	13.68	.00	.50	.48
Deviance	.54	.66	1.01	.39	1.18	.32	3.40	.02
R	.19		.12		.13			
Eta							.14	

Attitudes towards plurality and support for violence

Table 32 Monism and support for violence

Monism	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslims		Christians		Muslims		Christians	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.72	18	1.24	63	3.11	18	2.95	63
Disagree	1.58	111	1.76	246	3.01	111	2.97	245
Neither disagree nor agree	1.80	320	1.76	210	3.13	323	2.94	211
Agree	1.69	157	1.62	29	3.47	157	3.24	29
Totally agree	1.59	46	2.27	15	3.66	47	3.87	15
Total	1.72	652	1.71	563	3.23	656	2.99	563
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	2.74	.03	11.20	.00	11.41	.00	5.16	.00
Linearity	.00	.99	19.58	.00	38.64	.00	7.33	.01
Deviance	3.65	.01	8.41	.00	2.33	.07	4.44	.00
R			.18		.24		.11	
Eta	.13		.27				.19	

Table 33 Pluralism and support for violence

Pluralism	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.58	52	1.00	3	3.19	53	2.33	3
Disagree	1.68	198	1.78	32	3.31	200	3.00	32
Neither disagree nor agree	1.75	389	1.79	263	3.24	389	2.97	263
Agree	1.80	87	1.82	73	3.34	87	3.03	73
Totally agree	1.71	14	1.75	40	3.00	14	3.28	40
Total	1.73	740	1.78	411	3.26	743	3.01	411
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	1.31	.27	1.01	.41	.98	.42	1.59	.18
Linearity								
Deviance								
R								
Eta								

Fundamentalism and support for violence

Table 34 Intra-textual fundamentalism and support for violence

Intratextual	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	2.50	4	1.08	13	2.50	4	3.00	13
Disagree	1.76	25	1.61	69	2.96	25	3.07	68
Neither disagree nor agree	1.75	130	1.76	192	3.09	132	2.98	193
Agree	1.87	134	1.69	81	3.36	135	3.01	81
Totally agree	1.64	250	1.88	98	3.31	251	3.26	98
Total	1.74	543	1.73	453	3.25	547	3.06	453
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	3.79	.01	3.90	.00	3.99	.00	1.86	.12
Linearity	5.12	.02	8.86	.00	11.05	.00		
Deviance	3.35	.02	2.25	.08	1.64	.18		
R	-.10		.14		.14			
Eta	.17							

Table 35 Hermeneutic interpretation and support for violence

Symbolic Fundamentalism	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.73	26	1.67	6	2.81	26	2.67	6
Disagree	1.60	96	1.68	34	3.22	98	3.00	34
Neither disagree nor agree	1.72	303	1.82	165	3.15	304	3.02	164
Agree	1.76	236	1.81	200	3.29	237	2.99	201
Totally agree	1.76	74	1.62	107	3.64	74	3.16	107
Total	1.72	735	1.76	512	3.24	739	3.03	512
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.93	.45	1.64	.16	8.35	.00	1.08	.36
Linearity					22.96	.00		
Deviance					3.48	.02		
R					.17			
Eta					.21			

Nationalistic attitudes and support for violence

Table 36 National pride and support for violence

National pride	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Not proud at all	1.71	14	1.31	13	3.00	14	3.15	13
Not proud	1.74	38	1.72	68	3.21	38	3.34	68
Neither proud nor not	1.68	223	1.71	186	3.32	223	3.00	186
Somewhat proud	1.78	249	1.87	172	3.17	250	3.02	173
Very proud	1.75	167	1.78	80	3.33	168	3.13	79
Total	1.74	691	1.76	519	3.26	693	3.07	519
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	.73	.58	2.36	.05	1.85	.12	2.48	.04
Linearity			4.25	.04			1.37	.24
Deviance			1.73	.16			2.86	.04
R			.04					
Eta							.14	

Table 37 Nationalism and support for violence

Nationalism	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Disagree	2.05	22	1.58	12	2.86	22	3.17	12
Neither disagree nor agree	1.71	228	1.79	221	3.15	230	2.93	220
Agree	1.84	208	1.89	155	3.22	209	2.97	156
Totally agree	1.65	105	1.56	68	3.55	105	3.18	68
Total	1.76	563	1.78	456	3.24	566	2.99	456
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	3.47	.02	3.66	.01	8.78	.00	1.77	.15
Linearity	.94	.33	.94	.33	22.93	.00		
Deviance	4.73	.01	5.03	.01	1.70	.18		
R					.20			
Eta	.14		.15					

Table 38 Regiocentrism and Support for violence

Regiocentrism	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Totally disagree	1.34	140	1.40	90	3.31	140	3.12	90
Disagree	1.65	409	1.70	257	3.19	413	3.02	257
Neither disagree nor agree	1.93	205	1.88	177	3.35	206	2.99	177
Agree	2.04	50	2.09	53	3.18	50	3.04	53
Totally agree	2.58	12	2.21	14	3.58	12	3.00	14
Total	1.70	816	1.76	591	3.26	821	3.03	591
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	27.36	.00	11.30	.00	2.29	.06	.39	.82
Linearity	106.07	.00	43.98	.00				
Deviance	1.13	.34	.41	.75				
R	.34		.26					
Eta								

Table 39 Intergroup distrust and support for violence

Distrust out-group	Harm				Demonstration			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Disagree	1.60	471	1.68	332	3.21	474	2.98	332
Neither disagree nor agree	1.89	302	1.87	230	3.27	304	3.03	230
Agree	1.70	60	1.61	31	3.57	60	3.52	31
Total	1.71	833	1.75	593	3.26	838	3.03	593
		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.		Sign.
F	17.09	.00	4.79	.01	5.51	.00	5.95	.00
Linearity	18.50	.00	3.02	.08.	7.87	.01	6.91	.01
Deviance	15.67	.00	6.55	.01	3.14		4.99	.03
R	.15				.10		.11	
Eta			.13				.14	

Appendix 3

Regression tables

Table 1 Support for harm to persons and properties

	Model	1	2a	2b	2c		3		4	
					Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
	Constant	1.69**	1.79**	2.03**	1.63**	2.07**	2.48	2.09**	.08	1.66**
1	**Ethno-religious self identification** (Javanese Muslim = ref.)									
	Sundanese Muslim	-.12	-.09	-.14	-.06	-.09	-.07	-.07	-.06	.18
	Madurese Muslim	.20*	.24*	.18	.23	.22*	.01	.08	.09	-.04
	Ambonese Muslim	.00	.04	.10	.11	.03	-.07	-.02	.33	-.04
	Buton Muslim	.09	.10	.12	.21	.12	-.06	.13	-.61	.09
	Muslim Rest	.04	.10	.12	.14	.06	-.02	.11	-.65	.13
	Javanese Christian	-.13	-.11	-.12	-.04	-.15*	-.18	-.07	.02	.10
	Ambonese Christian	.12*	.07	.22*	.17	.11*	.04	.13	-.57	.03
	Chinese Christian	.08	.07	.27	.32*	.06**	-.27	.07	-.12	.23
	Batak Christian	.06	.06	-.16	-.09	.02	-.10	-.03	-.38	.05
	Christian Rest	-.01	.05	-.09	-.18	-.02	-.11	-.06	.40	-.01
2	**Ethnic language use** (not use = ref.)									
	One to two occasions		-.05		.11					
	Three to four occasions		-.07		.08					
	Five - Six occasions		-.04		.10					
	Friends by ethnicity (none to some as ref.)									
	Relatively many		-.16*		-.13					
	Almost all		-.18*		-.12					
	All		-.17*		-.07					
	Ethnic ceremony (no knowledge = ref.)									
	I do not participate in it, and neither does my family		.08		.06					
	I do not participate in it but my family does		.09		.07					
	I do participate		.10		.18					
	Membership in ethnic organization		-.10*		-.02					

	Model	1	2a	2b	2c		3		4	
					Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
	Constant	1.69**	1.79**	2.03**	1.63**	2.07**	2.48	2.09**	.08	1.66**
	Participation in collective rituals (no participation both I and my family = ref.)									
	I do not participate in it but family does			-.01	.39					
	I do participate for non religious reasons			-.04	.35					
	I do participate for religious reasons			-.21	.23					
	Religious practices (only on feast days or special holy days = ref.)									
	Once a month to once a week			.16	.19					
	More than once a week			.12	.13					
	Once a day			.13	.04					
	Several times a day			.09	.03					
	Participation in rites de passage (never as ref.)									
	Only on feast days or special holy days			.01	-.15					
	At least once a month			-.13	-.29					
	Once a week			.03	-.16					
	In-group friends of the same religion (some = ref.)									
	Relatively many			.14	.13	.36**	.39*	.32*	.42	.10
	Almost all			.26	.27	.41**	.41*	.32*	.06	.17
	All			.26	.23	.44**	.44*	.36*	.09	.17
	Out-group friends of the same religion (none = ref.)									
	Some			.01	.11					
	Relatively many			-.11	-.07					
	Almost all			-.05	-.01					
	Membership in religious organization (no=ref.)			-.14*	-.11					
3	**Women** (men=ref.)						-.10			
	Homogamy (heterogamy = ref.)						-.13			
	Parent education (low = ref.)									
	Medium						.03			
	High						.02			

	Model	1	2a	2b	2c		3		4	
					Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
	Constant	**1.69****	**1.79****	**2.03****	**1.63****	**2.07****	**2.48**	**2.09****	**.08**	**1.66****
	Parent's occupational status (self employee = ref.)									
	Officer						-.03	-.13	.33	-.17
	Informal worker						-.24*	-.18*	.24	-.17*
	Unpaid worker						-.25	-.21	-1.03	-.19
	Parent's occupation									
	Manager						-.57*	-.55*		-.63*
	Profesional						-.54*	-.52*	-1.63*	-.66*
	Technician						-.05	-.00		-.45*
	Clerk						-.16	-.09	-.83*	-.32*
	Serviceworker						-.00	-.10	-.08	-.22
	Trader						-.17*	-.20*	.40	-.28*
	Operator						-.08	-.16	.40	-.05
	Laborer						-.37*	-.23*		-.27*
	Special						-.05	-.06	.44	-.13
	Dead/ Absence						-.41	-.40	.13	-.57
	Household income (High = ref.)									
	Low						.12	.06	-.22	
	Medium						.22*	.17*	-.56	
	Salience of ethnic identity								.20	
4	**Salience of religious identity**								.01	
	Perceived group threat								.57*	.17**
	Quantity of contact								.13	
	Quality of contact								-.05	
	Positive ingroup								-.13	.15*
	Negative outgroup								-.19	
	Monism								-.16	
	Pluralism								.29	.15*
	Fundamentalism								.38	
	Hermeneutic Interpretation								.11	
	Perceived discrimination								.10	
	National pride								-.30	
	Nationalism								-.05	-.22**
	Regiocentrism								.15	
	Memory of violence								-.51	
	Direct violence								.69*	
	Indirect violence								-.21*	
	Distrust								.07	
	R^2	.11	.14	25	.29	.15	.28	.24	.84	.45
	Adjusted R^2	.01	.02	.06	.09	.02	.08	.06	.71	.20

*p < .05 ** p < .01

Table 2 Support for public criticism and demonstration

	Model	1	2a	2b	2c		3		4	
					Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
	Constant	3.25**	3.06**	2.38**	2.20**	2.58**	2.34**	2.64**	.34	2.03**
1	**Ethno-religious self identification** (Javanese Muslim = ref.)									
	Sundanese Muslim	-.08	-.14	-.21	-.13	-.07	-.02	-.11	-.42	-.17
	Madurese Muslim	.00	.07	.17	-.07	.10	.06	.02	-.35	.05
	Ambonese Muslim	.04	.07	.03	.14	.04	.21*	.03	.59	-.08
	Buton Muslim	.01	.07	.01	.07	.02	.01	.03	-.19	-.04
	Muslim Rest	-.02	-.05	-.17	-.25	-.06	-.06	.02	.44	-.07
	Javanese Christian	-.31**	-.23*	-.43**	-.38*	-.28**	-.20	-.27*	-.46	-.16
	Ambonese Christian	-.20**	-.16*	-.24*	-.11	-.18*	-.08	-.16*	-.65	-.26*
	Chinese Christian	-.22*	-.11	-.32*	-.18	-.19	-.35	-.29*	-.60	-.27
	Batak Christian	-.02	.15	-.06	.21	.02	-.21	-.03	-.33	-.15
	Christian Rest	-.21*	-.21	-.22	-.19	-.18*	-.03	-.13	.52	-.05
2	**Ethnic language use** (not use = ref.)									
	One to two occasions		.12*		.11					
	Three to four occasions		.08		.37*					
	Five - Six occasions		.21**		.35**					
	Friends by ethnicity (none to some as ref.)									
	Relatively many		-.12		-.12					
	Almost all		-.05		-.08					
	All		-.17		-.27					
	Ethnic ceremony		.04		.02					
	Membership in ethnic organization		.05		-.04					
	Participation in collective rituals			.13	.11	.10**	.23**	.14**	.51*	.11**
	Religious practices (only on feast days or special holy days = ref.)									
	Once a month to once a week			-.04	.05					
	More than once a week			-.10	.05					
	Once a day			.03	.08					
	Several times a day			-.03	.03					
	Participation in rites de passage (never as ref.)									
	Only on feast days or special holy days			.02	.02					
	At least once a month			.30	.37					
	Once a week			.22	.21					

	Model	1	2a	2b	2c		3		4	
					Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
	Constant	**3.25****	**3.06****	**2.38****	**2.20****	**2.58****	**2.34****	**2.64****	**.34**	**2.03****
	Participation in rites de passage (never as ref.)									
	Only on feast days or special holy days			.02	.02					
	At least once a month			.30	.37					
	Once a week			.22	.21					
	In-group friends of the same religion			.05	.04					
	Out-group friends of the same religion			.02	-.01					
	Membership in religious organization (no=ref.)			.11	.12	.10*	.08			
3	**Women** (men=ref.)						-.20**	-.17**	-.83*	-.10
	Homogamy (heterogamy = ref.)						.33			
	Parent education (low = ref.)									
	Medium						-.05			
	High						.01			
	Parent's occupational status (self employee = ref.)									
	Officer						.03	.03	.41	.08
	Informal worker						-.11	-.11	-.51	-.14
	Unpaid worker						.26	.53*	1.24	.45*
	Parent's occupation									
	Manager						-.81*	-.80*		-.65
	Profesional						-.41	-.35	-1.06	-.57*
	Technician						-.28	-.24		-.20
	Clerk						-.30*	-.25	-.63	-.35*
	Serviceworker						-.10	-.08	-.42	-.28
	Trader						-.14	-.16*	.11	-.08
	Operator						-.28	-.29*	.53	-.31*
	Laborer						-.07	-.07		-.19
	Special						-.22	-.42*	-.82	-.39*
	Dead/ Absence						-.32	-.25	-2.22*	-.43
	Household income (High = ref.)									
	Low						-.28*	-.17*	.01	-.15
	Medium						-.03	-.01	.05	.01
4	**Salience of ethnic identity**								.20	.15**
	Salience of religious identity								.13	
	Perceived group threat								-.16	
	Quantity of contact								.13	
	Quality of contact								.15	
	Positive ingroup								.17	

Model	1	2a	2b	2c		3		4	
				Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Constant	**3.25****	**3.06****	**2.38****	**2.20****	**2.58****	**2.34****	**2.64****	**.34**	**2.03****
Negative outgroup								.15	
Monism								-.32	
Pluralism								.16	
Fundamentalism								-.09	
Hermeneutic interpretation								.13	.13**
Memory of violence								-.28	
Direct violence								.19	
Indirect violence								-.01	
National pride								.04	
Nationalism								-.17	
Regiocentrism								-.13	
Perceived discrimination								-.03	
Distrust								.07	
R^2	.15	.20	.27	.34	.18	.29	.26	.83	.34
Adjusted R^2	.02	.04	.07	.11	.03	.08	.07	.69	.12

*p < .05 ** p < .01

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Samenvatting

Nadat in Indonesië vanaf 1990 op grote schaal etnisch-religieus geweld uitbrak, kreeg dit collectief geweld relatief snel veel wetenschappelijke aandacht. In de talrijke publicaties over etnisch-religieuze conflicten in Indonesië werden de gewelddadige feiten en hun concrete aanleidingen niet alleen gedetailleerd beschreven, maar werd ook gezocht naar de complexe oorzaken tegen de achtergrond van brede theoretische kaders. Deze studie voegt nieuwe inzichten aan deze literatuur toe door zich te richten op de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en de steun voor het geweld tussen etnisch-religieuze groepen ('intergroepsgeweld') onder islamitische en christelijke studenten.

In deze studie wordt gebruik gemaakt van theorieën aangaande etnisch-religieuze identificatie en exclusionaire attitudes ('exclusionary attitudes') die reeds eerder zijn getest en gedeeltelijk gevalideerd in westerse samenlevingen. Deze studie past deze theorieën toe op het specifieke thema van steun voor geweld onder Indonesische jongeren, en stelt de vraag naar de relevantie van deze theorieën voor de Indonesische samenleving. Dat wil zeggen: worden deze theorieën in deze context bevestigd of afgewezen? Het belangrijkste voorbeeld is de etnische groep conflict theorie die herhaaldelijk is getest door verschillende wetenschappers in vele landen. De belangrijkste stelling is dat competitie tussen groepen op *zowel individueel als contextueel niveau* de mechanismen van sociale identificatie en contra-identificatie versterken, met exclusionaire attitudes als resultaat. Een andere theorie die ik heb getest is de zogenaamde (inter-groep) contact theorie die zich richt op de invloed van feitelijk contact tussen leden van groepen op attitudes ten opzichte van anderen. Verder is gekeken naar mogelijke de invloed van de saillantie van identiteit, van de herinnering aan en eerdere ervaringen met geweld, van gepercipieerde discriminatie, van religieuze opvattingen (met name houdingen tegenover pluraliteit, religiocentrisme en fundamentalisme), van nationalistische houdingen en van het vertrouwen, respectievelijk wantrouwen tussen groepen.

Deze studie maakt gebruik van een cross-cultureel vergelijkend onderzoek onder islamitische en christelijke respondenten uit verschillende etnische groepen in twee onderzoeksgebieden. Het ene gebied, Ambon, wordt geplaagd door frequente uitbarstingen van geweld tussen groepen, terwijl het andere gebied, Yogyakarta, relatief rustig is. In Ambon wordt het dagelijkse leven bepaald door sociale segregatie van moslims en christenen en een haast strikte scheiding van hun woongebieden. Beide groepen hebben duidelijke grenzen ten opzichte van elkaar vastgesteld en communiceren intern relatief intens over hun etnische en religieuze identiteit en daarmee samenhangende solidariteit. De etnisch-religieuze identificatie is zo sterk dat deze heeft geleid tot toenemende verschillen tussen groepen, tot grotere spanningen tussen moslims en christenen, en zelfs tot herhaaldelijk geweld. In tegenstelling tot Ambon is de relatie tussen de etnisch-religieuze groepen in Yogyakarta relatief

vreedzaam. Hoewel er af en toe geschillen hebben plaatsgevonden (en nog steeds plaatsvinden), hebben deze in Yogyakarta niet geleid tot massaal geweld tussen groepen.

In dit onderzoek is gebruik gemaakt van een mix van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve benaderingen. We hebben gebruik gemaakt van een groot dataset voortkomende uit een enquête en kwalitatieve interviews. De steekproef voor de enquête werd willekeurig getrokken uit de studentenpopulatie van zes universiteiten. Zowel in Ambon als in Yogyakarta werden een christelijke universiteit, een islamitische universiteit en een staatsuniversiteit gekozen. In totaal maakten 1.500 respondenten, gelijkmatig verdeeld over deze universiteiten, deel uit van de steekproef. De belangrijkste informanten voor de interviews werden geselecteerd uit zowel de respondenten als non-respondenten van de enquête. De interviews met respondenten van de steekproef werden afgenomen nadat ze waren uitgenodigd om verdere uitleg te geven over hun verklaringen. Ze werden gevraagd om hun antwoorden uit te breiden en extra uitleg te geven over de onderzoeksthema's.

Tijdens de voorbereiding van het onderzoek is gezocht naar eerder gevalideerde en betrouwbare meetinstrumenten. We hebben deze meetinstrumenten zo nodig herzien en aangepast aan de Indonesische context alvorens ze naar het Indonesisch werden vertaald. Belangrijke punten die onderbelicht bleven in het kwantitatief onderzoek werden uitgewerkt via de ontwikkeling van een topiclijst voor de interviews. De lijst werd gebruikt om verdere relevante onderwerpen uit te werken en naar eventueel aanvullende verklaringen van ondersteuning van geweld te zoeken. De resultaten van de enquêtes en de interviews werden ook onderling vergeleken (triangulatie).

De onderzoeksvragen zijn zowel van beschrijvende als verklarende aard De beschrijvende vragen gaan over de aanwezigheid van etnisch-religieuze identificatie en de mate van steun voor geweld onder moslims en christenen in Ambon en Yogyakarta; alsmede over de concrete manieren waarop etnisch-religieuze identificatie en steun voor intergroepsgeweld waarneembaar zijn onder moslims en christenen in de genoemde twee steden.

De verklarende vragen richten zich op drie punten. Het eerste punt betreft de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en de (steun voor) geweld tussen groepen. Het tweede punt gaat over de invloed van sociale kenmerken zoals geslacht, het beroep van de ouders of gezinsinkomen op deze relatie, en het derde heeft betrekking op de invloed van intermediaire factoren op deze relaties, zoals gepercipieerde competitie en groepsdreiging, saillantie van identiteit, intergroepscontact, herinneringen aan geweld uit het verleden, gepercipieerde discriminatie, religiositeit (bestaande uit verschillende houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit, religiocentrisme en fundamentalisme), nationalistische houdingen en wantrouwen. De verklarende vragen kunnen als volgt worden geformuleerd:

1. In hoeverre is er een relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie onder moslims en christenen in Ambon en Yogyakarta en steun voor intergroepsgeweld?
2. In hoeverre is er een relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie onder moslims en christenen in Ambon en Yogyakarta en steun voor intergroepsgeweld, rekening houdend met andere individuele determinanten?
3. In hoeverre kunnen we de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en steun voor intergroepsgeweld verklaren met behulp van intermediaire determinanten?

We hebben de etnisch-religieuze identificatie met een set van metingen in kaart gebracht. Deze omvatten etnische taalgebruik, deelname aan etnische ceremonies, het aantal vrienden uit de eigen etnische groep (*in-group)* en andere etnische groepen (*out*-groups), lidmaatschap van etnische organisaties, deelname aan collectieve religieuze rituelen, *rites de passage*, religieuze praktijken, het aantal vrienden uit de religieuze *in-group* en de religieuze *out-group*, en lidmaatschap van religieuze organisaties. Bij vrijwel alle respondenten behoort etnische identificatie tot een belangrijk onderdeel van de identiteit, maar moslims tonen een sterkere etnische identificatie dan christenen. Ze spreken hun etnische taal vaker en wonen etnische ceremonies vaker bij. Meer moslims zijn ook lid van etnische organisaties. Ten aanzien van religieuze identificatie, nemen moslims vaker dan christenen deel aan collectieve rituelen. Ze bidden en wonen religieuze diensten ook vaker bij. Alleen wat betreft *rites de passage* is de participatie van moslims lager. Degenen die wel aanwezig zijn op de ceremonies doen dit vooral om niet-religieuze redenen, zoals solidariteit met de buren, of om de uitnodiging van hun familieleden te respecteren. Moslims hebben ook meer vrienden die tot de religieuze *in-group* behoren, en minder relatief minder vrienden die tot de religieuze *out-group* behoren.

De kwalitatieve gegevens ondersteunen de bevindingen van de kwantitatieve analyses. Etnische identificatie onder moslims is sterker dan onder christenen. In Ambon spreken moslims hun etnische taal vaker dan christenen. Dit is vooral het geval tijdens de traditionele ceremonies in islamitische dorpen. Christenen gebruiken het standaard Indonesisch vaker dan hun etnische taal. De kwalitatieve gegevens tonen ook aan dat religieuze identificatie in zowel Yogyakarta als Ambon sterker is dan etnische identificatie. Uit de interviews blijkt dat religieuze praktijken en persoonlijke religieuze expressie de afgelopen tien jaar steeds belangrijker zijn geworden. Het merendeel van de geïnterviewden bevestigde dat zij deelnemen aan traditionele ceremonies en religieuze rituelen en gaven daarvoor religieuze redenen op. In *rites de passage* is veelal sprake van een mengeling van religieuze en etnische aspecten, met name in huwelijks- en funeraire rituelen. De deelname hieraan is

zodoende ook gebaseerd op niet-religieuze motieven. In vergelijking met christenen, zijn moslims meer betrokken bij religieuze organisaties en religieus gelieerde politieke organisaties. Enkele christenen zeggen ook lid te zijn van religieuze organisaties, maar deze organisaties hebben primair politieke belangen. Zowel de kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve gegevens bevestigen dat religieuze identificatie sterker en belangrijker is dan etnische identificatie, en dat over het algemeen moslims sterkere religieuze identificatie tonen dan christenen.

De tweede onderzoeksvraag, over steun voor intergroepsgeweld, wordt ook beantwoord via zowel kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve analyses. De meting van de steun voor geweld onderging een strikte procedure van factor analyse(s). Ik vond dat steun voor geweld twee dimensies heeft: steun voor openbare kritiek en demonstraties; en steun voor het berokkenen van schade aan personen en goederen. In het algemeen hebben de respondenten de neiging om openbare kritiek en demonstraties te ondersteunen, maar weigeren ze om schade aan personen en goederen goed te keuren. Vergelijking tussen moslims en christenen toont aan dat moslims meer steun verlenen aan protest en demonstraties dan christenen. Onze interviews ondersteunen de resultaten van de kwantitatieve analyses. In Ambon drukten alle informanten, zowel moslims als christenen, hun steun uit voor het veroorzaken van schade, met name degenen die sterke herinneringen aan het gewelddadige verleden hebben en persoonlijke ervaringen met geweld hebben gehad. De meeste van hen bevestigen ze dat ze deze steunbetuiging zien als een daad van zelfverdediging of verdediging van de belangen van de groep. De data-triangulatie bevestigt dat zowel moslims als christenen openbare kritiek en demonstraties meer ondersteunen dan het berokkenen van schade aan personen en goederen.

Wat betreft de relatie tussen religieuze en etnische zelfdefinitie en steun voor geweld, de eerste verklarende vraag, blijkt dat in de meeste etnisch-religieuze groepen, Sundanese moslims en Javaanse christenen uitgezonderd, het berokkenen van schade meer kans heeft om gesteund te worden dan onder Javaanse moslims. De meeste steun wordt gegeven door Madurese moslims en Ambonese christenen. Inzake demonstraties, vertonen moslims van niet-Javaanse afkomst meer steun voor demonstraties, terwijl de christelijke etnische groepen minder ondersteunend zijn dan de Javaanse Moslims.

De tweede verklarende vraag is beantwoord door het testen van de relatie tussen de etnisch-religieuze identificatie en steun voor intergroepsgeweld. Dit onderzoek stelt vast dat de steun van de respondenten voor het berokkenen van schade wordt beïnvloed door het aantal vrienden binnen de eigen religie. In tegenstelling tot onze verwachting, laten degenen die veel vrienden van dezelfde religie hebben minder steun zien voor het veroorzaken van schade. Inzake steun voor demonstraties, vond ik dat deelname aan collectieve rituelen en lidmaatschap van religieuze organisatie sterk bepalend zijn. Hoe actiever de mensen aan de collectieve rituelen deelnemen,

hoe meer ze demonstraties steunen. Bovendien geven degenen die lid zijn van religieuze organisaties meer steun voor demonstraties dan niet-leden.

Individuele determinanten, zoals opleiding en beroep van ouders of geslacht van de respondenten, beïnvloeden de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en steun voor geweld niet aanzienlijk. De resultaten zijn voor alle etnische en religieuze groepen vergelijkbaar zowel wat steun voor het veroorzaken schade als steun voor demonstraties betreft. De respondenten van wie de ouders boeren zijn, tonen meer bereidheid tot steun dan respondenten van wie de ouders als managers, bedienden, handelaren, fabrieksarbeiders of handarbeiders werken. Respondenten met relatief hogere inkomens tonen meer steun dan mensen met lagere inkomens. In het algemeen tonen de bevindingen aan dat steun voor geweld slechts gedeeltelijk kan worden verklaard door de sociaal-economische status van de respondenten. Etnisch-religieuze identificatie blijft een sterke determinant nadat met deze individuele kenmerken rekening werd gehouden.

De derde onderzoeksvraag werd beantwoord door het testen van de invloed van de intermediaire variabelen op de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en steun voor geweld. Deze variabelen werden afgeleid uit diverse theorieën, en bestonden uit gepercipieerde groepsdreiging, saillantie van identiteit, intergroepscontact, herinnering aan geweld, gepercipieerde discriminatie, religiositeit (bestaande uit houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit, religiocentrisme en fundamentalisme), nationalisme en wantrouwen. Wat steun voor schade betreft, vonden we dat gepercipieerde groepsdreiging, religiocentrisme (meer specifiek positieve *in-group* attitudes), pluralisme en nationalistische houding van invloed zijn op de relatie. Hoe meer mensen zich bedreigd voelen en hoe positiever de houding ten opzichte van de *in-group* is, des te groter de kans dat ze het berokkenen van schade aan personen en goederen steunen. In tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen tonen mensen met een pluralistische religieuze visie meer steun voor het aanbrengen van schade. Steun voor schade is ook sterker wanneer het nationalisme relatief laag is. Wat de steun voor demonstraties betreft, zijn de relevante intermediaire determinanten saillantie van etnische identiteit en acceptatie van hermeneutische interpretaties van de Heilige schrift. Hoe meer saillantie van etnische identiteit de respondenten accepteren en hoe meer ze het erover eens zijn dat de Heilige Schrift (respectievelijk koran en bijbel) een hermeneutische interpretatie nodig heeft (in tegenstelling tot fundamentalisme), hoe meer ze demonstraties steunen.

Over het algemeen ondersteunen de bevindingen de belangrijkste theorieën en voegen ze inzichten toe aan de bestaande theorieën die we in deze studie gebruikten. De studie bewijst het gelijk van de sociale identiteitstheorie die stelt dat mensen altijd proberen een positieve sociale identiteit te ontwikkelen door zich met de positieve kenmerken van de *in-group* te identificeren, en zich van de *out-groups* te onderscheiden (Tajfel, 1978; 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Phinney and Ong,

2007). Er bestaat een sterkere identificatie met religie dan met etniciteit. Wanneer we de onderzochte groepen vergelijken, tonen moslims echter een grotere etnisch-religieuze identificatie dan christenen. Deze bevindingen bieden een bevestiging van eerdere studies in Indonesië die de groei van religieuze identificatie, vooral onder moslims, sinds de jaren 1990 laten zien (van Bruinessen, 2003; Sidel, 2006; Heffner, 2011).

De bevindingen van de gepercipieerde groepsdreiging valideren de etnische groep conflict theorie waarin dreiging de sterkste determinant is voor schadelijke en exclusionaire attitudes ten opzichte van *out-groups* (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Coenders et al., 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2011). Dit toont aan dat deze theorie, die in staat is gebleken om exclusionaire attitudes in westerse landen te verklaren, ook van toepassing is op de Indonesische samenleving. In deze studie is evenwel weinig aandacht besteed aan het contextuele niveau dat deel ook deel uitmaakt van voornoemde theorie en de invloed van daadwerkelijke competitie, migratie en relatieve groepsomvang (meerderheids- versus minderheidsstatus) in rekening brengt.

De uitkomsten bewijzen ook de verwachtingen betreffende de rol van religiocentrisme (Sterkens en Anthony, 2008). Een positieve evaluatie van de religieuze *in-group* heeft te maken met groepsidentificatie, en kan gepaard kan met een denigrerende houding ten opzichte van *out-groups*. Echter, wat betreft de religieuze houding ten opzichte van pluraliteit, zijn onze bevindingen in tegenspraak met eerdere studies. Terwijl deze studies hebben aangetoond dat het pluralisme vooroordelen en vijandigheid jegens *out-groups* vermindert (Sterkens, 2001; Anthony et al., 2015), toont deze studie aan dat mensen die tot een religieuze groep behoren en een pluralistische religieuze visie hebben, wel degelijk geweld kunnen ondersteunen. Blijkbaar kan pluralisme evenzeer een indicator zijn voor religieuze identificatie als monisme.

Onze bevindingen komen overeen met stellingen betreffende nationalistische houdingen (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001), die suggereren dat toenemende etnisch-religieuze identificatie nationalisme vermindert (waarbij nationalisme wordt gezien als inzet voor de nationale Indonesische staat en daarmee verzet impliceert tegen oproepen tot meer regionale autonomie). Lagere niveaus van nationalisme leiden in ons onderzoek tot meer steun voor geweld. Men dient zich daarbij te realiseren dat het geweld in onze onderzoekscontext vooral gerelateerd is aan de strijd voor emancipatie van specifieke etnisch-religieuze groepen en de ondersteuning van regionale (lokale) belangen. De bevindingen ondersteunen daarom de theoretische stelling dat de minder nationalisme heeft bijgedragen aan het uitbreken van etnisch-religieus geweld (Bertrand, 2004).

Op het lagere niveau van steun voor intergroepsgeweld, dat wil zeggen steun voor protesten en demonstraties, bleken etnische saillantie en hermeneutische

interpretatie relevante intermediaire bepalende variabelen te zijn. Het onderzoek bevestigt de uitkomsten van eerdere studies die een significantie correlatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en etnische saillantie laten zien: hoe groter de saillantie van etnische identiteit, hoe hoger de kans op steun voor geweld. Bovendien verhoogt de acceptatie van hermeneutische interpretaties van de tekstuele bronnen van religieuze tradities ook steun voor geweld. Deze vaststelling staat haaks op een eerdere studie, die suggereert dat alleen fundamentalistische interpretaties van religieuze teksten steun voor geweld wekken (Williamson et al., 2010).

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This study employs a cross-cultural comparative approach to analyse the support for violence among Muslim and Christian respondents from different ethnic groups in two research areas. One of these areas, Ambon, experiences frequent eruptions of inter-group violence, while the other, Yogyakarta, is relatively peaceful. In Ambon, the social border between Muslims and Christians clearly defines their living space and their social activity. Both groups have established boundaries, and seldom interact across the demarcation of religious belonging. Their ethno-religious identification is so strong that tensions between Muslims and Christians have repeatedly led to intergroup violence. In contrast, the relationship between ethno-religious groups in Yogyakarta is relatively peaceful; while disputes have occurred occasionally, they have not led to massive intergroup violence. What is the role of ethno-religious identifications in the support for violence in Indonesia? This project was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).

USD Press

Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

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for Scientific Research

ISBN 978-602-0830-06-3